Global Voices » Julián Ortega Martínez

Colombia: A Long Way to Peace?

Julián Ortega Martínez — Wed, 30 Jan 2013 21:04:16 +0000

This post is part of our International Relations & Security coverage.

Colombian Armed Forces. Photo by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on flickr (CC BY 2.0)

In the early hours of New Year’s Day, the Colombian Armed Forces launched [es] an air strike on a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp located near Chigorodó northwestern Colombia. The air strike was called after Elda Ramírez (aka ‘Mayerly’), considered a senior member of the FARC hierarchy, called a man who she believed was a drug dealer interested in buying cocaine. Instead, the dealer turned out to be an undercover police officer, and the consequent air attack claimed the lives of fourteen guerrilla fighters belonging to the FARC’s fifth front.

The air strike also occurred against the backdrop of negotiations between the FARC and Colombian government that have been ongoing since September 2012. To support the peace talks, the FARC announced a ceasefire on November 20. However, Colombia’s armed forces have continued military operations against the organization. On January 20, FARC announced that it had suspended the ceasefire and instead proposed a bilateral truce.

The Colombian government’s attack and the broken ceasefire [es] provoked a variety of response from Colombian bloggers. For instance, a blogger at Colombia Opina celebrated [es] the bombings and explains why the FARC’s fifth front was so dangerous:

El frente 5 de las Farc era una especie de escuela de formación de terroristas. Desde Efraín Guzmán hasta Iván Márquez, y desde la hoy desmovilizada “Karina” hasta el aún alzado en armas alias “Manteco”, han pasado por el 5° frente de las Farc, una estructura guerrillera vieja y belicosa que la madrugada del 31 de diciembre recibió otro golpe por parte de la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana en la “Operación Fortuna”: un bombardeo que dejó al menos 14 bandoleros muertos y devuelve la esperanza de seguridad necesaria a los habitantes de una zona estratégica como es el Eje Bananero, que además linda con el corredor que va desde la Serranía de Abibe y cruza siguiendo la ruta del Río Sucio hasta el Atrato Medio.

FARC's 5th front was some kind of school for terrorists. From Efraín Guzmán [es] to Iván Márquez, and to the now demobilized “Karina” to the still armed rebel [Jhover Man Sánchez Arroyave] aka “Manteco” have all belonged to [this front], an old, belligerent guerrilla structure, which in the early hours of December 31 received another blow by the Colombian Air Forces in ‘Operation Fortune', a bombing which left at least 14 rebels dead and brings back the hope for security of the inhabitants in the strategic area known as the Banana Axis, which borders a corridor of the Abibe Mountains and crosses through Riosucio river to the middle of Atrato river.

In contrast, Camilo Raigozo criticizes [es] President Santos’ ‘happiness’ with the killing of the guerrilla fighters:

El régimen que encabeza el presidente Santos se ha negado a parar la orgía de sangre y muerte que enluta al pueblo colombiano, al no aceptar una tregua bilateral del fuego, ni siquiera para navidad y año nuevo. La insaciable sed de sangre de quienes detentan el poder lo impide.

The regime headed by President Santos has refused to stop the bloody and deadly orgy which saddens the Colombian people, by not accepting a bilateral ceasefire, not even for the Christmas and New Year's holidays. The insatiable bloodthirst of those in power prevents that.

Horacio Duque, on Tercera Información, wonders [es] if the unilateral ceasefire by FARC has worked:

Tal parece, por los datos que entregan los expertos que hacen un seguimiento detallado de los combates, que en los primeros 30 días el éxito ha sido rotundo. Se pasó de 190 combates y enfrentamientos mensuales a 26, 23 de los cuales tienen su origen en los grupos ajenas a los diálogos de Cuba. (…) Incluso las empresas petroleras y las que explotan minerales han reportado un ambiente de mucho menos hostilidad.

It seems, based on the data delivered by the experts who closely follow these combat operations, that in the first day the success [of the ceasefire] has been resounding. Combat operations and clashes went from 190 to 26 monthly, 23 of them with origin in groups not related to the talks in Cuba (…) Even oil and mining companies have reported a less hostile environment.

Fernando Dorado writes [es] about the convenience of extending the ceasefire:

De mantenerse o alargarse el período del cese de fuegos – más allá de la época navideña y festiva – la guerrilla de las FARC le estaría colocando toda la presión al gobierno de cara a concertar un cese de fuegos bilateral, lo que le daría mayor empuje al proceso de Paz.

If the ceasefire period is kept or extended, beyond the holiday season, FARC guerrillas would be putting all the pressure on the government in order to agree to a bilateral ceasefire, which would make the peace process more convincing.

It seems that the reluctance of the Colombian government to respect the FARC ceasefire is intended to weaken [es] the group both militarily and strategically. In doing so, Bogota anticipate that the FARC will have less space to make demands. during the peace talks. The effectiveness of this strategy will likely be determined over the course of 2013, especially as the November deadline for brokering a peace agreement approaches.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

Colombia: How Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Affects Citizens

Julián Ortega Martínez — Tue, 23 Oct 2012 09:59:17 +0000

This post is part of our International Relations & Security coverage.

Electricity cables in Baranquilla, Colombia. Photo by Lucho Molina on Flickr (CC BY-NC 2.0)

In the last few months, attacks on Colombia’s energy infrastructure by the FARC and ELN have increased. While such attacks affect the lives of many ordinary Colombians, they are most often discussed within the bigger issue of terrorism. However, there are a few Colombian bloggers who offer different perspectives.

Alejandro Gaviria describes [es] the gloomy panorama of attacks up to late August 2012:

The issue is serious. Much more than acknowledged. Tumaco has been without electrical power for two weeks. Several towns in Arauca department have been in the same situation for a few days. One of the transmission lines connecting central Colombia with the Caribbean Coast was dynamited this week. In August, fifteen towers were knocked down. Another seven have been severely damaged. Since the beginning of this year, the attempts against the national electricity system add up to 60. In 2010, there were 24; in 2011, 58.

In a post [es] from August criticizing former Finance Minister Juan Carlos Echeverry for claiming [es] that FARC attacks don't affect the economy, Jorge Monroy writes:

Every time FARC mount an illegal patrol, destroy an electricity tower or blow up an oil pipeline, they are reducing the production possibilities of Colombia as a whole, reducing our potential GNP (gross national product). What the minister intends to say is serious, because if attacks happen outside Bogotá, the potential GNP decreases more than proportionately to the real GNP, which means that the gross national product figures he can show are, according to this measurement, more significant.

Tumaco, a coastal town on the Pacific, in southwestern Colombia, near Ecuador, was one of the most affected places. The town was left in the dark for two weeks in August and also had their supply of water reduced. Landmines planted around the towers killed three people [es] who were making repairs, including one indigenous Awá citizen. Another landmine, close to one of the towers and also to the local school, killed a 17-year-old Awá boy [es].

Mundo Noticias summarized [es] the situation and some of the measures taken or considered by the authorities:

The local administration, together with security forces intends to issue a curfew within the next few hours in Tumaco [...] The situation faced by the people is dramatic and worrying because essential goods are becoming scarce. Besides, some bus drivers don't want to go to the town because of the serious public order situation in the region. [...] Public and private schools decided to suspend activities until order has been restored. A total of 56,000 were on a [forced] school break.

On August 18, 2012, around 2,000 marched [es] to express their contempt for terrorism. The strategic location of Tumaco and its poor security have made this town a victim of guerrillas, paramilitaries and criminal gangs (bacrim) engaged in drug-trafficking. A left-wing Senator demanded [es] the government should develop a security policy for the region.

Though mentioned in the media, these attacks do not usually get deep coverage, and bloggers hardly mention it apart from the list of all criminal acts violent groups commit. Gaviria claimed that the increase in attacks bore relation to rumors at the time of conversations between the Colombian government and FARC guerrillas, which had “the veiled purpose of gaining a strategic advantage.” These rumors were confirmed days later. The attacks show how the Colombian state, which claims [es] these attacks show the “weakness” of guerrilla groups, is still far from achieving complete presence in remote areas of the country where armed and criminal groups thrive, despite some efforts [es].

Colombia: The Conflicting Relationship With ‘The Public’

Julián Ortega Martínez — Mon, 08 Oct 2012 16:42:49 +0000

After riots at the campus of the National University of Colombia in Bogotá last week, some students proposed [es] to paint the buildings white to express their rejection of vandalism, prompting a debate [es] about the issue. Andrés Villaveces writes [es] about this and the “conflicting relationship” of most Bogotanos with “the public”, pointing out that, unlike other countries in Latin America, the best universities, hospitals, schools, etc. are privately owned.

The Gloomy Years of Colombian Television

Julián Ortega Martínez — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 12:00:22 +0000

Since last May [es], ‘pink sauce’ from popular gossip website La Fiscalía has been posting a series on “the gloomy years of Colombian television” [es], where he reviews, tongue-in-cheek and year by year between 1992 and 2012, the most popular mainstream medium in the country. Readers share their memories of their favourite or hated shows in the comments section, as well as fun facts and impressions of what most of them consider the increasingly decreasing quality of Colombian television.

Colombians Cautiously Optimistic About Peace Talks with FARC

Julián Ortega Martínez — Thu, 27 Sep 2012 14:34:07 +0000

This post is part of our International Relations & Security coverage.

Demonstration against FARC (2008) by xmascarol on Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Despite President Juan Manuel Santos’ wish [es] for discretion, news broke [es] in late August that the Colombian government was to begin negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This was finally confirmed by Santos on September 4 during a televised speech that outlined that the government’s negotiations [es] with FARC would seek an end to the armed conflict and drug trafficking. Both sides will also discuss victims’ rights, rural development and the participation of FARC in Colombia’s democratic process. Fearing a repeat of the last round of failed negotiations in 1999-2002, Santos also said that no amnesty would be granted for FARC leaders and that military operations would continue. Minutes later, FARC’s leader, Timoleón Jiménez (‘Timochenko’) appeared in a broadcast from Havana, Cuba and declared that FARC is truly committed to a “civilized dialogue” that would end the decades-old conflict.

Violence will persist

On Distintas Latitudes, Lucas Peña analyzes the differences and similarities with past processes, not only with FARC but also with other armed groups. In conclusion, he asks for more realism, since even a successful process with FARC would not bring an end to violence in Colombia:

Lo cierto es que la dejación de las armas de las FARC es una condición para la paz pero no la única, pues existen actores asociados a la criminalidad organizada que siguen ejerciendo la violencia, que pueden incluso surgir luego de la eventual desmovilización de las FARC, como se demostró tras la desmovilización de los paramilitares. En Colombia solemos llamar a estos nuevos actores ‘bacrim’ “bandas criminales al servicio del narcotráfico, los ejércitos de los carteles mafiosos.

The truth is that FARC's abandonment of arms is one, but not the only condition for peace, because there are other actors associated with organised crime who will still engage in violence, some who may even emerge after the eventual FARC demobilisation, as it was shown after the demobilisation of the paramilitaries. In Colombia we call these new actors ‘bacrim', criminal bands servicing drug trafficking, the armies of mafia cartels.

Government in the lead?

On Revista Posición, Alberto Bernal is very critical of the ongoing process, but praises the choice of government negotiators:

Una buena noticia es que el equipo de negociación que nombró el gobierno es un equipo de negociación de lujo. Nada diferente se puede decir de Villegas, Pearl, o de Mora, para nombrar solo tres de las personas que estarán permanentemente en la mesa. También me parece importante recalcar el hecho de que la decisión de no decretar un cese al fuego le conviene al gobierno, pues el gobierno lleva la delantera en la guerra, así las FARC hayan incrementado sus ataques contra la población civil últimamente.

On piece of good news is that the negotiation team appointed by the government is first class. Nothing different could be said about [Luis Carlos] Villegas, [Frank] Pearl, or [retired Army general Jorge Enrique] Mora, three of the people who will be permanently seated at the table. I also find it important to highlight the fact that the decision not to declare a ceasefire is convenient for the government, because it is leading in the war, regardless that FARC lately have increased their attacks against civilians.

On the blog Tras la Cola de la Rata, Juana Galeano says [es] the inclusion of the military in the process is brilliant:

Hay que admitirlo, la inclusión de miembros del Ejército como negociadores es una jugada maestra. Incluir a los militares, darles voz, los coacciona e impide que torpedeen el proceso más adelante.

I have to admit it: including members of the Army as negotiators is a masterstroke. Including them, giving them voice, co-opts them and prevents them from sabotaging the process later on.

Most Colombians seem to support the peace process with caution. According to polls 77% favour the talks, but 72% oppose an eventual participation of FARC in politics, and 78% do not approve an amnesty with no jail terms for guerrilla commanders.

FARC leaders Raul Reyes, Manuel Marulanda and Ivan Rios in Bogota, Colombia by bixentro on Flickr (CC-BY-2.0)

Though former President Álvaro Uribe has become a staunch opponent [es] of almost everything related to President Santos (his former defence minister), some non-governmental organizations have voiced concerns about a legal framework [es] for FARC passed by the Congress last June.

Santos imposed a June 2013 deadline to reach landmark advances, but it seems that this will be a long process, especially since FARC increased their attacks before the announcement.

Learning from past mistakes [es], improving security all over the country and strengthening trust [es] between the negotiating parties should be important steps towards the success of the talks.

Colombia: Chronicling a Mugging

Julián Ortega Martínez — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 12:00:18 +0000

Santiago Ardila Reyes blogs [es] about the mugging he suffered in front of his house for his smartphone, describes how he feels about it, and wonders about the causes of the increasing reports of muggings and murders in Colombia.

Colombia: Political Blog ‘Atrabilioso’ Closes Down

Julián Ortega Martínez — Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:37:07 +0000

After 7 years and thousands of posts by several contributors, the political blog Atrabilioso, managed by journalist Jaime Restrepo Vásquez, closed last August 31. The blog's contributors were critics of President Juan Manuel Santos‘ administration and staunch supporters of former President Álvaro Uribe.
(more…)

The Nazi Past of the Father of Colombian Anthropology

Julián Ortega Martínez — Thu, 16 Aug 2012 15:11:24 +0000

Cristina Vélez posts [es] her thoughts about “Nazi intellectuals” in her blog after it was revealed [es], at an academic Congress in Vienna, that Austrian-born Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff (1912-1994), considered the “father of Colombian anthropology,” had been a member of the Nazi party and the SS in Germany before World War II, as cultural magazine Arcadia reports [es].

Colombians Celebrate Unexpected Silver Medal

Julián Ortega Martínez — Sun, 29 Jul 2012 19:41:22 +0000

This post is part of our special coverage London 2012 Olympics.

On Saturday, July 28, Rigoberto Urán, 25, became the first Colombian to win a medal in the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London. He finished second at the men's road race final, behind veteran cyclist Aleksandr Vinokurov from Kazakhstan. Norwegian Alexander Kristoff won the bronze medal.

Urán, who belongs to Team Sky, was registered at the last minute [es]. He and Vinokurov left the peloton 10 km before the end and Urán turned his head while he was leading, but his legs “said” otherwise: Vinokurov outmastered him in the sprint and won. Urán's silver medal is the first in cycling and the twelfth overall for Colombia in Olympic history.

Most reactions were positive. Alexander García (@aguardientosky) [es] mentioned Urán's medal was not even considered likely:

@Aguardientosky: Realmente sólo se esperan medallas para Colombia con Ibargüen, alguna en las pesas y tal vez Pajón. Lo de Urán fue sorpresivo.

@Aguardientosky [es]: Actually only [athlete Catherine] Ibargüen, some [people] at weightlifting and maybe [BMX world champion Mariana] Pajón are expected to get medals for Colombia. What Urán did was surprising.

Rigoberto Uran (Colombia). Image by Flickr user Sum_of_Marc (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Some were frustrated that Urán turned his head, like Giovanni Hernández (@Gihernandez77) [es]:

Gihernandez77: Me da la impresión que perdió la medalla de oro por estar pendiente del pelotón de atrás. Pero muy bien!!!

Gihernandez77 [es]: I have the impression that he lost the gold medal because he was paying attention to the peloton behind him. But he was great!!!

User La de la foto (@Fulania) [es] joked:

@Fulania: Miró hacia atrás pensando que lo iban a atracar. Pura costumbre colombiana.

@Fulania [es]: He looked behind thinking he was going to be robbed. Pure Colombian custom.

But Federico Arango (@siempreconusted) [es] highlights the merits of the winner:

@siempreconusted: A Uran le ganó un viejo zorro, un monstruo como Vinokurov muy muy difícil de vencer en una definición así.

@siempreconusted: Urán was beaten by an old fox, a monster like Vinokurov is very very hard to beat in such kind of definition.

And José Ángel Báez (@joseangelbaez) [es] adds:

@joseangelbaez: Urán no perdió por mirar para atrás. En un mano a mano, en el sprint, siempre perderá con Vinokourov que es más rápido.

@joseangelbaez [es]: Urán didn't lose because he looked behind. At a head to head, in the sprint, he will always lose to Vinokurov who is faster.

Daniel (@Da5_12) [es] tweeted about the cyclist's origins:

@Da5_12: Rigoberto Urán no es cualquier pati-hinchado. Vendía lotería y, a los 14 años, los paracos le mataron el papá. Ese man es un ganador. Punto.

@Da5_12: Rigoberto Urán is not some swollen-footed. He used to sell lottery and, when he was 14, paramilitaries killed his dad. That guy is a winner. Period.

Andrés Sánchez (@tropicalia115) [es] mocked the dumb questions posed by sports reporters and commentators on television:

@tropicalia115: J.H. Bonice: “¿Y qué comía Rigoberto Uran?”. Mamá de Rigoberto: “Pues lo mismo, la misma comida de siempre”. +10 para la señora Urán.

@tropicalia115: J.H. Bonice (refering to Caracol TV's Javier Hernández Bonnett): “And what did Rigoberto Urán eat?” Rigoberto's mom: “The same thing, the same food he always had”. +10 for Ms Urán.

Aníbal Pérez (@anibaljpg) [es] compares the money Coldeportes (the state-run Colombian Institute of Sports) will award Urán for his silver medal with the annual salary of the former secretary of the Senate:

@anibaljpg: Urán se gana 73 millones por una medalla de plata que le costo matarse entrenando muchos años, Emilio Otero 360 millones al año… calculen

@anibaljpg: Urán wins COP 73 million [it will actually be almost COP 80 million [es] (€36,000 or USD44,200)] for a silver medal which cost him training many years, Emilio Otero (former Senate's secretary) COP 360 million (€163,000 or USD200,000) a year… do the math

Olympic men's road race: Alexandre Vinokourov heads Colombian Rigoberto Uran. Image by The Department for Culture, Media and Sport on Flickr (CC BY 2.0)

But not everyone was satisfied. Daniel Arango (@stultaviro) [es] tweeted:

@stultaviro (1, 2): ¿Hay algo más deprimente que un segundo lugar? O primero o último. (…) Mientras no asimilemos que la única opción es ganar, seguiremos siendo nada en el deporte mundial.

@stultaviro (1, 2): Is there anything more depressing than a second place? Either first or last. (…) As long as we don't assimilate the only option is to win, we'll continue being nothing in world sport.

In the same vein, Túrin Turambar (@Turint) [es] writes:

@Turint: Si algún día entrenamos mucho con apoyo estatal y cambiamos la mentalidad perdedora de q una medalla plata está bien, ganaremos otra de oro

@Turint: If someday we train a lot with state support and change our loser's mentality claiming a silver medal is okay, we'll win another gold one [referring to Colombia's only Olympic gold, won by weightlifter María Isabel Urrutia at Sydney 2000].

Adolfo Zableh wrote [es] on his blog La copa del burro:

Imposible fue no emocionarse al verlo en el podio, pero yo sentí más rabia que alegría, porque se esforzó y quedó cerca, pero igual acá celebramos como si un segundo lugar fuera lo máximo, cuando no lo es. Preferimos perder porque nos da miedo ganar, y para acabar con eso sería bueno empezar a reconocerlo.

[It was] impossible not to get excited as I watched him on the podium, but I felt more anger than joy, because he did his best and finished close, but anyway here we celebrate as if a second place was the best thing, when it isn't. We prefer to lose because we're afraid to win, and in order to end with that it would be good to start recognizing it.

Urán himself posted a picture of himself with his team mates on Twitter [es] as he returned to the hotel. Later he wrote:

@UranRigoberto: Colombianos si se puede , todo es posible con dedicación disciplina . Gracias por ese apoyo se les quiere . pic.twitter.com/HisbhdEr

@UranRigoberto [es]: Colombians, we can do it, everything's possible with dedication [and] discipline. Thank you for your support, love you. pic.twitter.com/HisbhdEr

Colombia sent 104 athletes (46 men and 58 women) to London 2012, its biggest olympic delegation ever.

This post is part of our special coverage London 2012 Olympics.

Colombia: Locals Concerned Over Media's Slant on Cauca Conflict

Julián Ortega Martínez — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 13:28:22 +0000

Though the serious situation affecting the southwestern department of Cauca in the last few days is quite complex, the most notorious event was the removal of around 100 soldiers from a military base at the top of El Berlín mountain in Toribío on Tuesday, July 17. A close-up photo [es] of Army sergeant Rodrigo García, taken by photographer Luis Robayo of AFP, crying out of humiliation after been pushed by dozens of indigenous, prompted outrage on social media sites [es] and made the cover [es] of centre-left newspaper El Espectador on Wednesday, July 18.

Most Colombians learned about the incident through television [es], but the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN) uploaded their own version [es]:

The Defence Ministry [es] and other indigenous groups, such as the OPIC [es] (Pluricultural Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Cauca), have accused the main local indigenous organisations, ACIN and CRIC (Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca), of being infiltrated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), despite the communities’ public rejection of FARC. The weekend before these accusations, some indigenous people and a crew from newscast Noticias Uno were caught in the crossfire [es] as indigenous youth tried to expel guerrilla fighters. Days before, sergeant García himself recorded with his mobile phone [es] and uploaded footage of the indigenous as they destroyed military trenches to his YouTube channel.

Furthermore, on Thursday, July 19, the Indigenous Guard caught 4 indigenous guerrilla members, which they sentenced to be lashed [es] and also exiled from their territory if they return to FARC [es]. A photo by Manuel Saldarriaga depicting armed indigenous people circulated on the web [es] and was published by economic daily La República on its front page [es] on Wednesday 18. Racist, anti-indigenous comments poured on social media, though there were also respectful tweets supporting the Army (all links lead to Spanish-language tweets).

On Atrabilioso, Adas Oz claims [es] that the Cauca department is controlled by FARC and criticizes the current government for its lack of action:

¿Por qué ponerle un ultimátum a las FFMM si son una fuerza legítima del Estado creada para brindar seguridad en todos los rincones del país y para defender la soberanía y el orden? ¿Por qué no ponerle más bien un único ultimátum a las FARC que son los que siembran el terror en la zona y en toda Colombia? ¿Por qué la supuesta guardia indígena no se alía con la verdadera fuerza legítima para combatir el flagelo del narcoterrorismo que azota al departamento del Cauca? La respuesta es muy sencilla: porque el CRIC no es más que otro frente de las FARC y porque no tienen ningún interés en dejar a un lado su actividad cocalera.

Why impose an ultimatum to the Military Forces if they're a legitimate State force created to give security all over the country and defend sovereignty and order? Why don't they rather issue an only ultimatum to FARC, which are the ones seeding terror in the area and all of Colombia? Why doesn't the alleged indigenous guard join the true legitimate force to fight the narcoterrorism slashing Cauca? The answer is very simple: because the CRIC is no more than another FARC front and because they have no interest in leaving aside their coca activity.

The CRIC has complained [es] about “the subjectivity and bias” showed by mainstream media and “the expressions of racism and resentment against the Cauca indigenous peoples.”

Carlos Cortés Castillo wrote two posts about the media coverage of this situation in his blog Subversión de los hechos. In the first post he mocks [es] the speeches delivered by hosts of the morning radio programmes on Caracol Radio (Darío Arizmendi and Gustavo Gómez Córdoba) and W Radio (Julio Sánchez Cristo):

El discurso nos dará bríos para enfrentar el futuro, afianzáremos los lazos familiares, llamaremos a esa tía que hace diez años olvidamos. Pondremos la Constitución en la mesa de la sala. Nada de esto lo verá el periodista, que recibirá abrazos de todos sus colegas, Había que decirlo, Well done. Poderosas tus palabras.

The speech will give us determination to face the future, we'll reinforce our family ties, we'll call that aunt we forgot 10 years ago. We'll put the Constitution on the living room table. Nothing of this will be seen by the journalist, who will be hugged by all his colleagues, “it had to be said, Well done. Your words are powerful.”

In the second one, Cortés writes tongue-in-cheek [es] about a harsh interview [es] by Luis Carlos Vélez, a former CNN journalist and now director of Noticias Caracol newscast, with two indigenous leaders: Luis Évelis Andrade, head of CRIC, and Marcos Avirama, an indigenous senator (he also posted the interview with some of his own notes [es] with what Vélez would ‘actually’ do and say):

[Vélez] aprendió el oficio en dos escuelas similares, idénticas para los observadores más agudos: la Doctrina de la Guerra Preventiva, de Estados Unidos, donde acumuló horas de vuelo, y el Análisis Futbolístico Estrambótico, que lleva en la sangre.

[Vélez] learnt his job at two similar schools, identical for the most acute observers: the United States’ Preventive War Doctrine, where he accumulated flight hours, and the Outlandish Football Analysis, which he carries within his blood [referring to Vélez's father, sports commentator Carlos Antonio Vélez].

In a comment in this post, Hermes Trimegistro says [es]:

creo que los indígenas se equivocan y que han extralimitado el margen de autonomía que les da la constitución. Sin embargo ese es un debate aún abierto y que merece mayor sosiego y crítica objetiva. Los medios no han hecho más que suscribir ciegamente la posición gobiernista, con la despreciable mirada racista y dogmática propia de las dictaduras.

I think the indigenous are wrong and have overstepped the autonomy given by the constitution. Nevertheless that's still an open debate which deserves more calm and objective analysis. The media hasn't done anything else than blindly support the government's position, with the despicable racist, dogmatic view typical of dictatorships.

Álvaro Duque carries out an exercise [es] with this interview: using a strategy he claims is used by Japanese companies, he switches the questions around, as if the indigenous leaders where interviewing Vélez.

Finally, artist Lucas Ospina assesses [es] both the interview by Vélez and another one (in the same confrontational tone) by veteran newscaster Yamid Amat with Giovani Yule, a spokesperson of CRIC.

Colombia: Scientific Community Concerned Over Resignation of Top Official

Julián Ortega Martínez — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 11:00:21 +0000

Jaime Restrepo Cuartas [es], director of the Administrative Department of Science, Technology, and Innovation, Colciencias, resigned [es] late June to his post. Mr Restrepo, former president of the University of Antioquia and representative to the House (2006-2010), was one of the sponsors of the law 1286 of 2009 [es], which promoted Colciencias from a section of the National Planning Department (DNP) to an administrative department (a “quasi-Ministry”) and issued a new policy for ST&I (Science, Technology, and Innovation).

Colciencias was created [es] in 1968 as a fund for science research within the Ministry of Education. In 1991 it became [es] an institute for science and technology part of the DNP. Mr Restrepo's resignation has raised concern among the scientific community about the future of Colciencias (the main source of funding for most Colombian scientists) and the future of research in general in the country.

In [es] several [es] interviews [es], Restrepo has stated that there is “no real support” from the administration of president Juan Manuel Santos for Colciencias and that inconsistencies exist between the goals aimed by the government and the financial resources allocated by the Finance Ministry, which would cut Colciencias’ budget for 2013 (in fact, Restrepo said [es] that the finance minister has not given an appointment to him in four months). Colciencias’ staff has been frozen since the mid-1990s [es] but, since research groups have multiplied several times, the staff is overwhelmed.

Otto Gerardo writes [es] about this in the blog La Parresia:

De pasada, el suceso entre Colciencias y Hacienda, revela el estilo y el modo de ser rico en Colombia: en la legalidad, a través de la acumulación de tierra, la ganadería extensiva y la intensa y despiadada extracción de materias primas, que a la larga, nos conducirá a la miseria; y en la ilegalidad, por vías del narcotráfico y el negocio de la guerra, que se parapeta en lo más oscuro y criminal de la mente humana, cuando las condiciones de los que representan la legalidad, no construyen las avenidas amplias de las posibilidades de riqueza, desarrollo y bienestar a las que puede conducir una nación con pleno desarrollo científico.

In fact, the incident between Colciencias and the Finance [Ministry] reveals the style and the way of being rich in Colombia: legally, through land accumulation, extensive stockbreeding and intense and ruthless extraction of raw materials, which eventually, will lead us to misery; and illegally, through drug trafficking and the business of war, which shelters in the darkest and most criminal [places] of human mind, when the conditions of those representing legality don't build the wide avenues of the possibilities of wealth, development and welfare which a nation with complete scientific development can lead.

Expectations were high within the scientific community since president Santos pushed a constitutional reform [es] that passed in Congress last year, which redistributed the oil royalties paid to the state and allocated 10% of them for a fund to science, technology and innovation [es]. But these resources will be distributed regionally [es], to finance investment projects aiming to solve local needs according to the development plans issued by local authorities, and Colciencias is set to be only one [es] of multiple instances in the process [es], which includes ministries, governors [es], mayors, etc.

Shortly after Restrepo's resignation, there were rumours [es] claiming that Luis Pérez Gutiérrez, a controversial former mayor of Medellín, had been offered to replace him. Some researchers published a letter to President Santos [es] expressing their concern and asking him for political will to strengthen Colciencias. Around 1,500 academics signed it [es]. Another three letters [es] have been sent to the President.

Santiago Giraldo is also worried about the future of Colciencias and adds [es]:

Casi que se podría decir que Colciencias existe en Colombia porque daría pena, oso si se quiere, no tener una institución como las que hay en otros países de Suramérica o del mundo desarrollado, no porque realmente se quiera que haya investigación en C y T.

You could arguably say that Colciencias exists in Colombia because it would be embarrassing, even ridiculous, to not have such an institution as those in other countries in South America or the developed world, not because [the government] actually wants research in science and technology.

Carlos Estévez writes [es] about nine points Mr Restrepo explained as the reasons innovation does not “start” in Colombia [es]. One of them is:

6. Ahora resulta que Bancoldex es el ente mas apropiado para gestionar el proceso de innovación, aquí lo que se evidencia es la absoluta ignorancia en lo que debe ser in sistema de C&T+I, por eso las tres iniciales, Innovación sin ciencia y tecnología no existe.
Si no hay dinero para investigar en ciencia básica o aplicada o en la implementación, apropiación de tecnologías de todo tipo, con que base piensan innovar? Esto le quita las manos al sistema de C&T+I.

6. Now it turns out that Bancoldex [a Colombian state bank focused on external trade] is the most appropriate entity to manage the innovation process. This is evidence of absolute ignorance about what a ST&I system should be, that's why there are three initials, innovation without science and technology doesn't exist.
If there's no money to research on basic or applied science, or implementation, appropriation of all kinds of technology, with which foundation do they intend to innovate with? This cuts the ST&I system its hands.

For the time being, Jorge Alonso Cano, Colciencias director of innovation, has been in charge of the institution [es]. Political website La Silla Vacía [es] and TV newscast CM& [es] have claimed that Santos will appoint a new director close to the green party [es], whose candidate lost the 2010 presidential election in the second round (despite this, the green party joined the ruling coalition).

Professor Alexis de Greiff criticizes the government for weakening Colciencias and the possibility of ‘granting’ it to a political party, and states [es]:

Colciencias necesita de un gerente público que haga política de CTI desde una posición de credibilidad entre científicos y empresarios.

Colciencias needs a public manager who makes a ST&I policy from a credibility position among scientists and businesspeople.

Thumbnail image by Flickr user Move the Clouds (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Colombia: Cauca Indigenous Demand Army and Guerrillas Leave Their Territories

Julián Ortega Martínez — Wed, 11 Jul 2012 16:43:06 +0000

In an open letter [es, fr], the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN), in south western Colombia, demanded that “groups and legal and illegal armies” leave their territories, specifically the town of Toribío, which is routinely attacked by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) [es]. The indigenous destroyed army and police trenches, as well as a FARC camp [es]. President Juan Manuel Santos was booed [es] when he arrived to the town, where a council of ministers is set to be held on Wednesday, July 11.

Colombia: Concern About Contamination at Santa Marta Bay

Julián Ortega Martínez — Tue, 10 Jul 2012 15:00:00 +0000

José D. Pacheco M., of the blog Tras la cola de la rata, writes [es] about a study [es] and a report [pdf, es] on the contamination of the bay of Santa Marta, an important tourist destination in the Colombian Caribbean, because of the “poor handling and inadequate control of solid and liquid wastes”.

Colombia: ‘Higgsteria’ in Medellín

Julián Ortega Martínez — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 20:01:36 +0000

After the announcement by CERN (the European Organization for Nuclear Research) last week about the search of the Higgs’ boson, Helena Cortés writes [es] about a conference held at the Medellín Planetarium with local scientists explaining the news, and compiles tweets with “accurate and inaccurate comments” about the ‘Higgsteria'.

Colombia: Outrage at Celebrity for Mocking Fat Women

Julián Ortega Martínez — Fri, 06 Jul 2012 17:16:30 +0000

A column [es] written by TV celebrity Alejandra Azcárate [es] for women's magazine Aló, where she writes tongue-in-cheek about “the 7 advantages of being [a] fat [woman]“, prompted harsh reactions in Colombian social media this week. Blog posts parodying [es] the ‘7 advantages‘ [es] format or replying [es]to her text [es] have appeared [es], as well as an internet meme [es]. The magazine apologised [es] but Ms Azcárate said in a radio interview [es] that she won't retract [es].