Cloth for sale in Makola Market in Accra, Ghana. Photo by Caroline Beaumont shared by Transaid on flickr (CC BY-NC 2.0)

The quest is on for solutions to poverty reduction with the approach of the 2015 deadline for the UN Millenium Development Goals (MDG). Many organizations are exploring new avenues for answers hoping it can lead to fresh ideas. Among the goals agreed to by the international community more than a decade ago was to halve the number of people suffering from hunger, and for the world's poorest citizens to gain productive employment. Most of the targets are far from being met in most countries, but progress has been made, for instance in Sub Saharan Africa where the proportion of people living on less than $1.25 a day, poverty declined from 58% to 51% between 1990 and 2005 [pdf].

Ideas exchange on the internet

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will hold their annual Global Forum on Development in Paris on April 4-5, 2013. This year, the OECD is exploring more inclusive approaches to tackle the poverty issue by inviting to an open pre-forum discussion online with OECD scholars. All the main conversation topics on the agenda are laid out for everyone to see and contribute.

Another interesting approach to online ideas exchange is hosted by Concerned African Scholars, an organization of scholars and students of Africa. Among the many issues explored is the impact of the hundreds of billions of dollars flowing illicitly out of Africa on the slow progress of poverty reduction. The author, Janvier D. Nkurunziza, suggests one key to bringing down poverty would be “the repatriation of the resources which are currently held abroad and not benefiting the continent.”

Had Africa had not lost so much resources in the form of illicit financial transfers, it is likely that poverty would have been less acute. The logic is that keeping these resources in Africa would have produced higher rates of investment, allowing African countries to invest in productivity enhancing sectors such as infrastructure, creating jobs, and raising incomes, resulting in lower levels of poverty.

In a TEDx talk in UlaanBataar, Mongolia on “Social Media and Poverty Reduction” in September 2012, Robert Reid, the Resident Country Director of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in Mongolia, highlighted the necessity of a broad public participation in poverty reduction projects, stressing the importance of private sector involvement for sustainable development. “It's important that the involvment of the private sector be considered at the beginning of discussions on how to reduce poverty,” he says.

This multistakeholder approach is also a key tenet of the open data movement, which is progressively penetrating the development sphere.

The Uganda Open Development Partnership Platform, a civil society organization-led public initiative, is an example of what open data could bring to the debate on poverty reduction:

Open development is where organisations are using information technologies, among other information sharing channels, to provide and share information. Open development enhances transparency and accountability about resources that are available to be invested in development, how those resources are invested and what results they achieve. In the end, all the stakeholders involved in this information sharing chain; the data owners and users benefit from this mutually reinforcing ecosystem

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Rebel in Northern Central African Republic by hdptcar on Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)

On January 11, 2013 the Central African Republic (CAR) government, led by President François Bozizé, and the rebel coalition Séléka signed a new peace deal. The agreement comes after a month of political and military instability that saw rebels advance on the capital Bangui in an attempt to overthrow Bozizé during a military advance. It is expected that the peace deal will result in the naming of new a prime minister and the formation of a government of national unity. According to Centrafrique Presse Info, President Bozizé is expected to respect the decision to appoint Nicolas Tiangaye, [fr] a lawyer and former president of the Central African Human Rights League, as the country’s new prime minister.

Questions over Séléka’s supporters

Despite the rebels’ attempts to seize control of an important region of the CAR, little is known about Séléka and its coalition partners. L’Observateur [fr], for example, raises the following questions:

Qui est cette rébellion? D’où sort-elle? De qui reçoit-elle les financements? Autant de questions dont les réponses ne sont pas faciles.

Pour certains analystes, comme Thierry Vircoulon, chercheur à l’International Crisis Group (ICG), les insurgés centrafricains bénéficient d’une logistique importante et sans doute des soutiens politiques au Tchad. (…)

Ce pays est depuis une dizaine d’années le protecteur de la Centrafrique. La libération des geôles de N’Djamena dans les mois passés de plusieurs opposants aujourd’hui dans les rangs du Séléka étaye notamment les soupçons. Tout comme la passivité montrée ces derniers jours par la force d’interposition tchadienne dépêchée à Sibut, un verrou à une centaine de kilomètres de Bangui.

Who is behind this rebellion? Where does it come from? Where does it get its money from?

For some analysts, such as Thierry Vircoulon, a researcher at the International Crisis Group (ICG), Central African insurgents enjoy significant logistics and probably political support from Chad. (…)

This country has been for the past ten years the protector of the CAR. The release from N’Djamena jails in the past months of several opponents today in the ranks of Séléka supports such suspicion. As well as the passivity shown in recent days by the Chadian interposition force dispatched to Sibut, a barrier located a hundred kilometers from Bangui

A Wikieaks cable by the US embassy in Bangui from 2009 confirms suspicions of the involvement of Chad in supporting the rebels. However, Séléka has always denied being supported by a foreign power, a stance that it reaffirmed as recently [fr] as January 1. These declarations, however, have not stopped President Bozizé from accusing the coalition of being manipulated by outside actors.

African Mobilization

The renewed violence prompted a host of African states to redeploy troops in support of MICOPAX [fr], the peacekeeping operation in CAR led by the Economic Community of Central African States. On January 6 South Africa announced that they were also sending 400 troops to the CAR, a decision that was criticized [fr] by the country’s opposition. Pretoria’s decision nevertheless reflects that South Africa has a history of providing military to support to the CAR. In 2006, for example, the US Embassy in Pretoria revealed that South Africa had agreed to provide military training and assistance to the CAR on the basis that stability in this region is important to the country’s wider interests.

Yet in an opinion piece [fr] published on Le Plus Nouvel Obs, Florence Gabay, Vice-President of the Robert Schuman Institute for Europe, suggests that such mobilization represents a turning point for conflict resolution in this part of Africa:

Il est intéressant de noter que la force apaisante est ici une force économique, la CEEAC. C’est un fait lourd de sens : Benjamin Constant décrivit fameusement comment le commerce tendait de plus en plus à se substituer aux conflits armés. L’Afrique en montre des signes clairs : on ne fait pas la paix d’abord au nom d’abstractions, au nom d’idéaux, si nobles soient-ils, mais on la fait au nom d’intérêts économiques.

It is interesting to note that the soothing strength here is an economic strength, the ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States). It is a fact full of meaning: Benjamin Constant famously described how trade tended increasingly to replace armed conflict. Africa is showing clear signs of it: Peace is not done first in the name of abstractions, in the name of ideals, however noble they may be, but it is done in the name of economic interests

Solid Ground for a Sustainable Peace?

However, some of observers question the ability of this new deal to bring a sustainable peace to the CAR. Survie, a French Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that is critical of the ‘Françafrique system’ published an article claiming that the CAR remains ‘terminally ill’ [fr]. Its author, Raphaël de Benito, argues that conditions for the next crisis are ripe:

L’accord qui en a découlé ne satisfait personne : Bozizé allant jusqu’au bout de son mandat en 2016, flanqué d’un premier ministre de l’opposition civile tandis que la coalition Séléka rentre bredouille au grand dam de ses chefs militaires qui contrôlent la majeure partie du pays.

This agreement will not satisfy anyone: Bozizé will stay in power until the end of his mandate, flung with a prime minister from the civil opposition, while the Séléka returns empty-handed, to the chagrin of its military chiefs, who control most of the country.

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RAJOSEP and SYNJIT witnessed the assault of several journalists during the repression of the demonstration of the Collective Save the Togo (CST), on Thursday January 10, 2013.

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Goche Lamine, a medical merchant, was caught with a high school student named Sanda, aged 17. The crowd was alerted by a kid shouting “samaroka! Samaroka (homosexual in the Fulfulde language), they rushed towards both men and started throwing stones at them.

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Qui était censé mettre en oeuvre le dispositif sécuritaire pour cette soirée ? Qui a pris le temps de créer les couloirs de dégagement nécessaires ? Y a-t’il eu anticipation sur les flux naturels de circulation des populations après les feux d’artifice ? Si déploiement massif des forces de sécurité il y a eu, quels sont les éléments affectés à la tâche et quel a été leur rôle avant, pendant et après les évènements ? Pourquoi le dispositif mis en place la veille qui a garanti une sécurité maximale pour le concert pour la paix n’a-t’il pas été conservé pour cette soirée qui prévoyait attirer beaucoup plus de monde ?

Who was supposed to implement the safety measures for that night? Who took the time to create the necessary safety exit ways? Was there some planning done on the natural flow of movement of people after the fireworks? If there was massive deployment of security forces, who were the elements assigned to work that night and what was their role before, during and after the events? Why was the police presence set up the day before, which guaranted maximum security for the Peace Concert not maintained for the New Year's eve event, an event likely to attract many more people?

Here is a video of an interview of Mohamed Diaby with AJ Stream on what happened from his perspective:

Mohamed Diaby and Cyriac Gbogou are not detained anymore. Their effort to help the victims of the stampede continued even during their arrest.

Here is a poster with information on how to find relatives that went missing during the stampede:

Poster designed by ivorian activists to help with the recovery after the stampede in Abidjan. It says: ” To retrieve relatives missing since December 31 after the plateau (a borough in Abidjan) event , call +225 05346713  via @cyriacgbogou -public domain

While people gather to watch fireworks at a New Year celebration in Abidjan, a lethal stampede [fr] killed more than 60 and injured another 49 people.  This is the third disaster of this kind since 2009 [fr] in Côte d'Ivoire.

Update: The causes of the disaster are now clearer, as noted by the lead prosecutor. He cites [fr] the narrowing of the road due to the presence of a temporary metal fence, tree trunks on the sidewalk and the lack of lighting and law enforcement as main culprits for the disaster.

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Screenshot from Al Qarra TV's report on Rebels in CAR posted on Youtube

Who are the rebels?

At the beginning of December the Séléka Alliance began its progression within the country. According to Alain Lamessi, contributor on Centrafrique Presse, it is a diverse group devoid of a clear political agenda:

Le Séléka est une coalition hétéroclite de factions rebelles dissidentes qui écument l’arrière-pays depuis quelques années déjà. (…) Pas de ligne politique conceptualisée, ni structurée, pas d’idéologie claire et cohérente, pas de revendications précises. Tout cela finit par convaincre que Séléka, dans sa forme actuelle, n’est pas et ne peut pas être une alternance crédible au régime de Bozize.

Seleka is a diverse coalition of dissident rebel groups that have been roaming the back country for some years. (…) No conceptualized nor structured political line, no clear and coherent ideology, no specific claims. At the end of the day,  this ought to be convincing evidence that Seleka in its current form, is not and cannot be a credible alternative to the Bozize administration.

In reality, there are four main armed groups, which have been fighting in the North and East of the country for many years now, interspersed with peace agreements with the national government. A statement posted on the Central Press website, signed by Seleka on December 17, 2012, mentions three of these groups:

CPJP  – General Nouredine Adam's Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace general Nureldine Adam
CPSK  – Patriotic Convention of Kodro's Safety led by General Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane
UFDR – Union of Democratic Forces for Unity led by Michel Djotodia and backed Chadian rebels of the FPR, which will be discussed later.

This article mentions the last member to have joined the alliance: the FDPC – The Democratic Front of the Central African People led by Abdoulaye Miskine.

The group's recent claims are related mainly to non-compliance, according to Seleka, with a peace agreement signed in 2007 between the rebels and the government of President Bozizé. These claims include:

La régularisation des 15 millions de francs CFA par combattant selon l'accord conclu avec le Général François Bozizé afin de laver la Dignité centrafricaine de ce genre de revendications malencontreuses mais tout de même légitimes,

Le versement sans condition de la somme négociée d'un million de francs CFA par combattant, somme débloquée mais encore détenue en partie par le Ministre délégué à la Défense, Jean Francis Bozizé,

La restitution inconditionnelle des diamants et or, argent liquide et autres biens spoliés par le gouvernement en 2008,

La libération de tous les prisonniers politiques tant en Centrafrique qu'à l'étranger,

L'ouverture d'une commission d'enquête indépendante sur les crimes odieux de guerre et crimes contre l'Humanité perpétré par un détachement de la Garde présidentielle sur des populations civiles au village “Zakoumba” ou Soukoumba [fr] et l'incendie des maisons d'habitation ainsi que la mosquée centrale d'Akroub-soulback dans le Bamingui Bangoran

Regularization of 15 million CFA francs payment per fighter according to the agreement with General François Bozizé, in order to restore the dignity of the Central African Group and satisfy their claims, which are unfortunate but nevertheless legitimate

Unconditional payment of the negotiated sum of a million CFA francs per fighter, amount released but still partly owned by the Minister for Defence, Jean Francis Bozizé,

The unconditional return of diamonds and gold, cash and other property expropriated by the government in 2008,

The release of all political prisoners in both Central Africa and abroad,

The opening of an independent commission of inquiry on the heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by a detachment of the Presidential Guard on civilians in the village of “Zakoumba” and the burning of houses and the Central Mosque Akroubsoulback in Bamingui Bangoran

In 2007, the first two peace agreements were signed in Sirte, Libya, then in Birao with the FDPC and UFDR. In May 2008, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Libreville would pave the way to an inclusive political dialogue between the government, opposition political parties, rebellions and civil society for sustainable peace.

The rebels of Seleka have been accused of exactions in the regions of the country they control. The  Network of Journalists for Human Rights in Central African Republic (RJDH-RCA) in partnership with Internews agency put in place a Ushahidi crowdsourcing platform that lists the critical events in the country since March 14, 2012.  Alleged accusations against the rebels have appeared in these reports. For instance, on  September 3, the inhabitants of the town of Sam-Ouadja (northeast) complained of certain activities of UFDR:

Deux femmes soupçonnées de sorcellerie ont trouvé la mort les 28 et 30 mai à Sam-Ouandja  après avoir été battues par des éléments de l’UFDR et deux autres femmes ont subi les mêmes traitements, mais ont  survécu.

Two women suspected of witchcraft were killed on May 28 and 30 in Sam-Ouandja after being beaten by the elements of the UFDR and two other women were subjected to the same treatment, but survived.

On September 11, 20 people from the sub-prefecture of Kabo in the north, were robbed by suspected elements of the FDPC.

The Shadow of Islamism?

Two names seem to come up often when talking about the rebellion that is currently progressing towards the capital of the Central African Republic: Abdel Kader Baba-Laddé, former member of the Chadian forces and that of Chadian rebellion of which he was a leader for a long while, Popular Front for Recovery (FPR). The group claims to belong to the Islamist movement according to this article on RJDH-RCA‘s platform [fr], and wishes to unite all Islamic groups. Because of the porous borders between Chad and the Central African Republic, the FPR has at times occupied the north and north-central region. In September 2012, an agreement was signed between Chad, CAR and Baba-Laddé to end the rebellion and allow the return of its leader in his country, Chad. Baba-Laddé would be received with honors if all agree as this article states on September 5, 2012.

However, in a press release dated 21 December 2012, the RPF announced on its blog [fr] its total support to Seleka:

Le FPR, notre mouvement en opérations entre la frontière tchado- centrafricaine déclare à l'attention de l'opinion nationale et internationale ce qui suit :

1- le FPR déclare ouvertement la guerre au gouvernement tchadien pour son implication directe contre le “SELEKA”, la coalition de la rébellion centrafricaine qui ne réclame rien que le légitime droit d'un peuple meurtri et martyrisé par le régime imposé en RCA par Deby lui-même;

2- le FPR dès ce jour soutiendra militairement et politiquement la coalition UFDR, CPJP et CPSK afin que tombent les deux régimes fantoches;

3- le FPR déclare par la même occasion que ses vaillants combattants révolutionnaires lanceront impérativement des attaques contre les positions de la milice de Deby dans leurs positions au Tchad jusqu'à la tombée de Ndjamena entre les mains de la nouvelle révolution;

The FPR, our movement, which operated at the Chad-Central Africa border states to the attention of the national and international opinion that:
1 – FPR openly declares war to the government of Chad for its direct involvement against “Seleka”, the coalition of Centralfrican rebellion that is claiming nothing less than the legitimate right of a people battered and tortured by the regime imposed in CAR by Deby himself;
2 – FPR from this day will support militarily and politically the coalition of UFDR, CPJP and CPSK so that the two puppet regimes fall;
3 – the FPR declares at the same time that his valiant revolutionary fighters will launch attacks against essential positions of the Déby's militia in their positions in Chad until N'Djamena falls into the hands of the revolution;

Some Central African officials also fear Islamist incursions in this region of Africa. The RJDH-RCA reported [fr] on July 2, 2012 that the Minister of Security and Public Order had referred to the Nigerian Islamist sect Boko Haram:

Le groupe islamique Boko Haram a été pointé du doigt par le ministre de la Sécurité et de l’Ordre public, Claude Richard Ngouandja, le vendredi 29 juin, au cours d’une audience avec le chargé d’affaires de l’ambassade du Nigéria et les représentants de la colonie nigériane en Centrafrique.

Compte tenu de la montée des violences du groupe Boko Haram, le ministre de la Sécurité et de l’Ordre public a invité les ressortissants nigérians au respect de la loi, en leur demandant de régulariser leurs documents de séjour en République centrafricaine.

The Islamist group Boko Haram has been singled out by the Minister of Security and Public Order, Claude Richard Ngouandja, Friday, June 29, during an audience with the chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of Nigeria and representatives of the Nigerian colony in Central Africa.

Given the increasing of violence from the group Boko Haram, the Minister of Security and Public Order urged Nigerians to respect the law, asking them to regularize their documents to stay in the Central African Republic.

If these trails are confirmed, it could lead to the opening of a second Islamist front in the South of Chad, and it would result in limiting the range of actions for Idriss Deby Itno, President of neighboring Chad, already taken up by his involvement in trying to resolve the crisis in Northern Mali.

Suspicious Timing of the Attacks?

The 2008 agreements did not secure the sought after peace. The disputed reelection of François Bozizé at the head of the country in 2011 has aggravated the tense atmosphere. Some, like Alain Lamessi on Centrafrique Presse [fr], questioned the timing chosen by the rebels to launch attacks on the country's capital and attempt to overthrow the President:

Est-ce par hasard que cette rébellion s’active dans le Nord et le Nord-Est de la république Centrafricaine au moment où l’exploration du pétrole centrafricain paraît de plus en plus prometteuse?

Is it by chance that this rebellion is bursting out in the North and North-East of Central African Republic when the exploration of Central African oil seems suddenly very promising?

In recent months, the licensing of oil exploration has been underway. Africa Energy Intelligence, quoted by Centrafrique Presse, revealed in March and April 2012 that the South African company DIG Oil had been awarded two exploration contracts and that a Chinese company had also obtained such authorization. Cooperation with China had already strengthened with the announcement in August 2010 by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nyala in neighboring Sudan, Pr Abbaker Ali Idris, of the construction of a Chinese university in Central Africa. On November 13, 2012, the government announced the re-opening of oil exploration in the village of Boromata, located 120 km from Birao.

President Bozizé in his December 27, 2012 speech suggested that he was being attacked because he decided to grant oil exploration contracts to a Chinese company:

Pourquoi on les a poussés, car nous avons maintenant le Ciment, si on nous laisse tranquille, dans 2, 3 ou 4 mois, les Chinois vont exploiter notre Pétrole. Quelle faute j’ai commise ? Pas de prisonniers politiques actuellement, la presse est libre. Pourquoi ils ont commencé à violer, à tuer et faire du mal à la population centrafricaine ? (…) On leur a tout donné. Avant de donner le Pétrole aux Chinois, j’ai rencontré à Paris Total et leur ai dit de prendre le Pétrole, rien, j’ai donné aux Chinois et c’est devenu un problème sur moi. J’ai envoyé le Conseiller Maidou à Paris pour le dossier de l’Uranium, ils sont refusé. J’ai finalement donné aux Sud-Africains.

Why were they pushed, because we now have cement, if they leave us alone, in 2, 3 or 4 months, Chinese will harness our oil. What mistake did I make? No political prisoner at the moment, the press is free. Why did they start raping, killing and hurting the Central African population? (…) We gave them everything. Before giving oil to the Chinese, I met Total in Paris and told them to take the oil, nothing happended, I gave oil to the Chinese and it became a problem. I sent counselor Maidou in Paris for the Uranium dossier, they refused. I finally gave it to the South Africans.

Request for French intervention

Since December 26, protesters have gathered in front of the French Embassy in Bangui. They have been seeking help from France and his intervention to stop the rebels’ progress. A similar appeal was launched this Thursday, on December 27 by President François Bozizé to the U.S. and France. An approach that has not failed to elicit reactions in the African twittosphere. Alain Kiana [fr] for instance thinks that such an approach is not appropriate:

@jovial987: C'est ridicule, quand on sait plus gérer sa maison, facile d'accuser les autres! #Bozize sa gestion mediocre est responsable

@jovial987: This is ridiculous, when you don't know how to manage your house anymore, it is easy to accuse others. #Bozize his mediocre management is responsible for all this

Aaron W. M. [fr] continues:

@Aarwan: #Bozizé F.n'est pas 1 démocrate.  Son pouvoir est issu de coup d'Etat contre #Patassé. Il ne peut récolter que ce qu'il a semé. #Centrafrique

 @Aarwan: #Bozizé F. is not a democrat. His power comes from a coup against #Patassé. He can only reap what he sow. #Centrafrique

Defense agreements bind France to the CAR. In 2006, 200 French militaries from the force Boali, created in 2002, had provided air support, and supported the defense lines of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) in the region of Birao. This is what you can read on the website of the French Minstry of Defence:

En vertu des accords de défense et de sécurité liant la France à la RCA et à la demande des autorités centrafricaines, les militaires français ont apporté à plusieurs reprises aux forces armées centrafricaines et à la FOMUC un soutien renseignement et logistique, un appui feu aérien, une aide à la planification et à la conduite des opérations visant à reprendre le contrôle du Nord-Est du pays occupé par des éléments armés rebelles.

Under the defense and security agreements between France and the CAR and at the request of the Central African authorities, French soldiers helped FACA and FOMUC with information and logistics support, fire missile support and assistance in the planning and conduct of operations to regain control of the North-East of the country occupied by armed rebels.

Later, France stated through President François Hollande that its forces were not there to protect a regime, but to protect its citizens and its interests in the Central African territory.

Following a meeting of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Ndjamena, Chad's capital city, on December 21, the Heads of State of the subregion recommended the opening negotiations in Libreville, Gabon, between the rebels and the government. If he is still in place and the time of these negotiations are held, will President Bozizé take the risk of flying to Libreville, leaving the country in the hands of Seleka?

Written by Julie Owono · Translated by Julie Owono · View original post [fr] · comments (6)
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http://youtu.be/kQAgKodnGHU

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University of Port Harcourt's four murdered students via babajidesalu.wordpress.com

On October 5, 2012, four students of the University of Port Harcourt in Nigeria were beaten and burnt to death by a lynch mob, for allegedly stealing a Blackberry phone and a laptop. The tragic deaths of the students – now known as the Aluu4 – have caused outrage and plenty of online discussion about the serious problem of mob justice in Nigeria. It has also created opportunities for citizens to raise public awareness and propose solutions.

Noting the absence of legal provisions against mob justice, blogger Okechukwu Ofili posted a petition on October 18 for a mob justice prohibition bill signed by himself and “Nigerians Fighting for CHANGE” (read the full draft bill here) that has so far gathered more than 3,500 signatures.

Ofili explains:

This scene Mob Justice has gradually become a normal way of life in Nigeria. As people/communities usurp the law and take matters into their own hands. Now we know that there are no dependable statistics or numbers regarding Mob Justice occurrences in Nigeria, but what we do know is that has been happening for years. And for years we have complained, we have cried and we have watched, but nothing has changed as Mob Justice still occurs with its perpetrators largely going unpunished.

This is largely due to the fact that people have lost faith in a police force and judicial system that have been derailed by corruption, incompetence, and inadequate resources. But also exacerbating the matter is the absence and lack of recognition of Mob Justice (and its many variations) as a crime in our Federal Laws, most particularly our CRIMINAL CODE ACT, CAP C38 LFN 2004. An act which in its robust 145 page listing of criminal acts makes no mention or reference to Mob Justice…it covers Ritual Killings, Riots and even Counterfeit Stamps, but not Mob Justice.

Two senators have received copies of the bill for consideration.

If passed into law it would introduce jail sentences and fines for perpetrators of mob justice and the communities where the violence takes place. It would also become a felony for citizens or police to stand by and watch an attack without attempting to disperse the crowd.

As part of the campaign to seek justice for the Aluu4, a group of bloggers helped organize a Tweet-a-thon on October 25 using the hashtags #NeveragainNG and #Aluu4 in order to try to make the topic trend on Twitter in Nigeria.

In an email interview, Kathleen Ndongmo, a Cameroonian citizen based in Lagos, Nigeria who has been active in the campaign, describes how they hope to inspire more action against mob justice:

1. The petition is used as a trigger. It will be historical if the people can change the current criminal act. It will give a lot of confidence to activists, groups who have been working for years to change the judiciary, the police and the law on this issue.

2. Then there should be awareness, education, because there is a knowledge gap somewhere that we have to solve.

3. Last but not least, a work of advocacy will be undertaken for the implementation of judiciary and police reforms.

This holistic approach will help us achieve the goal of a sustainable grassroots movement to create dialogue for change.

Nigerian website Premium Times reported on October 18 that 13 suspects have been charged with conspiracy and murder at the Magistrate Court in Port Harcourt.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide.

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Earlier this year, I suggested we organise a regular informal chat on Twitter regarding our beloved – Zimbabwe. The discussion mainly revolves around Zimbabwe’s interesting past, the future but more importantly focusing on the actual solutions going forward. I’ve always felt that identifying problems is 25% of the actual issue.

(more…)

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UNOCI Conducts Disarmament Operation in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire – February 2012. By United Nations Photo (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

According to a controversial report commissioned by the United Nations, former Ivorian President Laurent Gbabo's exiled allies are recruiting Islamists from Northern Mali to destabilize the current government of President Alassane Ouattara.

News of the report broke on Saturday, October 6, 2012 on Radio France International (RFI). In an article entitled “Côte d'Ivoire: UN report rich in revelations” [fr] RFI describes the alleged links between the pro-Gbabo Ivorian Patriotic Front (FPI) and Ansar Dine Islamists in Mali. Their report also claims that a meeting took place on the border between Mauritania and Senegal to discuss the mobilization of mercenaries.

Truth or propaganda?

French national newspaper Le Figaro took up the RFI story [fr], followed by the Associated Press, whose story was republished on the New York Times and other international news sites.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson of the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) emphasized that the report was by no means binding upon the UN [fr]:

Contrairement à ce qui a été dit sur Rfi et qui a semé la confusion, ce n’est pas un rapport de l’Onu. C’est un rapport d’experts indépendants qui doit être soumis au Conseil de sécurité.

(…) les conclusions de ce rapport n’engagent que ces experts.

Il faut qu’on attende tous de voir le rapport et de voir les preuves qui ont été apportées par les experts. Pour pouvoir établir si les éléments sont vrais et savoir ce que les experts ont comme éléments de preuves.

Contrary to what has been said on RFI and sowed confusion, this is not a UN report. It is an independent expert report to be submitted to the Security Council.

(…) the findings of this report solely bind those experts.

We have to wait for everyone to read the report and see the evidence collected by experts to determine whether the elements are true and what the elements of proof they have.

The five independent experts in question were mandated by the UN Security Council and appointed by the Secretary General in June 2012.

Théophile Kouamouo, a well-known blogger and editor in chief of Cote d'Ivoire pro-Gbagbo opposition newspaper Nouveau Courrier doubts [fr] the accuracy of the UN expert investigations:

Les experts doivent, pour publier une information, se fonder sur des sources documentaires éprouvées ou au moins deux sources indépendantes. Ils doivent aussi, autant que faire se peut, contacter les mis en cause et recueillir leur version des faits. Ce qui n’a pas encore été fait, selon les nombreuses personnalités interrogées par Le Nouveau Courrier. Par exemple, sur un sujet comme la prétendue réunion de Takoradi, Marcel Gossio, par exemple peut aisément prouver qu’il n’était pas au Ghana à la date citée.

The experts should, before publishing a report, rely on documented sources tested or based on at least two independent sources. They should also, whenever possible, contact the respondents and collect their version of facts. This has not been done, according to numerous persons interviewed by The New Courier. For example, on a subject like the alleged meeting in Takoradi (Ghana), Marcel Gossio, can easily prove that he was not in Ghana at the date cited.

Casting further doubt on the report's accuracy, Kouamouo assumes that the current Ivorian regime must have provided the UN-appointed experts with the mobile phone messages exchanged between exiled FPI politicians and Islamists:

Par ailleurs, selon RFI, le rapport (?) évoque des SMS interceptés et qui seraient des preuves contre les pro-Gbagbo. Or, le Comité des experts ne comporte en son sein aucun expert en écoutes téléphoniques, et l’ONUCI non plus. La réalité doit être la suivante, au-delà de cette opération de propagande bien huilée. Il est fort probable que, tout simplement, les sécurocrates du régime Ouattara aient livré de prétendues «preuves» aux experts.

Moreover, according to RFI, the report (?) evokes intercepted SMS messages as evidence against the pro-Gbagbo. However, the expert committee is not comprised of experts on wiretapping, and neither is UNOCI. The reality must be that, beyond this well-oiled propaganda operation, it is highly probable that the securocrats of Ouattara's regime have simply released the alleged “evidence” to the experts.

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A solution to the Mali crisis seems to be vanishing as time goes by. It has been five months now that the country has been divided into two parts: the South is ruled by a fragile [fr] government while the North, which includes the historic cities of Timbuktu and Gao, is the theater of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb‘s (AQIM) expansion in the Sahel.

North Mali indirectly in the hands of AQIM

In April 2012, after the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal had fallen, the Tuareg rebellion group National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) unilaterally proclaimed the secession of the northern part of the country.

Mali begins Touareg dialogue. Image by Flickr user Magharebia (CC BY 2.0).

Currently, the region is under the influence of four [fr] different groups: the MNLA, Ansar Dine, which defines itself as Salafist, the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), and AQIM.

However, a report [fr] by AFP, suggests that it is actually AQIM that coordinates and funds the three other organisations; this suspicion is reinforced by the alleged presence in Mali of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a founding member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC), which became the AQIM.

In March 2012, israeldefense.com wrote about Belmokhtar's visits to Libya, and already reported fears of a possible AQIM expansion in the Southern Sahara:

According to Mali’s security sources, the leader of al-Qaeda's North African branch, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has been in Libya for several weeks with the goal of procuring arms. (…) Malian security sources claim that Belmokhtar's activities in Libya confirm the premise that AQIM intends to extend its sphere of influence and that “terrorists will do anything to create a sweeping network in the Sahel and the Sahara.”

Political and diplomatic deadlock

It appears that AQIM is consolidating its grip on Northern Mali.  On August 9, Koaci.com reported that members of the Mujao cut the hand [fr] off of an alleged thief in the city of Ansogo. This followed the July 30 stoning of an unwed couple in the region of Kidal.

To date, regional response  to the crisis have been muted. While West African leaders appointed Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, as a mediator [fr] in this crisis after the March 22 Mali coup, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) has yet to send military forces to restore the territorial unity of Mali.

And while Afrik.com [fr] reports that the de facto Malian government and ECOWAS have reached an agreement aimed at resolving the crisis, military intervention remains the preferred option of many netizens. Thierno A. Diallo from neighboring Guinea writes on his blog [fr]:

Ce qui se passe au Mali est grave. Notre pays, frontalier au sud et pas tellement éloigné de cette zone de non-droit a tout à perdre d'une victoire des fanatiques à nos portes. Le landernau politique guinéen, la tête dans le guidon des interminables législatives voulues par Alpha Condé, risque d'avoir un réveil en sursaut très douloureux. La zone la plus proche géographiquement et donc  la plus menacée étant la Haute-Guinée.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

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Equatoguinean Teodoro President Obiang and African Union Chairman Jean Ping at the African Union Summit in Malabo. Photo from Embassy of Equatorial Guinea

2011 was a tumultuous year for the African continent with revolutions, attempted coups and violent political crises. Unfortunately the union of 53 African states that has as its mission to help strengthen regional peace and development has proved its own shortcomings in dealing with these situations.

The African Union, created in 1999 after the dissolution of the Organisation of the African Unity, was unable to solve the Côte d'Ivoire post-electoral crisis, offered late support to popular movements of the Arab Spring, and its position on Libya was primarily determined by the late Colonel Gaddafi's influence on the organisation.

All this has led many African citizens to distrust whether the Union is really able to fulfill its mission [fr]. This much is clear studying critical blogs from commentators across the region. On the blog Cry Me An Onion, Patrick-Bernard is unequivocal in his post “Let's Get Rid Of The African Union“:

In light of the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, RDC, Libya and many more in Africa an institution that should be boycotted and toppled down to the ground is the African Union. The embarrassing Ali Baba gang of 53 thieves is useless in solving any or all the conflicts in Africa or finding any unifying consensus. (…)

In the unfolding crisis in Mali, the organisation currently appears to be faring no batter. Although worrying reports are coming from the Northern part of the country, now ruled by Islamist group Ansar Dine, the African Union failed to mobilise the United Nations Security Council to back a military intervention with troops from the countries of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS). On a France-based blog of a Touareg association, Temoust.org [fr], it is explained:

(…) sur le dossier du Mali, les arguments avancés par Ramtane Lamamra (photo), le Commissaire de l’Union africaine pour la paix et la sécurité, pour un soutien de l’ONU à une intervention militaire dans ce pays n’ont pas convaincu les 15 membres du Conseil de sécurité. (…) L’UA reste très imprécise ; combien de soldats seront envoyés sur place, à combien se chiffre cette opération, quelle sera la mission de cette force militaire ?

Limited Means

In spite of this assessment, it is important for the 1 billion inhabitants of the 53 African member states to be represented and see their interests protected by a strong, inclusive regional organisation, in a globalised world. Such ambition requires means which the organisation currently lacks.

In 2012, the budget proposal presented by the African Union Commission reached $274 million USD. It is a pittance compared to the 147 billion EUR of the European Union. Moreover, even such a budget is likely not to be secured by the organisation, since only 5 among the 53 member states [fr] actually pay their annual contributions (Libya, Egypt, South Africa, Algeria and Nigeria).

Furthermore, according to African Union Chairman Jean Ping himself in 2010, 77% [fr] of the operational budget, which serves to implement and sustain programs such as military force deployments, come from foreign counterparts, like the European Union. Knowing this one can understands how limited the pan-African organisation's breathing space is.

As the continent continues to suffer from strife, it appears unlikely in spite of noble goals that the African Union will offer much respite.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

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Power lines over buildings in Cameroon, 2008. Photo by Zzilch on Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

After his reelection in November 2011, President Paul Biya of Cameroon announced [fr] that the country would soon become a giant “construction site”. The goal for his new term is for Cameroon to reach emerging market status by 2035 through a series of “great achievements” in transport and energy infrastructure development [fr]. It’s a deadline that fails to convince [fr] many commentators, if only because the challenges are so great.

Energy, and specifically electricity, is especially problematic.  Like many other African countries, Cameroon suffers from insufficient electricity supplies.

Journalist Leopold Nséké explains in an article published in Afrique Expansion Magazine:

Underequipped, the African continent is awash in the obsolescence of its facilities and bore the brunt of poor management of available resources. Representing 15% of the world population, Africa consumes paradoxically only 3% of the total world production of electricity.

There is no electricity in Mafa Kilda village, it's just passing by (and going from Ngong to Garoua). By Philippe Semanaz on Flickr in 2006 (CC BY-SA 2.0)

According to some estimates (fr) only 20% of Cameroon’s population has a regular access to electricity supplies. Indeed, those who have access to power tend to experience cuts in supply as often as every three days. Electricity is also increasingly expensive commodity for most of the country’s citizens. The privately-owned AES Sonel, for example, recently announced a 7% rise in prices [fr] starting from June 1, 2012.

Limited access to electricity also represents a threat to the industrialization of Cameroon, which in turn could undermine Cameroon’s ambition of becoming emerging economy by 2035. A study [fr] conducted by the Polytechnic National High School of Yaounde outlined that:

Production losses were estimated at EU91.5 million per year in industrial enterprises because of the difficulties in supplying electricity. These results indicate that inadequate and poor quality of electricity supply has slowed industrial development.

Yet unreliable electricity supplies are also a major concern for the wider population. Feowl is a new community-led initiative that aims to refine and provide currently absent data on the impact of poor electricity supply in Douala, the economic center of Cameroon.

As Cameroon essentially relies on hydro-energy production, the Government also launched the construction of the Lom Pangar dam in the east of the country. The project – funded by the World Bank and other international organizations – is considered to be integral to Cameroon’s aspirations to become an emerging economy.

The dam is expected to the increase energy production of Cameroon with a planned capacity of 7.250 billion cubic meters for a reservoir that will cover 610 km2. Water supplies will also be held in reserve for the dry season at two damns further downstream of the Sanaga River, thereby enabling them to generate more electricity.

Christiane Badgley’s blog highlights some of the shortcomings of the project. She is concerned that the electricity produced will mainly prioritize the needs of Cameroon’s industries :

…the urban and rural poor do not appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the Lom Pangar project. Instead, the dam is designed to regulate the flow of the Sanaga River in order to increase energy production from existing and proposed downstream hydropower plants serving the southern electricity grid and the country’s single largest electricity consumer, the Alucam aluminum smelter. Jointly owned by the government of Cameroon and the Canadian-based company Alcan, Alucam plans to more than double its production and needs new sources of cheap energy to do so.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

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In recent years, major reserves of oil have been discovered at various locations across Africa. If this ‘black gold’ represents an opportunity for economic growth, the fear that the windfall may not benefit the local populations – and maybe even become a curse – is shared by Sub-Saharan African citizens and experts alike.

In 2009, Modern Ghana’s Nana Adjoa Hackman suggested a possible solution:

It is common practice for oil and gas producing countries to negotiate local content agreements with interested IOCs [International Oil Companies] in an attempt to secure for the country a higher share of the value from oil and gas projects. This trend has surfaced as a result of the realization of the poor economic performance of many resource rich countries despite their vast wealth.

Tullow oil camp, Uganda. Image by Conservation Concepts on Flickr (CC BY 2.0).

Taking the example of Ghana, he explains:

As part of measures being undertaken to put in place the framework for Ghana's oil and gas production, a Bill entitled the Ghana Petroleum Regulatory Authority (GPRA) Bill was released in October 2008. (…) Sections 100 to 105 inclusive of the Bill deal with the promotion of local content, specifically, the involvement of the state oil company, provision of goods and services by local entrepreneurs, as well as the employment and training of citizens of Ghana.

The adoption of the local content policy framework in Ghana followed in 2010, however it is still pending parliamentary endorsement. The latter is now more urgent than ever, as finding employment is a preoccupation for an increasing number of Ghanaian citizens.

Commenting on an article entitled ‘Youth Angry-Over Elusive Jobs In Oil Industry‘, Christiane Badgley writes:

Oil brings in huge amounts of money, of course, and along with that come expectations of many, well-paid jobs. The problem is that the industry – at least as it exists in Ghana now – doesn’t generate much work. (…) We’ll have to wait for details on how the government intends to increase local content and participation, which is easier said than done. Training, education, quotas, regulation, penalties, taxation, incentives – the government has multiple options for addressing the question.

In Uganda, the same move towards the adoption of a local content policy is being made, as explained on the In2EastAfrica website:

Uganda wants a strong local content in the nascent oil and gas industry for its citizens to gain skilled manpower and a competitive supply edge. This is in an attempt to ensure revenues trickles down, averting the resource curse.

Indeed, avoiding the oil curse is important for Uganda, particularly if it helps to prevent the emergence of other Joseph Kony- like characters. Petroleum was, after all, discovered in the north-west, near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the epicenter of the 30 year long conflict led by the Lord's Resistance Army chief. A local content policy would hopefully create employment for local populations and distract them from the path of war.

In Kenya case, where oil was found earlier this year, Local Development Network of Africa asks on Twitter:

@ledna: How far have discussion on #Ghana “local content” for the oil and gas sector gone? #Kenya (new found oil) could learn from that

Günther Schulze, professor of economics at the University of Freiburg, Germany, adds another perspective on the World Bank blog:

The biggest -but most important- challenge is to build and maintain good institutions. (…) transparency will be the most powerful lever for accountability. If Kenyans know exactly how much oil is being produced, how much royalties oil companies pay this would already be a major step in the right direction. (…) Kenya’s strong civil society and creative industries, especially in ICT, can play a strong role in monitoring the oil revenue flows and proposing solutions on how to spend the money well. Then the resource curse can be turned into a blessing.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

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