Global Voices » Daniel Alan Kennedy

Russians See Themselves in Turkish Protests

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Wed, 19 Jun 2013 01:21:17 +0000

While Istanbul continues to be rocked by mass demonstrations [en] against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the RuNet has been actively observing and discussing the events. Turkey is a popular holiday destination with Russians, who are drawn there by its beaches, proximity, low prices and a visa-free travel agreement with Russia. Last year alone nearly 3 million Russians visited Turkey. While some interest in current events there can therefore be chalked up to concerns for non-refundable travel packages, Russia itself has been no stranger to street protests in the last two years. Many Russians were quick to draw parallels: both between the two protest movements and the two political leaders.

From the start, most Russian sympathies have tended to be with the protesters, a phenomenon the controversial writer and head of the Other Russia opposition group Eduard Limonov ascribed [ru] to the Russian national character:

Мы, российские граждане, всегда надеемся, что восставшие против своих правительств победят, всегда инстинктивно встаём на их сторону. Объясняется этот феномен крайне просто. Поскольку мы ненавидим своё правительство и всё руководство нашей страны, и хотим, чтобы оно оставило нас, как можно быстрее; мы солидаризируемся инстинктивно с любой борьбой против правительств.

We Russian citizens always hope that those rising up against their governments will win, instinctively flocking to their side. This phenomenon is quite easily explained. As we hate our government and all those who rule our country and want for them to leave us, the quicker the better, we instinctively express our solidarity with any struggle against the state.

“Unrest in Istanbul”, June 11, 2013, Photo by Eser Karadağ CC2.0

Limonov, however, went on to explain that in Turkey's case the sympathy was not just a reflex. Noting the centrality of environmentalism to sparking the Taksim protests, Limonov wrote “the Turks appeared very similar to us, like Chirikova and her Khimki Forest [en].”

Limonov wasn't alone, as many Russians took to Twitter and LiveJournal to express their support of the protesters. Arkady Babchenko, a Russian journalist who blogged about the Istanbul protests from the ground, was highly critical [ru] of Erdoğan's response (he was later detained, beaten [ru] and deported from Turkey [en].)

По поводу переговорщиков (вчера одиннадцать человек ездили к Эрдогану на переговоры, насколько я понял, ни о чем не договорились, но это не точно) – не то, чтобы разброд и шатание, но разговоры уже начались. Очень грамотный ход со стороны Эрдогана. Разделяй и властвуй. Умно. У Путина учится.

As for the negotiators (yesterday [June 12, 2013] eleven people went to Erdoğan for negotiations, as far as I known they haven't reached any agreement, but that's not clear) — it's not so much confusion and disharmony [that they've caused], but people have already started to talk. An expert move on Erdoğan's part. Divide and rule. Clever. He's learning from Putin.

Comparisons of Erdoğan to Putin abounded, particularly on Twitter. Real_Estate_Mos [ru] tweeted:

Эрдоган – это такой турецкий Путин..

Erdoğan is a sort of Turkish Putin

Riffing on both leaders’ fondness for presenting themselves as public servants, sergeiolevskii [ru] tweeted:

Эрдоган: “я слуга народа”.
Путин: “я как раб на галерах”.
Чего же так сложно избавиться от этих слуг и рабов?

Erdoğan – “I'm a servant of the people”
Putin- “I work like a galley slave”
Why is it so hard to get rid of these servants and slaves?

Pro-Putin Russians were reticent to voice their support for Erdoğan, under whose premiership Russo-Turkish relations have soured, particularly over the issue of Syria. Nevertheless, Nikolai Starikov, a hard-line Putin supporter, writer, and conspirologist stated [ru] that the protests had been whipped up by the Americans in order to create disorder in Turkey and force the government to support Syrian opposition fighters, which Starikov alleges they have been trying to avoid:

Не хочет – нужно заставить. И вот «турецкая весна» на улицах. Погромы, драки с полицией, попытки штурма офисов правящей партии. И все из-за планов сноса одного парка, как говорят нам СМИ? Полная чушь. Цель беспорядков – заставить Турцию активно вписаться в сирийский конфликт и помочь исламистам.

[Turkey] doesn't want [to get involved] so they need to be compelled. And there you have it: “The Turkish Spring” is on the streets. Pogroms, clashes with police, attempts to storm the offices of the ruling party. And all from plans to demolish a single park, as the media says? Complete rubbish. The aim of the disturbances is to force Turkey to sign up for the Syrian conflict and help the Islamists.

In the past Starikov has repeatedly claimed the US State Department is behind Russia's opposition movement, as an active means of weakening the country.

Twitter user aliciamillor [ru] made an argument in a series of tweets [ru] that since Erdoğan had offered to hold a referendum on the park, he was better than some other western politicians:

Браво! Эрдоган предложил провести референдум. Того же самого требовали фр-зы по поводу гей браков. Олланд отказал в груб форме,собаками и газом. Вывод – Эрдоган больше демократ чем Олланд.

Bravo! Erdoğan has proposed holding a referendum. The French demanded the same thing for gay marriage. [French President] Hollande refused this very rudely, with dogs and [tear] gas. Consequently, Erdoğan is a bigger democrat than Hollande.

One Russophone group that did seem to mostly support Erdoğan were citizens of the Central Asian republics, most of whom are Turkic peoples, ethnically and linguistically related to the Turks of Anatolia. One user [ru, uz] in Uzbekistan (whose own president responded to popular protest in 2005 by massacring [en] hundreds of people) applauded Erdoğan [ru] for his relative restraint:

Эрдоган поступил правильно , предупредил , не отреагировали , и теперь выгнал всех нахрен !!! и вообще можно было без предупреждении

Erdoğan has acted correctly, he warned [the protesters], they didn't react, and now he's gotten them the hell out of there!!! and anyway, he didn't have to warn them

Another user, Eva_Alli [ru, kg] of Kyrgyzstan, whose country has also been plagued by unstable government, also praised [ru] Erdoğan's steadfastness.

Эрдоган красавчик. нам бы такого. знает, что делает, имеет свою точку зрения и ни перед кем не пасует. лев в мужском роде. одним словом.

Erdoğan is one cool dude. Would that we had someone like that. He knows what he's doing, has his own point of view and nothing gets past him. A sort of a lion, in a word.

Leonine Erdogan is anything but cowardly, according to some RuNet users. YouTube screenshot. June 18, 2013.

Each of these groups of RuNet users perceives Turkey through the prism of their own domestic concerns: members of the opposition see an example to follow, while regime supporters see the disturbances as evidence of foreign meddling and western hypocrisy. Conversely, Central Asians seem to envy their Anatolian cousins for having a more moderate or more decisive leader than they do. While social media has clearly made it much easier for users to closely follow and discuss events thousands of kilometers away, their concerns suggest that for many, all politics is still local.

Russia Eyes Another Orphan Experiment

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Tue, 11 Jun 2013 02:58:44 +0000

It's been a particularly bad year for Russia's long-suffering orphans. First they became unwitting pawns in Russia's diplomatic spat with the US, and adoptions by Americans were banned [GV] in retaliation for the American “Magnitsky List” back in December 2012. Then, on May 30, 2013, Pavel Astakhov, the Russian Ombudsman for Children's Rights, proposed a ban [en] on adoptions by France, citing France's new laws on same-sex marriage. Perhaps eager to head off suggestions he was merely curtailing orphans’ opportunities for adoption, rather than expanding them, on June 7, Astakhov proposed a new, experimental programme [ru] where Russian orphans could be put up for adoption in different regions of the country.

“Странно, что итальянец, француз, немец приезжают в Россию и могут взять ребенка, а житель Северо-Кавказского или Дальневосточного федерального округа не может взять ребенка в Москве или Нижнем Новгороде. Это возможно.”

It's strange that an Italian, a Frenchman or a German can come to Russia and take a child, but someone living in the North Caucasus or the Far-East Federal District can't take a child from Moscow or Nizhny Novgorod. This is a possibility.

“Explaining Dipping Sticks to Russian Orphans” Kaluga, Russia. Photo by Robert Dann CC 2.0

Astakhov went on to claim that “If we are talking about an experiment, then I'm not opposed to an experiment”. He should probably have chosen his words more carefully, as the idea of sending Russia's highly-politicized orphans to the restive North Caucasian Republics as a kind of social “experiment” was overwhelmingly condemned by netizens of all political stripes.

Russian nationalists were naturally incensed. One blogger, fotograf_1 (whose blog is simply called “Slav”), pulled no punches [ru].

Мои глаза меня обманывают?! Да этим детям сломают психику, их будут насиловать, их будут учить убивать, их будут воспитывать в ненависти к русским. А если нет, то что? они будут овец пасти в горах?! да к этим детям будут относиться как к рабам, если не хуже!

Are my eyes deceiving me!? These children will have their psyches broken, they'll be raped, they'll be taught to kill, they'll be brought up to hate ethnic Russians. And if not, then what? They'll tend sheep in the mountains?! These children will be treated like slaves, if not worse!

The theme of slavery was brought up by another nationalist blogger, belyaev [ru], who wrote [ru]

К примеру, не так давно в СМИ просочилась информация, что прямо на автобусной остановке в Махачкале был организован рынок рабов, который «крышевали» полицейские. Местный блогер Закир Магомедов, который и привлёк внимание к этому ужасу, даже приводил цены на живой товар – 15 тысяч рублей за мужчину и за 150 тысяч за девушку. Ну а сколько приходит сообщений про рабов, освобождённых с кирпичных заводов Кавказа, лучше вообще промолчать.

Look at the recent example exposed by the media [ru], where a slave market was organised at a bus stop in Makhachkala, which was “under the protection” of the police. Local blogger Zakir Magomedov, who brought this horrific story to public attention, even gave the prices for the living goods – 15,000 rubles [460 USD] for a man and up to 150,000 rubles [4,600 USD] for a girl. And I'll save my breath on the subject of how many slaves have been liberated from brick factories in the Caucasus.

Belyaev was referring to the case of Andrei Popov [en], a soldier who claims he was kidnapped and forced to work in a brick factory in Dagestan. Such fears are not the sole preserve of hard-line nationalists. News of the story prompted over 300 comments [ru] on Andrei Malgin's popular opposition blog [ru], the overwhelming majority of them negative and many of them xenophobic or Islamophobic.

Even otherwise liberal Russians were less than impressed. Blogger yttytt [ru] sarcastically tweeted [ru]:

А меня Астахов порадовал свежестью мысли: отдадим сирот на Северный Кавказ, обратим в мусульманство и дадим в руки по автомату “Борз”. Ура!

I'm pleased with Astakhov's original thinking: give orphans to the North Caucasus, convert them to Islam and put a “Borz” [en] machine gun in their hands. Hurray!

The announcement was also discussed on the popular liberal opposition Facebook group “We Were On Bolotnaya Square and We'll Come Again“[ru], where the reaction [ru] was entirely negative:

Diallo Marina: У них девочка считается женщиной лет с 12 . Об этом он подумал?

Diallo Marina: They consider a girl to be a woman when she turns 12. Has [Astakhov] thought about that?

Olga Leonova: А что? И вырастят…боевиков

Olga Leonova. So what? They'll raise them… to be [terrorist] fighters

Leonid Jerschow: Похоже, Астахов нашел способ подготовки террористов с европейской внешностью

Leonid Jerschow: Looks like Astakhov has found a means of creating terrorists with a European appearance

The Kremlin has expended a great deal of blood and treasure over the last 20 years ensuring that the North Caucasus remains within the Russian Federation and has broadly succeeded in this aim. But while the threat of secession now seems remote, for the vast majority of Russians the North Caucasus and her people remain decidedly hostile and alien. Opposition activists from across the ideological spectrum have come to associate the region with the worst excesses of corruption and lawlessness, and resent the massive subsidies that go to local despots like Leader of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov [en]. Perhaps Astakhov's proposal was designed to bridge this divide and bring ethnic Russians and the peoples of the North Caucasus closer together. If that's the case, then the public outcry shows it's going to take a lot more than a few adoptions to change xenophobic attitudes.

Russians & Cigarettes: A Hard Goodbye

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Thu, 06 Jun 2013 19:42:45 +0000

Russia is one of the heaviest smoking countries in the world. While 39 percent of Russians smoke, the figure rises to 60 percent among Russian men (for comparison, the figure is about 21 percent for both sexes in the UK). Russian attitudes and laws on smoking have been incredibly lax when compared to the rest of Europe. Russians have been free to feed their nicotine addictions not only in bars, restaurants and cafes, but in schools, hospitals, many forms of public transport, government buildings and apartment complexes. Adverts for cigarettes decorate the nation's street corners and metro systems, and fill the pages of Russian publications. Taxes on cigarettes are negligible and a pack of Marlboro can be purchased for less than two dollars, with domestic brands available for half that.

Russians’ smoking habits know few boundaries. “Bad Habit,” Volgograd, Russia, 22 November 2009, photo by Mohd Hafizuddin Husin, CC 2.0.

The Russian government aims to change this and, on Saturday, June 1, 2013, it instituted a new law “On the Protection of the Health of Citizens from the Effects of Passive Tabacco Smoke and the Consequences of Tabacco Consumption” [ru], banning smoking in government buildings, educational facilities, healthcare facilities, the lifts and corridors of apartment complexes, train stations, and inside most trains. The law also mandates tough restrictions on tobacco advertizing, increases taxes on the smoking industry, raises penalties for sales to minors, and paves the way to a phased introduction of similar bans in shops, cafes, bars, and restaurants.

Back in October 2012, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev himself used his blog to disseminate a video (see below) explaining the government's reasons for introducing such a law, noting that Russia's smoking rate was abnormally high (comparable only to China's) and that, since the 1990s, the percentage of Russian women who smoke had risen from 7 to 22 percent, while the age at which a person first smoked on average had fallen from 15 to 11.

While official figures [ru] state that between 70 and 80 percent of the population supports these new measures, the law has proved controversial on the Russian blogosphere, where many took issue with it for a variety of reasons. Blogger Nicolai Troitsky (pictured in his LiveJournal profile enjoying a cigarette) claimed that he was joining the recently established “Common Russian Movement for the Rights of Smokers” [ru]. Troitsky denounced the legislation in the strongest possible terms in his post, “Stop the Genocide Against Smokers!” [ru].

тоталитарная, гестаповская, фашистская борьба с курильщиками, больше похожая на истребление, на геноцид, противоречит всем нормам здравого смысла. Целая немалая группа граждан демонстративно лишается элементарных прав.

This totalitarian, gestapo-like, fascist fight with smokers is more like an extermination, a genocide, running counter to all norms of common sense. An entire group of citizens is having its basic rights violated.

While Troitsky was apparently happy to confirm Godwin's Law in his opening salvo, hyperbole was not the sole preserve of smokers. Duma Deputy Igor Lebedev took the time to pen an article titled, “‘The Rights of Smokers’ Are ‘The Rights of Drug Addicts’ and ‘The Rights of Murders'” [ru]:

Привычка, конечно, сильна. Причем не только привычка курильщиков к никотину, но и наша общая привычка видеть вокруг себя людей с белыми бумажными дымящимися палочками во рту. Надо сделать так, чтобы вид прилюдно курящего человека вызывал такую же реакцию, как и вид прилюдно “ширяющегося” наркомана. По сути, это одно и то же.

The habit is strong, of course. Not just the smokers’ nicotine habit, but also our common habit of seeing people around us with smoking white paper sticks in their mouths. We need to make it so that the sight of a person smoking in front of people will bring the same reaction as the sight of a drug addict “shooting up” in front of people. After all, they are one and the same.

Lebedev, a member of the ultra-nationalist political party LDPR, also underlined that “smoking is not a Russian tradition—the habit was introduced by Peter the Great” (that is, 300 years ago).

The more liberal Anton Nossik criticized the law on the grounds that the coercive measures contained in the laws would prove fruitless [ru].

в любой стране, где за последние 10 лет достигнуты ощутимые успехи в борьбе с курением, мы видим огромный спектр усилий, направленных именно на помощь курильщикам в бросании курить… А там, где это направление работы задвинуто, никакие даже самые жёсткие репрессивные меры не помогают. Мы это недавно тут обсуждали на примере французских драконовских мер, результат которых с 2000 по 2010 год оказался нулевым. И британских программ помощи курильщикам, которые за тот же период помогли снизить число страдающих зависимостью в полтора раза.

In any country where they've achieved an apreciable success in the fight against smoking, we see the massive spectre of efforts centered namely on helping smokers to quit… But where the direction of the work is forceful, even the harshest, most repressive measures don't help. We recently discussed [on Nossik's blog] the example of France's repressive measures, the results of which between 2000 and 2010 turned out to be nothing. And the British program of helping smokers in the same period lowered the number of those suffering [nicotine] dependence by one-and-half times.

Many Russians, however, were less interested in the law as a question of rights and simply focused on the likelihood of it being enforced or enforceable. As Osik101195 bluntly tweeted [ru]:

Если вы думаете, что антитабачный закон будут соблюдать в России, то вы точно ебанутый

If you think the anti-tabacco law will be observed in Russia, then you're a complete f*cking idiot

Writing several days after the law's adoption, MindNasty painted a grim picture [ru] of the efficacy of the ban:

В тамбуре электрички курили два контролера, выдыхали дым в табличку “Не курить”. Обсуждали антитабачный закон. Не вижу смысла в этом законе.

Between the carriages on the train, two ticket inspectors were smoking, blowing their smoke at the “No Smoking” sign. They were discussing the anti-tabacco law. I don't see the point of this law.

For all the controversy, Russia's new smoking laws are broadly similar to legislation most Western countries have had for over 20 years (not coincidentally, its smoking rates are similar to those of countries like the UK 30 years ago). With 400,000 Russians dying from smoking-related illnesses every year, the government has a huge incentive to increase public health and implement anti-smoking legislation, but whether Russia's population is willing to obey or its police are ready to enforce such legislation remains to be seen.

Tinker, Tailor, Compass, Wig: Russia's Amusing American Spy Scandal

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Sat, 18 May 2013 17:57:22 +0000

The Cold War may have ended over twenty years ago, but it's an open secret that the US and Russia continue to spy on each other. The uncovering of a Russian spy-ring three years ago in America demonstrated that for the SVR (Russia's CIA equivalent), old habits die hard. This week showed that the same holds true for the CIA, when on Tuesday 14 May 2013, the FSB (Russia's internal security service) announced they had arrested Ryan Christopher Fogle, third secretary at the US embassy in Moscow for attempting to recruit Russian citizens as spies. Fogle had allegedly written letters and placed telephone calls to potential agents offering them up to one million dollars for their services. The US State Department declined to publicly comment on which government agency Fogle works for or on the allegations of spying.

Fogle's arrest was filmed by the FSB and shown on Russian television. In the video [ru], Fogle is seen in an unconvincing blond wig and baseball cap, which are then removed by an FSB agent before Fogle is frogmarched into a waiting car. Fogle's “spy-kit” (which included two wigs, sunglasses, a compass, a cheap Nokia phone, an Atlas of Moscow, a Swiss army knife and several envelopes of 500-euro notes) is then displayed for the cameras. Later in the video, Fogle and what appear to be three of his colleagues from the Embassy are given a dressing-down by a pixilated FSB agent. In a manner strangely reminiscent of a school headmaster scolding wayward students, the agent expresses his shock and disappointment at Fogle's attempts to recruit Russian citizens, in light of the recent close cooperation of Russia with American intelligence agencies in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings.

The story catapulted the murky world of counterintelligence into the spotlight of the Russian blogosphere, where the details of the case were dissected with glee. From the start many were somewhat perplexed at Fogle's spy-kit, which seemed to come straight from an early James Bond novel.

User Best_JS [ru] quipped

Парики,черные очки и особенно–компас в Москве.Не хватает только секстанта и астролябии.ЦРУ оснащает своих агентов в магазине 99 центов?

Wigs, sunglasses and especially — a compass in Moscow. He's only missing a sextant and astrolabe. Is the CIA equipping their agents at the 99 cent store?

Tweeter user Timque [ru] also took a dim view of Fogle's spycraft.

Если наша контрразведка способна ловить только шпионов с чуть ли не надписью «ШПИОН» на лбу. То из меня бы вышел отличный агент ЦРУ!

If our counterintelligence is only capable of catching spies with the word “SPY” practically written on their forheads, then I could make an excellent CIA agent!

Fogle's alleged spy-kit generated interest for it's “low-tech” nature. YouTube Screenshot. May 17, 2013.

Somewhat surprisingly, a much more charitable appraisal [ru] of Fogle's equipment came from popular Russian tech blogger Eldar Murtazin [ru], who pointed out the pitfalls of using advanced gadgets in the world of espionage.

Начнем с самого противоречивого предмета в глазах обывателей — обычного атласа Москвы и дорог с указанием каждого дома. В век высоких технологий, когда у каждого в телефоне есть навигация и хорошие карты, это выглядит анахронизмом. А теперь давайте представим специфику работы агента, когда он не должен оставлять следов, в том числе и цифровых. Я плохо представляю себе агента, который прокладывает путь к тайнику или месту встречу в Google Maps и затем сохраняет маршрут. Этот агент должен быть конченным идиотом. Равно, как мне сложно представить как сообщить о месте встречи в электронном виде, это дополнительный риск [...] Поэтому можно долго ворчать, что разведчикам чужды новые технологии, но это не так. Эффективный способ не оставлять следов, не использовать программы навигации.

Let's start with the most controversial item in the eyes of the average person: the common Moscow road atlas with the adresses of all the buildings in it. In the high-tech era, when everyone has a phone with GPS and good maps, it seems like an anachronism. But now consider the specifics of an agent's work, when he can leave no traces, including digital ones. I can't picture the agent who looks up the way to a secret location or a meeting place on Google Maps and then saves the route. That agent would have to be a complete idiot. Similarly, it's hard for me to imagine sending information about meeting place in electronic form, this is an additional risk [...] So you can whinge all you like about intelligence agents shunning new technologies, but it isn't the case. An effective means of leaving no traces is not to use GPS.

Blogger and social media guru, Anton Nossik [ru], on the other hand, laid the blame at Americans’ inability to work with agents in human intelligence. Referencing an interview [ru] with famous Soviet defector Viktor Suvorov, Nossik claimed:

По мнению Суворова, у ЦРУ просто очень хреново поставлена агентурная работа. Потому что, с одной стороны, львиная доля разведданных собирается с помощью техсредств (спутниковая съёмка, перехват коммуникаций), а не от живых людей. С другой стороны, самые эффективные агенты на службе Америки — иностранцы, шпионящие в своих собственных странах. Которых не нужно учить маскироваться, гримироваться, носить парики, потому что их главная маскировка — реальная биография и занимаемая должность.

According to Suvorov, the CIA is simply bloody awful at working with agents. This is because, on the one hand, the lion's share of intelligence info is gathered by technical means (satelite photos, intercepted communications) and not from living people. And, on the other hand, the most effective agents in the service of America are foreigners working in their own countries, who don't need to learn to disguise themselves, apply make-up, wear wigs, because their main disguise is their real biography and the work they do.

Nossik went on to claim Fogle's alleged letter [ru] (written in awkward if grammatically correct Russian) looked like “Nigerian spam run through Google translate”.

Of course, as usual, some RuNet users saw the invisible hand of the Kremlin at work in the entire episode. As one commentator [ru] sarcastically put it

Ну, да — накладные усы, парики, шифры и прочая хуета. Почти как в кино. Не верю я в это лицедейство! Компас меня убил окончательно. Надо было еще словарь англо-русский добавить. И детскую порнографию.

Oh yeah, fake moustaches, wigs, codebooks and similar bullsh*t. Almost like in the films. I don't believe this charade. The compass was the last straw. They should have added a Russian-English dictionary. And some child porn.

Interestingly, while Fogle's competence (or lack there of) as a spy has been a hot topic of conversation, almost no attention has been paid to the potential fallout from the expulsion of a US diplomat for spying. Similarly few have bothered to speculate on why the Kremlin chose to expel Fogle now, when the Kremlin and the US are in high-level talks about Syria and intelligence-sharing. It is telling that what should normally be a major diplomatic incident now barely registers as more than an amusing anecdote for Russian netizens.

After Fatality, May 6 Displays Troubles & Resilience of Russian Protest Movement

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Wed, 08 May 2013 12:30:06 +0000

The Russian opposition, it seems, can't catch a break. Sometimes, this is because the Kremlin's political technologists outmaneuver them. Other times, it is thanks to internal bickering. On May 6, 2013, however, the culprit was plain bad luck. On May 6, Muscovites planned to assemble at Bolotnaya Square for the largest rally in a year, in order to commemorate the anniversary of the now infamous protests at the same location on May 6, 2012, when demonstrators and riot police clashed violently for the first and only time in Russia's 2011-2012 protest season. Investigators have charged twenty-eight people with varying degrees of involvement in the “rioting,” making this group a cause célèbre for the Russian opposition, which views them as political prisoners.

After months of preparation and weeks of wrangling with the Moscow authorities for permission to hold the protest, a tragic fatality marred the event before it could even begin. When the rally's start was just six hours away, a falling speaker crushed to death 25-year-old Maksim Melkov, a volunteer helping to set up the stage. When police declared the stage area a potential crime scene, it seemed possible that organizers might have to cancel the entire event. Shortly thereafter, however, the Mayor's office announced the demonstration could continue without the stage. Amidst the confusion, anti-opposition spambots flooded Twitter with messages bearing the hashtags “sick of protests” [ru] and “the opposition has faded away” [ru].

Twitterbots simultaneously tweeting the hashtag “the opposition has faded away”

Such tactics failed to distract Ekho Moskvy journalist Serguei Parkhomenko, who quickly took to Facebook, where he tried to coordinate alternative logistical arragements in a post [ru] that attracted over 130 “shares”:

Друзья, пожалуйста, прекратить битья головами об углы и причитать,”какой кошмар”. Да, случилось ужасное несчастье. Но именно потому, что оно ужасное, сейчас не истериковать нужно, а очень слаженно работать, чтобы в создавшейся ситуации ситуация не пошла вразнос.

Ситауция таков: поскольку трагедия случилась в самом начале работ, сцены нет, и звука нет. Место монтажа оцеплено полицией. Организаторы (не я) продолжают переговоры с мэрией о том, как быть дальше [...]

Итак, нужны:

1) Большой грузовик с откидывающимися бортами
2) генераторы
3) мощные динамики
4) усилители
5) пульт
6) кабели для всего этого

[...]

Если кто-то может помочь – немедленно пишите мне в личные сообщения.

И пожалуйста, не истерите здесь больше. Не накачивайте друг друга, не орите истошно. Просто помогите.

Friends, please stop beating your heads against the wall and proclaiming “what a disaster.” Yes, a horrible accident has occurred. But, exactly because it is horrible, we don't need to get hysterical. Instead we need to work as a team, so the situation doesn't get away from us.

The situation is this: insofar as the tragedy happened at the very beginning of the work, there is no stage and no sound. The rigging is cordoned off by police. The organizers (not me) are in talks with the mayor about how to continue. [...]

And so we need:

1) A large truck with removable sides.
2) generators
3) powerful speakers
4) amplifiers
5) a mixing board
6) cables for all of this

[...]

If someone can help, quickly get in touch with me.

And please, no more hysterics about this. Don't work yourselves up, and don't lose your heads. Just pitch in.

Some oppositionists were keen to turn Melkov into something of a martyr. User social_hipster[ru] tweeted:

Максим Мелков – жертва режима!

Maksim Melkov is a victim of the regime!

Pro-regime netizens were less impressed by oppositionists’ handling of the tragedy. Twitter user xstazik was happy to take the opportunity to troll the protestors:

погиб человек, а этим лишь бы помитинговать #6мая #ОппозицияСдулась

A person has died, but these guys just want to have their rally #6may #TheOppositionHasFadedAway

Blogger alekssidor [ru] also disapproved:

Организаторы готовят аппаратуру к митингу на крови

The organizers are setting up the equipment for their protest on blood

While organizers did manage to acquire a truck and a sound-system, a lack of adequate amplification plagued the event's speeches. Journalist Oleg Kashin, perhaps given the circumstances, decided to forgo a speech. Instead, he sang an a capella version of seminal Soviet punk band Grazhdanskaya Oborona‘s best known song, “Everything is going to plan” [ru], to the apparent bafflement of many in attendance.

The confusion was shared by others online, as well, including those who enjoyed it. LiveJournal user langobard wrote [ru]:

сказать откровенно, я Кашина после вчерашнего зауважал.

Хотя один мелкий обывательский вопрос все равно мозолит мозги. Все-таки он бухой был или нет? Ну чего уж, ну принято интересоваться про это в таких вот случаях.

I can honestly say that I respect Kashin after what happened yesterday.

Just one little parochial question all the same pops into my head. Was he wasted or what? No big deal, it's just interesting to know in such cases, that's all.

Kashin, of course, is an extremely prolific tweeter [ru] and occasionally posts entire song lyrics, 140 characters at a time. SimonKostin [ru] noted the collision of the journalist's online and offline personae.

Похоже, Кашин перенес свои принципы ведения твиттера в реальную жизнь

It's as if Kashin has carried his tweeting principles into real life

The event finished with a speech from Alexey Navalny, who appeared onstage alongside his wife. In a straightforward address, which Navalny himself admitted contained “nothing new,” he promised to continue to fight the criminal charges against him and the corruption and excesses of the government. He closed with “Russia is our country! Russia will be free!” The crowd repeated the slogan in a shout, and Navalny's speech was over.

Though the final attendance of the event (estimated to be around 27,500) was much smaller than the mass demonstrations of December 2011 and early 2012, the turnout does testify that that there are still people in Russia willing to come out on an unseasonably cold day and make their displeasure known to the regime, despite accidents, soundsystem failures, and the ever-present fear of arrest and provocation. Despite its setbacks, the opposition has not faded away, which—a year on from Putin's reinauguration—could be an achievement in and of itself.

Russian Conspiracy Theories About Boston Bombings Abound

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Sat, 27 Apr 2013 17:40:52 +0000

Conspiracy theories flourish in times of confusion and uncertainty. Claims that the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings were part of some sort of US government-led false flag operation were circulating on the English-speaking internet before the dust had literally settled, particularly on conspiracy forums and social media groups like the Citizens Action Network.

The news that the two bombing suspects were ethnic Chechens turned what had been a passing interest for the RuNet into the number one topic of conversation [GV]. Because the RuNet, just like the Internet at large, has always had a penchant for conspiracy theories, the events in Boston provided ample fodder for some its more paranoid denizens. For example, the pro-regime nationalist LiveJournal community vvv-ig [ru] was quick to place the blame on the American intelligence services, running an extremely graphic post [ru] from the blogger frallik [ru], outlining how the bombings had in fact been faked using actors. The post, mainly using materials and memes sourced from western sites, alleged, among other things, that a man who was in the epicenter of the explosion and lost both of his legs was in fact an Iraq war veteran and previous amputee named Nick Vogt.

Despite the fact that the vvv-ig commonly deals in anti-American conspiracies, the allegation that the bombings had been faked proved too bizarre for some contributors. Blogger proobman [ru] published a rebuttal [ru] in the same community, pointing out that the man who lost his legs was in fact named Jeff Bauman, who has a Facebook page and a fund set up to aid his recovery. Interestingly, proobman's issues with accusations of “staging” appears partially due their similarity to ones leveled at the Russian security services: that they were behind the bombings of several apartment buildings in 1999 [en] as a pretext for the Second Chechen War. proobman quipped:

Башни-близнецы взорвал Буш, Буйнакск и Волгодонск – Путин. Обама взорвал марафон. Продам шапочки из фольги, недорого.

Bush blew up the Twin Towers, Putin blew up [the towns of] Buinaksk and Volgodonsk. Obama blew up the marathon. Tin foil hats for sale, cheap.

The two suspects, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. FBI.gov, April 25, 2013

While many Russian bloggers were quick to accuse the FBI and CIA of carrying out or staging the bombings, one group in particular has almost entirely rejected the official version of events: the Chechens. The Tsarnaev family itself continues to profess their sons’ innocence. The belief that the Tsarnaev Brothers are innocent (or have at least been set up in some way) is common among groups and individuals ranging from Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, to his sworn enemies at KavkazCenter [ru], the online mouthpiece of the Caucasian Emirate. While the Tsarnaevs’ innocence may be one of the incredibly few things Chechens can agree on, radically different conclusions have been drawn about who is to blame. Kadyrov stated publicly [ru] that “what happened in Boston is the fault of the American security services”. Kavkaz Center pointed the finger [ru] squarely at Kadyrov himself, and claimed he was acting on orders from Putin.

Кадыров очень удобная фигура для выполнения «грязных дел». В случае необходимости его можно в любой момент ликвидировать, спрятав все концы, и никто этому не удивится. На нём кровь десятков тысяч чеченцев, да и моджахеды ведут на него постоянную охоту.

Kadyrov is a very useful figure for carrying out “dirty business”. If the situation required it, he could be liquidated at any moment, concealing all evidence, and no one would be surprised. He has the blood of tens of thousands of Chechens on his hands and the mujaheddin are constantly hunting him.

Chechen blogger Zulikhan [ru], whose views on the Boston bombing are discussed in detail here [GV], saw the hands of both the Russian and American security services at work in the bombings.

Путин и Обама, по инициативе российской стороны, договорились по телефону о координации усилий в борьбе с международным терроризмом. Считаю, что за событиями в Бостоне торчат уши российских спецслужб. По принципу “кому выгодно”. [...] Путину выгодно – чтобы Штаты не мешали России творить на Северном Кавказе все, что угодно, под видом борьбы с терроризмом.

Putin and Obama, at the initiative of the Russians, have come to an agreement about coordinating efforts in combating international terrorism. I think that the Russian special services are visible behind the events in Boston. Based on the “who profits” principle. [...] Putin profits — so that the States let Russia do what it wants in the North Caucasus under the guise of fighting terrorism.

Netizens have not confined themselves to speculation and counterfactuals. Some have set up an active defense of Tsarnaev. An April 21 petition on Avaaz.org entitled “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is innocent” [en] gained over 5,500 signatures in four days. Ethnic Chechens actively distributed links [ru[ to the petition on social media. A rolling tally at the side of the page showed the names and locations of the signatories, many of whom were located in Russia and many of whom had Chechen names. According to the author of the page, when enough signatures are collected the letter will be delivered to Barack Obama.

List of recent signatures to an online petition proclaiming Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's innocence. “Lom-Ali” and “Khamzat” are Chechen names. Screenshot. April 25, 2013

Chechnya and her people have suffered greatly throughout this century and the last. It seems in this case they are reluctant to suffer yet another indignity – that of having their people's name tied to a terrorist act half way around the world. Someone is to blame no doubt, but few in Chechenya want to believe it is the two young men whose family left their war-town country years ago.

Russian Journalist and Election Observer Speaks about Her Arrest

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:22:35 +0000

On April 16, 2013, RuNet Echo published an article about Svetlana Lokotkova, a Russian journalist and election observer who was arrested and removed from an overnight train for alleged intoxication. Lokotkova was charged with “minor hooliganism” and faces 15 days in jail if convicted. Lokotkova denied the charges and used Twitter [ru] and Facebook [ru] to post pictures of injuries she claims to have received at the hands of the police. Her version of events was apparently contradicted when pro-Putin television station NTV aired “amateur footage” [ru] of her in police custody, where she appeared confused and unsteady on her feet. The NTV report also quoted extracts from her Twitter feed that seemed to suggest she had been indulging herself both before and after boarding the train (Lokotkova made references to Saratov's “outstanding hospitality” and recovering from a cold using “traditional methods” [or "folk remedies"]).

Svetlana Lokotkova, 6 April 2012, photo by Svetlana Lokotkova, used with permission.

Lokotkova later contacted RuNet Echo, and agreed to outline what happened on the train and in the police station in her own words. She also spoke about social media as a tool for political activism.

First, Lokotkova contests the fact that she was intoxicated at the time of her arrest. In fact, she strenuously denies consuming any alcohol at all:

в поезде я пила только чай с медом и сок. в материалах дела, представленных полицейскими в суд, есть показания проводницы вагона, в котором я ехала. в своих письменных объяснениях полиции проводница поясняет, что я села в поезд трезвой, и что в поезде я не пила. кроме того, как я уже говорила, в последнее время я живу в таком бешеном ритме, который чисто физически не позволяет даже задуматься о выпивке.

on the train I drank only tea with honey and juice. in the case materials, which the police have submitted to the court, there are testimonials from from the conductor of the train-car. in her written account she explains that I was sober when I got on the train, and did not drink while on the train. besides, as I already said, recently I've been living at such a frantic pace, that I physically haven't even had the time to think about drinking.

Instead, she attributes her wooziness and apparent intoxication visible in the video to a combination of physical illness and emotional distress:

у меня была очень сильная простуда, кашель, с утра была температура 38,8. [...] сразу после того, как меня притащили в отделение полиции, с моей шеи сорвали сумочку со всеми документами и кошельком (впоследствии из него пропало около 10тыс. рублей), грубо сильно толкнули так, что я упала на пол и ударилась головой. впоследствии врачи у меня зафиксировали закрытую черепно-мозговую травму-сотрясение мозга. и кроме того, у меня сильно поднялось давление. уже на следующий день, когда все успокоилось, у меня было давление 160/130. так что в момент выложенного полицейскими видео давление было никак не меньше этих цифр. а по ощущениям – где-то 180/140: жутко кружилась голова, все плыло перед глазами.

I had a very bad cold and a cough, and since that morning my temperature was 38.8 degrees [101.8 F]. right after they dragged me to the police station, they ripped my purse from my neck, containing all my documents and wallet (from which about 10,000 rubles later disappeared), rudely pushed me so that I fell to the floor and hit my head. later, doctors determined that I received a closed head brain injury. in addition, my blood pressure rose a lot. the next day, when everything was calmer, my blood pressure was 160/130. so when the police were shooting the video my blood pressure could not have been any lower. but, actually, I felt like it was 180/140: my head was spinning, everything was blurry.

Lokotkova also argues that the tweets read on television, which NTV clearly implied were evidence of alcohol consumption (“folk remedy” being a common euphemism for liquor), were taken out of context. She says she was simply using actual folk remedies like honeyed tea to cure her cold, which she claims to use commonly:

поскольку лекарства вообще не люблю принимать, предпочитаю народные средства – травяные настои, мед, малина

since I do not like to take medicine, I prefer folk methods — herbal infusions, honey, raspberries

She elaborated:

под словами “опять угощают” я подразумевала домашние котлеты, которыми меня угостили соседи. в прошлый раз, когда я ехала из саратова, меня угостили домашними пирожками с капустой. [...] а под словами “лечусь народными средствами” – как уже выше пояснила – я подразумевала средства народной медицины для лечения простуды, главным из которых во все времена был и остается мед. медом меня угостили другие соседи.

by “getting entertained again” I meant the homemade cutlets that my neighbors [in the train car] treated me to. the last time I was coming from Saratov, I was treated to homemade cabbage pirozhki. [...] and by “recovering using folk remedies” – as I said earlier – I meant folk medicine for curing colds, the main [ingredient] of which has always been and always will be honey. I was treated to the honey by another neighbor.

Lokotkova also described what happened to her in the police station:

со мной обращались очень грубо, издевались морально и физически. били, толкали, пытались затащить в камеру [...], несколько раз прищемили дверью руки, ко мне не пускали врача, отобрали паспорт и телефон.

they treated me very roughly, abused me morally and physically. beat me, pushed me, tried to drag me into a cell [...], several times they squashed my hands in the door, didn't let me see a doctor, and took away my passport and telephone.

Finally, Lokotkova explained why it was that she refused to undergo a medical test for drunkenness. She cited the fact that she was charged with hooliganism (which does not require a blood alcohol test), not drinking in public (which does). She also says that the way she was offered the test was procedurally incorrect. Instead of officially recording the need for a test, and offering a choice of medical institutions:

меня обманом вывели из помещения полиции (сказали, что идем покупать билет на поезд до Москвы), уже на улице скрутили, силой затолкали в машину, отобрали телефон, привезли посреди ночи в какое-то здание без опознавательных знаков (во всяком случае, я не увидела никакой вывески, хотя просила мне ее показать), завели в кабинет, где была одна-единственная женщина, вручили ей направление на мое освидетельствование. а когда я сказала, что в таких условиях я проходить не буду, на оборотной стороне этого листочка написали, что я отказалась.

they tricked me into leaving the station (told me that we are going to buy a train ticket to Moscow), on they street they tied me up, pushed me into a car, took away my phone, drove me through the night to some unmarked building (at least I didn't see a sign, even though I asked to show me one), took me to an office where there was one single woman, gave her a referral for my examination. and when I said that I would not go through with it under these conditions, on the back of that sheet they wrote that I refused.

This moment was also recorded on the video published after the case gained notoriety. Interestingly, although the video is clearly being shot with a hand held camera, or perhaps a smartphone, Lokotkova believes that the footage came from some sort of security camera:

я не знаю, кто снимал. но насколько я поняла, в этом отделении полиции идет круглосуточная запись на видеокамеры, и именно запись с этих камер была использована.

I don't know who shot [the video]. as far as I understand, at that police station there is 24 hour video recording, and it was these cameras that were used.

Despite the fact that she thinks her tweets were misinterpreted, Lokotkova remains positive about the use of social media, and particularly impressed by the effectiveness of social networking for practical action.

абсолютно все без исключения мои друзья и даже почти совсем незнакомые люди в ФБ меня поддерживали, выражали сочувствие, предлагали помощь, координировали действия по моему вызволению из полиции. предложения о помощи поступают до сих пор – все в шоке от этой истории. в твиттере появилось несколько (3-4) бота-тролля с 20-ю подписчиками и с реальным заданием (в одном из твитов оно даже сохранилось) – как поливать меня грязью и выводить из себя идиотскими сообщениями. в ситуациях, подобных той, что произошла со мной, я считаю, что соцсети гораздо более эффективны, чем СМИ: люди координируются друг с другом, консультируют друг друга, находят телефоны полиции, прокуратуры, распределяют усилия – кто кому звонит, что предпринимает. так, например, в ФБ совсем недавно создана группа прямого действия, участники которой в частности помогали и моему вызволению.

absolutely without exception my friends and even people I didn't know have supported me on Facebook, expressed their sympathy, offered help, and coordinated actions to get me released. Offers of help are still coming in – everyone is shocked by the story. on Twitter, there are a few (three or four) troll-bots with 20 followers each and an actual assignment (which is still around in one of the tweets) to heap dirt on me and to harass me with idiotic messages. in situations like the one that happened to me, I think that social networks are a lot more effective than [traditional] mass media: people coordinate with each other, consult one another, find the phone numbers of the police, the prosecutor's office, and divide the labor - who calls whom, who does what. for example on Facebook this direct action group [ru] was recently created, members of which in particular helped get me released.

Beer & Twitter Prove Toxic Mix for Russian Journalist

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 15:14:37 +0000

Trains are a cheap and reliable way to get around Russia, particularly compared to the country's famously poor roads. Russia is a big country and journeys between cities can take hours (or even days). Given these difficulties, it is not uncommon for some passengers to have a drink or two to pass the time. Sometimes people can overdo it. According to a Russian police statement [ru], this is exactly what happened on an overnight train from Saratov to Moscow on April 11, 2013, when law enforcement officers ejected and detained Svetlana Lokotkova, a journalist with the independent magazine The New Times, after reports that “a passenger in a state of alcohol intoxication was disturbing the general peace.”

Lokotkova, an election observer who had traveled to Saratov to testify at an enquiry into the disputed October 2012 election for the regional parliament, was quick to hit back, informing a correspondent [ru] from Ekho Moskvy that she had called the police herself, due to the unwanted attention of a male passenger, but that the police instead arrested her:

за руки-ноги схватили, в полицейский участок буквально бросили. Когда пыталась пройти, буквально прищемляли руку дверью, у меня все руки в синяках, обзывались, оскорбляли.

They grabbed me by the arms and legs and literally threw me into the police station. When I tried to go past, they literally pinched my arm with the door, my whole arm is in bruises. They called me names and insulted me.

Lakotkova later posted pictures on her Facebook [ru] and Twitter [ru] accounts, showing the injuries she claimed to have received at the hands of the police.

Some were quick to jump to her defense. Twitter user tsarfree wrote (employing a hashtag for Lokotkova's surname):

#Локоткова стала жертвой провокации. Она должна была свидетельствовать в суде по выборам в Саратовской обл.

#Lokotkova has become a victim of a political provocation. She was supposed to give evidence in a court on the elections in the Saratov Region.

Despite her claims, Lokotkova's credibility was somewhat diminished, when pro-Putin television station NTV aired “amateur footage” [ru] of Lokotkova in the police station.

In the film, Lokotkova appears unsteady on her feet, irritable, and slurs her words. In the report, NTV also reproduced two tweets [ru] from Lokotkova's account dated just before the incident.

Саратовцы нравятся все больше и больше. Опять потрясяющее гостеприимство (предс ТИК Иноземцеву не считаем), опять в поезде угощают #саратов

I like Saratov's inhabitants more and more. Once again outstanding hospitality (apart from Electoral Commission head Inozemtzev), once again being treated [by others] on the train. #saratov

лечусь от дичайшей простуды в поезде #саратов-мск, 2й вагон. народными методами. саратовцы супер))))

Recovering from the worst cold on the train #saratov-moscow, 2nd train car. Using traditional methods. Saratov people are great :)

The NTV announcer inflects his reading of Lokotkova's tweets with an ironic pronunciation of “outstanding hospitality,” “being treated,” and “traditional methods,” implying (rather plausibly) that Lokotkova did not, as she maintains, abstain from liquor while on the train. This was an opinion that LiveJournal user Fish12a seemed to share:

Хорошо, что наша полиция научилась снимать своих клиентов на видео.
Дабы вранье неполживых журналистов было видно сразу же.
Уж лучше бы она молчала. Потому что видео появилось на тв в ответ на обвинения журналистки в “провокациях” и “зверстве полиции”.

It's good that our police have learnt to film their clients on video. That way the lies of disingenuous journalists are immediately apparent. She should have kept quiet, because the video was shown on TV in answer to the journalist's [own] accusations of “provocation” and “police brutality.”

Ironically, Lokotkova's attempts to paint herself as the victim of excessive police force and political provocation seem to have failed because the authorities utilized two of the opposition's most beloved tools: smartphone cameras and Twitter.

Lokotkova faces a 15-day administrative detention penalty for “minor hooliganism,” and it remains to be seen whether this will affect her planned return to Saratov, where she is scheduled to testify again in election fraud hearings today, April 16.

Putin Unfazed by Topless Protest in Hannover

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:04:48 +0000

On Monday, 8 April 2013, Putin's tour of a trade fair in Hannover with German Chancellor Angela Merkel took an unexpected turn when three members of the controversial Ukrainian feminist and self-described “sextremist” organization FEMEN [en] staged a half-naked protest [photo gallery] aimed at the Russian president. Their bodies painted with anti-Putin slogans in English and Russian, the protestors rushed the President and Chancellor screaming “F**k the dictator!” before security dragged them away.

FEMEN's unconventional and confrontational style of protest has been the topic of controversy in both the West and Russia. However, from the very beginning, many were more intrigued by Putin's reaction to the protests than anything else.

President Vladimir Putin is accosted by a Femen demonstrator. The writing on her back reads “Go f**k yourself, Putin”. Photo courtesy http://femen.org/

Many on the RuNet were particularly struck by one widely distributed photo, in which the Russian President appears to smile and give two thumbs up, while Merkel looks on in shock. Neiswestnij [ru] claimed Putin's “duckface” reminded him of “Yeltsin in his last days in the Kremlin”. Within hours humurously photoshopped versions appeared online:

One example of the many Putin-FEMEN-related photo-edited satires widely and anonymously distributed online.

When asked about the events at a press conference [ru] later that day, Putin stunned some by expressing his overwhelmingly positive reaction to the protest.

Что касается акции – она мне понравилась. В принципе мы знали о том, что такая акция готивится. Скажите спасибо украинским девушкам. Они вам помогли раскрутить ярмарку… Секьюрити работают очень жестко. Такие здоровые лбы навалились на девчонок. Это.. мне кажется, что неправильно. Можно было бы и помягче с ними обращаться.

As for the protest, I liked it. We basically knew such a protest was being prepared. Say thank you to the Ukrainian girls. They helped you promote the trade fair… The security guards were a bit rough—such big lugs launching themselves at these girls. This is… it seems to me, wasn't right. They could have dealt with them more gently.

While Putin clearly enjoyed the display of “sextremism”, reaction to FEMEN's latest protest was primarily negative, leading to an unusual consensus between the RuNet's liberal and conservative factions.

Feminist blogger radulova [ru] was quick to denigrate FEMEN's supposed commitment to women's rights:

эти девушки, конечно, такие же феминистки, как и Pussy Riot. Ни те, ни другие не имеют никакого отношения к борьбе за равноправие полов. Просто слово, которое считается у наших теток и дядек почти матерным, им как бунтарям понравилось.

These girls, of course, are feminists in the same way Pussy Riot are. Neither one, nor the other has any relation to the battle for gender equality. [Feminism] is just a word that our aunts and uncles consider almost profanity, and these rebels like it for that reason.

Pro-kremlin blogger lera-vad [ru] was also not amused:

Забавно, конечно, но скоро эти абсолютно больные на голову тетки уже на детских утренниках голосискаться будут. Им бы в стриптизерш переквалифицироваться, на праздниках олигархов выпрыгивать из торта.

It's all very funny, of course, but soon these sick-in-the-head chicks will be flashing their breasts in children's matinees. They would be better of retraining as strippers and jumping out of cakes at oligarch's parties.

While many were entertained by Putin's reaction, some found his subsequent comments distasteful in light of how the Kremlin handled the Pussy Riot affair last year. Twitter user sangdrag [ru] was quick to point out what he saw as the President's hypocrisy:

Продажные СМИ наперебой хвалят путина, дескать добрый, пожалел пославших его на х+й Фемен. Что же он, крыса лживая, Pusse Riot не пожалеет?!

The mercenary media are all vying to praise Putin, saying how kind he is to pity Femen after they told him to go f**k himself. So why doesn't this lying rat pity Pussy Riot?!

While FEMEN issued a statement [en] denying Putin had any advance warning of the protest, the President's nonchalant reaction to the whole affair lends a certain credence to his claim to the contrary. Twitter user sovprezident [ru] posited the theory that the Kremlin could have hired the protesters, and warned Putin in advance. Members of FEMEN have been called agents provocateurs before, notably after cutting down a Christian cross with a chainsaw [en] at the height of the Pussy Riot scandal. Regardless of how much the Kremlin knew in advance, it is hard to deny that Putin emerged from what could have been an embarrassing affair looking far better composed than his detractors—whether that's the result of innate PR instincts or something more sinister is anyone's guess.

A Dishonest Election & A Divided Opposition in Russia

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Sat, 06 Apr 2013 21:29:17 +0000

Zhukovsky, a mid-sized city just 40 kilometers outside Moscow famed for its aerospace industry, last weekend became the site of a bitterly contested mayoral election, which was marred by reports of electoral fraud and vote-buying. The election was prompted last January, when mayor Aleksandr Bobovnikov resigned at the behest of the acting governor of the Moscow Region, Aleksandr Vorob'yov.

In the last year, Zhukovsky has witnessed a grass roots protest movement [ru] to protect the local Tsagovsky forest, after local authorities stripped it of protected status in order to construct a new road. The local reaction and protests [photo album], which include clashes with police and riot troops, have surprised the authorities, ultimately leading Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to intervene personally [ru] on the side of the protesters. Having drawn much of their inspiration and public support from the better-known environmentalist movement to protect Khimki Forest [en], many consider the protests to have been instrumental in removing Bobovnikov, who allegedly lost his post due to “the loss of the inhabitants’ confidence” and “the instability of the socio-political situation” [ru].

Eleven candidates appeared on the ballot, including Sergei “The Spider” Troitsky. Troitsky is the leader of legendary Russian metal band Korroziya Metalla [en] and had previously stood in the October 2012 mayoral election in Khimki. The real contest, however, was between the nominally independent Andrei Voityuk (a former official in the Ministry of Emergency Affairs with strong links to Vorob'yov and Shoigu) and Igor Novikov (a member of “opposition oligarch” Mikhail Prokhorov's “Civic Platform”).

The election itself was marred by suspicion and tension long before anyone went to the polling stations. Novikov's campaign website suffered a DDoS attack on March 23, 2013. A week later, activist Ilya Yashin tweeted a picture [ru] of an official notice forbidding any photo- or video-recording by anyone but “representatives of the media”:

Избирком официальным (!) решением запретил наблюдателям съемку на выборах в #Жуковский. Жулики. Совсем охамели.

The electoral commission has officially (!) forbidden observers from taking photos at the elections in #Zhukovsky. Swindlers. Completely egregious behavior.

While Zhukovsky has only about 80,000 registered voters, in order to ensure the election went ahead peacefully, the authorities brought in 600 police [ru] from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while an estimated 1,000 independent electoral observers [ru] monitored the proceedings.

Despite the presence of these monitors (or perhaps because of it), within hours of polls opening, videos emerged online purporting to show widespread, organized vote-buying on behalf of Voityuk. In the video below, posted by the independent Russian electoral rights group GOLOS [en], people are seen queueing to have papers with the name “Aleksandr [sic] Petrovich Voityuk” stamped by two young women.

The two women report that they are merely “taking note” of the proceedings and that “everything is being done officially,” but seem ill at ease when questioned. When the camerawoman asks those in line if they were “promised any kind of reward,” however, an elderly man in a hat leans forward and replies “of course.” When asked what he was promised, he replies “one thousand roubles” (roughly thirty U.S. dollars).

A similar video posted by youtube user Alex Flaxman showed a large queue outside a local vehicle inspection center.

Moving towards the front of the queue, the cameraman asks several users how much money is being given out. Several reply that they too were promised 1,000 roubles. At the very front, the cameraman asks a man in a leather jacket if there is any sort of pass needed to receive money. The man removes from his wallet a copy of the same paper with the name “Aleksandr Voityuk” seen in the first video. He informs the cameraman that it was given to him by “United Russia.”

The liberal blogosphere reacted angrily to the reports of electoral fraud and to the news that Voityuk had been declared the winner of the election. The next day “в Жуковском” (“in Zhukovsky”) trended on Twitter in Russia and worldwide. User Sapojnik, in a LiveJournal post titled “1000 Roubles for a Vote,” wrote:

На самом деле никто во власти, конечно же, не собирался устраивать никакие «честные выборы». Наоборот: эти выборы руководством МО и даже, возможно, АП воспринимались как выборы «выставочные», «Химки-2». Жуковским власти хотели продемонстрировать urbi et orbi, что они полностью контролируют электоральную ситуацию и что «оппозиция не имеет никаких шансов».

Basically no one in power, of course, planned on staging any kind of “honest election.” On the contrary, the leadership of Moscow Oblast and even, perhaps the Presidential Administration took these elections to be “staged.” A “Khimki Part 2.” The Zhukovsky authorities wanted to demonstrate urbi et orbi that they are in full control of the electoral situation and that “the opposition doesn't stand a chance.”

In a Facebook post, Mikhail Fishman drew similarly depressing conclusions from the election:

Первый: выиграл Войтюк. Второй: нам показали, как “Единая Россия” (или ОНФ) будет выигрывать выборы в Думу. Третий: барьера против фальсификаций, обмана, жульничества любого рода больше не существует. Now it's official.

Firstly: Voityuk won. Secondly, they've shown us how “United Russia” (or the All-Russian People's Front [Putin's new social coalition]) will win the Duma elections. Thirdly, the barrier against falsification, fraud, [and] swindling of any variety no longer exists. Now it's official.

Twitter humorist KermlinRussia reacted to the reports with characteristic levity:

На выборах в Жуковском Единая Россия не стала воровать голоса избирателей и честно скупила их.

In the elections in Zhukovsky United Russia has stopped stealing the votes of the electorate and purchased them honestly.

Not everyone was content to lay the blame solely with the authorities. Some faulted the opposition for failing to win in a city home to a highly educated workforce that has long been a hotspot of anti-Kremlin sentiments. Writing on Twitter, opposition Duma Deputy Ilya Ponamarev pointed the finger at the protest movement's disunity:

В #жуковский все, как всегда – два главных оппозионера не договорились, взяли 30% и 25%, в итоге побеждает единоросс с 35%. Доколе?

In #zhukovsky it's business as usual – the two main oppositionists [Novikov and Communist candidate Andrei Anikanov] took 30% and 25% with the result that United Russia wins with 35%. When will it end?

Similar accusations were leveled by Twitter user iphone_mitko, who faulted the opposition for lackluster campaigning:

Кстати, #Химки и #Жуковский очень яркие примеры беспомощности “оппозиции”. Кричать и митинговать – да. Работать “на земле” – ноль.

By the way, #Khimki and #Zhukovsky are excellent examples of the helplessness of the “opposition.” Shouting and demonstrating – sure. Working “on the ground” – zip.

Such well-documented voter fraud shows that “managed democracy” (where the ruling elite uses its administrative resources to ensure desired electoral results) continues to be the defining characteristic of the Russian political process. If anything, that process has become cruder and more obvious in the last two years. The election also shows that the United Russia brand may be becoming a liability for the elite, as Voityuk ran as an independent, despite strong links to party figures.

But the main lesson from the Zhukovsky election is that over a year on since the Bolotnaya Protests [en] (probably the high water mark of the protest movement) the opposition has yet to make much of a dent in Russians’ widespread political apathy. Indeed, the official turnout in Zhukovsky was a mere 37.6% [ru]. Given the choice between the opposition and the elite, most voters chose simply to stay home.

An Online Project for Monitoring the State of Russia's Roads

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Mon, 12 Nov 2012 00:51:05 +0000

The “RosYama” [ru] [literally "Russian Pothole"] project is a method of monitoring the state of the roads and their compliance with latest government standards. Anyone who notices a roadway that fails to meet these standards can use RosYama's service.

The coordinator of RosYama, Fyodor Ezeev, told Evgeny Voropai of Greenhouses of Social Technologies how he has long since stopped seeing the borders between the online and offline worlds, and why “targeted” projects are more effective than universal ones.

Fyodor Yezeev. Photo supplied by owner.

Fyodor Ezeev: I think that RosYama has three components which lead to its successes. First of all, the relevancy of the theme — potholes on the roads genuinely bother many people. Secondly, the influence of [prominent opposition blogger and activist] Navalny meant that a large amount of people found out about the project from the very start. Thirdly, RosYama differentiates itself from similar road projects by assisting users with composition of complaints and by taking on the legal aspects of the task.

Evgeny Voropai: How has the behavior of users changed since RosYama was first established.

F.E.: Our audience has decreased by about two or three times, but the number of registered potholes has increased at about the same rate. Which means that every visitor now registers about five times as many potholes as before. People have stopped visiting the site out of curiosity but there are more of those who use it as intended.

E.V.: RosYama is an automated service of submitting complaints with a significant number of active users. Tell us what the project team does in Moscow and the regions.

F.E.: RosYama isn't an automated service for forwarding complaints. User complaints must be submitted independently. The RosYama team works on the site and advises project users.

E.V.: When a project works on a model of cooperation that is “The user is in charge”, it is important to soberly appraise the active participation of your audience. What other indicators can tell you that your project is effective and working?

F.E.: The only indicator of the viability of any action is the presence or absence of tangible results. RosYama's tangible results are more than 8,500 fixed potholes.

E.V.: You've written on your blog that after the [recently organized opposition] debates, the number of visitors grew by 58%. Would you say that public management of internet projects is more effective than traditional management?

F.E.: The the effectiveness of any marketing, as a rule, is very short-term. I believe RosYama needs to pay more attention to the development of possibilities for our users and ease of use. These actions bring good long-term results.

E.V.: The blogosphere has actively responded to your participation in the elections of the opposition's Coordinating Council. Were there worries that this might negatively affect RosYama?

F.E.: No, there were no such worries.

E.V.: “Seven candidates for seven projects” [a voting block at Coordinating Council elections] is represented by the managers and coordinators of internet projects. If they were to start working in the offline world, how would this affect their online activities?

F.E.: I've stopped seeing the boundaries between the online and offline worlds a long time ago. The internet is only another means of transmitting information, a method of connecting people. Just like a phone, for example. One person uses a telephone to pointlessly yap for hours, while another orders his broker to sell a portfolio of shares worth millions of dollars.

E.V.: Before “RosYama” we already had [anti-corruption website] “RosPil”, after that “RosUznik” [a legal aid fund for arrested opposition figures] appeared and then [election monitoring website] “RosVybory”. Have you tracked the migration of a loyal audience from one project to another?

F.E.: I haven't. I'd suppose that it's zero or practically zero. If someone is interested in government tenders, he won't stop being interested in them because of RosUznik.

E.V.: In your posts on LiveJournal, you point out that the audience often doesn't see the connection between their immediate problems and free elections. But at the same time all these “Ros-projects” are very targeted and don't allow the audience to see these issues as part of a complex whole. Has there been any plan to integrate all these projects into one, but with larger scope?

F.E.: I believe that our projects achieve their success in large thanks to their “targeted-ness”. The idea “do a little, but well” works better than the idea “do a lot, but badly”. As for the link between the immediate problems of citizens and free elections — its participation in a project like RosYama that allows them not only to see, but to feel this connection, practically touch it.

E.V.: You've worked in a large internet company, then you began the civic project RosYama. Did it change your approach to work and task performance?

F.E.: I try to only take on tasks which I'm actually interested in solving. Other superficial factors have practically no meaning for me.

This interview was conducted by Evgeny Voropai, the original [ru] is available on Teplitsa's website.

Russia: Nepofigism, Free Crowdsourced Legal Consultation

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Mon, 30 Jul 2012 18:19:41 +0000

The Russian online group “Nepofigism” (a neologism that loosely translates to “giving a damn” or “not being ambivalent”) offers a free legal consulting service. The project's creators designate no particular direction for the consulting. Their aim is to offer real help to people with any type of problem. The site is a space for professionals and ordinary Internet users with various legal and everyday problems (such as violations of consumer rights, labor laws, and family law).

The fact that more than 52,000 users registered on the site in a month speaks to Russian citizens’ interest in protecting their rights. Evgeny Voropai of “Greenhouses of Social Technologies” recently interviewed the creator and head of “Nepofigism,” Vladimir Belyaev, who described operating an online legal consultancy and explained why the project will never become commercial.

Creator of the project “Nepofigism,” Vladimir Belyaev. Photo courtesy of V. Balyaev. CC 1.0.

Evgeny Voropai (E.V.): Legal consultancy has long been seen as a means of solving legal problems in real life. How did the idea to create an online version of this process come about?

Vladimir Belyaev (V.B.): After finishing university, I was looking for a way to realize my professional ambitions. Fortuitously, an announcement about a vacancy at a court appeared at the same time. I started my career at the very bottom of the ladder and in a few months had become an assistant to the judge. While performing their duties, workers in the court are not allowed to offer legal counsel to citizens. But answering the questions that arose was unavoidable. Because of this, I had to waste a certain part of the working day on mini-consultations, before returning to my regular duties. It seemed to me that the flow of people who wanted consultations was never-ending, so the idea came to me to take this activity online.

E.V.: When you were creating “Nepofigism,” did you know exactly what kind of project you wanted to have “at the end,” or were you guided by available resources?

V.B: When I had only just come up with the idea of creating the project, there were already online-consultancies, but they were all fee-based or striving to become so. I was not comfortable with this format. In reality, many legal questions do not require much time to answer, and it is absurd to take money for doing it. I didn't have any real requirements for defining the exact parameters of the project, but I knew exactly what I didn't want. Even after the launch of “Nepofigism,” how the service is formatted is still an open question.

E.V.: You're a practicing lawyer and had no experience creating an Internet project. Was it a difficult decision to launch something like this? What were your expectations of the project?

V.B: Before “Nepofigism,” I had my own blog, where I posted articles on legal issues, and I carried this experience to my new project. I didn't know what I got myself into or how it would work. Indeed, I had a complete lack of experience starting online projects. This project gradually evolved and I had to familiarize myself with certain technical issues. Apart from that, I had to change my content-managing system several times (the project changed, its philosophy changed, and the demands on the system changed) — all in order to allow the site to function. In practice, “Nepofigism” allowed me not only to offer consultations, but also to become more of a universal specialist. First and foremost, this is because the submitted questions varied and involved different facets of the law.

E.V.: Now that “Nepofigism” has existed for three years and become well known on the RuNet, can you say if the activity of Russia's online community differs from what goes on offline?

V.B.: These are two absolutely different forums and, accordingly, two different audiences. As far as I know, it's primarily for this reason that many Internet projects involving legal consultation have not been very successful. You need to remember that most online consultant professionals work with a younger and more active audience, addressing questions that usually don't require terribly active intervention. Because of this, the idea of fee-based online consultancies seems to me to lack perspective. There remains a category of problems that are impossible to solve from a distance, and the elementary technical education of citizens occupies no small part in all this, as well.

E.V.: The ‘forum’ is one of the most popular formats on the RuNet and lends itself well to the concept of legal consultations. But you decided to design “Nepofigism” as a community. Why?

V.B.: At the very start, “Nepofigism” existed as a single-user blog. Afterwards, it transformed into something more akin to a table of questions and answers. Currently, it's more useful for us to structure it as a community of experts. Within the framework of “Nepofigism,” I try to convey to the user a single idea: in order to defend your rights, at a certain level it isn't necessary to be a lawyer. We reach that level when there is no difference between the consultants and the people demanding legal advice. Now, anyone with experience solving various legal problems or disputes can participate in our project and help other users. Such is the relay race of legal awareness.

E.V.: Getting a person with unsolved legal questions interested in a free legal consultation is simple. It's a lot harder to bring experts to the project who can offer this consultation. How does this work on “Nepofigism”?

V.B.: At “Nepofigism,” we try to avoid the labels “expert” and “professional.” At the very beginning of the project, I tried to work with certain firms, but they weren't willing to waste time on free consultations. Yet, our site is frequented by people with formal legal educations (such individuals rarely draw attention to this fact). Projects like “Nepofigism” demonstrate the mechanisms for solving a particular problem, allowing the site's users to act analogously in the future.

E.V.: Online consultations are a quick way to get an answer to a question, but how effective are they? Do you follow the resolution of problems offline?

V.B.: Actually, most users inform us themselves about how their issues were resolved. During the course of the project, we've noted another interesting tendency: there is a rule of silence operating, it seems to me. If a person receives a consultation and goes quiet, then most likely he got a good consultation. Of course, there are consultations that turn out to be unhelpful or downright shoddy, but this only goes to show that real (fallible) people are behind every every question and answer on the site.

E.V.: Some time ago, you tried to implement the idea of crowdsourcing for “Nepofigism.” What happened and why didn't this come about?

V.B.: I never expected to make money from “Nepofigism.” All attempts to raise funds were undertaken in the hope of paying for hosting. But my expectations were not fulfilled. Users complained that ads with money transfer requests were distracting. For this very reason, I had to get rid of them. Moreover, they turned out to be ineffective — the money donated was insignificant.

E.V.: Right now, several online projects have appeared that allow people to discuss various bills and laws. Looking at the interest citizens have expressed in legal information and discussing government legal initiatives, can you talk about how these subjects attract the interest of your site's users?

V.B.: The very idea of subjecting laws to a general discussion is interesting, but due to the specifics of life in our country, initiatives designed to protect the interests of the majority never become laws. For evidence of this, just look at the series of federal laws recently passed. I know for certain that such changes to the law are possible only when the public doesn't participate — and, even if it did, the laws still wouldn't reflect the opinion of the majority: the country's constituents are too passive, and getting them to discuss such specific topics is complicated.

E.V.: Recently the project changed the design of the site and became more functional. What's in store for “Nepofigism” in the future?

V.B: I can't tell you how “Nepofigism” will develop for a single reason: I have absolutely no idea what direction we'll take it. I'm sure that the project will never be monetized, although developing the portal and the creation of certain services requires certain investments. There's a number of ideas on this issue and they all require the active participation of specialists. The problem is that, without teams of paid workers and the corresponding financial backing, all this is practically impossible. I'm increasingly of the opinion that, if we don't arrive at some kind of breakthrough soon, the project may lose relevance. But we're doing all that we can to ensure that this doesn't happen. Our audience is growing and the community is changing. I hope that everything will be okay.

Originally posted [ru] at “Greenhouses of Social Technologies.”

Russia: Crowdsourcing Project for Finding Missing Children

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Wed, 20 Jun 2012 07:49:23 +0000

The emergence of the search and rescue team Liza Alert [ru] is hardly a typical story for the Web. After September 13, 2010, when Liza Fomkina disappeared in the town of Orekhovo-Zuevo [about 80 kilometers, or 50 miles, east of Moscow], the flaws in the work of the Interior and Emergency Situations ministries became clear. Shaken by this tragic story and responding to the call for help, volunteers decided to unite in order to ensure nothing like it would ever happen again. And so the search team Liza Alert was formed online.

Liza Alert's work is based on crowdsourcing. The community exists and grows almost exclusively thanks to its online effect and the wide territorial dispersion of its volunteers.

Screenshot of the main page of lizaalert.org

Liza Alert's advantages:

A large base of volunteers
A developing infrastructure
Information support from the media and the online community
A simple functional site
It provides real help in the offline world.

Organizers have managed to recruit not only concerned citizens to the project, but also a number of experts with useful skills. Volunteers working with Liza Alert in the search for missing children include: dog-handlers and trackers, 4×4 and quad-bike drivers, and aircraft and boat pilots. Nikolai Lomakin, one such volunteer, says:

I can't stay home when a person has gone missing in the forest. More than likely, they're alive, and we'll search for them until we find them.

Any concerned individual can contribute to Liza Alert. One simply needs to complete the volunteer form, joining any of the existing teams on a real-time basis.

The site Liza Alert is accessible to all Internet users. As a resource, it is very simple and functional. Information is posted on the portal about projects, current searches, and so on. Telephone numbers for reporting disappearances and learning how to take part in searches are also available on the site. (Specific information about individual searches’ progress, however, was made inaccessible to the general public, after a child-abductor used data published on Liza Alert's portal to evade the authorities.)

Original [ru]

Russia: Crowdsourcing to Solve Local Urban Problems

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Thu, 03 May 2012 19:12:48 +0000

Solving problems at the local level, the kind encountered by inhabitants of big cities and regional centers, is becoming more and more feasible thanks to projects based on crowdsourcing technology. Crowdsourcing is getting groups of people involved in the discussion and resolution of all sorts of different problems, ranging from firefighting to election-monitoring.

Map of Moscow and the Moscow Region

In theory, there are already various government agencies and institutions working to manage local life so that citizens can live in comfort and security. But in practice the results are not always satisfactory: the illegal cutting down of trees, broken lifts, and burnt-out light streetlights are still problems people encounter on a daily basis. To solve these and similar problems “clouds” have been created — virtual projects, in which anyone with an Internet connection and a desire to improve things can take part.

StreetJournal.org [ru] is a project launched in the city of Perm, now operating in several major cities across Russia. The site has publicized nearly 8,000 problems, of which more than a third have been resolved. In addition to ordinary citizens, the platform is also being using by local authorities, who can use it to monitor the work of their contractors and to react to serious reports efficiently and directly.

The third group of people using the platform are nonprofit organizations, which can get access to up-to-date information and use it to monitor a situation and direct volunteers towards solving it.

ДайСигнал [DaiSignal] [ru] is an alternative project concerned with the eternal problems of roads and urban infrastructure and services. The portal receives information from more than 220 cities and towns.

The problem-solving process becomes itself the biggest problem.

In a majority of our encounters with life's daily problems (which we are individually incapable of fixing ourselves), the “problem-solving process becomes itself the biggest problem.” While the complaints submitted to DaiSignal are from individuals without any connection to one another (and are resolved privately, as well), the platform is a tool that allows people to view a situation holistically.

In cases where the number of reports in a given region is “off the scale,” one can conclude that specific services there are ineffective, and take the necessary measures, not by informing the authorities but instead informing those competent to fix things.

How effective such a system can be is demonstrated by the British analog FixMyStreet, which has accumulated more than 1,600 reports a week, including photographic and video evidence, of overflowing trash-bins, broken footpaths, and illegal graffiti.

Original [ru]

Russia and Tajikistan: Pilots Sentenced and Migrants Deported

Daniel Alan Kennedy — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 12:14:08 +0000

This story began in March 2011, when the crews of two Antonov An-72 planes owned by the airliner Rolkan Investmens [sic] Ltd were arrested in Qurghonteppa, Tajikistan. The planes had arrived from Kabul, Afghanistan. Both planes and their crews were inspected without incident by the customs and border services of Tajikistan. However, later all eight members of the crews were detained by representatives of the republic's Committee on National Security and placed under arrest.

One month later, the captains of the aircraft were indicted and the remaining members of the crews were released. The trial of the pilots began in mid-October, 2011.

Sentencing the Russian pilots

On November 8, 2011, both pilots, Vladimir Sadovnichy (a Russian) and Aleksei Rudenko (a citizen of Estonia) were found guilty of smuggling contraband airplane parts, violating the norms of international air travel, and illegally crossing the border. The court sentenced them each to 10.5 years in a maximum security facility. The sentence was reduced to 8.5 years for each pilot on the basis of a law on amnesties for those convicted. Both Antonov An-72s and a jet engine were confiscated for government use.

According to [ru] a representative of Rolkan Invesmens Ltd, Viktor Pfefer, “a half disassembled engine, which was located amongst the pilots’ belongings and was declared [by Tajikistan] to be contraband, could be considered such if it was unloaded on the territory of Tajikistan, but it was not”.

Tajiks: Russia's new enemies?

The reaction from Russia's side was immediately forthcoming. After the Ministry of Internal Affairs failed to solve the problem through unofficial channels, the authorities decided to change tactics. As the website of [the pro-Kremlin Youth Group] “Molodaya Gvardiya” reports [ru], on November 12, activists from the group picketed the embassy and consulate of Tajikstan in Moscow.

Picketing by the movement "Molodaya Gvardiya" at the embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow. The sign reads "Don't bite the hand that feeds you". Photo taken from the movement's website.

Moreover, two days after the guilty verdict, representatives of the Federal Migration Service announced [ru] the arrests of 300 illegal Tajiks whom they planned to deport. However President Dmitri Medvedev refuted claims that a “revenge campaign” was being carried out, stating [ru] that “citizens who break the law must be deported from the country”. Many raised the question of why this hadn't been done earlier. After all, it's not as if illegal immigrants only became a problem yesterday.

Whats more, the Russian authorities justified the deportation of the Tajiks by declaring [ru] the common incidence of Tuberculosis and HIV in migrants from Tajikistan. In total 300 Tajiks were detained in Moscow over the course of three days. The Internet community discussed the massive campaign against immigrants from Tajikistan. Internet users let touches of xenophobia slip in their commentary, such as proposals to introduce a visa regime with Tajikistan, or to indiscriminately deport all Tajiks. All the same, there was criticism [ru] directed at Russia.

наблюдатель

Какая “молодчина” Россия – выгораживает своих. Но, когда так же поступили в Узбекистане в Корепановым, в США с Бутом – душонки не хватило их защищать? […] Стало очевидно: Москва боится сильных стран, и предпочитает не замечать проблему.

Rahmon

Россия ведет себя как истеричная женщина. То все ок, то все из рук вон плохо. Эти горе пилоты сидели шесть месяцев, никого это не волновало, и вдруг такая шумиха.

Nablyudatel’

Good on you Russia, for looking after your own. But when the same thing happened in Uzbekistan with [Yuri] Korepanov or in the US with [Viktor] Bout did you lack the spirit to defend them?[...] It's become obvious: Moscow fears powerful countries and prefers not to draw attention to the problem.

Rahmon

Russia is behaving like a hysterical woman. One second everything is fine and the next everything is hellishly bad. These poor pilots were in prison for six months and no one carred, but now suddenly there's all this commotion

Some bloggers say Russia is using the same problem-solving methods it once used with Georgia or with Ukraine during the Yushchenko period: firstly the indignity of “the blatant disregard for international norms” and then the undertaking of “disproportionate” measures.

There is a connection to be found in these events with the upcoming elections. The editor of Ferghana, Daniil Kislov commented on the action of the action on his personal blog on radio station Ekho Moskvy's site [ru]:

Еще отвратительнее то, что отчеты о массовой депортации подозрительно смахивают на заигрывание с ксенофобски настроенной публикой в рамках начавшейся предвыборной кампании.

What's even more disgusting is that the reports of mass deportations are suspiciously mixed up with attempts to woo the xenophobically inclined public as part of the pre-election campaign.

Inter-user Dilshod went even further in his observations and wrote that he wouldn't be surprised if “Rahmonid [President of Tajikistan Emomalii Rahmon] turned out to be the co-director of this farce, entitled “Saving Private Sadovnichy”.

Economic analyst Boris Grozovsky doesn't agree that the deportations of Tajiks are somehow connected with the pre-election campaign, but reckons [ru] that the Russian authorities have used one of the most amoral means of responding to Tajikistan's actions, despite the existence in world politics of “a wide arsenal of responding to stupid actions undertaken by another state”.

Hidden motives

There are at least two other supposed reasons for the scandal around the pilots and the deportation of the Tajiks. According to the first version, proposed by the analyst Innokent Adyasov, by sentencing the pilots Tajikistan is attempting to “make Russia reconsider its position on the construction of the Rogun Dam, a pet project of Emomalii Rahmon”.

According to the second version, published in Izvestiya [ru], “the pilots became the hostages of ‘international raiders’ and shady deals, which the owners of the airline used for tax evasion”.

As things stand, the real reasons behind the scandal can only be guessed at by most of society. However, the uproar around the “pilots’ affair” has played into the hands of these same pilots: on November 16, a press release [ru] was issued in which the procurator of Tajikistan's Khatlon Province criticised the sentence handed down to the pilots, calling it disproportionately severe. And once again there appeared signs of interference from forces within: firstly the state prosecutor asked the court to increase the sentence to 13 years and then the procurator adopted the position of his coworker.

It is still not yet clear how this story will end. Never-the-less, one would like to hope that it will not end up impacting on either imprisoned pilots or the disenfranchised Tajik immigrants.