Global Voices » Victoria Robertson

The Future of a Community Library in Puerto Rico is Threatened

Victoria Robertson — Sun, 21 Apr 2013 23:24:24 +0000

The San Juan Community Library is a rarity in Puerto Rico. The island lacks a culture of public and community libraries, as most are specialized catering to the needs of members of parent institutions such as universities.

Of the existing libraries that serve the general public, few allow users to borrow books. The importance of the San Juan Community Library is underscored by the almost complete lack of public discourse from the government on the subject of cultural policies, and even less about how lending libraries could form the cornerstone of a solid strategy for cultural development within the country.

San Juan Community Library. Photo taken form its Facebook page.

The San Juan Community Library is a local institution that started out with two folding tables and a couple of chairs. It gradually grew into a full-fledged library with more than 26,000 books on a variety of topics, offering services such as free Internet access (including Wi-Fi), programs for young children, teenagers and adults, and borrowing privileges for both print and e-books. The library maintains close ties to its users through its Facebook page, and a good deal of its offering depends on private donations and volunteers. At a time when there is economic hardship in Puerto Rico, a place that can provide these kinds of resources to the public is without a doubt of vital importance.

That is why many were saddened to discover, ironically in the middle of Library week [es], that this community library would be closed until further notice because it lacked sufficient funds to repair its roof. The situation is dire, as the whole roof has to be removed, and any rainfall could damage both the collection of books and the electronic equipment.

The library is exploring possible sources of financial assistance in order to meet immediate needs and protect its collection. Meanwhile, donations are being accepted through its website here.

Venezuela: Post-Election Suspicion and Uncertainty Spark Violence

Victoria Robertson — Sun, 21 Apr 2013 16:01:36 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages except where indicated.]

Public discussion [en] about the results of the elections held on April 14 continue in the streets and on the Internet.

A number of clashes have occurred in some Venezuelan cities, and social networks are overflowing with accusations and angry messages on both sides of the line that, now more than ever, separates followers of Chavismo from opponents of the government. The latter are demanding [en] a recount now that Nicolás Maduro has been declared president-elect of the Republic.

As a lead-up to the confrontations, several protests took place outside the different headquarters of the National Electoral Council (CNE in Spanish), which can be seen in the photographs shared by Carlos Bauza on Facebook. He also published images from Caracas of tire burning and pot banging [en] by the opposition while the director of the CNE, Tibisay Lucena, addressed the country through the public media.

CNE Valencia, 15/04/13. Photo by Flickr user Marco Hernández, under Creative Commons license (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Many pictures taken in prior years of soldiers throwing out paper ballots were also shared on the Internet in order to prove the irregularities being denounced. The photographs made a big impact online, which provoked heated arguments and the arrest [en] of one of the users who published the “destabilizing” photos.

Meanwhile, Henrique Capriles is accused of inciting the violence that occurred in various parts of the country. Pedro Carreño (@PedroCarreno_e), a member of the National Assembly and leader of the parliamentary faction of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), wrote on Twitter:

@PedroCarreno_e: Eso de responsabilizar a CAPriles es pura paja. Donde esta el ministerio publico para que lo mande a detener y que asuma su responsabilidad

@PedroCarreno_e: This holding CAPriles responsible is a complete lie. Where is the Public Prosecutor so an arrest warrant can be issued and he can take responsibility

These accusations are reflected in the tweets of the followers of Chavismo, who see Capriles as the intellectual author of the confrontations and the victims of the alleged attacks on diagnostic centers (CDI). Sonia Quishpe (@SoniaQuishpe) echoed these accusations:

@SoniaQuishpe: @hcapriles ya van 12 CDI quemados, 2 casas del PSUV, carros, 2 dirigentes del PSUV muertos q mas quieres fascista? Ese era el camino?”

@SoniaQuishpe: @hcapriles 12 CDI have been burned, 2 PSUV offices, cars, 2 directors of the PSUV dead what more do you want fascist? Was this the way?”

At the same time user @joseanton1990 responded:

@joseanton1990: Sí alguien tiene las fotos de los 20 CDI quemados q las muestre y con gente de la oposición generando el incendio más rápido para q las suba

@joseanton1990: If anyone has photos of the 20 burned CDI they should show them with people from the opposition starting the fire uploading them as soon as possible

In the following days, however, a few photographs of the diagnostic centers were shared to refute attack claims.

For his part, Héctor Ruribarri published a video on his Facebook channel in which he maintains that pro-government groups ”attacked a peaceful demonstration in the CNE headquarters in Maracaibo.”

User Illdiego published a video on YouTube in which he points out that groups belonging to the Communist Party of Venezuela and the Communist Youth Party “recovered” one of the headquarters of the National Electoral Council, which had been “taken by Caprilistas”.

The opposition also published videos and photos with which they accuse police and armed groups who support the government of using firearms against opposition supporters.

As the hours pass, tension is increasing and, although there is an effort to maintain calm in the streets, order is being eroded. In social networks, arguments grow more intense, confusing, and widespread. Nevertheless, online space has fostered some sober reflection that opens the door to new dialogue, standing in contrast to physical attacks and confrontations. The outcome still remains open and ambiguous.

Urban Art Festival Highlights Neighborhood in Puerto Rico

Victoria Robertson — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 14:21:23 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages unless otherwise noted.]

The fourth annual urban art festival known as Santurce es Ley (Santurce is Law), an event during which visual, performance, and musical artists come together to create street art in the midst of the Santurce neighborhood, was held during the weekend of April 5-7.

Over the last several decades, what was once among the most important urban centers in Puerto Rico—a bustling cultural and commercial hub—gradually deteriorated into one of the most run-down neighbourhoods in the capital city of San Juan. Empty buildings abound; sidewalks are in disrepair; and even a cursory glance reveals profound social inequality.

In recent years, efforts have been made to revitalize Santurce, perhaps the most well known being the arteSanturce alliance of cultural institutions. But these efforts, which include everything from community-wide outdoor activities to commercial, cultural, and real estate projects are for the most part centered on one of Santurce's main arteries, Ponce de León Avenue. Moreover, the negative side of these developments has been gentrification, and the relocation and elimination of entire communities.

Santurce es Ley is the brainchild of artist Alexis Busquet [en]. This year's focal point was Calle Cerra (Cerra Street), a street that played a pivotal role in the history of Puerto Rico's music industry. Today Calle Cerra is home to many members of the Dominican community, who are very marginalized in the country. During the weekend-long event, it became Puerto Rico's mecca for murals. Below are some of the pictures I took as I walked along the Calle Cerra in the days following the festival.

Artistic installation by Colectivo Camiseta (La CoCa).

The topic of agriculture echoed throughout this year's celebration of Santurce es Ley.

An urban farm on Calle Cerra.

A mural in the urban farm created for this year's festival.

In addition to an eye-catching mural, this abandoned space now boasts a plant nursery, something I had not expected to find.

This mural, one of the urban exhibit's most impressive, seems to be a metaphor for Puerto Rican capitalism. By Colectivo Basta.

Another interesting mural on Calle Cerra.

Detail of the facade of a building with the symbol of Santurce. (Historically, Santurce was known as San Mateo de Cangrejos, the Spanish word for crabs.)

Despite the favourable reception of the Santurce art festival, it also received critiques. One of the strongest arguments was that people who live in the area do not participate in the artistic activities and are not represented, the majority being immigrants from the Dominican Republic. Daniel Nina, writing in El Post Antillano, says the following:

Tendríamos que pensar esta convocatoria de Santurce es Ley como un proceso a democratizar. Me pregunto, para la quinta edición en el 2014, ¿cuántos de los artistas serán dominicanos, de ahí mismo, de la comunidad de la pobreza y la desesperanza? A los organizadores les pedimos que tomen nota. Inventen un Santurce es Ley que sea representativo de la diversidad cultural de la región, y no exclusivo de unos afortunados que por razón de ser intocables, invaden comunidades a su predilección.

We should think about Santurce es Ley as an opportunity for greater democratization. I wonder about the fifth edition in 2014; how many of the artists will be Dominican, from right there, from a community of poverty and despair? We ask that the organizers take note. Put together a Santurce es Ley that is representative of the cultural diversity of the region and not just of the fortunate few who, because they are considered beyond reproach, take over communities at will.

The organizers responded to the criticism on Facebook. The gauntlet has been thrown, but we will have to wait until next year's festival to see whether the organizers are willing to take it up. You can see more photographs of the murals painted during the festival here and here.

All photos were taken by the author.

Venezuela's Post-election Tension Escalates

Victoria Robertson — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 18:07:31 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages except where noted.]

The election results [en] following the death of Hugo Chávez, in which Nicolás Maduro and Henrique Capriles Radonski measured the support of their followers, is at the heart of mounting tension.

Just as Maduro was being declared the new President of the Republic, calls for public protests and an election recount were multiplying across social networks. In a matter of hours, photos of demonstrations, tweets in support of both candidates, and complaints about voting irregularities dominated Twitter's trending topics in Venezuela. The journalist Inti Acevedo (@inti) commented:

@inti: La situación en Venezuela tiende a ponerse más compleja con las horas, muchísimos rumores (no confirmados) de mil situaciones distintas.

@inti: The situation in Venezuela is getting more complicated by the hour, many rumours (unconfirmed) of a thousand different incidents.

Meanwhile, from Caracas, Liliana Ochoa (@liliob) shared a picture that shows deployment of military troops.

@liliob: La autopista fco fajardo esta asi justo ahora. Foto por @andreavmm18 pic.twitter.com/DnXydf67wf”

@liliob: The fco highway (Francisco Fajardo) looks like this right now. Photo by @andreavmm18 pic.twitter.com/DnXydf67wf”

Photo from @andreavmm18, shared on Twitter by @liliob

At the same time in Valencia, Anaÿs La Riva uploaded this photo in her Facebook profile:

Protest in Valencia. Photo shared by Anaÿs La Riva in her Facebook profile

A little while later, Hugo Londoño (@huguito) reported from his Twitter account:

@huguito: En Venezuela, en este momento el CNE [Consejo Nacional Electoral] proclama a Maduro como presidente, hay disturbios y protestas en centro CNE del país, suenan cacerolas

@huguito: In Venezuela, at this very moment the CNE [National Electoral Council] has declared Maduro president; there are demonstrations and protests in the country's CNE headquarters, the banging of pots

Tomás Fernández (@Tomasnomas29) shared several reports of violence in the morning and throughout the day in the city of Mérida, in the western part of the country, after the arrival of groups known as “Tupamaros”:

@Tomasnomas29: AUXILIOOO en el liceo libertador PORFAVOR!! Difundanlo! Los tupamaros no dejan hacer el conteo! Que esto llegue a toda Venezuela! DIFUNDE

@Tomasnomas29: HEEELP us in the liceo (high school) libertador PLEASE!! Please spread! The Tupamaros are preventing a ballot count! Get the word out across Venezuela! SPREAD IT

Sebastiana Barráez (@SebastianaB) also reported:

@SebastianaB: En Tachira hay tanquetas en la calle, en Merida los Tupamaros salieron a amedrentar, en Barinas hay protestas en la calle

@SebastianaB: In Tachira there are armoured vehicles in the street; in Merida the Tupamaros are going around intimidating; in Barinas there are protests in the street

In the coming hours, more calls to action and street protests are expected from both sides. The hashtags citizens are using to inform and comment can be seen in Venezuela's trending topics on Twitter: #CaprilesGanóTibisayMintió; #ElPuebloHablóMaduroGanó; #NicolásElDerrotadoEresTú; #CacerolazoALas8; #ConteoVotoPorVotoYA; y Mañana al CNE.

This post was written with help from Jessica Carrillo Mazzali.

Racism Remarks in the NYT Land Cuban Intellectual in Trouble

Victoria Robertson — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 14:43:35 +0000

[All links are to Spanish-language pages except where otherwise indicated.]

Cuba's intellectual circles are buzzing over an incident that occurred a little more than a week ago when author and intellectual Roberto Zurbano denounced racism in Cuba in the opinion section of The New York Times [en]; his words apparently cost him his position as editor of the publishing house Casa de las Américas.

According to the article, Zurbano believes that:

el sector privado goza ahora en Cuba de cierto grado de liberalización económica, pero los negros no estamos en posición ventajosa para aprovecharnos de ello. Heredamos más de tres siglos de esclavitud durante la era colonial española.

The private sector in Cuba now enjoys a certain degree of economic liberation, but blacks are not well positioned to take advantage of it. We inherited more than three centuries of slavery during the Spanish colonial era.

However, the most controversial element was, in fact, the headline The New York Times gave to the article: “For Blacks in Cuba, the Revolution Hasn't Begun.”

In a post published on the blog of the Cuban singer-songwriter Silvio Rodríguez, Guillermo Rodríguez Rivera commented:

La Revolución Cubana no solo inició la lucha contra el racismo y la discriminación sino que puede decirse que nunca esa lucha había sido tan a fondo como en ese momento de nuestra historia.

The Cuban Revolution not only launched the struggle against racism and discrimination, it can be said that never has the struggle been as far-reaching as it was in this period of our history.

The controversy, which opened up public debate on racial discrimination on the island, soon moved away from the issue of racism and the truth or fallacy of the arguments, and

Roberto Zurbano. Photo: Jorge Luis Baños (Reproduced with the author's permission)

focused instead on what blogger Rogelio Díaz Moreno called the ”administrative and professional retaliation against a person whose work stems precisely from his ability to think.”

In a post dedicated to Beyoncé's visit to Havana, Carlos Manuel Álvarez, a journalism student, pointed out:

La semana pasada, un tanto más a la sombra, algún decisor liberó –esto es un eufemismo- a Roberto Zurbano de su cargo de Director del Fondo Editorial de Casa de las Américas, pues el New York Times publicó un artículo suyo sobre el racismo en Cuba. El artículo yerra en más de un punto, pero a Zurbano le asiste ese derecho.

Last week, with slightly less fanfare, an unknown ‘decider’ relieved—this is a euphemism—Roberto Zurbano of his duties as editor of the Casa de las Americas publishing house, after the New York Times published an article of his on racism in Cuba. Zurbano's article erred on more than one point, but that is his right.

In a post published on the blog Observatorio Crítico, the Cuban researcher and blogger Rosa Muñoz Kiel, based in Germany, commented:

Hace apenas dos días le comenté a un amigo en Facebook que “me gustaría, por la salud del debate, que Zurbano no sea removido de su puesto por atreverse a decir algo o dejar que NYT dijera algo que no ha gustado a muchos, es el tipo de consecuencias que estamos acostumbrados a ver, pero que no considero sanas, ojalá esta vez me equivoque y no suceda.

Barely two days ago, I commented to a friend on Facebook that “I would like, in the interest of healthy debate, for Zurbano not to be removed from his job for having dared to say something or for letting the NYT say something that a lot of people didn't like; these are the kinds of consequences we are used to seeing, but ones I do not consider healthy, hopefully this time I will be proven wrong and it won't happen.”

For his part, Rogelio Díaz Moreno elaborated on his position in his post entitled “The right to be wrong, is that also racist?:”

Se sabe lo ilustrativo que resultan las tomas de posición, y ahora están por verse unas cuantas. Ya sabemos que muchos intelectuales critican a Zurbano y ejercen con ello su propio y muy respetable derecho pero, ¿defenderán el principio del debate crítico constructivo, sin censuras humillantes ni represalias inicuas? ¿Nos percatamos todos, verdaderamente, cómo están en juego principios importantes, como el derecho de sostener la lucha contra las lacras de las discriminaciones; de trabajar por este fin ya sea de manera autónoma o integrada, y azuzar a las instituciones estatales cuando estas flaqueen en el cumplimiento de este deber?

Taking a position is indicative of many things, and we are only going to see more of that kind of thing. We already know that many intellectuals are critical of Zurbano and they have every right to be, but will they also defend the principle of constructive criticism without humiliating rebukes or unfair reprisals? Do we all truly appreciate that important principles are at stake, like the right to continue the fight against the scourge of discrimination, to work towards that end either independently or in concert with others, and to put pressure on government bodies when they fall short of their duty in this respect?

The Regional Network of Afrodescendants in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuban Chapter (ARAC), clearly stated its position [en] of strong support of ”free expression of ideas for all of its activists, as part of the fundamental liberty of expression in our society as a whole.”

Moreover it declared its opposition to “any institutional or individual process or method, of an obstructive or repressive character, against any participant involved in such controversies that has personally elected to express his or her opinion or reasoning.”

Peru: NO Vote Straddles Victory and Defeat in Lima's Recall Election

Victoria Robertson — Sat, 23 Mar 2013 23:17:19 +0000

[All links are to Spanish-language pages except where noted.]

According to exit polling, the preliminary results [en] of the March 17 recall election [en] gave supporters of Mayoress Susana Villarán a narrow victory. However, pollsters soon began to offer up the first concrete figures, performing a quick count of actual ballots yet to be processed. It didn't take long for the NO crowd to feel the first drops of rain on their parade.

With the outcome now fully and officially tallied, the trend continues: 20 councillors will be recalled, which means complementary elections will have to be held next November in order to fill their seats. In the meantime, interim councillors will assume their responsibilities. But this process could be delayed in the event of any challenge to the official results of the recall vote.

Initial media gloating soon dwindled, and even now social networks are ahead of the mainstream in analyzing and elucidating the reasons why Lima's electorate voted the way it did. The answer is hard to find, perhaps because the outcome is the product of a number of factors, such as the confluence of feelings and decisions among different social groups and circumstantial elements like the particular format of the ballot—there may even have been some lassitude on the part of voters faced with having to tick off the names of 40 different candidates.

Lima City Hall. Photo by Flickr user CHIMI FOTOS, under license by Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Moreover there is no getting around the potential repercussions of former Prime Minister Pedro Pablo Kuzczynski's announcement that he would vote NO to recalling Mayoress Villarán but would vote YES with respect to some councillors at Lima's city hall whom he considers anti-mining.

The economist Silvio Rendón speculates, on the Facebook page Gran Combo Club, on how what he calls a cross-over effect actually came about. As an example, he cites the vote in Lima's Comas district:

En Comas, por ejemplo, gana el SI en alcaldesa y todos los regidores, pero el margen es mucho menor en alcaldesa. A partir de los regidores de izquierda aumenta sustancialmente el número de votos en blanco, de manera que el margen por el que gana en SI en regidores de izquierda aumenta.
[...]
En suma, el voto en blanco en regidores en este distrito perjudica a los de LA izquierda y beneficia a los de LA derecha. A pesar de que gana el SI en todo, las diferencias son mayores en regidores de LA izquierda que en los de LA derecha y en alcaldesa.
(Aquí “izquierda” y “derecha” más que posición ideológica significan posición en la cédula).

In Comas, for example, the YES vote won for the Mayoress and all the councillors, but the margin was much lower for the Mayoress. For councillors on the Left, the number of blank ballots increases substantially, such that the margin for the YES vote among councillors on the Left also increased.
[...]
To sum up, blank ballots for councillors in this district damaged those on the left and benefited those on the right. Despite the fact that the YES won overall, the difference was greater for councillors on the left than those on the right and for the Mayoress. (Here the terms “right” and “left” have less to do with ideological orientation than their physical location on the ballot.)

Many attribute the vote against the councillors of Fuerza Social, Mayoress Villarán's political party, to the support of Lourdes Flores, leader of the Christian People's Party (PPC) [en]. In fact her support was one of the decisive factors in overturning the recall of the Mayoress, but is there a deeper political calculation behind the endorsement?

Journalist Isabel Guerra comments on her Facebook page:

no crean que estoy contenta. Me gustaría ver en mi país una izquierda pensante, genuinamente progresista, formadora de conciencias políticas, y también una derecha semillero de intelectuales/teóricos de peso, y que puedan todos generar planteamientos sólidos, aportar a su país cada uno desde su trinchera, que puedan debatir una tendencia con la otra y contrapesarse. Pero no, no tenemos ni uno ni lo otro. Lo que veo es un montón de oportunistas clientelistas (de uno u otro signo) vendiéndose al mejor postor y tratando de comprar las conciencias de los potenciales votantes.

Don't assume I am pleased. I would like to see a thoughtful Left in my country, genuinely progressive, that fosters political awareness as well as a Right that is the breeding ground for commanding intellectuals/theorists, who could all generate solid approaches, bringing their experience in the trenches to bear for their country, who could debate positions and balance each other out. But no, we have neither. What I see is a bunch of opportunists (of one ilk or another) selling themselves to the highest bidder and trying to buy the will of potential voters.

Isabel continues:

¿Es de sorprender que el ciudadano de a pie no ya no confíe para nada en nuestra(s) clase(s) política(s)? Menos mal que mi Perú está empezando a despertar y a darse cuenta de que nos merecemos algo mejor que esto, que los caudillismos no pueden conducir a nada bueno a la larga. La educación jugará un rol muy importante para nuestro progreso como país, al igual que la creciente conciencia de que podemos expresar nuestra voluntad con nuestros votos y fiscalizar de distintas formas a nuestras autoridades…

Is it surprising that the ordinary citizen no longer trusts our political class(es)? It is a good thing my Peru is starting to wake up and realize that we deserve better than this, that in the long run strongman politics lead to no good. Education will play a very important role in the future of our country, just as the growing awareness that we an express our will through our votes and monitor the authorities in different ways…

Another hot topic is the participation of the political activist and publicist Luis Favre (Argentine-born Felipe Belisario Wermus now living in Brazil). His efforts on behalf of the NO campaign effectively saved the Mayoress, but apparently he did not take into account the councillors. In fact his campaign was orchestrated around the involvement of well-known personalities and did not include a few councillors until late in the game. The slogan “40 times NO” that urged a NO vote for all councillors apparently was not welcomed by NO supporters, something that definitely influenced the recall of almost all councillors.

Facebook user Inmovil viajero has already made an overall—if preliminary—assessment of what this electoral process has wrought and comments:

Estoy en duda, no si si es casualidad, sabiduria popular, conciencia colectiva o que, pero me quedan claro algunos puntos:

1. el voto fue para respaldar la institucionalidad no a SV [Susana Villarán],
2. hay un castigo claro a la gestion de SV y los pagantes han sido sus regidores,
3. LCL [Luis Castañeda], el alcalde anterior], ha perdido piso y posibilidades futuras, la revocatoria a su hijo es una llamada de atención y su regreso al cargo de Alcalde una incertidumbre,
4. el [partido político] APRA calculó mal, y es un claro derrotado,
5. a la gente si le importa el comportamiento definido como “anti-todo”, hay un castigo hacia Patria Roja [Partido Comunista del Perú], Sutep [sindicato de maestros], TyL [Tierra y Libertad] y demas; no están siendo respaldados, sea por miedo o por conviccion,
6. la izquiera en general a salido maltratada, han perdido piso y claramente no se los ve como gestores eficientes ni canalizadores de los ideales del “pueblo”,
7. el PPC [Partido Popular Cristiano] ha salido fortalecido, como partido democratico, pero no le alcanzará para ganar una presidencial, no tienen ese arraigo y no tienen ese efecto,
8. igual la izquierda los traicionará llegado el momento,
9. Keiko [Fujimori] jugó bien al dejar libre a sus electores, no se metio en este pleito, creo que la tuvo mas clara,
10. la felicidad y soberbia inicial dieron paso al desconcierto y luego a la agresividad moralistoide tan recurrente en el grupo del NO; nuevamente los votantes son unos ineptos, brutos y desconectados; nuevamente los únicos inteligentes son los q pertenecen a esa opción, me queda dibujado de manera diáfana que no les está llegando el mensaje, no han entendido lo que les ha pasado.

I have my doubts; I don't know whether it is luck, popular wisdom, collective consciousness or what, but a few things are clear to me.

1. the vote was to endorse institutions, not SV [Susana Villarán];
2. there is a clear indictment of SV's management and the price was paid by her councillors;
3. LCL [Luis Castañeda [en], the former mayor], has lost ground and future capital, the recall of his son is a wake-up call, and his return to the position of mayor is in doubt;
4. the [political party] [en] APRA miscalculated badly; and were routed;
5. people do care about behaviour defined as ‘anti-everything', there is a penalty for Patria Roja [Partido Comunista del Perú] [en], the teachers’ union Sutep [sindicato de maestros], the leftist Land and Freedom party [Tierra y Libertad], and others; they are not getting support, whether through fear or conviction;
6. the Left in general took a beating, they have lost ground and clearly they are not perceived as efficient managers nor conveyors of the ideals of the ‘people';
7. the PPC [Partido Popular Cristiano] [en] has come out stronger, as a democratic party, but they won't win the presidential election, neither their support nor their message is deep-rooted enough,
8. and the Left might just betray them if the occasion arises;
9. Keiko [Fujimori] [en] played well, leaving the electors free to choose, she didn't get her hands dirty, I think she understood the game;
10. initial satisfaction and smugness gave way to confusion and then to aggressive moralizing so common among NO supporters; all of a sudden voters are inept, brutish, disconnected; all of a sudden the only smart people are those who supported that choice, it is obvious to me that the message is not getting through, they have not understood what happened to them.

Post published in Globalizado, Juan Arellano's blog.

The Curious Case of Hugo Chávez and Peru

Victoria Robertson — Tue, 12 Mar 2013 14:04:45 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages unless otherwise noted.]

As we all know, Hugo Chávez [en], president of Venezuela, died [en] on March 5. But what we are perhaps less familiar with is the relationship between Chávez and Peru. It began in 1974 when Chávez arrived in the country [en] as a young cadet and part of the Venezuelan military delegation come to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Ayacucho [en], which secured the independence of Peru. It is likely that this event inspired Chavez's admiration for General Juan Velasco Alvarado [en], the erstwhile President of Peru and architect of the so-called Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.

Later, in 1992, President Fujimori gave asylum to 93 members of the Venezuelan military, followers of Chávez, who had mounted a failed coup [en] against Carlos Andrés Pérez [en].

The next noteworthy event in this relationship took place in 2000, when it was rumoured [en] that the Chávez regime (he was now president) had provided protection to the fugitive Vladimiro Montesinos [en], a close advisor to then Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori [en].

Hugo Chávez also had a cameo in the Peruvian presidential elections of 2006 [en], where his support [en] for the candidate Ollanta Humala was the country's worst-kept secret. Humala lost the campaign; so when he ran again and won the elections of 2011 [en], he avoided overt ties to Chávez. In 2006, Casas del Alba were established in Peru. Officially an organization offering humanitarian assistance, it has nevertheless been investigated on several occasions because of accusations that it functions as a front for interference and meddling by proponents of “chavismo”.

Hugo Chávez and Ollanta Humala outside the Miraflores palace in Venezuela. Photo shared by Flickr user chavezcandanga, under license by Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Another incident that provoked speculation occurred when cans of fish turned up bearing labels with photos of Humala and Chávez, apparently as part of an aid package sent to the victims of the 2007 earthquake in Pisco [en]. But Chávez's interest in the victims was not confined to foodstuffs, he also donated 100 new homes in a housing project, christened Simon Bolivar, in the badly damaged town of Chincha, a fact that local residents contrasted with the scant support provided by the government of then President Alan García.

So it is understandable that reactions to the Venezuelan president during his tenure were more conflicting in Peru than other Latin-American countries. Most of the political class, except on the left, did not sympathize with his ideas. Neither was he a favourite in journalistic circles, with the same exceptions. But the response to his death in the blogosphere has been more moderate.

For example, Jorge Enrique Seoane Morla, of Metro Press & Photo, wonders what the future holds for those countries who were recipients of aid from the Chavista regime in Venezuela. He comments:

Equivocado o no pretendió, ser el aglutinador de una América Latina en torno a si mismo y a una “Revolución Bolivariana” en la cual los intelectuales e historiadores peruanos no creen ni aprueban. Es más, muchos, en el Perú, creen que Simón Bolívar fue nefasto para los intereses peruanos [...] El Perú de Ollanta Humala (y de Nadine [esposa de Humala]), felizmente que se distanció de Venezuela y la infiltración de las casas ALBA. Somos Libres.

Rightly or wrongly, he tried to bring Latin America together, binding it to him in a Bolivarian-style revolution that Peruvian intellectuals and historians neither believed in nor supported. Moreover, many in Peru think Simón Bolívar was detrimental to Peruvian interests [...] Happily, the Peru of Ollanta Humala (and his wife Nadine) distanced itself from Venezuela and meddling by the casas ALBA. We are free.

A while ago the blogger Luis Vigil republished an article by the historian Antonio Zapata, which focused on the relationship between Chávez and Fujimori:

Algunos medios de comunicación no querrán acordarse, pero Humala no es el aliado principal de Hugo Chávez en nuestra historia política, sino Fujimori. El manto autoritario hermana al Perú de la década de 1990 con la Venezuela de los últimos años.

Some of the media may not wish to remember that it is not Humala who is Hugo Chavez's main ally in our political history, but rather Fujimori. The corresponding mantle of Peruvian authoritarianism in the 1990s is Venezuela in the last few years.

Juan Acevedo, a well-known Peruvian cartoonist, posted a brief assessment of Chávez on his Facebook profile and concluded:

Cuando Chávez surgió, su discurso me pareció bienintencionado y simplón. Como él se entendía, era un soldado y como tal batalló e hizo bastante. [...] Chávez, como Fidel, Velasco, y otros, sin ser iguales entre sí, creyeron que podían cambiar la historia y se la jugaron a fondo desde sus tareas de gobierno. Cometieron errores, por supuesto, y gruesos, pero se la jugaron. Otros se acomodaron nomás y encima con eso se pretendieron novedosos. Ojalá no cejemos de apostar a que podemos cambiar lo que es injusto, lo que está mal, lo que es feo, lo que es falso…

When Chávez emerged, his rhetoric seemed to me to be simplistic but well-meaning. As he saw it, he was a soldier and as such fought well and hard. [...] Chávez, like Fidel, Velasco, and others, without being clones of one another, all thought they could change history, and they took risks in the way they governed. They made mistakes, of course, and big ones, but they took chances. Others simply adapted and on top of that claimed they were innovative. Let us not give up believing we can change what is unjust, what is wrong, what is bad, what is false…

Professor and journalist Hugo Neira recalls the Venezuela he knew over the years and writes quoting his own old articles:

lo que vi, nunca me gustó. La extrema descomposición social de uno de los países no solo entre los más ricos del continente sino con una renta petrolera envidiable. Vi la degradación de la vida venezolana en medio del esplendor de sus clases medias, ciegas a la pobreza de los cerritos y al desamparo de los pobres en medio de ricos que no merecían sus fortunas. Hasta que pasó lo que pasó. Llegó Chávez. “Llegó el llanero, no tan solitario, y se va a quedar un buen rato, tiene apenas 50 años, y va a revertir los dividendos petroleros hacia abajo. El método puede no convencernos, pero es lo que ocurre en países rentistas, Venezuela hoy y Argentina ayer, cuando el egoísmo social deja crecer una masa enorme de excluidos.

I never liked what I saw. The drastic breakdown of society in a country that was not just one of the richest on the continent but with enviable oil revenues. I saw the deterioration of life in Venezuela in the splendour of its middle classes, blind to the poverty in the nearby hills and to the helplessness of the poor in the midst of the wealthy who did not deserve their fortunes. Until what happened happened. Chávez arrived. “The lone ranger has come, only he isn't alone, and he is going to stay a while; he is barely 50, and he is going to make sure the oil dividends trickle down. We may not buy into his method, but that is what happens in rentier sates, Venezuela today and Argentina yesterday, when general selfishness allows a huge portion of people to live increasingly at the margins of society.

Neira continues:

No me gustó Chávez pero tampoco la Venezuela anterior a Chávez. Así de sencillo [...]: “A Chávez lo auparon para otra cosa, para que corrigiera una democracia corrupta, pero se ha inventado esa « democracia directa », cuando toda la que se vuelva directa deja de serlo. No le gusta la palabra compromiso ni mediación, es decir, no sólo lo que a Venezuela le falta sino la esencia de toda política. Chávez es un político de la antipolítica, como lo fuera Fujimori. Lo llamaron para curar la peste y aportó el cólera. Pero, aun así, nadie lleva por completo razón, ni la oposición ni las bases chavistas, cada una con su ulcerada y parcial verdad venezolana.

I didn't like Chávez, or Venezuela before Chávez. It's that simple [...] “Chávez was elevated for other reasons, so he would fix a corrupt democracy; instead he invented that ‘direct democracy', where in becoming so direct, it became less democratic. He doesn't like the words obligation or mediation, something not just missing from Venezuela but that is the essence of all politics. Chávez is an anti-politics politician, as was Fujimori. They called him in to cure the plague, and he brought cholera. Even so, nobody is 100 percent right, not the opposition, not the Chavista base, each one suffering their own Venezuelan ulcerating half-truth.

But beyond all these opinions, Peru was respectful in the wake of Chávez's death. The congress observed a minute of silence in his memory, although not without objection [en] by those who considered him a dictator. Outside the Venezuelan embassy in Lima, sympathizers arrived to express their condolences and pay hommage. The government, for its part, declared [en] three days of national mourning, and Presidente Humala led a delegation that travelled to Caracas [en] for the funeral [en] of President Chávez. Meanwhile, the mayor of the province of Chincha announced the construction of a bust in honour of the Venezuelan president.

Post originally published on the blog Globalizado by Juan Arellano.

Peru: Are Safety Concerns in Lima Justified or Overblown?

Victoria Robertson — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 10:34:46 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages except where otherwise indicated.]

In recent weeks, an increase in criminal activity in Lima and throughout the country in general has reignited the debate over public safety.

Two cases in particular, however, have captured media attention. The first was the armed robbery of a notary's office as a financial transaction was taking place; it left one man dead and another shot and wounded and resulted in the theft of 160,000 soles (about 62,000 U.S. dollars). Then there was the murder of a journalist [en] in the doorway of his house, in circumstances that remain unclear.

Initial anger was directed at the government for its apparent complacency and inaction in dealing with crime, an accusation Peru's Minister of the Interior denied [en] during the inaugural ceremony of 100 new patrol cars, where he “dismissed the notion that criminal activities were putting the country at risk.” At the same time, the Minister of Justice announced that life imprisonment for offenders was under consideration.

Photo of fokus Lima on Flickr, licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Not everyone is convinced, however. A columnist for the newspaper Correo comments, ”It is worth noting that the government reacted just yesterday, confidently announcing new measures that we can only hope will be effective.” And while reports affirm [en] that the crime rate is rising and public safety concerns are deepening, the Prime Minister indicated he did not believe it necessary to declare a state of emergency with respect to public safety, especially so as to avoid potential corruption in the hiring of police officers.

In fact, in a recent report by Peru's National Institute for Statistics and Informatics, the figures for the second half of last year show that from 2011 to 2012, the number of Peruvians who were victims of crime fell by 6.8% (from 45.1 to 38.3%) and that burglary and attempted burglary dropped from 19.9 to 16.8% (down 3.1%). In Lima, moreover, the percentage of victims of crime went from 48.4 to 39.9; as for homicides, Lima is far from being the city with the highest murder rate.

To that end, lawyer Martín Soto Florián reviews these statistics on his blog and mentions that “the trend points not to an increase in criminal activity and delinquency [...], but rather the opposite,” adding that:

hacerle el juego a la inseguridad ciudadana y meter miedo, es algo no solo peligroso sino contraproducente: podría terminar incentivando medidas populistas y poco técnicas.

Pandering to the public's fear of crime is not only dangerous but counterproductive: ultimately it can end up bringing about measures more populist than concrete.

So why do 86.7% of people surveyed say they feel unsafe [en]? It is likely due to that fact that armed robbery and assault, as in the cases cited above, have shown a slight increase. But this may also be because of exaggerated media coverage, the extent of which has prompted complaints by a group of reporters who claim that it has “turned misfortune into a daily chronicle of terror”.

A lot can be said about this tendency, but in an opinion piece on Pressenza's website, Gerardo Alcántara Salazar, a Ph.D. in social sciences, describes the relationship between criminal activity, tabloid journalism, and the vulnerability of the rule of law. He opines on a recent case that occurred in Lima:

Un canal de la televisión peruana presenta a unos veinte policías recibiendo homenaje por haber capturado a gringasho, el sicario más joven y sanguinario del Perú, [...] Gringasho, el feroz asesino en serie de diecisiete años de edad, aparece feliz en medio de los agasajados, como si en realidad el agasajado fuera él, terminando por adueñarse de los espacios estelares de televisión, prensa escrita y radial. Después de todo, la noticia es el. Desde que se tuvo noticia de él, cuando se lo recluyó y luego fugó, fue recapturado, encarcelado y nuevamente recapturado, él desplazó de la escena noticiosa a muchos acontecimientos importantes, pero menos proveedores de rating,

[...] Alabado por poseer una presunta inteligencia superior, Gringasho, ahora es una celebridad y las autoridades encargadas de su custodia deben cuidar de su integridad física, guarecerlo en celda segura, separado de la masa de adolescentes marginales, practicantes de asesinatos, de hurto agravados, violadores sexuales y autores de una variada conducta disfuncional. [...] Gringasho y Gringasha (NdE. Su pareja sentimental) son ahora celebridades en el Perú merced a la prensa roja.

A Peruvian television station broadcast some 20 police officers being commended for having captured “Gringasho”, the nickname of the youngest and deadliest hitman in Peru [...] Gringasho, a 17-year-old serial murderer, appears pleased to be among the honourees, as though he himself were being honoured, ultimately co-opting primetime television, radio, and print media. After all, he is the headline. Ever since media attention focused on him, his capture, his escape, and subsequent recapture and incarceration, he has displaced many stories that were just as newsworthy but less likely to garner ratings.

[...] Praised for his alleged superior intelligence, Gringasho is now a celebrity, and the authorities responsible for him must also ensure his safekeeping while in custody, which means a special cell, separate from the horde of marginalized adolescents who commit murder, assault, and rape and exhibit all sorts of dysfunctional behaviour. [...] Gringasho and Gringashaa (his girlfriend, Ed.) are now celebrities in Peru thanks to the tabloid press.

But this is only one facet of the complex problem of public safety; another is the consequence of privatizing police forces in Peru. This should not to be seen as a broadening of public safety services through the private sector; rather it is the private sector that demands exclusive service from the police.

Underreported but telling examples of this are the Sheraton hotel, which coordinated with police to provide private protection for its guests to and from the airport; the congressman who was detained and handcuffed by a police officer on a “private” beach south of Lima supposedly for taking photographs; and in the city of Chiclayo, the policeman working security detail at a brothel, who shot and killed a fellow officer after he showed up inebriated.

Journalist Juan Carlos Luján shares these news items on Facebook and comments:

Si quieres sentirte seguro y disuadir a los delincuentes, policías debes “alquilar”. El sistema los obliga a trabajar así en sus dias de franco. Por eso tenemos una policía reactiva, no es preventiva (ni en temas de tránsito) y para ellos la investigación dependerá de la buena voluntad o de algún incentivo para hacerlo.

If you want to feel safe and deter criminals, you should “hire” the police. As it is, the system forces them to work on their days off. This is why we have a reactionary police force, not a preventative one (not even in terms of traffic control), and for them any investigation depends on either goodwill or some form of incentive.

Meanwhile Omar Guerrero, commenting on one these stories, adds:

aqui se esta privatizando la seguridad, al estilo peruano, por motivaciones distintas que en usa. mientras los americanos contratan (aparte de hacer guerra con ejercitos privados) seguridad privada por la sofisticacion e impacto del crimen organizado ademas de que practicamente todos portan armas, aqui en peru es porque la policia no puede o no quiere ser mantenida eficientemente por el estado. el resultado es un salvese quien pueda o tenga dinero para hacerlo.

here we are privatizing public safety, Peruvian-style, for reasons different from the U.S. While Americans hire private security (besides waging war with private armies) because of the sophistication and impact of organized crime, in addition to which almost everyone carries a weapon, here in Peru it is because the police cannot or do not want to be managed efficiently by the state. The result is to save your own skin or pay someone to do it for you.

Fears about public safety, whether justified or not, are of concern to more than just Peruvians. A few weeks ago, the American embassy in Peru warned [en] its citizens of the potential threat of kidnapping in the Cusco area. Similarly, CNN broadcast a video of thieves robbing cars stopped in traffic in downtown Lima. For their part, a group of citizens is organizing a March for a safe Peru (@marchaseguridad), which is slated to take place on March 21.

Post originally published on the blog Globalizado.

Peru: Lima's Electors Caught Between Yes and No

Victoria Robertson — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 13:42:31 +0000

[Links are to Spanish-language pages, unless otherwise indicated.]

In Lima these days, it isn't just summer temperatures that are heating up the electorate, it's also the political climate. On March 17, the city will hold a recall referendum on municipal officials in the metropolitan area, and the YES and NO campaigns are all ready in full swing.

Photo by Flickr user Manuel (Imanol), licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY 2.0).

In this case, the NO and YES refer respectively to current Mayoress Susana Villarán [en] and whether she keeps or loses her job. The Mayoress is finishing up the second year of the four-year term for which she was elected, and without embarking on an assessment of her tenure, events such as the riots that broke out during the relocation of the La Parada market [en], which resulted in two deaths, and the flooding of the Via Parque Rimac construction site [en], have undermined her image among limeños, as the city's residents are known. Recent opinion polls put her approval rating at only 29%, and more worrisome still are the 60% of limeños who favour her recall.

Renatto, of the blog Perú Académico, commented on these numbers and the confusion between the YES and NO sides:

Un 8% de limeños aún no sabe cómo votará, y es ahí que comienza lo realmente asqueroso: mienten, engañan, confunden a la gente con tal de ganarse esos ocho puntos que quizá decidan la revocatoria. Nos quedamos cortos si hablamos de un 8% de limeños indecisos, pues si bien un contundente 60% votaría por revocar a Susana Villarán, estos no saben qué marcar: o el NO o el SÍ. Frases como “yo votaré para que NO siga Susana Villarán”, “Marquen el NO, para que no siga Susana en la alcaldía”, solo buscan confundir a la mayor cantidad posible de electores.

Some 8% of limeños still don't know how they are going to vote, and this is where it gets really sickening: there is lying, cheating, misleading of people in order to capture those eight points that could decide the recall. It is an understatement to say 8% of limeños are undecided: even if a resounding 60% would vote to recall Susana Villarán, they don't know whether to tick YES or NO. Lines like “I will vote NO more Susan Villarán” or “Tick NO, to make sure Susana leaves city hall” are just trying to confuse as many voters as possible.

Javier Diez Canseco, a leftwing congressman, points out that “the recall started the day Susana Villarán took office”, implying that this is not a response to bad municipal management, rather that it is the slogan of her political opponents, and that ex-president Alan García and former mayor of Lima Luis Castañeda are behind the recall.

It seems this premature decision to secure the recall of Mayoress Villarán could bear fruit. In his blog Percepciones y Realidades, Alfredo Torres, CEO of the market research firm Ipsos Perú, describes the paradox of the working classes fingering a social crusader who has tried to make a “Lima for all”:

Un aspecto de su gestión valorado por las élites es que Susana Villarán se ha atrevido a enfrentar el desorden del tránsito vehicular y clausurar el caótico mercado de La Parada. Sin embargo, es probable que esas mismas medidas la hayan alejado de un amplio sector de la población que vive en la informalidad y que desconfía de las autoridades que quieren formalizar actividades porque supone que eso implicará pagar impuestos y mayores precios para el consumidor. Lamentablemente la cultura cívica es minoritaria en nuestra población.

One aspect of Susana Villarán's management appreciated by the elites is the way she has dared to confront traffic congestion and close the chaotic La Parada market. However, it is likely that these same measures alienated a wide section of the population that relies on an informal economy, suspicious of authorities who want to formalize activities because it means they will have to pay taxes and higher consumer prices. Unfortunately civic culture is scarce in our city.

But those who have prompted the recall, commonly known as the “recallers”, do not enjoy a good reputation. They are linked to alleged corruption, in particular Marco Tulio Gutiérrez, the main instigator of the process, whom the Mayoress's defenders have nicknamed “Murky Marco”. In his eponymous blog, Jinre, provides a list of some of those who support the recall along with their biographical “gems”. And in another post he voices his support for the Mayoress and Fuerza Social, her political party:

Yo apoyo a Susana Villarán [...] porque ningún alcalde anterior de Lima hasta la fecha se atrevió a enfrentar los problemas más difíciles de esta ciudad (¿será porque recibían “algo” a cambio de no hacer nada?), sin embargo, Susana Villarán los está afrontando con valentía, asumiendo con dignidad incluso posibles errores en el camino (lo cual la dignifica aún más) y sobretodo “sin arreglos bajo la mesa”; su decencia y conducta incorruptible parece que ha desubicado a los que estaban acostumbrados a “aceitar” a ciertas autoridades para seguir sacando provecho de lo que está mal [...] Yo no apoyo la cochinada política. Fuerza Susana !!

I support Susana Villarán [...] because no previous mayor of Lima has ever dared tackle the city's most difficult problems. (Is it because they received ‘something’ in return for doing nothing?) Despite that, Susana Villarán is confronting them with courage and dignity, even admitting possible mistakes made along the way (a fact that further dignifies her), and most of all ‘without back room dealings'. Her decency and honest conduct seem to have disoriented those who are used to greasing the wheels of power in order to continue taking advantage of a bad situation [...] I don't support political filth. More power to you, Susana!

Nevertheless, transparency is not the highlight of the campaign: both the YES and NO sides have failed to adequately disclose their finances. Still, because this is a referendum and not an election per se, it is not sanctionable by Peru's National Electoral Committee. Diego Macera, of the blog A Chicago voy, weighs in on the relevance of this aspect:

¿Qué relación guarda que Marco Tulio Gutiérrez genere poca confianza y haya recogido las firmas usando financiamiento desconocido con que algún ciudadano de Surco se sienta decepcionado por la inacción de la municipalidad respecto del tráfico en su distrito u otro ciudadano se sienta estafado por las cifras poco claras de escaleras construidas por la municipalidad? La verdad es que ninguna. El desmerecer la campaña por el Sí con el argumento de que su financiamiento es irregular es intentar tapar el sol con un dedo. Los fondos del Sí pueden ser cuestionables, es cierto, pero eso no tiene por qué cambiar la opinión ciudadana sobre la labor que Susana Villarán y su equipo llevan a cabo al frente de Lima, y es de eso de lo que trata la consulta popular.

What does the fact that Marco Tulio Gutiérrez generates little confidence and obtained signatures using undisclosed financing have to do with a resident of Surco being disappointed by the lack of municipal initiative on traffic in his district or another feeling swindled because of the unclear figures on municipal stairway construction? In truth nothing. Discrediting the YES campaign by claiming its financing is irregular is like trying to block out the sun with one finger. Funding of the YES side may indeed be questionable, but this should not alter the public's opinion of the work Susana Villarán and her team have undertaken at the city's helm, and that is what the referendum is about.

Still the referendum process, as indicated above, is itself a little complicated. In addition to confusion over the use of YES and NO, there is the matter of the ballot, which features 80 options because the referendum is not just on the record of the Mayoress but the 40-member Council as well. In that regard, Fernando Tuesta, former head of the National Office of Electoral Processes, published on his blog what he believes are the four possible outcomes of the referendum:

1. Susana Villarán es mellada en su mandato. Este escenario se produciría si la alcaldesa NO es revocada, pero sí varios regidores, indistintamente de cualquier partido, pero un máximo de 13 regidores.
2. Susana Villarán pierde la mayoría del Concejo. Este escenario se produciría si la alcaldesa NO es revocada, pero sí 14 regidores o más de cualquier partido [...] los regidores revocados son reemplazados por los accesitarios, pero de manera provisional, hasta la realización de Nuevas Elecciones Municipales
3. Lima tiene un alcalde que nadie eligió. Este escenario se produciría si la alcaldesa SÍ es revocada y, además un máximo de 12 regidores. No hay, sin embargo, nuevas elecciones municipales. La alcaldesa es reemplazada por el primer regidor de Fuerza Social no revocado.
4. Un nuevo alcalde, sin mayoría. Este escenario se produciría si la alcaldesa SÍ es revocada, así como 13 regidores o más. La alcaldesa y los regidores revocados son reemplazados por los accesitarios [...] hasta que se elija un nuevo alcalde y regidores.

1. Susana Villarán's mandate is damaged. This would occur in a scenario where NO, the Mayoress is not recalled but several councillors are, from either party, up to a maximum of 13.
2. Susana Villarán loses a majority of the Council. This would occur if NO, the Mayoress is not recalled, but 14 or more councillors from either party are [...] the recalled councillors would be provisionally replaced until new municipal elections were held.
3. Lima has a mayor that nobody elected. This would happen if YES, the Mayoress were recalled, along with a maximum of 12 councillors. However new municipal elections are not held. The Mayoress is replaced by the first councillor of Fuerza Social not to have been recalled.
4. A new mayor, without a majority. This would occur if YES, the Mayoress is recalled, along with 13 or more councillors. The mayoress and recalled councillors are provisionally replaced [...] until the election of a new mayor and councillors.

Facebook user René Galarreta disagrees with some of the outcomes outlined above:

Lo que no explica Tuesta es que para revocar un regidor, es necesario 1/3 de votos válidos, una vez que vayan a votar más del 50% del número de electores limeños. O sea que si van a votar al menos 3,179,158 electores y hay un voto más del SI contra el NO en la casilla 39, y hasta 2/3 del resto de votos nulos o en blanco, ese regidor es revocado (si hay más de 2/3 de votos nulos o en blanco, el regidor se quedaría). Cada regidor sería revocado de manera independiente, así como la alcaldesa. Eso explica el “40 veces NO”, donde para salvar el pellejo cada regidor tiene que rezar para que los votos del No superen al Si, o haya menos de 1/3 de votos válidos.

What Tuesta does not explain is that to recall a councillor requires 1/3 of valid votes, once more than 50% of eligible voters have participated. In other words, if at least 3,179,158 constituents vote and there is one vote more for YES than NO in box 39, and up to 2/3 of the rest are null or blank ballots, that councillor is recalled (if more than 2/3 of ballots are null or blank, the councillor stays). Each councillor would be recalled independently, just like the Mayoress. This explains the “40 times NO”, where in order to save their skin, every councillor has to pray that the NO votes trump the YES, or that less than 1/3 of ballots are declared valid.

The referendum is less than two months away, and although Lima's newspapers provide daily campaign updates, until now there has been little information on how constituents can properly exercise their vote in accordance with their opinion. As the journalist Martín Hidalgo mentions in Sesión de Control, the political parties see this campaign as a warmup to the presidential elections of 2016, and:

Mientras tanto, Susana Villarán juega su propio partido entre frases desafortunadas, cifras falsas y encuestas que le anticipan un futuro nada alentador. La campaña recién empieza.

Meanwhile, Susana Villarán is risking her own party amid unfortunate catchphrases, inaccurate figures, and polls that point to a less than encouraging future. The campaign has just begun.

Post previously published on the blog Globalizado.

Ecuador: “Children of the Jaguar” Documentary Wins National Geographic Prize

Victoria Robertson — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 21:25:15 +0000

[All links are to Spanish-language pages unless otherwise noted.]

Eriberto Benedicto Gualinga Montalvo is the head of Selvas Productions and the director of the documentary “Children of the Jaguar“, winner of two film festival prizes: the National Geographic's award for best documentary and Columbia's Indigenous Festival prize for best depiction of a struggle by an indigenous people.

The documentary follows the lives of the inhabitants of Sarayaku in the southern Amazonic region of Ecuador and their fight against multinationals [En] seeking to exploit oil reserves beneath the Amazon forest floor. Eriberto filmed the documentary over a six-month period, from June to December 2011, in Sarayaku in the province of Pastaza [En]. The work has been screened in a number of venues such as the National Geographic All Roads Film Festival, Colombia's Indigenous Peoples’ Film and Video Festival, Ecuador's EDOC (Encounters of the Other Cinema) Festival, and the Brussels International Film Festival.

Eriberto Benedicto Gualinga, director of the documentary “Children of the Jaguar”. Photo: Redes indígenas.

Global Voices: Why is the film titled “Children of the Jaguar”?

Eriberto: Mi familia viene de una descendencia de un shamán, que podía convertirse en tigre; el jaguar lucha hasta la muerte por defender su espacio de vida, es por eso que Sarayaku dice que son los descendientes del jaguar.

Eriberto: My family are the descendants of a shaman who could transform himself into a jaguar–the jaguar fights until death to defend his living space–that is why the Sarayaku people consider themselves children of the jaguar.

GV: What stands out most in this film?

E. G: El viaje de la delegación de Sarayaku, hacia la sede de Costa Rica para hacer respetar sus derechos [humanos y los derechos de otras muchas comunidades] frente al estado de Ecuador.

E.G.: The trip by the Sarayaku delegation to the seat [of the court] in Costa Rica to have their rights [human rights and the rights of many other communities] respected by the Government of Ecuador.

GV: What caught your attention the most when it came time to film?

E. G: La preparación, los testimonios, el viaje que hizo Sarayaku, ya que algunos ni siquiera conocían la capital del Ecuador, menos un avión, y muchos menos se imaginaban lo que era un juicio en la sede de la corte en Costa Rica.

E.G.: The planning, the testimony, the trip by the Sarayaku people, some of whom had never even been to the capital of Ecuador, much less on an airplane; and even fewer of them could have imagined what a trial in the seat of the Court [of Human rights] in Costa Rica would be like.

GV: Who were the main and supporting actors?

E. G: Los miembros que viajaron hacia Costa Rica. Los narradores fuimos Eriberto Gualinga (realizador), Patricia Gualinga (dirigente de la mujer y familia) Ena Santi (testigo).

E.G.: The members [of the community] who travelled to Costa Rica. The narrators were myself, Eriberto Gualinga (director), Patricia Gualinga (in charge of women and family) and Ena Santi (witness).

GV: Did you have to overcome any hurdles?

E. G: [Sí], los gastos de financiamiento, son un obstáculo para cualquier producción que quiera realizar un pueblo originario.

E.G.: [Yes], the financing costs are a challenge for any production undertaken by indigenous people.

GV: From a cinematographic perspective, how was the experience of making this documentary?

E. G: A más de filmar en el pueblo, tuve que filmar en otros escenarios, [como] fuera del país [con] otras realidades, enriqueciendo así el conocimiento artístico y personal.

E.G.: In addition to filming in the village, I had to film in other settings, [like] outside the country [with] different realities, thereby enriching artistic and personal awareness.

GV: How do you feel about the recognition you received at National Geographics' All Roads Film Project in the best documentary category?

E. G: Cada reconocimiento es un incentivo para seguir haciendo más obras a favor de los pueblos originarios. [Uno se] siente con más energía y en paz consigo mismo al saber que su trabajo es tomado en cuenta y reconocido.

E.G.: Any recognition is an incentive to keep working on behalf of indigenous peoples. [One] feels more energized and at peace with oneself knowing that one's work is taken into account and recognized.

GV: What projects to you have in mind now?

E.G.: Trabajar en el siguiente video KAWSAK SACHA selvas vivientes, y hacer entender a la sociedad a través del video en la selva [que] existen otros seres similares a nosotros (seres espirituales), que son los dueños de la Selva y están en constante comunicación con nosotros a través de los shamanes.

E.G.: Working on the next video KAWSAK SACHA living jungles; and to explain to society by means of the video in the jungle [that] there exist beings similar to ourselves (spiritual beings) who are the keepers of the Jungle, and that they are continuously communicating with us through the shamans.

Sarayaku, is located in the eastern province of Pastaza in the Amazon Region of Ecuador. “Children of the Jaguar”, a documentary that depicts the daily resistance of the inhabitants of this village, is a testament to a free community that stands firm in its defence of the Amazon forest. So far, the ruling by the international body has not yet been implemented.

On 18 December 2012, Eriberto Gualinga received the Award for International Recognition, conferred on him by Ecuador's Ministry of Culture for the film “Children of the Jaguar”.

Ecuador: President Refuses to Inaugurate Wind Farm

Victoria Robertson — Sat, 05 Jan 2013 17:59:43 +0000

[All links are to Spanish-language pages]

Ecuador's Villonaco wind farm project, located in the province of Loja, is considered emblematic of the government of President Rafael Correa Delgado, himself a former economist. Morevoer, it is the world's highest such eolian structure, built some 2,720 metres above sea level.

On Wednesday January 2, 2013, President Correa refused to officially open the Villonaco wind farm, branding it incomplete because it does not have an access road.

Para este presidente, acabar el proyecto, es tener una vía decente. Incluso es una falta de respeto llevar al presidente por una vía llena de baches, por eso el día de hoy no inauguré el proyecto Villonaco, lo cual me ha dado mucho dolor.

For this president, a finished project is one with adequate access. What's more it shows a lack of respect to have the president driven over a road full of pot holes. It pains to me to say it, but this is why I did not inaugurate the Villonaco project today.

Villonaco wind farm. Photo by Flickr user franzpc (CC BY-ND 2.0).

The wind farm is made up of 11 generators with a total output capacity of 16.5 MW, a substation to step up power from 34.5 to 69 kilovolts, and a subtransmission line that links the Villonaco substation to its counterpart in Loja, which is on Ecuador's national power grid.

The system was set up by the Chinese company Xinjian Goldwind Science and Technology and will cut CO2 emissions by as much as 35.270 metric tons a year. It will also reduce diesel imports, the fuel needed to generate thermal electricity. As Correa points out on Ecuador's Ministry of Tourism website, “We would save almost USD 13 million per year in fuel costs alone.”

Ecuador's electrical company CELEC is in charge of the infrastructure, with an investment of USD 36 million. The benefits are myriad, especially in terms of the environment insofar as the project will reduce toxic emissions in the atmosphere; in economic terms, it will satisfy 25% of the annual energy consumption of the province of Loja. The project will also cover 68,7% of the demand currently handled by the Empresea Eléctrica Regional Sur, the company that provides power to the provinces of Loja, Zamora, and sections of Morona Santiago.

An additional advantage is that it will generate some 90% of local jobs, direct and indirect employment of 257 and 760 posts respectively. It also promises to be an important tourist attraction, with an information centre open to locals and visitors from farther afield.

During his January 2 visit to Loja, however, the president declined the opportunity to inaugurate, among other projects, the Villonaco wind farm, characterising it as incomplete because of the poor state of its access roads.

Me negué a inaugurar el proyecto eólico, porque no somos mediocres. No se hizo lo principal, una vía decente de entrada.

I refuse to inaugurate the wind farm project because we are not mediocre. We did not provide the cornerstone: a decent means of entry.

In response to this, a number of residents of Loja commented on Twitter.

Santiago Carpio R (‏@SantiagoCarpioR) said:

@SantiagoCarpioR: Amigos periodistas, no se iba a inaugurar el Proyecto Eólico. Sólo era “La puesta en funcionamiento de UNA turbina”. Pilas no!

@SantiagoCarpioR: Journalist friends: they weren't going to inaugurate the wind farm project. They were just firing up ONE turbine. Keep those batteries charging!

Naida_Valarezo (‏@Naida_Valarezo) retweeted:

@Naida_Valarezo: @NiloV107: @marcetorrespaz @GoberLoja “politica d gobierno es obras INTEGRALES. Parque #Eolico #Loja se inaugurará cuando este completo”

@Naida_Valarezo: @NiloV107: @marcetorrespaz @GoberLoja “government policy calls for COMPLETE WORKS. Parque #Eolico #Loja wil be inaugurated when it's done”

JOHANNA ORDOÑEZ ‏(@joaordonezceli), a journalist in Loja, tweeted on Wednesday evening, January 2:

@joaordonezceli: Presidente Rafael Correa suspendió la puesta en operación del Parque Eolico, por no estar concluido el 100% faltan las vías de acceso

@joaordonezceli: President Rafael Correa cancelled the launch of the wind farm, because it wasn't 100% finished, it is missing access roads

In the end the provincial government of Loja (GPL) was tasked with improving the access road.

Ecuador Creates Electoral ‘Code of Conduct’ for Social Media

Victoria Robertson — Mon, 17 Dec 2012 15:18:16 +0000

[All links lead to Spanish-language pages, unless otherwise noted.]

The National Electoral Council of Ecuador (CNE) has unveiled Voto transparente, Conoce a Tu Candidato (Transparent voting, Know your candidate), a project aimed at familiarizing voters with the campaign platforms of the different presidential candidates. The government portal, www.gne.gob.ec, provides information about the eight presidential tickets, the delegates to the Andean Parliament, and the candidates for national and provincial assemblies as well as foreign postings. Political organizations, social groups, and the media have all contributed to the project, which has coalesced into an electoral Code of Conduct, the Manual de Convivencia. Available throughout social networks and digital media, the handbook is aimed at both political stakeholders and citizens–with the goal of promoting respect and tolerance for differing political leanings and ideologies.

2009 General elections in Ecuador. Photo by Dan Figueroa. Copyright Demotix (24/04/2009)

In anticipation of the presidential elections of February 2013, the Code of Conduct lays down 15 basic principles:

Principle #0: Treat others as you would wish to be treated.

Principle #1: Never forget that the person reading your message is a human being whose feelings can be hurt.

Principle #2: Behave online just as you would in real life.

Principle #3: Help maintain a healthy and informative environment for public debate.

Principle #4: Share your knowledge with the community.

Principle #5: Make sure both your opinions and your contributions are friendly, courteous, polite, patient and respectful–this is also a good rule of life.

Principle #6: Respect the privacy of third parties–ganging up on another person is wrong.

Principle #7: Respect the time and bandwidth of other people.

Principle #8: Show your good side online–don't encourage gossip, smear campaigns, or intolerance.

Principle #9: If you write everything in capital letters, people will think you are shouting.

Principle #10: Respect the opinons of others without insulting them; your replies should be polite and considerate and reflect the truth.

Principle #11: Be objective about topics that are of personal concern to you but not necessarily of general interest.

Principle #12: Respect religious beliefs as well as sexual, ideological, and political orientations.

Principle #13: Be tolerant of people whose opinions you do not share.

Principle #14: Do not use hurtful or derogatory language, and do not violate the personal integrity of others.

Twitter feedback

Shortly after the project was unveiled, the online daily hoy.com.ec reported that Twitter users had created the hashtag #redessocialesCNE [CNE social networks] and were circulating their own assessments and jokes:

@darknitch:#redessocialesCNE, Respete el ancho de banda de las otras personas ??? Perdon ancho de banda por utilizarte para leer pendejadas de la CNE

@darknitch :#redessocialesCNE , Respect other people's bandwidth??? Sorry bandwidth for using you to read the CNE's crap.

@Danku_G:#redessocialesCNE la primera regla del CNE en las redes sociales: do not talk about las reglas del CNE en redes sociales…

@Danku_G:#redessocialesCNE the first rule of the CNE for social networks: do not talk about the CNE's rules for social networks…

@xavoviz: No olvide sonreír mientras escribe su tuit. Un troll alegre es un troll eficiente. #redessocialesCNE

@xavoviz: Don't forget to smile when tweeting. A happy troll is an efficient troll. #redessocialesCNE

Does Peru have Internet Freedom?

Victoria Robertson — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 11:44:20 +0000

[All links lead to Spanish-language pages, except where otherwise noted.]

It is increasingly common to hear that a particular country is considering or actually enacting some type of law that affects Internet freedom. Peru is not immune to this. A few months ago, the country's Cybercrime Law (Ley de Delitos informáticos [en] or Ley Beingolea) sparked concern and debate over the possibility that it posed a threat to Internet privacy and freedom of expression.

More recently, another controversy has arisen over #SOPAcriolla, an attempt to gather input geared towards establishing copyright regulation and ISP (Internet Service Provider) responsibility that ended up instead focusing attention on Internet freedom in Peru and the potential threats against it.

Why is this happening? There are many reasons, ranging from corporations with a vested interest in intellectual property [en] putting pressure on other institutions and government bodies to combat Internet piracy to those same governments seeking [en] to fight perceived opposition and dissidence by sometimes cloaking it in national security measures—all the while telecommunication companies are themselves restricting user access in order to reap maximum economic benefits.

Picture courtesy of Daniela Goulart, asleeponasunbeam on Flickr, Creative Commons-licensed (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The idea that “the web is a fundamental human right” [en - all links in paragraph] and the notion of net neutrality , including such basic tenets as freedom of speech and the right to privacy, are affected by proposed North American legislation such as SOPA, PIPA, the free-trade agreements and other pacts (ACTA, TPP) between various countries.

Even though it would appear that Peru's social networks are actively discussing the question of Internet freedom, in reality there is little large-scale awareness or interest. And why should there be? Because it affects us all, especially considering how much we pay for our home and mobile Internet access and how little we receive in return.

A while ago, Internet blogger Chillinfart wrote about telecommunications companies in Peru and their rates:

siempre hablé de lo perjudicial que son las limitaciones de tráfico que el oligopolio en telecomunicaciones busca imponer (sea Claro, Movistar, Nextel o Velatel, […] Por el otro lado, es importante entender lo vital que es la tarifa plana en el Perú, donde pese al despegue del uso de internet mediante los cibercafés (o cabinas como decimos acá) y algunos logros a nivel local, la penetración de internet en el Perú sigue siendo bajísima y donde las limitaciones de tráfico terminarán deprimiendo aún más los intentos por acceder a la información.

I have always pointed out the detrimental nature of restrictions on traffic, which the telecommunications oligopoly tries to impose, be it Claro, Movistar, Nextel or Velatel, [...] On the other hand, it is important to understand how vital the flat rate is in Peru. Despite the increase in Internet use through cybercafés and other gains made locally, Internet penetration in Peru is still very low, and restrictions on traffic will only end up undermining further attempts to access information.

He added:

¿En qué afecta a los peruanos medidas como las limitaciones de tráfico? Lo primero es lo más obvio, nuestro bolsillo, al encarecer el acceso a internet de la misma forma que en los tiempos de los módem analógicos (costos por conexión y llamada o consumo). Segundo, permite que los operadores pongan trampas para entorpecer el acceso a ciertos servicios (ej. Redes p2p, páginas de multimedios, servicios VoIP como Skype), crear saturaciones artificiales para excusarse cuando las cosas andan mal o hasta vender información sobre la actividad de sus clientes a terceros.

How are Peruvians affected by measures to limit traffic? The most obvious way is hitting us in our pocketbooks, by making Internet access costlier in the same way as when analog modems were billed by connection, call frequency and consumption. Second, restrictions allow operators to deceive users by slowing access to certain services (e.g., P2P networks, multimedia pages, and voIPs such as Skype), by generating artificial saturation to divert attention when things are not working properly, or even by selling user activity to third parties.

So we see that despite the significant digital divide in Peru, the telecommunications companies continue to place hurdles in the way of Internet access. Moreover, they often abuse their power and block particular sites for reasons not clearly explained (the most recent case involved Bitly, a URL shortening and bookmarking service, that was mysteriously inaccessible in Peru for several days).

In this regard, journalist José Soriano, an Internet pioneer in Peru, outlined the following issue on Facebook:

Si los DNS y los servidores esta en manos privadas, que no tienen ningún control institucional ¿Cuanto aumenta la vulnerabilidad del Internet del Perú? ¿No será tiempo de poner genuinamente en manos de la sociedad civil un Comité Peruano de Gestión de Internet, con la participación del Estado y las empresas proveedoras con representantes de usuarios y ONG´s?

If the DNS and the servers are in private hands, with no institutional oversight, does this not increase the vulnerability of the Internet in Peru? Is it not time to put a Peruvian Internet Management Committee in the hands of civil society, through joint participation of the state and commercial providers with representation by users and NGOs?

Looking at it another way, just a few months ago, the Congress of Peru passed a law to promote broadband and establish a national fiber optic backbone (Ley de Promoción de la Banda Ancha y Construcción de la Red Dorsal Nacional de Fibra Óptica) without meaningful public debate. And while one section of the law recognizes net neutrality, another section increases regulation beyond what already exists. Lawyer Miguel Morachimo explains in Blawyer:

la nueva Ley de Banda Ancha intenta regular un tema que ya está regulado por OSIPTEL hace siete años. Pero incluso, se trata de una regulación mucho más restrictiva que la que tenemos vigente. (Establece bloqueos de aplicaciones por parte de los operadores “a solicitud expresa del abonado o usuario y/o algunos casos excepcionales por motivos de seguridad” Art.7) […] Resulta una verdadera lástima que, mientras en otros países se llevaron a cabo procesos de consulta pública y se realizaron serias investigaciones de mercado, en Perú se haya vuelto a tocar legislativamente este tema sin mayor debate ni difusión.

The new broadband law aims at regulating a matter that has already been under the auspices of OSIPTEL for seven years. What's more, it entails regulation that is far more restrictive than what is currently in effect. (It enables operators to block applications at the “request of the subscriber or user and, in exceptional cases, for security reasons” Art. 7) [...] It is a great pity that while other countries carried out public consultation and undertake serious market research, in Peru, we have gone back to legislatively addressing this topic without significant debate or transparency.

Again José Soriano argued on Facebook that the Internet laws recently being considered in Peru would at best only serve to confuse the issue, as evidenced by prior attempts:

La legislación nacional ya es abundante y suficiente, cualquier intento de adicionar una ley es para restringir los derechos ciudadanos. […] Internet ha crecido gracias a su autoregulación y libre tránsito de la información sin rompimiento de la neutralidad de la red. Cualquier intento de regulación o legislación es en sí mismo un atentado a las libertades públicas, ya que los usuarios de todas maneras se rigen por las leyes civiles y penales pre-existentes, con procedimientos, reglamento, y autoridades de aplicación y policía.

There is ample and sufficient national legislation; any additional law would only restrict the right of citizens. [...] The Internet has grown thanks to self-regulation and the free flow of information without violating net neutrality. Any attempt at regulating or legislating it is itself an assault on civil liberties, as users must already comply, in any event, with pre-existing criminal and civil laws, due process and regulation as well as enforcement and policing authorities.

Meanwhile the press would appear to be magnifying instances of cyber crimes in order to promote an environment in which restrictive Internet laws could be justified. At the same time, instances such as the signing of the free trade agreement with the European Union are not given due diligence or worse still, articles critical of such treaties simply ”disappear“.

As we can see, the notion of Internet freedom is as technical as it is legal, which may explain why so few people pay attention to or even understand what is at stake. Even lawmakers fall into this category. As Miguel Morachimo wrote recently:

Al igual que muchos países en América Latina y otras regiones, Perú es un estado cuyos representantes políticos no están familiarizados con Internet y tecnologías en general. Nuestras políticas nacionales al respecto siguen siendo directrices genéricas que no sirven de guía para soluciones innovadoras y leyes inteligentes. A diferencia de otros asuntos de interés público, como la violencia política o la discriminación, existen pocas voces que contribuyen al debate público sobre política de Internet en el Perú desde la perspectiva de la sociedad civil. Como resultado de este vacío, los intereses de los usuarios no se ven representados en el Congreso cuando se proponen proyectos de ley que afectan a nuestros derechos.

Just like so many countries in Latin America and elsewhere, Peru's political representatives are not well versed in the Internet or technology in general. Our public policy in this regard tends to follow generic guidelines that do not lead to innovative solutions and intelligent legislation. Compared with other matters of public interest in Peru, such as political violence or discrimination, few voices are heard in the public debate about Internet policy from the perspective of a civil society. As a result of this vacuum, when a legislative bill that affects all our rights is put before Congress, the interests of Internet users are not represented.

We recently spoke to Miguel Morachimo about this issue:

Post originally published in Juan Arellano's personal blog.

The video in this post was transcribed and subtitled by Irene Gutierrez Moncayo and Veronica Robertson