Seventy two hours after the election, the National Electoral Council [es] (Consejo Nacional Electoral, CNE) released the official results of the quick count, according to which the ruling party will have at least 96 of the 137 seats in the new Assembly. This means that the ruling party will have a majority in the Assembly, allowing it to approve laws that are still in discussion, but it will not have an absolute majority.

After hearing the official results, the reaction from Ecuadorian bloggers was quick.

On the blog Realidad Ecuador (Reality Ecuador), in a post titled “Ecuador's political future” [es], Juan Pablo Martínez writes:

La agenda del gobierno para los próximos cuatro años parece bastante clara. Primero, la tónica de los últimos años continuará, tanto en los aspectos positivos, como la inversión social, como en los aspectos negativos, como los ataques contra la libertad de expresión. Segundo, el plan de trabajo de Rafael Correa, que espero analizar a profundidad en artículos posteriores, incluye algunos puntos que darán mucho de qué hablar como la “Revolución del conocimiento y de las capacidades” y la “Revolución agraria”.

The government's agenda for the next four years seems quite clear. Firstly, the tonic of the last few years will continue, with all its positive aspects, such as social investment [es], as well as its negative aspects, such as attacks on freedom of expression [es]. Secondly, Rafael Correa's work plan [es], which I hope to analyze in depth in subsequent articles, includes some points which will give people much to talk about, like the “Knowledge and skills revolution” and the “Agrarian revolution”.

For Martínez, there are various questions, including what will the be the future for the new opposition lead by Guillermo Lasso, the candidate with the second largest number of votes in this election.

Results from the quick count. Image posted by the National Electoral Council (CNE)

Una de las posibles conclusiones de los últimos comicios es que Guillermo Lasso se ha posicionado como la principal cara de la oposición al régimen. Lasso, a diferencia de Gutiérrez, Noboa, Nebot (quien es muy poco popular fuera de Guayaquil), o quien sea que represente a Bucaram, no parece generar un amplio rechazo o resistencia entre los ecuatorianos. Después de conocer los resultados electorales, el exbanquero afirmó que “de cero nos hemos convertido en la segunda fuerza política del Ecuador.”

One conclusion that can be drawn from the last elections is that Guillermo Lasso has positioned himself as the main face of opposition against the regime. Lasso, unlike Gutiérrez, Naboa, Nebot (who has little popularity outside Guayaquil), or whoever represents Bucaram, does not seem to generate widespread rejection or resistance among Ecuadorians. On hearing the election results, the former banker affirmed that “from zero we have become the second largest political force in Ecuador.” [es].

In addition, Martínez argues that Lasso should be very selective when choosing his political companions in the next few years:

Lasso deberá mantenerse como un candidato de centro-derecha, con interés en políticas sociales dirigidas a la reducción de la pobreza, y ser cauteloso en no asociarse con grupos dogmáticos de derecha que son fuertes en el Ecuador (léase libertarios). Rodearse de personas con esas creencias podría llevarlo a posturas que, además de ser perjudiciales para el país, resultarían impopulares en sus aspiraciones presidenciales (por ejemplo, pretender revertir el énfasis que el gobierno actual ha puesto en la inversión social).

Lasso should maintain his status as a center-right candidate, with an interest in social policies aimed at poverty reduction [es], and be careful not to associate himself with dogmatic right-wing groups that are strong in Ecuador (read: libertarians). Surrounding himself with people with these beliefs could lead him to positions that, in addition to being damaging for the country, would be unpopular for his presidential aspirations (for example, reversing the emphasis that the current government has placed on social investment).

The blogger also wonders who will take Rafael Correa's place as the candidate for the PAIS Alliance when Correa finishes his presidential mandate, if he does not reform the constitution to allow for his reelection:

Bajo el supuesto de que Correa cumpla su palabra de no cambiar las leyes para buscar ser reelegido en el 2017, Alianza País deberá empezar a decidir quién será el encargado de tomar la posta como candidato presidencial. ¿Empezará Correa a brindar más protagonismo a su sucesor? De ser así, ¿desde cuándo? ¿El sucesor se elegirá a través de un proceso de elecciones primarias dentro del partido o será directamente seleccionado por Correa? Si bien será difícil para Alianza País posicionar un sucesor fuerte ante la sombra de un líder como Correa.

Supposing that Correa keeps his word not to change the law in order to get reelected in 2017, the PAIS Alliance should start to decide who will take over his post as presidential candidate. Will Correa start to give a greater role to his successor? If that is the case, when? Will the successor be chosen through a primary election process within the party or will they be selected directly by Correa? It will be difficult for the PAIS Alliance to position a strong successor in the shadow of a leader like Correa.

Meanwhile, blogger Anita Parada Cotrina [es] reflects on the candidates that are elected every four years. In her post titled “Ecuador's 2013 Elections. Personal opinion” [es], Parada comments that citizens should be responsible when they choose their candidates:

Un buen o mal manejo de la política es una consecuencia no una causa, y su alcance social, del que somos parte nos afecta a todos, pero también depende de todos. Cuando somos responsables en el rol que nos corresponde, estamos promoviendo un sistema justo.

Si queremos que nuestros representantes sean gente bien preparada y justa, debemos ser eso nosotros mismos, así cambiaremos nuestra representatividad. Para explicar esto inventaré un ejemplo: si 7 de cada 10 personas son corruptas, hay un 70% de posibilidades de que el representante que se eliga [sic] sea corrupto, pero si personalmente 4 de esas personas quisieran cambian y lo hicieran, y ahora solo 3 de cada 10 son corruptos, la posibilidad de que el próximo gobernante sea corrupto baja dramaáticamente a un 30%.

Good or bad political management is a consequence and not a cause, and its social significance, of which we are a part, affects us all, but also depends on us all. When we take responsibility for our roles, we promote a fair system.

If we want our representatives to be well-qualified, fair people, we must be these things ourselves, in order to change our representation. To explain this I will use an example: if 7 out of every 10 people are corrupt, there is a 70% change that the representative they elect will be corrupt. But if 4 of these people personally want to change and do so, and now only 3 out of every 10 people are corrupt, the chances of the next leader being corrupt reduces dramatically to 30%.

Finally, Parada emphasizes that, in order to have better representatives, every Ecuadorian should make an effort to be a better citizen.

Por cada persona que decida hacer la diferencia y ser el mejor ciudadano que puede ser, aumenta las posibilidades de tener un mejor representante.

For each person that decides to make a difference and be the best citizen that they can be, the chances of having a better representative increase.

Written by Gina Yauri · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

On Twitter Bettina Riffel [pt] summarised in a few characters what Jeremias intended to do at the Conference. According to her:

Jeremias Vunjanhe pretender expor a atuação da Vale em Téte (Moçambiq), onde explora uma das maiores minas de carvão a céu aberto do mundo.

Jeremias Vunjanhe. Photo from his Facebook profile.

Jeremias is a journalist and advisor to community organisations, as well as a member of the NGO Justiça Ambiental – Amigos da Terra Moçambique (Environmental Justice – Friends of the Earth Mozambique).

In this video [pt], recorded by Friends of the Earth in 2010, and in this interview [pt], from 2011, conducted by the Instituto Humanitas Unisinos (Humanitas Institute of the University of Vale do Rio dos Sinos), he tells how coal extraction in Mozambique directly affects millions of families and causes environmental damage:

O projeto da Vale Moçambique consiste na pesquisa, prospecção e exploração mineira na bacia carbonífera de Moatize, uma das maiores reservas de carvão mineral não exploradas do mundo e de elevadíssima qualidade. (…) Há desrespeito dos mais elementares direitos humanos e liberdades básicas consagradas na Constituição da República de Moçambique e demais legislação em vigor.(…) Também há violação dos direitos à informação, à habitação adequada, ao trabalho e ao digno padrão de vida, às práticas e modos de vida tradicionais comunitários, bem como o acesso e preservação de patrimônios culturais materiais e imateriais.

On his Facebook profile [pt], Jeremias himself confirmed the deportation:

De facto fui deportado do aeroporto Internacional de São Paulo no passado dia 12 de Junho corrente quando eram as 1 horas e 30 minutos. Não me foi dada nenhuma explicação plausível e consistente sobre a decisão do Departamento da Policia.

The Comitê Popular da Copa (People's Cup Committee), which brings together civil society organisations and communities affected by infrastructure projects in the cities that will host the FIFA World Cup in 2014, asked [pt] on their Twitter profile:

@comitepopoa Por que Jeremias Vunjanhe entrou na lista do SINPI? Quais são os critérios para inclusão? Outros ativistas estão na lista?

Paulo Pavesi commented on the matter [pt] in the post “Jeremias Vunjanhe and Democracy”. He wrote:

O governo brasileiro tem praticado a democracia de uma forma bastante interessante. Expulsando, demonizando, impedindo, calando aqueles que são contrários às medidas políticas ou que expõem o governo de alguma forma.

Neither the Federal Police nor the National Database of Wanted and Banned Persons justified the action. However, after the mobilisation of more than 100 [pt] national and international movements and organisations, the journalist returned to Brazil on the 18 June, six days after being deported.

The Coletivo Catarse (Catarse Collective) [pt] filmed Jeremias Vunjanhe's arrival in Brazil. In the video [pt], Jeremias gives an interview and recounts what he has heard about Vale, the consequences for Mozambican families and the company's broken promises:

Finally in Rio de Janeiro, Jeremias was able to participate in planned events, such as the Anticorporation March, which generated the launch of the Report on the Unsustainability of Vale, and of the Third International Meeting of those Affected by Vale.

In addition to the NGO Justiça Ambiental, other organisations denounced Vale's activities during the Summit [pt], such as: Articulação Internacional dos Atingidos pela Vale (Interntional Articulation of those Affected by Vale), Via Campesina, Marcha Mundial das Mulheres (World March of Women), Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Pastoral Land Commission), the union United Steelworkers (USW), Movimento Xingu Vivo para Sempre (Xingu Alive Forever Movement, a movement against the Belo Monte dam project) and Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens (Movement of those Affected by Dams).

In an interview with the Instituto Humanitas Unisinos after Rio+20, the journalist characterised the event's final proposals as “too theoretical” [pt].

After returning to Mozambique, Jeremias shared a thank you [pt] on Facebook to all those who helped during those weeks “of so much incredible turbulence, emotion and adrenaline”. On the 16 July, he denounced [pt] the relationship between the former president of Vale and the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza:

Roger Agnelli, antido presidente da Vale entre 2001 e 2011 acaba de confirmar aquilo alguns de nos ja sabiamos. Ele faz parte do Conselho do Presidente de Mocambique Armando Emilio Guebuza. Na verdadeRoger Agnelli tornou-se um super lobbista da Vale e do Governo brasileiro e depois de ter vencido a ofenciva capitalista em Mocambique com o Projecto de Mineracao de Moatize foi escolhido pelo tambem loobista Armando Guebuza para ser um dos seus conselheiros. Como dizia uma companheira ha pouco ele participa de todas as decisões estratégicas do país quanto a mineração e possivelmente a energia e produção agrícola…

Vale, which is present in 38 countries in the Americas, Africa and Asia, was voted the worst company in the world, by popular vote, in the Public Eye Awards at the beginning of 2012.

Written by Yohana de Andrade · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [pt] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Thousands of people took to the streets to show their support for the Spanish miners, and joined them when they arrived in Madrid after walking 400 kilometres from the north of Spain. The protest began at 10pm on Tuesday 10 June, 2012, in La Moncloa, the seat of the government, and finished in Madrid's puerta del Sol plaza around 2am. The coal miners are protesting against the austerity measures and subsidy cuts imposed by Mariano Rajoy's government.

The gathering to welcome the so-called “Black March” took place in an emotional atmosphere charged with solidarity. The citizens gathered there welcomed the miners with applause, words of admiration, sympathetic slogans and with their own anthem, which was sung during the whole march through the centre of the capital. The miners showed their surprise at the scale of the mobilisation, which added to the intensity of what is known in social networks as the #nocheminera (mining night) [es].

The Black March passes through the centre of Madrid. Photo by Ismael Naranjo

Among the most common slogans were “Yes we can!”, “Yes, yes they do represent us!” and “This is our lineup!”, in reference to Spain's recent victory in the UEFA European Football Championship. This much was clear: those supporting the workers feel prouder and identify more with the working class than with politicians or football players.

The coal miners not only lit up the streets with their headlamps: they also represented a light for the protesters in a broader sense. Many other sectors identified with their cause, including anarchists, indignados from the 15-M movement, and people of all ages and from various regions throughout Spain. Because it is a strongly rebellious protest, more so than other protests carried out in Spain, the miners’ struggle has become the heart of the workers’ protest movement and the most radical rejection of the government's cutbacks.

The video below shows protesters expressing their solidarity with the striking miners [es] (video by Juan Luis Sánchez):

Through social networks, many people encouraged the miners to continue fighting against the cutbacks that could lead to the disappearance of their sector. A large number of tweeters stated that they felt proud of the Spanish miners through their messages and the hashtag #yosoyminero (I am a miner). As was the case with previous protests, it was the social networks that spread most information, confronted with what users denounced as #silenciomediático (media silence).

The historic miners’ protest started up again on the morning of Wednesday 11th of July. However, it turned out to be a much more terrible day than the previous one, due to violent confrontations between riot police and protesters. More than 76 people were injured in the conflicts [es] and about ten were arrested.

This post is part of our special coverage Europe in Crisis.

Written by Elena Arrontes · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (4)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Meanwhile, the media are reporting on its progress, and publishing editorials [es] on the real purpose of the march, stressing above all its political and ideological affiliations; and government spokespeople declare [es] that in reality “there is an excess of water in Cajamarca”.

The media does not have a standard figure on the number of people who departed from Celendín on February 1. While Terra.pe writes [es] of 200 people, EFE counts [es] 300. Newspaper El Comercio mentions [es] that 600 community landowners started the journey, and RPP indicates [es] that 300 people arrived at Cajamarca's Plaza de Armas to sleep overnight and continue marching the next day.

The blog Seamos un río (Let's be a river) reproduced [es] what was published by Marcio Arana, one of the march's organisers:

Salimos a las 4am, nos reunimos en la plaza de armas de Celendin. Líderes ronderos, mujeres, jóvenes, músicos, maestros, comunicadores, vamos llegando. No hace mucho frio y una suave llovizna nos anuncia que la tierra fértil la está esperando y que los pequeños ríos van a juntarse hasta formar el Gran Rio de Vida que es nuestra Marcha. [...]

La noche anterior habían llegado los responsables de barrios trayendo sus aportes económicos para apoyar a los caminantes. Hasta la colecta de profesores, maestros católicos y una niña que en nombre de sus padres dona 20 nuevos soles son aplaudidos. En Lima no faltan políticos que se preguntan quién financia la marcha. Los políticos financiados por grandes grupos de poder económico jamás comprenderán la fuerza y el poder de las pequeñas donaciones como no están entendiendo el gran río que serán los pequeños riachuelos y manantiales.

The first moments of the march were recorded, as can be seen in these videos from users GobRegCajamarca and jampaoli [es]. There were also various statements, like this one from user MetsaRiba who captures the words of a participating campesino:

Or this one showing women from Cajamarca chanting pro-water slogans:

That same day another march took place in Cajamarca, the Jug March [es], where 2,000 people marched in favour of nature and ecology, and protested against polluting mining activities. Servindi published some photos to accompany its report on the solidarity parade held in Lima, which can also be seen on a video uploaded on YouTube [es]. On the blog Celendín Libre (Free Celendín) an itinerary for the first day of the Water March was posted [es], alongside photos of the day's events:

10:30 a.m. Primer obstáculo, una tranquera particular en plena vía pública no deja el pase a ningún vehículo. Los manifestantes proceden a retirarla.

Arribo a la Laguna Cortada (a más de 3 800 m.s.n.m.), donde unas 300 personas dan inicio a la Marcha por el Agua con un rito simbólico de agradecimiento a la mamapacha y mamacocha, por comuneros del Ámaro.

Payment to mamapacha. Image by Celendín Libre blog.

Beginning of the Water March. Image by Celendín Libre blog.

In its blog [es], an “International Observation Mission of the Great National March for the Right to Water”[es] publishes information on the march's events, as well as monitoring its peaceful development. There they share the mission's principles and objectives [es] and a list [es] of the entities supporting it. On the first day of the march they commented:

La movilización también ha sido secundada en la región norteña de La Libertad, donde un grupo numeroso de campesinos inició una marcha hacia la ciudad de Trujillo desde las provincias andinas de Huamachuco y Santiago de Chuco.

En Lima, unas 300 personas, en su mayoría jóvenes y dirigentes estudiantiles, realizaron un Pasacalle para celebrar el arranque de la Marcha que culminó en la Plaza San Martín.

The next day, the second of the march, participants from Celendín, Bambamarca and other towns departed [es] Cajamarca for Ciudad de Dios in La Libertad, where they spent the night, though not before passing through Choropampa. This is a town where in the year 2000 about 151 kg of mercury belonging to the Yanacocha mine were spilled, greatly affecting the local population. The Observation Mission reported on this day in their blog [es]. Videos [es] of the departure [es] from Cajamarca in the morning have also been uploaded to the internet.

On the third day the marchers left Ciudad de Dios, passed [es] through Pacasmayo and arrived [es] in Trujillo, where they were joined by other delegations from various towns in the La Libertad region, in numbers estimated at around 2,000 [es]. These delegations were greeted by about 5,000 people, and then a rally was held, which included discussion sessions, the presentation of petitions, and other activities as planned [es].

In a post [es] on the blog “El Maletero” “Red Verde Cajamarca” (“The Trunk” “Cajamarca Green Network”) photos from the first three days of the march can be seen. Meanwhile the blog Frente de Defensa Ambiental de Cajamarca (“Cajamarca Environmental Defense Front”) shares more photos [es] of the day in Trujillo. A post on the blog ¡Conga no va! (“Conga will not happen!”) links to a set of photos on Flickr taken in Trujillo.

Twitpic user @YoDash posted some photos of the protest in Trujillo's Plaza de Armas, like this one:

Water March in Trujillo, image from Twitpic user @YoDash

Meanwhile, on Facebook the Water March's page reports [es] that in Trujillo defamatory flyers [es] were distributed, attempting to link the March and its organisers with terrorist movements. In spite of this, the protest continued in the Plaza de Armas until night time with various musical numbers, some of them related to the march and surrounding circumstances, as can be seen in this video posted on YouTube by user Fuzzerjoga:

In the Observation Mission's daily report [es] they note some incidents during a strike carried out in Huarmey:

La Comisión Nacional Organizadora de la Gran Marcha Nacional del Agua ha reportado y denuncia una acción represiva por parte de efectivos policiales. El jueves en la noche, en Huarmey, uno de los puntos de concentración previstos en la Marcha, se produjeron enfrentamientos entre la policía y la población en el marco de un paro de 48 horas contra la minera Antamina, a la que acusan de contaminar el acuífero que les provee de agua potable.

On the fourth day of the march, Saturday 4, the protesters stayed in Trujillo to rest, but they also continued holding discussions and making contact with the local population. On Sunday 5, the fifth day of the march, the group left [es] for the city of Chimbote. The Water March's Facebook page uploaded a video [es] of their arrival in the village of Santa, just before Chimbote. Once in the city they met [es] with the Fisherman's Union, and then left for the city of Casma, following the route South towards Lima.

Meanwhile the Observation Mission's fourth report [es] stresses the government's attitude towards the problem of mining companies and water, bringing together various statements and declarations, including:

- El pronunciamiento del Colegio de Ingenieros del Perú, señalando que: “El Gobierno Peruano, desde la época republicana y hasta la fecha, no tiene una visión de desarrollo sostenido, ya que ha cimentado gran parte de su crecimiento en la explotación minera”.

- El presidente Ollanta Humala señaló que “ningún proyecto se paralizará por la consulta previa, y que esto no es un pretexto para que se detenga la inversión”, en referencia a la falta de la reglamentación de la ley que debía estar lista en diciembre pasado. En agosto del año pasado, sin embargo, el propio presidente escribía en twitter: “El derecho a la consulta previa sobre del desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas es un signo más de inclusión social. Forjamos un Perú para todos”

En este contexto, parecen razonables las palabras de Emma Gómez, de Cooperacción: “hay una lectura equivocada del presidente Humala sobre la Consulta Previa, la cual está siendo considerada como un obstáculo para la inversión privada más que un imperativo para que las empresas extractivas cumplan con los estándares ambientales y sociales de una inversión seria y que respeten los derechos de las poblaciones en las zonas de influencia”.

Written by Juan Arellano · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (3)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

The childrens’ parents ran an astute campaign to find those responsible and bring them to justice before the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice.

In addition, they promoted a bill that would require all daycare centres in the country – public, private or mixed – to meet minimum safety requirements, assure quality standards, and submit to periodic inspections. It also includes the creation of a national register of daycare centres.

This bill has become known as the Ley 5 de Junio (5th of June Law) after the date of the tragedy, and its path to approval has been a difficult one. It passed through the Senate in the last days of ordinary sessions (at the end of April this year), meaning that it had to wait until September to be discussed and approved in the Chamber of Deputies. Nevertheless, after its approval in the Chamber and after being sent to the Executive for final signature and enactment, President Felipe Calderón was reluctant to sign it.

August 2009: Protest by parents of children who died in the fire, photo by Prometeo Lucero (CC BY-NC 2.0)

Faced with this fact, Mexican netizens embarked on a targeted campaign to generate pressure. Thanks to this exercise of collective citizenship, the President has conceded and announced the enactment of the law at his residence yesterday, Monday, October 24. Here are some of the reactions on Twitter.

Daniel Gershenson (@alconsumidor) [es], one of the main promoters of this law on Twitter, couldn't hide his joy:

Nada más fuerte, que el poder de una gran idea cuyo momento ha llegado « #ley5deJunio #GuarderiaABC, VA

Manuel Robles (@mroblesmx) [es] expresses his admiration and respect for these parents who played with the rules of politics to achieve their objective:

Respeto y admiración para los padres de #GuarderiaAbc . Saludo a quienes les han acompañado en su peregrinar #Ley5deJunio.

Jesús Robles Maloof (@roblesmaloof) [es], pointed out the importance of the law:

Increíble que no existiera una regulación integral de todos los centros de atención a la infancia. Gracias a la #Ley5deJunio ahora la habrá

Oscar López (@oscarl) [es] highlights the importance of this citizen achievement:

#ley5dejunio El logro de un movimiento de una tragedia que indignó a todo el país. Es lo mínimo que merece la memoria de aquellos niños(as)

Julio Márquez (@juliomarquez1) [es], father of Yeye, sends out an emotional message in 140 characters:

Gritenlo todos en TW¡¡¡¡ Mañana se publica #Ley5dejunio. Mis lagrimas hoy son de agradecimiento a ustedes, en nombre de mi hijito Yeye y mio

Written by Miguel Angel Guevara · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Maybe this is a result of the virtual stalemate shown in the polls. The first [es] polls showed a distance of between 6 and 8 percentage points between Humala (who was in first place) and Keiko. The next [es] polls showed a difference of between 5 and 3.8 percentage points between the two candidates. Later polls [es] gave a difference of 1 or 2 points but this time with Fujimori in the lead, displacing Humala as the electoral favourite. And some of the latest [es] polls confirm this trend while others show Humala making a comeback.

Candidates Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori

For many voters this second round is just the way Mario Vargas Llosa described [es] it after he heard the results of the first round: “Humala or Keiko? That's like choosing between AIDS and cancer, a rather academic discussion.” A lot of people are resisting voting for Alberto Fujimori‘s daughter as they say they fear the return of the people who participated in her father's corrupt regime. On the other hand, many won't vote for Humala for fear of returning to an outdated model like communism, and falling under the influence of ‘chavismo‘.

But is that really how things are? At this crossroads where Peruvians find themselves, the mass media should be fulfilling an informative and clarifying role, but this is far from reality. A recent poll shows [es] that the public sees the candidate for Fuerza 2011, Keiko Fujimori, as receiving greatest support from the media (48.3%). Ollanta Humala, on the other hand, is seen as having greater media support by about the same percentage of people who think neither candidate receives media support (18.1%).

This perception is not gratuitous – a few weeks ago it was made public [es] that two journalists from the cable TV chanel CanalN were fired “for not supporting Keiko Fujimori”. Meanwhile, there were rumours [es] that another 4 journalists quit their jobs at the newspaper Perú 21 “for not attacking Ollanta Humala in their writing.” Coincidentally both media outlets are owned by the same group of companies.

Gustavo Gorriti, journalist for IDL-Reporteros, recently declared [es] that there is a media front against Humala. Among other things he said that when talking about the threat that Ollanta's tendencies towards authoritarianism and chavismo pose to democracy, the media immediately support and promote Fujimori's candidacy, without considering that it may pose a much more serious threat to democracy and human rights.

But it is not only a question of bias in a large section of the media, but also of events that involve various levels of violence, and that make it clear that fear, an element that is present mainly in the counter-campaign against Humala, figures not only discursively, but also in reality and, unfortunately, it comes in varying degrees from both sides.

Javier Fernández from the blog Javi270270, reported [es] on the attack, or ‘escrache‘, of journalist Jaime de Altahus on leaving the television channel where he works (Canal N). A group of people (Javier mentions a Colectivo Dignidad [es] (Dignity Collective) that called a sit-in at the entrance to the channel's building, protesting their pro-Fujimori stance) surrounded and blocked the passage of the journalist's vehicle, while protesting against him with epithets of varying levels of offensiveness:

lo que ha pasado ayer a Altahus no es nada nuevo. Ciertamente es una salida que algún grupo ha decidido frente a tanta parcialización de los medios como la que describió Gustavo Gorriti casi a la misma hora.

In addition, Javier points out the lightness with which other media described the attack as coming from “Humalist mobs”. Altahus himself later stated [es]: “I don't know what their relationship is to Humala [...] but they were obviously defending the position of Ollanta Humala”. Carlos Quiróz from the blog Peruanista mentions [es] that there could have been infiltrators in the protest who carried out the violent acts in order to later incriminate Humala's supporters.

Another confusing event took place against Keiko Fujimori herself in the jungle region of Satipo. When the candidate was getting out of the truck that had taken her to a meeting, someone threw an egg at the vehicle. Media outlets like El Comercio talked [es] of eggs and stones, while in La República they wrote [es] that the incident had been exaggerated and reported on attacks by Fujimori's security personnel against the journalists that tried to record the incident. Matte from the blog Lugares Comunes (Common Places) writes [es]:

Rápidamente, la candidata acusó a Ollanta Humala del ataque a través de su cuenta de twitter. Sin embargo, podría tratarse de un montaje hecho por la candidatura fujimorista. [...] Según fuentes policiales, quienes atacaron a Fujimori habrían sido empleados municipales. [...] (esto) nos recuerda al incendio del Banco de la Nación, en Lima, durante la Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos, para acusar de ser violentos a quienes luchaban por la democracia.

A third incident comes, supposedly, from Fujimori's side. César Lévano, director of the newspaper La Primera, which has anti-Fujimori tendencies, was sent a wreath of flowers, like those used at funerals. Lévano himself wrote [es] that the message was meant to discourage his sources, who have shown fundamental veracity and strategic location. He added that the newspaper's information on the Plan “Sábana” (“Sheet” Plan) [es] has had international repercussions. In the blog Elecciones2011 (Elections2011) they comment [es] that:

Y aunque nadie se explica de donde salieron ambas coronas, esta práctica se realizaba en los años 90 (NdA: los años del fujimorismo) para intimidar a los periodistas.

These three incidents, among others, illustrate in a special way the dynamics of the current political campaign, in which the media are playing an important role, although for some it is a negative one. In the magazine Mariátegui‘s blog, there are some conclusions [es] on the matter:

Los medios de comunicación masivos pretenden calumniar a Ollanta y ensalzar a Keiko Fujimori, sin ningún tipo de reclamo. La victimización de la prensa y el constante clima de polarización incitan a periodistas como Renzo Mazzei a justificar la campaña mediática denunciada por Gustavo Gorriti sobre el cargamontón de El Comercio contra Ollanta. [...] Si el ambiente sigue con manipulaciones en medios y en encuestas que difieren abismalmente, vendrán más incidentes que pondrá en frente no sólo a fujimoristas y nacionalistas, sino a los medios, los colectivos y los jóvenes como en el 2000 …

From a similar perspective but with various differences, Renzo Mazzei writes [es] in his blog El Aliento de la Cebolla (Onion Breath):

Observo a diario que muchos de los simpatizantes humalistas pifean las preguntas de los periodistas referidas a temas que seguramente no son del agrado del candidato. Algunos periodistas han sido empujados, golpeados y hasta acorralados como ocurrió con Jaime de Altahus. Hay que recordarle al señor Humala que estos actos no solo le quitan votos sino que además justican para muchos esa campaña mediática de la que habla Gustavo Gorriti. Al señor Humala le debería preocupar no solo hablar su bendita pensión 65 o el programa SAMU sino también aquietar los apasionamiento de sus militantes. De lo contrario cualquier protesta contra alguién que anuncie su respaldo a Keiko Fujimori será relacionado con el modus operandi de algunos simpatizantes humalistas.

Meanwhile, journalist Jackqueline Fowks also stresses [es] in her blog the presence of fear in the campaign:

el miedo en una sociedad que ha vivido terrorismo, es gasolina al lado de un fósforo prendido. Los spots radiales de Confiep y el video de la Sociedad de Radio y TV son aludidos hoy por Jorge Secada Koechlin y José Villaorduña, quienes sugieren que los empresarios quieren perder algunas libertades y vendérselas a Fujimori.

What will happen in the remaining days of the campaign? Maybe the trend will continue, that is, more violent events, more polarisation and more misinformation. How will Peruvians vote in the end?

Columnist Farid Kahhat wrote [es] “It doesn't seem that how about half of Peruvians will vote in the second round can be explained by ignorance or resentment.” It probably shouldn't be explained by fear either.

Written by Juan Arellano · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (1)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

On Wednesday April 6, 2011, thousands of Mexicans in various cities throughout the country and some abroad, such as New York, Buenos Aires and Madrid, took to the streets to protest against violence. Some demanded the resignation of President Felipe Calderón, as they believe his strategy in the fight against crime and drug trafficking has exacerbated the bloodshed, according to reports by the BBC.

The murder of the son of journalist and poet Javier Sicilia [es], which happened in the state of Morelos at the end of March this year, revived a wave of indignation [es] against violence in Mexico and gave rise to the protest marches.

Mexicans protesting against violence in Mexico City's town square. Image by Alberto Millares, copyright Demotix (06/04/11).

Citizens’ reactions quickly appeared in various blogs. Víctor Hernández [es], whose opinion appears in the blog Michoacán en Resistencia (Michoacán in Resistance), celebrated the fact that the marches were organised by ordinary citizens and were not the result of a media campaign orchestrated by some political faction:

Le aplaudo a la marcha contra la violencia que se llevará a cabo hoy en diversos estados de la República el ser auténticamente ciudadana. Fue convocada por el escritor Javier Sicilia, pero su organización y difusión la hizo la gente, principalmente de clase media, por medio de redes sociales y sin la ayuda de los medios.

Por primera vez la clase media se organiza para exigir un alto a la violencia sin ser convocados a ser parte de un acto mediático de la derecha. Lo hizo la gente por si misma.

Javier Hernández Alpízar [es], for the blog Zapateando2, reproduced part of the open letter that Sicilia addressed to the government and the criminals, a document that was released before the protests. Hernández Alpízar pointed out that:

La carta, que se está convirtiendo en un documento que encarna la indignación de muchos, dice con palabras fuertes y claras lo que muchos ciudadanos ahora también suscriben: “Estamos hasta la madre de ustedes, políticos –y cuando digo políticos no me refiero a ninguno en particular, sino a una buena parte de ustedes, incluyendo a quienes componen los partidos–, porque en sus luchas por el poder han desgarrado el tejido de la nación, porque en medio de esta guerra mal planteada, mal hecha, mal dirigida, de esta guerra que ha puesto al país en estado de emergencia, han sido incapaces –a causa de sus mezquindades, de sus pugnas, de su miserable grilla, de su lucha por el poder– de crear los consensos que la nación necesita para encontrar la unidad sin la cual este país no tendrá salida (…)”.

Journalist and blogger Jenaro Villamil [es] reported that more than 10,000 people marched in Mexico City. For Villamil, the reason for the protest is clear:

Poetizados y politizados, multiclasistas e indignados, más de 10 mil personas marcharon de la explanada de Bellas Artes al Zócalo de la Ciudad de México para protestar por los efectos de la guerra contra el narcotráfico, al mismo tiempo que otros 8 mil ciudadanos, encabezados por el poeta y periodista Javier Sicilia, protestaron en Cuernavaca, el epicentro de esta protesta simultánea, a raíz de la ejecución de 7 jóvenes el pasado 28 de marzo en Temixco, Morelos.

“¡Fuera Calderón! ¡Fuera Calderón!”, gritaron durante su paso los ciudadanos convocados en las últimas 36 horas que se reunieron en un templete improvisado, frente a Palacio Nacional, en el Zócalo de la Ciudad de México. Reclamos similares se escucharon en Monterrey, Mérida, Guadalajara y decenas de ciudades más donde se escuchó el grito de protesta.

Mexicans protesting against violence in Mexico City's town square. Image by Alberto Millares, copyright Demotix (06/04/11).

Meanwhile, the administrator of the blog México Sí [es] (Yes Mexico) expressed some interesting questions relating to the marches, while making it known that his view is that the marches are against crime, not against the government, and wondered about the efficacy of these mobilisations:

¿Por qué la marcha? ¿Se acaban de dar cuenta de que existe el crimen organizado que ejerce una violencia estúpida contra nosotros? ¿Y cuál es la solución? ¿Salir la sociedad a la calle a comunicar que está en contra de la violencia? Creo que todo eso no sirve de nada, la violencia es ejercida por sicarios carentes de una formación social, tipos sin estudios la mayoría de las veces, drogadictos, alcohólicos, gente deshumanizada para los que asesinar a alguien es como cuando un vendedor hace una venta. Los sicarios son pagados por sus líderes, tipos a los que tampoco les interesa la sociedad excepto para extraernos dinero. Al momento de la marcha los sicarios estaban borrachos o drogados, los capos felices porque habían logrado el impacto que querían, tener atemorizada a la población. Si la gente está asustada, será más fácil extorsionarlos, secuestrarlos y sacarles más dinero.

And the blogger ends his post with an invitation to his readers:

No podemos dejarle la solución total de la inseguridad al estado, debemos involucrarnos y no esperar a que nos maten un hijo para empezar a protestar.

These are just some of the opinions generated by the simultaneous marches of April 6 in Mexico. Hence it is clear that there is no consensus on the reasons for the march, who is being protested against and what will be achieved. However, it will be interesting to see how the country confronts the situation of insecurity and social unrest, with a view to next year’s electoral process in which a new president will be elected and the people will be able to decide in the ballot boxes, whether to confirm the rule of the party currently in power (which is conservative) or to give their trust to a candidate from some other political camp in the hope that the situation might improve.

This post is part of our special coverage Mexico's Drug War.

Written by J. Tadeo · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (6)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

The Clarín newspaper – photo: Laura Schneider

On Sunday the 27th of March, Argentina awoke to some big news: The daily Clarín [es] could not distribute their newspapers in Buenos Aires due to a blockade at their printing plant. La Nación [es] also suffered a blockade, though theirs was shorter than Clarín’s, which lasted 12 hours.

It is important to note that this is not the first time Clarín has been blockaded, but no previous blockade has lasted long enough to prevent distribution of the newspaper to a large part of the population.

At the time of writing this post, it is still not known who is responsible for this action, as the blog Algo habré dicho [es] (I must have said something) explains:

Ayer veíamos las imágenes en TN (no había mucha más cobertura, era puro fútbol o Los Simpsons) sobre el bloqueo a la planta y nos preguntábamos si el televidente pensaría: “che, por qué es el bloqueo? por qué no enfocan una bandera, a ver que dicen…? por qué no entrevistan a alguno de los que bloquean?”

Nevertheless, Argentinian bloggers are attributing the blockade to various sectors, like, for example, Pepe in the blog Viñetas [es]:

El reciente bloqueo al diario CLARIN es la frutilla del postre de una serie de hechos e indicios evidentes, que marcan la inclinación autoritaria del gobierno de Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner.

Damian in the blog Perspectivas Críticas siglo XXI [es] (21st Century Critical Perspectives) analyses blockades carried out previously on the same newspaper, specifically by the union leader Hugo Moyano, Vice-President of the Justicialist Party of Buenos Aires Province and Secretary-General of the Argentinian General Confederation of Labour:

No es la primera vez que Moyano bloquea diarios, a fines del 2010 lo había hecho también en las plantas de Clarín y La Nación. También ha bloqueado a otros medios críticos como Perfil.

In the blog Cadena de Palabras [es] (Chain of Words), Laura Cambra looks beyond who may or may not be responsible, bearing in mind the electoral campaign which has already begun in Argentina for the 2011 presidential elections:

¿Por qué el gobierno calla? Porque, aunque quiera, no puede enfrentarse a Moyano……..¿Por qué la oposición calla? Porque sería poner a CFK (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) en posición de víctima y, por lo tanto, elevar la percepción positiva que de ella tiene el electorado………¿Por qué Clarín también calla? Porque aprovecha para victimizarse. Luego de tantos ataques, es lo que mejor sabe hacer para obtener adhesiones y no deja pasar la oportunidad de ponerse en el centro de una pelea que, en este caso, no es suya.

Some believe that it was all a show, like the blog Notero de a pie [es] (Street reporter):

Bastó un nuevo bloqueo en las puertas de sus distribuidoras para que el hombre montara un show de victimización de muy poca monta, muy barato….

However, not all bloggers are looking for those responsible for the action itself, but are instead carrying out an analysis that goes beyond what happened, like Fernando Santillan in his blog 7:50 a Retiro [es]:

El hecho es más grave porque se trata del bloqueo a dos diarios. A quienes no somos periodistas ni dueños de medios, decir que éstos merecen un tratamiento especial puede resultar por momentos molesto. Sabemos que hay casos en los que, bajo el manto de la libertad de prensa, se han cometido errores e injusticias. Pero en este caso como en pocos más, es claro que siempre hay que errar por el lado de la libertad: porque la libertad de prensa es una garantía para la vigencia de otros derechos.

The news has taken on various dimensions, and on Sunday the 27th, the Argentinian Federation of Press Workers [es] published a communiqué  on their website:

Fieles a su costumbre, los medios que integran el grupo Clarín pretenden inventar una realidad que no existe. Como si se pudiera mutar de victimarios a víctimas a partir de la ficción que el monopolio crea.

Los compañeros que son perseguidos en Artes Gráficas Rioplatenses (AGR) -perteneciente al Grupo Clarín- protestan, junto a sus familias, frente a la planta de impresión de la empresa en reclamo ante la persecución sindical que sufren los delegados. Ésa es la noticia del día.

Meanwhile, the 28th of March edition of Clarín came out with a blank front page.

Front page of the the daily Clarín on the 28th of March 2011 – photo: Laura Schneider

In summary, whether it was an attack on free expression or a union protest is still unknown, nor is it known who initiated the blockade. The blog Otra Noticia Mas [es] (Another News Story) analyses what happened so that readers can draw their own conclusions:

Cuando algo se quiere analizar realmente las preguntas para hacerse son: ¿A quién perjudica?, ¿A quién favorece? Al menos para empezar. En estos puntos creo estar en desacuerdo con muchos, no creo particularmente por la información que yo (simple ciudadano) puedo manejar, pero digo, esto. ¿A Clarín lo favorece? Creo que no porque saltan cosas que tal vez para ellos serían mejor que estén tapadas. ¿A Clarín lo perjudica? Quiero decir, le afecta económicamente? No lo creo, no al menos por un día, si fueran varios es otra cosa, pero un día lo pueden bancar. Aunque tendríamos que tener en cuenta que contra Clarín no es solo esta vez la que se le han hecho cosas similares que afecten su negocio con lo cual si lo prolongamos en el tiempo tal vez la respuesta sea sí.

Al oficialismo lo favorece? A mi modo de ver, no, porque mucha gente que está de acuerdo con ellos les puede parecer que si bien Clarín no les agrada, no es la forma.¿Al Oficialismo lo perjudica? Creo que aunque más no sea de costado sí.Entonces habiendo tantas dudas, por mi parte lo que voy a hacer es: buscar a otros que tal vez parecen estar más afuera del círculo que pueden salir beneficiados, mi abuelito decía, a rio revuelto ganancia de pescadores.

Written by Laura Schneider · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [es] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Intended to be a party, Obama’s first visit to Brazil was marked by the controversial decision to intervene militarily in Libya, in addition to the “covering up” of the favela shanty towns and police repression of protesters.

Obama go home

Even before touching down on Brazilian soil, Obama's visit was already causing controversy. Early on the night of Friday 18 March, 2011, a protest outside the United States Consulate in Rio ended in violence. Of the more than 300 activists present, thirteen were arrested after a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the Consulate, according to the police, who reacted with rubber bullets, pepper spray and tear gas.

The Youtube video above posted on March 18, shows people singing slogans against Obama’s visit, America’s supposed interest in Brazilian petroleum and the imminent attack on Libya. From 1 minute 45 seconds, the sound of explosions can be heard, followed by running.

In the comments box, user graficautopica [pt] negates the police version:

Este espírito pacífico era compartilhado pelos manifestantes. Entendemos que transformar a passeata em uma batalha apenas favoreceria o imperialismo, evitando que se discuta as verdadeiras intenções da visita. Neste sentido, desconhecemos os autores do ataque e queremos vir a público declarar nossa desconfiança de que provocadores tenham se infiltrado no ato, com esse objetivo.

Those detained were accused of causing bodily harm, attempted arson and conspiracy. In the blogosphere, they are being called political prisoners. For Anderson Balotta [pt], the case has been poorly explained:

pelo que pude perceber se tratou de uma prisão arbitrária de militantes que estavam passando no local e hora e acabaram pagando pelo pato. Novos presos políticos no país da democracia, justamente na visita de Obama e a contradição em alto, che cosa bella, mia gente!!!
Não espere ouvir um parecer da grande mídia (porque esta, está comprometida com as belezas da visita de Obama).

About an hour after Barack Obama left, the Court released a ruling in favour of releasing the protesters, who are now free.

US President Obama is received in Brazilian capital Brasilia. Image by William Volcov, copyright Demotix (19/03/11).

Between Dilma and Libya

The first stage of the trip to Brasília was marked by the decision to launch a military attack on Libya [pt], which was made by Obama, according to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, during a meeting with president Dilma Rousseff. Obama received a note and reacted by saying that “measures” must be taken.

For José Reinaldo Carvalho [pt], editor of the site Vermelho (Red), Obama disgraced Brazil by starting a “war disguised as a humanitarian cause” there:

Em atitude que viola as regras da hospitalidade, constrangendo o anfitrião, Obama simplesmente desonrou o Brasil, ao fazer uma declaração de guerra no país que por princípio constitucional e tradição advoga a solução pacífica dos conflitos internacionais. O presidente estadunidense ignorou o fato de que o Brasil se absteve na votação da resolução do Conselho de Segurança da ONU que abriu a via legal para a agressão, “por não estar seguro de que o uso da força é o melhor caminho”, conforme explicou a embaixadora Viotti, representante do Brasil no órgão das Nações Unidas.

For the Americans to see

Residents of Cidade de Deus find ways to have fun during Obama’s visit. Twitpic author's name withheld by request

President Obama made a frantic trip through Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, dedicating half an hour of his time to the shantytown, or favela, Cidade de Deus (City of God), where his lightning-fast visit generated new controversy: residents complained of the “covering up” of the favela to make it look presentable and criticised the security rules imposed by the White House, such as a 300 metre isolation cordon which forced residents from their homes, and the body searches imposed on everyone, including children.

In the face of these requirements, Rio’s Central Única das Favelas (Unified Favela Centre) removed itself from the organisation of the event, refusing to “be used as an exotic stage” [pt]. Its founder, Celso Athayde, let off steam [pt] in various Twitter messages:

Vou tuitar para o consulado para eles não tirarem as pessoas de casa, e não revistar os pretinhos de 3 anos de idade dentro da própria casa

Here he summarises the visit [pt] from the residents’ point of view:

é isso, eu vou na sua casa, mas eu não quero vc em casa. Uma questão de segurança. Então fica na casa branca irmão

A video of the collaborative community coverage [pt] published on the blog A Voz da Cidade de Deus (The Voice of Cidade de Deus) shows what wasn’t shown on television:

mostra sem maquiagem os bastidores do evento e a frustação dos moradores da comunidade em não ter visto o presidente dos E.U.A. Alem disso o video mostra um morador que reclama de um policial que o agrediu.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4YRkIFPYFAU

In summary

Summarising the main events related to the visit, Cristina Rodrigues [pt] points out what she calls the regression of Brazil’s foreign policy:

Nossos ministros foram revistados por americanos em território brasileiro para participar de evento com Barack Obama. Em cima da hora, por medo de vaias, a comitiva de Obama desiste do discurso em público e o Theatro Municipal é obrigado a cancelar sua programação para receber o presidente americano. Moradores da Cidade de Deus são obrigados a sair de suas casas (!!) para a passagem de Obama pela favela. Isso sem falar que foi daqui que Obama ordenou a invasão à Líbia.

O problema não é demonstrar prestígio a um presidente de outra nação. Tampouco criar condições especiais para que uma cidade receba uma liderança assim com segurança e conforto, fazendo-lhe algumas de suas vontades. O problema está no nível das exigências feitas por essa liderança e a necessidade de o país se rebaixar para cumpri-las. Isso um governo soberano não pode deixar acontecer.

Obama and Christ the Redeemer, on Twitpic, by @anglinho

Rudá Ricci [pt] does not know how to evaluate Obama’s visit which, for him, highlighted the editorial poverty of the Brazilian press:

Não soubemos o que faz Obama ser tão criticado em seu país por estar aqui; não soubemos claramente sua pauta (aviões? incorporação efetiva do país ao eixo ocidental liderado pelos EUA? Pré-sal?); análise dos acordos assinados. Sem saber claramente seus objetivos não conseguimos analisar seu sucesso.

Written by Paula Góes · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [pt] · comments (5)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

1 Kwanza from blog Aerograma

The author of the blog After all I’m just a boy walking around [pt] explains the purpose of reintroducing of the coins:

Com este objectivo pretende-se defender o consumidor, contribuindo para maior rigor nos trocos e menores perdas por parte deste. Ainda hoje ao almoço, a conta acabava em 7,50 kwanzas o que não me fez receber os 2,50 kwanzas a que tinha direito (mesmo sendo um valor residual, somado muitas vezes, dá um valor grande). Num país com extrema pobreza parece-me uma medida adequada a proteger os mais pobres.

The use of the coins has caused some suspicion among the population. According to the newspaper Jornal de Angola [Angola Newspaper, pt], “for many, they are a hurdle, because shopkeepers refuse to accept them”. However there are those who defend the circulation of the coins, arguing that they should be circulating in the formal and informal market, due to the “poor conservation of small bills” which are currently in circulation.

Afonso Loureiro of the blog Aerograma writes [pt] on this matter:

Faz sentido que se cunhem moedas para substituir as notas de denominações mais baixas, que se estragam muito depressa. Por trocar de mãos muitas vezes por dia, a vida média de uma nota de 50 kwanzas deve ser de apenas alguns meses, por exemplo.

Foreign Banknotes from Flickr user DanieVDM, CC Licensed (Remixed)

The question of coins in Angola has inspired artists, such as Manuel Guedes dos Santos Lima, who in his poem “Kwanza” makes a poetic joke about the Kwanza (the biggest river in Angola), and the national currency of the same name. The author of MultiBlog published his poem and says that “Angola’s real currency is the dollar”.

In fact, with the coins in circulation, the Angolan government is trying to curtail the use of the currency which really has reign over the country, the dollar. The American currency has found its way into the national market thanks to the political and military instability from which Angola has suffered; the country was for almost 30 years absorbed in war, a struggle between the two major national political parties, Unita and MPLA.

According to the newspaper O País [The Country, pt], price-setting policy is still under evaluation due to the coexistence of the two currencies in Angolan daily life, a practice which has its roots in the habits of the general population, and although advised against by the National Institute of Consumer Protection (INADEC, Instituto Nacional de Defesa do Consumidor), it is naturally difficult to change.

Written by Clara Onofre · Translated by Kitty Garden · View original post [pt] · comments (2)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper