Global Voices » Roger Franchini

Brazil: Police execution and YouTube voyeurism

Roger Franchini — Thu, 10 Jun 2010 23:46:43 +0000

On Friday, May 4, 2010, a YouTube video (the video has been removed) was posted in which a supposed criminal from the Fallet Slum, in Rio de Janeiro, was hit by a gunshot to the head. The scene shows the victim and two other people walking through the hillside streets carrying long guns, possibly rifles.

The images and voices were captured by the strategically placed shooters themselves. The video also includes the voices of at least two others people in the background, one watching the shooting and the other guiding the shooter. Despite the video’s availability on YouTube, we prefer to post it here using Vimeo in the hopes that it remains online:

After hearing the shooters’ confirmation that one of the targets was “Gordão” (01m08s), and that in a certain position at that particular location he would be “uncovered” (01m20s), police slang to refer to someone who is unprotected, the shooters began counting backwards and eventually fired a long gun. Bull's eye! The shooters then confirmed their shot screaming “You got one! You got one!” The victim fell to the ground and asked for help to then be dragged off camera by another person beside him.

Despite the unquestionable seriousness of the content, so far the reaction among bloggers has been, if not null, then at best mild. There are two possible reasons for this. The growing banality of human disgrace has made the viewer indifferent to misery and pain. Moreover, the people involved pertain to a world of historical stereotypes: on the one hand, armed traffickers going about their routine of breaking the law; on the other hand, courageous policemen carrying out their duty. Together, we have a perfect combination for not even taking notice.

Actually, up to now, nothing is known about who took the shot or who died. Or if he really died. Our tragedy falls into the so-called blank statistics, the mysterious percentage of crimes committed, but whose existence is unknown to the bureaucratic government . The majority of the comments left on the YouTube page criticize the police, not because they shot the guy in the back, but because they missed their mark and did not hit the other two supposed traffickers. Others praise the traffickers. Bolinhajack says:

Pelo pouco q eu conheço de armamento… foi um Fal 7.62!
A precisão (alcanse da mira) do Fal, chega no mín. 200 mt's e 600 mt's max.
Mas provavelmente o atirador tinha uma luneta de guerra ao seu poder!
EU ACHO, q deve ser um policial muito bem treinado, mas naum posso dizer com a certeza!
Se foi um policial? Ele fez o trabalho dele!

From the little I know about guns… it was aFal 7.62!
The Fal’s precision (the scope’s range) is a min of 200 mts and a max of 600 mts.
But the shooter probably had a police monocular in his possession!
I THINK that he has to be a well trained policeman, but I can't say for sure!
And if it was a policeman? He was doing his job!

FTwitter was where the greatest number of comments were left. Roberto Mosca Junior, who tweets as @robertomoscajr lamented the occurrence, paraphrasing the former BOPE (specialized Rio police force) policeman and screenwriter of Tropa de Elite, Rodrigo Pimentel:

Com diz o próprio Pimentel, isto aqui é uma guerra particular, a polícia mata o bandido, o bandido mata a polícia ou o outro traficante…

As Pimentel says, this here is a private war – the policeman kills the bandit, the bandit kills the policeman or other trafficker…

While José Soares Banana, who tweets as @bananinharadio, was desolate:

Vendo esse vídeo onde um suposto traficante é alvo de um atirador anônimo no Rio, eu me sinto na terra de ninguém http://is.gd/cJcKJ

Watching this video where a supposed trafficker is the target of an anonymous shooter in Rio, I feel like [I’m in] No Man’s Land http://is.gd/cJcKJ

A military policeman and twitterer whose initials are ACM and who tweets as @PMFogger12, protested the shooters’ actions, confirming that those involved were indeed policemen and traffickers. According to him, the shooting took place in September 2009 even though the video was only posted recently:

Só Deus e algumas pessoas sabem que foram os responsáveis pelos disparos que mataram o chefe do trafico na fallet e um do seus seguranças…

lembro que na época os moradores da fallet acusaram a PM de ter matado, um morador inocente, parece que o video desmente os moradores…

só posso disser: parabéns aos atiradores “desconhecidos”! rs

Only God and some people known that they were responsible for the shots that killed the head of the Fallet traffic ring and one of his bodyguards…

I remember at the time those in Fallet accused the military Police of having killed an innocent slum dweller; it seems the video belies the slum dwellers…

I can only say: congratulations to the “unknown” shooters! Haha

A quick blurb appeared on the website of Jornal Hoje and G1 News, both part of the Globo network. In an interview, the same former policeman, Pimental, states that the shot came from an abandoned hospital that is currently occupied temporarily by the military police of Rio de Janeiro:

Segundo Pimentel, o vídeo mostra a Rua Eliseu Visconti, que fica próxima aoo Hospital Quarto Centenário, de onde pode ter partido o tiro. O disparo também pode ter sido feito de um muro da Rua Almirante Alexandrino, diz Pimentel. O hospital, que foi desativado, atualmente é ocupado pela PM.

According to Pimentel, the video shows Eliseu Visconti street, which is close to the Quarto Centenário Hospital, from where the shot may have originated. The shot could also have come from a wall on Almirante Alexandrino Street, Pimental says. The hospital, which was closed, is currently occupied by the military police.

For centuries, the public safety squads in Brazil have been shouldering government interference in how they conduct their business. For a long time, the police and the government have been entwined in a dangerous play, one that allows the state governor to have a legitimate institution at his disposal authorized to invade citizens’ privacy and to produce legal evidence against anyone.

In terms of the policemen, groups of poorly paid human beings who are not even part of the middle class. They are left with the mediocre role of being the armed branch of the federal states and, at the same time, entrusted with clearing the streets of the residual population, which is confused with the actual work of public safety. On days off, they pick of freelance jobs to compensate their salaries.

Taking someone’s life in a violent and calculated manner, as is the case here, seems to be justified by the un-controversial visual proof. The voyeuristic citizen, before complaining of a government void in the form of arbitrary and criminal judgments such as this, seems to show his approval through his loquacious, and equally criminal, silence.

This post was translated by Melissa Mann

Brazil: Honduran crisis triggers international relations debate

Roger Franchini — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 17:18:43 +0000

There has been much discussion about the constitutional right to oust Honduras president Manuel Zelaya. The crisis itself has made the headlines in many countries and many Latin American bloggers, including Brazilians, are contributing to the debate on the events.

Brazil has now been involved in an unusual diplomatic situation. Even though there is as yet no evidence that Brazil was behind the crisis in Honduras, it is safe to say that there are no similar events in the history of international law. The crisis has reached the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa and prompted Brazilian bloggers to discuss international politics in Latin America and Brazil's role in these events.

Zelaya at the Brazilian Embassy. Picture by @kattracho on Twitpic.

Cesar Fonseca, who blogs at Independência Sul Americana [South American Independence, pt], describes the events in Honduras as a disgrace among the Latin nations because they involve the exercise of power through violence, bolstered by the military forces and the hollowness of the legislation in place:

Roberto Micheletti, presidente do Legislativo de Honduras, o Carlos Lacerda golpista hondurenho, errou o time histórico, ao aliar-se aos militares, para detonar governo constitucional de José Manuel Zelaya, que propôs referendo constitucional para respaldar nova Constituinte, que, entre outras determinações, suprimiria limite para mandatos presidenciais, como ocorre nas democracias européias.

Roberto Micheletti, President of the Honduran Congress and the Honduran equivalent of the Brazilian coup-monger Carlos Lacerda, made a bad error of timing when he allied himself with the military in order to destroy the constitutional government of José Manuel Zelaya, who had proposed a constitutional referendum to endorse the new constituent assembly, which, among other aims, wishes to impose a limit on presidential mandates, as in European democracies.

For Bruno Kazuhiro, from the Perspectiva Política blog [Political Perspective, pt], if Zelaya was wrong to contravene the terms of the country's constitution, so were the Congress, the military forces and the judicial system that ousted him from the country without a proper trial:

O que o exército hondurenho fez foi muito errado no modo, mas não, na essência. Não deveria ter sido o exército a retirar Zelaya do poder, porém, aceita a renúncia deste pelo Congresso e nomeado o novo Presidente, Manuel Zelaya deveria sim, no fim das contas, deixar o governo. Melhor que tivesse sido voluntariamente.

Para os que me disserem que o povo hondurenho desejava mais um mandato do grupo de Zelaya, pergunto:

Por que então Zelaya não indicou sucessor e respeitou a lei?

What the Honduran army did was pretty wrong in the way they did it, but it was not wrong in itself. It was not the place of the army to strip Zelaya of his power; nevertheless, if the Congress had accepted his resignation and named a new president, Manuel Zelaya should have left the government immediately. It would have been better if he had done so voluntarily.
I ask those who say that the Honduran people wanted a new mandate of the Zelaya party:
Then why didn't Zelaya suggest a successor and respect the law?

Picture brought by @jeneffermelo on TwitPic

On September 22nd, Zelaya managed to smuggle himself into Honduran territory and reach the Brazilian embassy in the capital Tegucigalpa, finding shelter for himself and 63 other supporters on the premises of the country's diplomatic mission. Immediately, the Honduran government surrounded the building, blocked access to the place and imposed a curfew on the citizens. Energy supply has been cut off, as have telephone lines in the Brazilian embassy building.

The controversy arises from the fact that Zelaya does not intend to apply to the Brazilian government for asylum, according to an interview he gave to the Globo TV Network, and that he is staying in the embassy for protection and as a way of mustering political support. If this is his intention, it puts Brazil in a delicate position, since Brazil is harboring a persecuted politician who isn't seeking shelter, but rather wishes to summon forces to fight those who removed him from the presidency.

The Movimento Ordem Vigília Contra a Corrupção blog [pt] believes that the admittance of Zelaya to the Brazilian embassy was directly supported by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and demonstrates inconsistencies that point to alleged lies told by the main players in this crisis:

A diplomacia terceiro-mundista tupiniquim inovou, em matéria de Direito Internacional, criando a figura do perseguido que pretende ENTRAR e não SAIR. Costuma-se conceder asilo para aquele que tenta sair do país, perseguido pelo seu governo, e Zelaya, ao contrário, entrou no país com uma súcia de 60 simpatizantes, o que desfigura a individualidade do asilo. Pior: Zelaya está usando o prédio diplomático como “bunker” da guerrilha para conclamar seus desordeiros e convulsionar as forças de ordem do país.

Brazilian 3rd world diplomacy has played around with international law by creating the figure of the refugee whose intention is to GET IN rather than OUT. It is common to grant asylum to someone who is trying to leave their country, pursued by the government, but Zelaya, on the contrary, has entered his country with a band of 60 supporters, distorting the individuality of asylum. Even worse, Zelaya is using a diplomatic building as a bunker to urge on riots by guerrillas and aggravate the country's security forces.

Chávez, moreover, is a recurring figure in reports about Zelaya's return to Honduras. He himself told the BBC that he knew that Zelaya would come back to Honduras and that he had helped the president to baffle the authorities. But not all bloggers accept the idea of Chávez's influence on these events. For Leandro Fortes, who blogs at Brasília, eu vi [Brasília, I have seen, pt], this theory is the cue ball of the Latin American press and the weak point of mass media. He believes that recent left-wing demonstrations have been covered in a superficial and watered-down way, ignoring their regional nuances [pt]:

O jornalismo está abandonando, aos poucos, por motivos inconfessáveis, a valorização das personagens como elemento de narrativa. Emblemático é o caso de Honduras, um catalisador profundo das intenções de setores da imprensa cada vez mais perfilados em bloco sobre um ensaiado viés chavista (a nova panacéia editorial do continente) aplicado ao noticiário toda vez que um movimento de esquerda se insinua sobre velhos latifúndios – físicos e imateriais. Para tal, recorre-se cada vez mais a malabarismos de linguagem para se referir ao golpe militar que derrubou o presidente constitucionalmente eleito Manuel Zelaya.

Por conta disso, o governo golpista passou a ser chamado, aqui e acolá, de “governo de fato”, uma solução patética encontrada por alguns veículos para se referir a uma administração firmada na fraude eleitoral e na usurpação pura e simples de poder. Há, ainda, quem se refira à quadrilha de Roberto Micheleti como “governo interino”, o que só pode ser piada.

Little by little, journalism is ceasing to acknowledge the true characters in the story, due to ulterior motives. The Honduras case is symptomatic of a serious intent among sections of the media, increasingly grouped around a rehearsed “Chavist” bias (South America's new editorial panacea), to apply this to news headlines every time a left-wing group starts sniffing around issues - physical or intangible - involving the old landed estates. In doing so they are using increasingly deceptive language when referring to the military coup that ousted the constitutionally elected President Manuel Zelaya.

Because of that, the coup government has been called, over here and over there, as the “de facto government”, a pathetic solution found by some media outlets for referring to an administration based on electoral fraud and the outright usurpation of power. There are even those who refer to the Roberto Micheletti gang as the “interim government” - they must be joking.

A demonstration in front of Brazil Embassy in Honduras. Photo by vredeseilanden on Flickr.

The possibility of the Brazilian government's involvement in promoting Zelaya's return to his country has been discussed, but not confirmed, and was vehemently denied by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, in an interview for the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo [pt]. According to Amorim, Brazil has only admitted Zelaya to the embassy's premises in order to comply with the international rules of political asylum. Formally, the Brazilian government advocates the peaceful return of Zelaya to the presidency of Honduras and the call for elections. Journalist and blogger Luis Nassif [pt] noted the apprehension in the Minister's comments during his interview with CNN, emphasizing that the paradigm shift in the political world now requires Brazil to take a more decisive stance on events such as Honduras' [pt]:

Mesmo que seja verdade (como disse Amorim) que o Brasil foi pego e surpresa no episódio (pedido de abrigo de Zelaya) um país que deseja se firmar como global player tem que estar preparado, não só para “surpresas” dsse tipo, como para assumir, sem hesitação ou insegurança, sua condição de protagonista, particularmente nas questões de politica continental. Para o bem ou para o mal.

Bom, espero que pelo menos a insegurança demonstrada por Amorim, (inegável na minha percepção) sirva de aprendizado.

Even if it is true (as stated by Amorim) that Brazil was surprised by this episode (Zelaya's request for asylum), a country that wishes to consolidate its position as a global player has to be prepared not only for such “surprises”, but also to assume its role as a protagonist without further hesitation or uncertainty, particularly when it comes to South American politics, for better or worse.

Well, I hope that Amorim's uncertainty (which I think was obvious enough) may at least serve as a lesson.

Gabriel Purcelli, from the Desabafo Brasil blog [Outburst Brazil, pt], maintains that the Brazilian government's behavior reaffirms its position as a leader in the region. The sheltering of the so-called “constitutional president” Zelaya, in the face of the excesses of the “de facto president” Micheletti is a step which indirectly allows it to fill the gap left by the decline of US influence in Latin America [pt]:

A jogada brasileira, na qual já estão publicamente envolvidos o chanceler Celso Amorim e o próprio presidente Lula, e para a qual estão utilizando a caixa de ressonância da Assembléia Geral da ONU, em Nova York, deve ser vista à luz da inquietação provocada em Brasília pela remobilização da IV Frota dos Estados Unidos no Atlântico Sul e a presença desse país em bases militares colombianas. Convencidos de que esses movimentos se destinam a contrabalançar sua força como potência emergente, os brasileiros não deixarão passar a oportunidade de se projetar, reafirmando-a.

Brazil's actions, in which the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and President Lula are already publicly involved, and for which they are using the sounding board of the UN General Assembly in New York, must be viewed in the light of the unrest in Brasília caused by the remobilization of the 4th Fleet of the USA in the South Atlantic and the presence of this country in military bases in Colombia. Convinced that these moves are intended to offset its force as a potential emerging nation, Brazilians will seize this opportunity to assert themselves, rather than letting it slip.

Raphael Garcia Tsavkko [pt] follows the same line of reasoning and points out some interesting facts regarding Brazil's participation in the resolution of this conflict. He argues [pt]:

O Brasil não sai prejudicado, na verdade foi forçado - a contragosto talvez - a mostrar porque é ou quer ser o líder da América Latina. Não mais o papo de que é mas ações concretas. Resolvendo ou ajudando a resolver o conflito no país o Brasil sai fortalecido como nunca, sai com mais força para pleitear a vaga permanente no Conselho de Segurança - que conta já com o apoio entusiasmado de Sarkozy - e sai fortalecido no cenário internacional.

Brazil is not going to be harmed by this; it was actually forced - probably reluctantly - to show why it is or why it wants to be the leader of Latin America. No more bluster about already being a leader - now it has to prove it with concrete actions. By solving or helping to solve the conflict in Honduras, Brazil emerges stronger than it ever has been; it strengthens its bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council - an idea already supported enthusiastically by Sarkozy - and becomes more prominent within the international community.

The restrictions imposed on the Brazilian embassy provoke discussions about the sovereignty of the nation within the limits of the building. Although many people believe that a country's diplomatic mission constitutes foreign territory, law professor and blogger Túlio Vianna points out [pt] that, even though it is not technically considered as such, the attack of an embassy must be repudiated in the same way:

A teoria atualmente dominante para legitimar as imunidades da Missão Diplomática é a “teoria do interesse da função”. Ainda segundo Celso Mello, estes privilégios e imunidades podem ser classificados em: inviolabilidade, imunidade de jurisidição civil e criminal e isenção fiscal (v2., nº511). Nas suas palavras:

“A inviolabilidade significa que nestes locais o Estado acreditado não pode exercer nenhum ato de coação (ex: ser invadido pela polícia), a não ser que haja o consentimento do chefe da Missão. Do mesmo modo, não pode ser efetuada uma citação dentro da Missão.”

Se os golpistas hondurenhos invadirem a embaixada brasileira em Honduras para capturar Zelaya, não estarão invadindo o território brasileiro, mas violando uma imunidade diplomática.

Pode ser tão grave quanto, mas não é a mesma coisa.

The currently dominant theory for justifying the immunity of the diplomatic mission is the “theory of the interest of the function”. According to Celso Mello, those privileges and immunities may be classified as: inviolability, immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction and tax exemption (v2., n°511). In his words:

“Inviolability means that in those places the accredited state cannot practice any act of coercion (e.g. invasion by police), unless it has the consent of the head of the mission. In the same way, a court summons cannot be made inside the mission.”

If the Honduran coup leaders invade the Brazilian embassy in Honduras to capture Zelaya, they will not be invading the Brazilian territory, but they will be violating diplomatic immunity.

It looks as serious as an invasion of territory, but it is not the same thing.

It has been confirmed that on September 25th there was a toxic gas attack on the Brazilian Embassy, causing stress to the people inside the building. The attack was firmly criticized by the UN Security Council [pt].

The Brazilian government says it is seeking a peaceful solution to the deadlock triggered by the return of Manuel Zelaya to Honduras. Bellicose gestures are not possible, as they would result in sending military forces to a foreign country. Still, bloggers are continuing to debate Brazil's role in the unfolding of this story.

You can read more about the political crisis in Honduras by following these Global Voices special coverage posts:

June 27th: Honduras: Political Crisis Over Controversial Referendum
June 29th: Honduras: Zelaya Arrested and Removed as President
July 2nd: Caribbean: On the Honduran Coup
July 4th: Honduras: Was it a Coup?
September 24th: Honduras: Citizen Videos from a Country Under Curfew
September 29th: Cuba: Eye on Honduras

This article was translated by Diego Casaes and proofread by Maisie Fitzpatrick.

Brazil: Has a free Internet really appeared on the electoral scene?

Roger Franchini — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 21:00:50 +0000

After much deliberation, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies [pt] and National Senate [pt] have this month approved a bill that reforms the laws number 9.096/95 (Electoral Law, pt) and 9.504/1997 (Standards for Elections, pt), imposing new rules for the 2010 election campaign, the largest in the country, in which the president, state governors as well as state and federal members of parliament will be chosen.

With the reform, the restrictions that used to ban all campaign advertising on the Internet have changed – and a few perplexing caveats, especially when it comes to blogging, have been put in place: now, personal websites and media outlets shall be treated equally, follow the same rules of conduct and be liable to the same punishments, already applied to the mainstream media. For it to come into force by next year's presidential and state elections, President Lula must sign the bill into law by October 2, exactly one year before the polls.

Political parties will campaign for their candidates from July 5 through October 3, 2010, the election date. The law will be enforced during this period, regulating the political propaganda as well as voters' participation on the Internet. The National Chamber of Deputies, who call themselves “the People's House”, released the news through their official news website [pt], stating in bold headlines that the “Chamber allows the Internet in election campaigns,” as if the use of the web was a gift given to citizens by members of parliament. So did the Senate.

The joint report [pt] by two of the Chamber's Commissions (Justice and Citizenship and Science, Technology and Innovation) upheld the point of view of the bill's author, Deputy Henrique Eduardo Alves [pt], and saw no objection to making independent Internet users' expression equal with political propaganda on radio, TV and print media.

Unfortunately, the national parliament has missed an excellent opportunity to display support for Brazilian society, choosing instead to respond to political interests only to the detriment of the broader freedom of expression. Regarding this point, Raphael Tsavkko on the Trezentos blog [pt] criticizes the lack of sense of the Brazilian Parliament in bringing the electoral reform close to the laws imposed on people by the military dictatorship 70 years ago. He highlights [pt] the contradiction that while bloggers can not speak their minds anonymously, campaign donors have kept the right not to reveal their identities:

Eles brigam, nós, o povo, perdemos.

A tentativa de colar a idéia desta censura à uma suposta moralização é inútil, soa ofensiva quando os políticos corruptos e com ficha suja continuarão a concorrer em total liberdade. Existe liberdade para a bandalha, para o roubo, mas não para a livre expressão! Nós, palhaços, ops, eleitores, para piorar, sequer podemos sabem quem financia nossos candidatos! A piada da doação oculta permanece. OS parlamentares tem medo de dizer a verdade, de mostrar de onde vem o dinheiro de suas campanhas e pra quem irão, efetivamente legislar. Para nós é que não é, disto já sabemos!

They fight, we, the people, lose.
Trying to give the idea of a supposed moralization to this censorship is useless, it sounds offensive when corrupt politicians with a dirty past continue to compete in total freedom. There is freedom for fuckup, for theft, but not for free speech! To make it worse, we, the clowns, I mean, voters, don't even know who are funding our candidates! The joke of secret donations remains. Lawmakers are afraid to tell the truth, to reveal where the money for their campaigns comes from and who they will effectively legislate for. Surely it is not for us, as we know!

The same blog suggests that readers send mass e-mails to the members of parliament responsible for the reform, stating dissatisfaction with this rights restricting law, and lists the relevant e-mail addresses.

On the other hand, the news pieces about the project's approval last week proved that society no longer remembers the censorship imposed by Law 9504/1997, a legal text that had already put the Internet and mainstream media in the same bag. To refresh your memory, this symbol of negative individual rights of the Brazilian people prohibits “disseminating opinion for or against a candidate, party, coalition, or their representative organizations” online (Article 45, item III), under penalty of a fine of up to R$ 100,000.00 (approximately US$ 50,000).

The current project does not differentiate personal blogs and web pages from those belonging to mainstream media, and includes other restrictions, such as those regarding debate and interviews with candidates. Should a netcitizen “commit this crime”, they may suffer criminal penalties and be subject to fines ranging between R$5,000.00 and R$30,000.00 (approximately US$ 2,500 to 15,000). According to the Members of Parliaments' interpretation, anyone who talks about a candidate is dangerous and should be tightly controlled. Moreover, if a blogger criticizes a candidate, they must give the right of reply according to fairness rules, which has made many Internet users wonder, like Rogério Martins, from the Marginal Conservador [pt] blog:

A Câmara manteve a liberdade de blogs, redes sociais, sites e programas de mensagens instantâneas (até o msn neguinho quer vigiar!), mas com ressalvas. Ressalvas um tanto inusitadas: o direito democrático de cada blogueiro em expressar sua opinião por um ou outro candidato está liberado, mas caberá o direito de resposta e a proibição do anonimato em artigos e reportagens. […] Direito de resposta para blogs?!?! Ora, os blogs estão entre os meios mais democráticos da internet, pois o “direito de resposta” já é algo inerente a eles, na ideia dos comentários que qualquer leitor pode fazer após a leitura das postagens. É isso que torna a internet 2.0 única. Aqui, o leitor também tem vez: cada post tem espaço para comentários, elogios, críticas, “direitos de resposta” etc. E há também a flexibilidade: podemos sempre “corrigir” textos já escritos, acrecentando algo ou cortando eventuais tropeços.

The Chamber has maintained the freedom of blogging, social networking, websites and instant messaging (even msn the folks wanted to watch!), but with reservations. These are somewhat unusual: the democratic right of every blogger to express their views on either candidate is guaranteed, but they will need to apply the right of reply, and the prohibition of anonymity in articles and reports. […] Right of reply in blogs, oi?!?! Blogs are among the most democratic vehicles of the Internet, because the “right of reply” is already inherent to them, in the comments box that any reader can use after reading the posts. That is what makes Web 2.0 unique. The reader has a voice here: each post has space for comments, compliments, criticisms, “right of reply” etc. Then there is the flexibility: we can always “correct” texts written, adding something or cutting off any eventual mistake.

The MP's fear of losing control over the free expression of all citizens is shown in item I of Article 57-D of the bill, which prohibits news pieces dealing with electoral research regarding the campaign and candidates, including:

Art. 57-D - It is forbidden for content providers and multimedia services, as well as media companies on the Internet, in their content available on the web pages:

I - To transmit, albeit in the form of journalistic interviews, images, text or sound about electoral research conducted, or any other kind of popular consultation about the elections where it is possible to identify the [candidate] interviewed or where there is data manipulation.

In other words, besides forbidding comments about any candidate, no online vehicle, including blogs, will be able to mention electoral research results, even if in a critical or journalistic instance. An online article that a netcitizen eventually writes can not bear the names of candidates, parties, coalitions, images, videos or other means to identify them. According to Arturios Maximus, from the Visão Panorâmica [pt] blog, the behavior of the members of parliament reveals a fear of having their personal lives exposed [pt] by the work of individual netcitizens:

A fantasia de honradez de hombridade e de progressividade longamente cultivada diante das lentes da televisão e dos gravadores de jornalistas subservientes e tolhidos por empresas dependentes de publicidade e de financiamentos públicos; de repente se torna a carantonha feia e asquerosa, corroída pela corrupção e por toda sorte de vícios e ilicitudes cometidos ao longo de décadas de dissimulação estudada, tolerada e incentivada. Do dia para a noite o “nobre senador” ou o “nobre deputado” vê sua verdadeira imagem de escroque oportunista exposta aos quatro ventos para quem quiser ver; bem ali, ao alcance de um simples clique do mouse.

There is a fantasy of nobility righteousness and of progressiveness cultivated for such a long time through the television cameras and voice recorders of subservient journalists, paralyzed by media companies dependent on advertising and public funding; suddenly, their large faces become disgusting and ugly, corroded by corruption and all sorts of vices and illegal acts committed over decades of studied, tolerated and encouraged slyness. Overnight, the “noble senator” or the “noble deputy” sees his true opportunistic swindler image exposed to the four winds for all to see, right there, within reach of a simple mouse click.

Member of Parliament Flávio Dino, who co-authored the controversial bill, gives a lesson in empty rhetoric, acknowledging that the Internet, radio and TV are all the same but at the same time denying that he had acknowledged so in an interview for the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo [pt]:

“A internet não é igual a rádio e televisão, mas é também rádio, é também televisão. É também equivalente a jornal e a revista. Então, o regime jurídico tem que ser também misto, tem que ser também híbrido. A equiparação absoluta que nós fizemos foi apenas em relação aos debates. Ou seja, se é feito um debate em um portal comercial e em uma rede comercial de TV há que se observar as mesmas regras que são democráticas. São as regras de garantir voz para todos”.

“The Internet is not like radio and television, but it is also like radio, like television. It is also equivalent to newspapers and magazines. Then, the legal system must also be mixed, it must be hybrid too. The absolute comparison we made was only for debates. That is, if a debate is hosted by a commercial portal and by a TV network, they must observe the same democratic rules. These are rules to ensure a voice for everyone”.

Marcelo Träsel, in his homonyms blog [pt], analyses the problems of comparing media traditionally linked to the market with Internet individuals, noting that the private nature of the Internet does not allow it to be treated in the same way as mainstream television channels, radio and press:

O maior problema é a comparação da Internet com rádio e televisão, completamente falaciosa. As regras para propaganda e jornalismo em rádio e televisão são mais restritivas por se tratarem de concessões públicas. A Internet não exige uma concessão para que qualquer pessoa ou instituição possa se manifestar, portanto não pode seguir as mesmas regras de rádio e televisão. Nas redes de computadores, os candidatos podem ocupar espaços livremente, sem depender da chancela de um jornalista ou empresário de comunicação. Assim, as possibilidades de manipulação por parte do poder econômico são muito menores — embora existam.

The biggest problem is that the comparison of the Internet to radio and television is completely misleading. The rules for advertising and journalism on radio and television are more restrictive because they are public concessions. The Internet does not require a grant to any person or institution for it to manifest itself, so we can not apply the same rules applied to radio and television. In computer networks, the candidates can occupy spaces freely, without depending on the support of a journalist or media manager. Thus, the scope for manipulation by the economic power is much lower - although it is still there.

The disservice done by this piece of legislature to the press and Web 2.0 reaches unimaginable proportions for a 21st century that is free from dictatorial moorings. The lone netcitizen has been legally obliged to behave as a media entrepreneur, unable to analyse the posture of candidates and the conduct of the elections in his country, and has had his constitutionally guaranteed right of expression restricted. Another shovel full of earth on the fragile democratic state.

Translated by Paula Góes