The day after the Semana article was published, President Uribe defended his officials in a press conference [es], claiming that “that people who wanted to testify about things concerning national security are welcome at the Presidential Palace” and that “the material handed by the paramilitaries wasn’t enough to incriminate the Court.” This week, the Colombian ambassador to the Dominican Republic resigned because of his links to Don Berna's envoy, and the Attorney's office is probing him and the other officials involved.

Colombian bloggers seem to take sides on the issue, some supporting the government, some others supporting the Supreme Court, whose president reacted to the scandal claiming the Presidency was conspiring against it.

Atrabilioso [es]'s Jaime Restrepo attacks the Supreme Court because they seem to seek to damage the government.

Los magistrados, como cualquier ciudadano, tienen derecho a debatir, a exponer su defensa y a no guardar silencio frente a los delicados hechos cuyas explicaciones evaden o minimizan en el mejor de los casos. ¿Acaso esos cuestionamientos son irrespeto a la independencia de poderes? Por supuesto que no: Los señalamientos contra el poder judicial son graves y el país está esperando aclaraciones y, porqué no, procesos en las instancias competentes.

Sin embargo, que esos pronunciamientos tengan la intención de ocasionar un perjuicio internacional al poder ejecutivo sí deja a la luz una maniobra desesperada de ataque y muestra a la Corte como el último bastión de aquellos cuyos feudos, privilegios y vagabundería están amenazados por el gobierno Uribe. Semejante respuesta es la exhibición de una maniobra que intenta llevar la confrontación al escenario internacional para que puedan entrometerse, de lleno, los patrocinadores y aliados latinoamericanos y europeos de las Farc.

At equinoXio [es], Marsares writes about the intentions of those who leaked the information about the meeting to the media:

Aparte de lo que signifiquen estas visitas de delincuentes, de entrada hay un hecho curioso. La reunión se realizó hace tres meses y fue intrascendente. Si no lo hubiera sido, y dados las relaciones álgidas que mantiene con la Corte, muy seguramente el presidente hubiera aprovechado la situación para atacarla. Pero nada pasó. ¿Por qué ahora se saca a la luz pública? La deducción es clara. Quien filtró la información quería causar un escándalo que perturbara aún más las relaciones entre el poder judicial y el Gobierno.

¿Pero quién lo hizo?

(…)

Todo es posible, pero la hipótesis más razonable es que la filtración proviene de los paramilitares y todos caímos en la trampa que armaron: enfrentar a los poderes públicos. Como en el pasado lo hizo Pablo Escobar con bombas materiales, hoy sus herederos atacan con bombas de publicidad malsana, buscando como el extinto capo, debilitar al Estado colombiano.

Besides what these visits by criminals mean, since the beginning there is something interesting. The meeting took place three months ago and was insignificant. If it were not, and given the critical relationship he maintains with the [Supreme] Court, the president would likely have taken advantage of the situation in order to turn on it. But nothing happened. Why is this put into the spotlight now? The conclusion is clear. Whoever leaked the information wanted to cause a scandal to upset, even more, the relationships between the judicial branch and the Government. But who did it?
(…) Everything is possible, but the most reasonable hypothesis is that the leaking came from the paramilitaries and we all fell into the trap they set up: to bring the public powers into conflict. As Pablo Escobar did it in the past with real bombs, today his heirs attack with bombs of bad publicity, seeking to weaken the Colombian State just as the deceased mafia boss.

Don Blog Pérez takes the news with some cynicism [es]:

[E]l asunto es que hace siete meses a la Casa de Alvarito de Nariño entró una camioneta en la que llegaron el abogado de alias Don Berna (paramilitar supuestamente desmovilizado), y un representante de la oficina de Envigado. El vehículo ingresó por la puerta trasera -por motivos de seguridad, claro-, y según explicó hoy Uribe el motivo de la visita fue la entrega de unas pruebas que incriminan a los magistrados de la corte suprema de justicia de manipulación de testigos, últimas tres palabras que Alvarito repitió como si fuera la única respuesta a todas las preguntas de los carnívoros periodistas.

¿Pero por qué se quedó callado el presidente y no sacó al aire las pruebas? pues según explicó él mismo, “las pruebas no eran nada trascendente”, es decir, que supuestamente los visitantes fueron a llevar pruebas falsas pero que él no podía negarles la oportunidad de hablar “porque este gobierno ha escucha’o a todo el que tiene algo qué decir” (que vaina, ¿será que Uribe no lee a Don Blog Pérez?). En fin, como al presidente nadie puede llevarle la contraria, digamos que se estaban tomando un tinto, de la forma más honesta, sincera, transparente, justa, noble, cristiana y legal que un gobierno como el nuestro puede hacerlo.

The thing is seven months ago [sic] a pickup entered Alvarito's Nariño's House carrying aka Don Berna's (a supposedly demobilized paramilitary boss) lawyer and a representative from the [criminal organization known as] Office of Envigado. The vehicle entered the backdoor -for security concerns, of course-, and as Uribe explained today, the reason was the delivery of some evidence incriminating the magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice on witness manipulation, three words that Álvaro kept saying over and over as if it was the only answer to all the questions from the carnivorous journalists. But why did the President stay quiet and not publish the evidences? Because, as he explained himself, “the evidence was nothing significant”, that is, allegedly the visitors went to deliver false evidence, but he couldn't deny them a chance to talk “because this government has listened to everyone who has something to say” (too bad, how come Uribe doesn't read Don Blog Pérez?). Whatever, as no one is allowed to disagree with the President, let's say they were having a cup of coffee, with the most honest, sincere, transparent, fair, noble, Christian, and legal way a Government as the one we have could have done.

Thumbnail by René Medel

There is no doubt that 2008 has been one of the worst year for the Marxist guerrilla founded in 1964. Just 5 weeks ago it was confirmed that Pedro Antonio Marín, aka Manuel Marulanda Vélez or Tirofijo (”Sureshot”), its top commander, had died on March. The death of FARC's number 2, Édgar Devia, aka Raúl Reyes, unleashed a diplomatic crisis which caused the breaking of diplomatic relations with Ecuador and Nicaragua (the latter restored since). Other top bosses have been captured, killed or delivered themselves. On February 4 a huge demonstration against FARC was held.

Adam Isacson, from Plan Colombia and Beyond, writes about the “anti-FARC strategies” that have and have not worked:

[W]hat has worked over the past few years?

• Putting a much greater focus on intelligence aimed at the guerrillas’ top leadership (and hostage captors). This includes both signals intelligence to intercept their communications, and human intelligence in the form of informants and infiltrators.
• Making clear to the guerrilla rank-and-file, through public-relations campaigns and the testimonies of previous deserters, that those who surrender to the government will not only not be tortured or disappeared (as too often happened in the past), but they will get job training, perhaps a stipend, and the promise of a new life.
• Increasing the security forces’ presence in population centers and main roads and (though there is much room for improvement here) making these forces’ main mission protecting citizens instead of treating them as suspects.

What is interesting about these strategies is that, with the exception of increasing manpower and protective presence, they are relatively inexpensive. Compared to big-ticket items like fumigation and “Plan Patriota”-style military offensives, these efforts make up only a sliver of Colombia’s defense budget (and only a sliver of U.S. assistance). Planners of future aid packages to Colombia should take note.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo writes on Atrabilioso [es]:

Sin duda, el rescate militar de 15 secuestrados en poder de la estructura militar de las FARC es el más duro golpe propinado a los áulicos y servidores del totalitarismo “humanitario” en Colombia. La operación Jaque demostró con hechos que un rescate militar exitoso es posible y que las cacareadas justificaciones, según las cuales eso equivalía a condenar a muerte a los secuestrados, eran solo arengas que buscaban que las FARC, y sobre todo sus socios políticos, obtuvieran ganancias del secuestro. Quedaron sin argumentos aquellos servidores de las FARC que cada día se consagraban a presionar al Gobierno para que cediera a las condiciones que imponían los terroristas para liberar a los secuestrados: son 15 seres humanos que han sido rescatados sin despejes que dejarían a miles de colombianos a merced de los terroristas por cuenta de los intereses de los “humanitarios”.

Undoubtedly, the military rescue of the 15 kidnapped held by FARC's military structure is the hardest blow given to the aulics and servants of the “humanitarian” totalitarism in Colombia. Operation Jaque demonstrated that a successful military rescue is possible and that the widespread justifications, of those claiming that it was a death sentence for those kidnapped, were just harangues seeking that the FARC, and above all their political partners, wanted to profit from kidnapping. Those FARC servants who everyday pressured the Goverment to give in to the conditions imposed by the terrorists to release the kidnapped ended without arguments: there are 15 human beings rescued without safe havens which would have let thousands of Colombians at the mercy of the terrorists because of the interests of the “humanitarians”.

Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra praises President Álvaro Uribe and his administration [es]. He writes that the rescue raises the possibility that Uribe will be reelected as president. However, the rescue also draws attention to the role of Colombia's neighbors.

Alejandro Peláez attacks [es] the “Bolivarian coalition”:

El Ministro de Defensa ecuatoriano celebra el rescate, pero se lamenta que no fuera realizado dentro de un proceso de paz y, como cereza del postre, la maquinaria de propaganda chavista empieza a circular la versión de que a Ingrid la libretió el Gobierno colombiano. Estuve buscando la reacción de los “comités de solidaridad con Ingrid” y no dicen nada. Se quedaron sin jueguito ahora que la liberaron y van a tener que encontrar una nueva causa para subir al Mont Blanc. Paradójicamente, las palabras de Ingrid fueron el más duro golpe para los opositores que usaban su imagen y dolor para mover una agenda política.

The Ecuadorian Defence Minister celebrates the rescue, but regrets it was not carried out within a peace process and, as the cherry on the top, the Chavista propaganda machine begins to pass around the theory that Íngrid was “scripted” by the Colombian government. I was searching for the reaction of the “support committees for Íngrid” and they say nothing. They were left without nothing to play now that she was released and they will have to find a new cause to climb Mont Blanc. Ironically, Íngrid's words were the hardest blow for the opposition leaders and supporters which used her image and her pain to promote a political agenda.

Italian blogger Doppiafila gives his two cents [it]:

Da questa gioia deve nascere qualcosa di buono. Il 2 Luglio del 2008 é un grande giorno. Chissá che Ingrid Betancourt non possa essere per la Colombia come Nelson Mandela per il Sudafrica: ha pagato il prezzo della credibilitá ed a quanto pare é riuscita a mantenere la luciditá; chissa.
Le FARC hanno perso una grande occasione, e si staranno mangiando le mani. Il loro ciclo é finito, non saranno loro a cambiare il futuro del Paese. Speriamo non puntino al “colpo di coda”, magari con qualche attentato urbano da centinaia di morti - sarebbe inutile. Per Uribe, Santos, i Generali e compagnia una grande vittoria: hanno mantenuto la promessa della “mano dura”, e questo la gente lo capisce - e lo premia. Ora devono solo decidere come “passare all'incasso”.

From this joy something good should be born. July 2, 2008 is a big day. Maybe Íngrid Betancourt could not represent for Colombia the same thing Nelson Mandela for South Africa: she has paid the price of credibility and from what it seems she has achieved her lucidity; maybe.
The FARC lost a big chance, and they must be eating their hands. Their cycle is over, they will not be the ones who will change the future of the country. We hope they don't aim a “last attempt” -probably with an urban attack with hundreds of victims - would be useless. For Uribe, Santos, the generals and company it's a great victory: they have kept their promise of “hard hand”, and this is understood -and rewarded- by the people. Now they just should decide how to “to charge for it.”

Meanwhile, journalist Víctor Solano states that Ms Betancourt necessarily “overshadows” the others' rescue [es]:

Haciendo un barrido por todos varios medios de comunicación vemos con ‘alborozo’ la noticia del rescate producto de una astucia de los cuerpos de inteligencia de Colombia para ‘robarse’ a los secuestrados y llevarlos a la libertad. En prácticamente todos los medios se establecen tres niveles de importancia y hasta se señala textualmente: “Ha sido rescatada Ingrid Betancourt; también los tres norteamericanos y 11 militares”. La forma en que se revela la información a la opinión pública es normal, mas no significa que sea la forma ideal. A la hora de la verdad, cualquiera de los 15 rescatados tiene tanta importancia como ser humano. Pero resulta absolutamente normal dadas las formas de la noticiabilidad/espectacularidad con que se ha cubierto este drama. Para muchos, el drama del secuestro en Colombia y otras partes del mundo solo ha tenido un rostro: el de Ingrid.

Doing a quick check through all the mass media we see the ‘rejoice' for the news of the rescue with the shrewdness of Colombian intelligence agents to 'steal' the kidnapped taking them to freedom. Practically all the media have established three levels of importance and even textually headlining: “Íngrid Betancourt has been rescued; as well as the three Americans and 11 soldiers.” The way the information is revealed to the public opinion is the usual one, but it does not mean it is the ideal one. Actually, any of the 15 rescued has the same importance as a human being. But it turns absolutely normal given the forms of noticeability / spectacularity this drama has been covered. For a lot of people, the drama of kidnapping in Colombia and other parts of the world has only had one face: Íngrid.

Paola Vargas, a new blogger at equinoXio [es], writes, among other things, about the media coverage of the arrival of the released to Bogotá [es] (she also does not seem very convinced by the rescue operation):

El cubrimiento mediático no podía desligarse del sentimentalismo que mueve este país desde hace unos años. Noticias Caracol no resistió la tentación de hacer sonar las letras de nuestro himno nacional, el segundo mejor del mundo después del francés según el mito urbano (¡qué ironía!), cuando Íngrid (y solo ella) salió del avión que transportaba a los otros once uniformados. El canal RCN, por su parte, lucía orgulloso la bandera colombiana. Sin embargo, unos y otros convencían con el mismo discurso: las fuerzas militares han triunfado gracias a la pericia del presidente Uribe y del ministro de defensa, la guerra se acabará pronto, etc.

The media coverage couldn't separate itself from the sentimentalism that has been part of this country over the past few years. Noticias Caracol couldn't resist the temptation to play the lyrics of our national anthem, the second best of the world after the French one according to the urban legend (what an irony!), when Íngrid (and just her) came out from the plane carrying the other 11 soldiers and policemen. RCN TV, on the other hand, was proudly wearing the Colombian flag. Nevertheless, both were convinced with the same discourse: the military forces have prevailed thanks to President Uribe's and Minister of Defense's skillfulness, and that the war will soon be over, etc.

The blog Colombia Hoy [es] comments [es]:

Las FARC reciben un nuevo golpe político y militar. Si es cierta la versión oficial, lo que hay detrás de la liberación es una operación de inteligencia impecable. Inteligencia militar habría manejado el engaño con gran maestría. Está por verse cuál fue el papel jugado por los emisarios de Francia y Suiza que llegaron al país hace dos días, y si estos gobiernos formaron parte del engaño. Como sea, lo cierto es que queda en evidencia una vez más la fragilidad militar de las FARC y su vulnerabilidad frente a las infiltraciones y el engaño. Pareciera más que una coincidencia que tanto en el bombardeo al campamento de Reyes como en este caso, existe el antecedente de la visita de un agente de inteligencia francés a los campamentos guerrilleros.

FARC received a new political and military blow. If the official version is true, what lies behind the release is an impeccable intelligence operation. [Colombia's] Military intelligence handled the plot with great mastery. It remains to be seen the role of the French and Swiss envoys who arrived two days ago, and if these governments took part on the plot. Anyway, the truth is again FARC's military fragility and its vulnerability toward infiltrations and deceptions have become evident. It seems more than a coincidence that both in the bombing of Raúl Reyes camp and this case, there's the precedent of the visit of a French intelligence agent to the guerrilla camps.

There are still around 3,000 kidnapped people in Colombia, around 700 of them being held by FARC. We want all of them free and safe.

On Sunday morning, teleSUR broadcast a video [es] sent by FARC where Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, aka “Timoleón Jiménez” or “Timochenko”, in a 12-minute speech, celebrated FARC's 44th anniversary and confirmed Sureshot's death on March 26 “of a heart attack, in the arms of his companion.” There are several doubts about where this video, using 3 cameras and editing facilities, was recorded. Some claim, because of the vegetation [es] and the uniform Londoño was wearing [es], it was shot in Venezuela.

Boz provides some context by telling us who's who in FARC's Secretariat, Adam Isacson from Plan Colombia and Beyond sees 3 likely post-Marulanda “scenarios”:

1. Disintegration (25% probability). Call this the “Shining Path” scenario: after the group loses its founder, it disintegrates. Discipline, command and ideological direction largely disappear with the maximum leader.
(…)
2. Greater cohesion and increased military action (35% probability). For the FARC, Marulanda’s latter years have resembled Cuba during Fidel Castro’s last years in office, or China awaiting Mao’s death in the mid-1970s. While a new generation awaited its turn to lead, the aging founder continued to hold ultimate decision-making power, refusing to change course - and perhaps losing touch with reality - while his creation stagnated. If Marulanda’s chosen successor, Alfonso Cano, is actually able to command the remaining top FARC leaders - a big “if” - the FARC could become more dangerous.
(…)
3. Partial fragmentation (40% probability). With Marulanda gone, a power struggle could begin within the next tier of the FARC’s leadership. There may be purges and schisms as moderates and hard-liners vie for control of the group. (…) Like bandits and drug cartels that came before, this rump would be easier for Colombia’s military to defeat within the next five to ten years.

Isacson later published a post on the questions arising from news of Marulanda's death, regarding Minister Juan Manuel Santos' presidential aspirations, FARC troop morale, and the supposed “ascension” of FARC's “political” faction.

Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra [es] seems to agree with Isacson in the third “scenario”:

[El] haber mantenido en secreto la muerte de su máximo comandante, confirma el temor, sobre las reacciones de militantes rasos y mandos medios al conocer la noticia. El anciano militante, era el factor de cohesión y aglutinamiento en las filas subversivas, por lo que se prevén deserciones, pugnas y divisiones al interior del organismo delictivo. Las FARC, están en su peor momento y virtualmente derrotadas. Muy seguramente, como en el paramilitarismo, quedaran reductos de narcotraficantes disfrazados de militantes subversivos.

The fact they kept the death of their top commander a secret confirms the fear of the reactions of low-ranking fighters and middle-ranks after learning the news. The militant old man was the cohesion and gathering factor in the subversive ranks, therefore desertions, internal struggles, and divisions in the criminal organization are expected. The FARC is going through their worst moments and is virtually defeated. Surely, as it happened with the paramilitaries, some drug-traffickers strongholds disguised as subversive guerrillas will remain.

Italian blogger Doppiafila [it] thinks that Minister Santos has “launched” his presidential campaign for 2010:

L'annuncio (e le modalitá con cui viene dato) segna il lancio “ufficioso” della candidatura di Juan Manuel Santos alla presidenza nel 2010. Resta da vedere se il tutto avviene d'accordo o alle spalle di Uribe. Di certo, il Ministro della Difesa va bene agli USA: antichavista, politico ed oligarca tradizionale, il fatto che venga ora associato alla “sconfittta delle FARC” non puó che far comodo.

The announcement (and the way it was announced) marks the “off-the-record” launch of Juan Manuel Santos's candidacy for the presidency in 2010. We'll have to see if everything that happened with Uribe's agreement is on his back. If true, the Defense Minister is a good fit for the USA: an anti-Chávez, traditional politician and oligarch, the fact he's now associated to the “FARC's defeat” can't be a comfortable one.

According to some media outlets [es], President Álvaro Uribe was somewhat upset because he likely was going to announce Sureshot's death himself later the same day to “all the media, not just one”.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo [es], from Atrabilioso, criticizes presidential adviser José Obdulio Gaviria's statements on the death of the FARC leader, who claimed “they no longer exist”:

Que ‘Tirofijo’ esté muerto no significa que las FARC hayan descendido con él al sepulcro, pues las estructuras terroristas, aunque deterioradas, siguen vivas y con capacidad de cometer crímenes contra los colombianos: además de las estructuras en el exterior (sorprendente la parafernalia que armó Telesur en menos de 24 horas para difundir la noticia del mediocre terrorista muerto) las milicias urbanas continúan activas y dos o tres terroristas pueden detonar carros-bomba, comprar secuestrados o seguir practicando el plan pistola (sicarios que disparan contra miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad).

The fact that Tirofijo is dead does not mean that FARC have descended with him to the sepulchre, because the terrorist structures, though deteriorated, are still alive and hold the capacity to perpetuate crimes against Colombians: besides their structures abroad (it's surprising all the show teleSUR put together in less than 24 hours to spread the news of the the mediocre dead terrorist), the urban militias are still active, and two or three terrorists can detonate car bombs, buy hostages or continue to practice the “pistol plan” (hit men who shoot members of the security forces).

equinoXio's Marsares comments on the “last death of Tirofijo” [es]:

Gracias a Marulanda y su degradada organización, la mayoría del pueblo colombiano cerró filas en torno a uno de los gobiernos más corruptos de la historia, comprador de conciencias, protector de paramilitares, cuidandero de las grandes fortunas. Gracias a las FARC la izquierda democrática es satanizada y nos preparamos para la segunda reelección de un régimen excluyente que a cada paso destruye la legitimidad del Estado. Dicen que Marulanda murió de un infarto. También debió ayudar la soledad y la derrota. Su castillo de 44 años derrumbado, su enemigo más fuerte que nunca, con millones en las calles gritando “no más FARC”, con sus hombres robándose la plata, matándose para cobrar recompensas, entregándose o simplemente soñando con dinosaurios. ¿Estará en el infierno, como lo desea el ministro Santos? No lo creo. El infierno lo dejó aquí. Y como siempre, Marulanda volvió a escaparse.

Thanks to Marulanda and his degraded organization, the majority of the Colombian people rallied around one of the most corrupt administrations in history, buyer of consciences, protector of paramilitaries, protector of the big fortunes. Thanks to the FARC the democratic left is demonized and we're preparing for the second re-election of an exclusionary regime which with every step destroys the legitimacy of the State. They say Marulanda died by a stroke. Loneliness and defeat must also have helped. His 44-year castle collapsed, his enemy stronger than ever, with millions on the streets shouting “no more FARC”, with his men stealing their money, killing each other to claim rewards, surrendering or simply dreaming about dinosaurs Will he be in hell, as Minister Santos wishes? I don't think so. Hell left him here. And, as usual, Marulanda escaped again.

The blog Colombia Hoy [es] analyzes the implications of Marulanda's death on the guerrilla command succession and a political negotiation with the government:

Sin la muerte de Reyes, la transición del mando se hubiera producido de una manera natural, pero en las actuales circunstancias no parece muy viable que Cano consiga mantener la unidad de unos frentes cada vez más debilitados, aislados y asediados.
(…)
Aprovechará el gobierno la coyuntura para ofrecerle a las FARC una salida política que no puedan rechazar? Entenderá el gobierno que es preferible ofrecer una salida negociada a unas FARC débiles y ad portas de una posible implosión, que buscar su destrucción definitiva al costo de su atomización en grupos aislados y la prolongación indefinida del conflicto armado? Es posible que el triunfalismo dentro del gobierno y el odio contra las FARC sea un obstáculo para encontrar salidas que sean menos costosas en términos de vidas humanas e inclusive económicos.

Without [Raúl] Reyes's death, the command transition would have taken place naturally, but with the current circumstances it is not quite feasible that [Alfonso] Cano [new FARC top commander] manages to maintain the unity of fronts that have been increasingly weakened, isolated, and besieged.
(…)
Will the government take advantage of the current situation to offer the FARC a political solution they can't reject? Will the government understand that it is better to offer a negotiated solution to a weakened and soon-to-be imploded FARC guerrilla group than seeking their definitive destruction at the price of its atomization in isolated groups and the indefinite continuation of the armed conflict? It is possible that the triumph inside the government and hatred towards the FARC had become an obstacle to find less expensive solutions in terms of human lives and even economic costs.

Álvaro Ramírez Ospina, besides being distrustful on FARC's confirmation of Sureshot's death, remembers how the way one referred to the guerrilla leader had changed with the times [es]:

Tirofijo es tan viejo como la guerra de guerrillas en Colombia. Fue campesino, y por efecto de su incorporación a la política y las armas, pasó a ser bandolero (en la época de la llamada “Violencia”, años 50 y 60); luego se convirtió en guerrillero, bandido, criminal y recientemente alcanzó la “diploma” de terrorista, por obra y gracia de la clasificación establecida por el gobierno de Bush.

Tirofijo is as old as the guerrilla war in Colombia. He was a peasant and, because of his incorporation to politics and arms, he went on to become a gangster (at the time of La Violencia, 1950s and 1960s); then he became a guerrilla, a bandit, a criminal, and recently achieved the terrorist “diploma” by the power of the classification established by Bush government.

Utopian chronicler Daniel Ramos refers to the passionate speech by Timochenko [es]:

[C]uando escuchaba a Timochenko diciendo que la humanidad no conocía a otro líder de la magnitud de Tirofijo, primero pensé en los grandes líderes (Jesucristo, Buda, Gandhi, Lincoln, Bolívar, etc.) y luego en que Timo estaba hablando evidentemente en otro contexto, estaba lanzando un nuevo tag a la nube de las FARC. La crónica utópica de las FARC es triste, dolorosa, de reseñar. Creo que la declaración de Timo es una clave para comprender por qué salió tan mal: la pérdida total de las proporciones. Imaginémonos una guerrilla de 10.000 hombres que se quiere tomar el poder en un país donde 12 millones de habitantes salen a manifestarse para decirles “No más”. Ningún presidente colombiano ha obtenido tal cantidad de votos. La maquinaria del Estado, los medios de comunicación, la publicidad desbordada de las campañas electorales nunca han sido capaces de convocar a tantos colombianos alrededor de un mismo propósito. Un genio político como Marulanda –al decir de Timo— jamás debió desestimar este indicador de legitimidad.

When I was listening to Timochenko say that humanity had not known a leader of the magnitude of Tirofijo, I first thought about the great leaders (Jesus Christ, Buddha, Gandhi, Lincoln, Bolívar, etc.) and then on the fact that Timo was evidently speaking in another context, he was releasing a new tag to the FARC's tag cloud. FARC's utopian chronicle is sad and painful to review. I think Timo's statement is a key to understanding why it went wrong: the total loss of proportions. Let's imagine a 10,000 men guerrilla army, who wants to seize power in a country where 12 million people go out into the streets to demonstrate to say to them “No more.” No Colombian president has obtained such amount of votes. The State machinery, the mass media, the burst of the electoral campaigns advertising have never been able to gather so many Colombians around a common purpose. A political genius such as Marulanda -as Timo claims- should have never dismissed such an indicator of legitimacy.

Thumbnail photo by Bastian and used under a CC license.

Jaime Restrepo praises INTERPOL and the Colombian government, and states that the chain of custody was not broken as the opposition claims:

INTERPOL has confirmed it: the files and contents of the three laptops seized in FARC strongman Raúl Reyes’s camp were not modified, nor adultered or deleted by the Colombian authorities. This is the second blow against FARC and its allies in a little more than two months, because INTERPOL’s certification implies an independent warranty that the proofs found at the Ecuadorian camp were not contaminated. If the Colombian government had not taken the decision to ask an audit on the devices and their content, the opposition -specially the people mentioned in the Reyes dossier- would be screaming that Uribe and his “thugs” manipulated the information to start a persecution on his political opponents, for sure.

Marsares claims the press conference was a show and that Colombian president Álvaro Uribe was seeking domestic support so that the people would ignore the scandals involving his government, just as Chávez and Correa do in their own countries:

What are [they] looking for? It is not to show the collusion of FARC with Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. If it were so, the evidence should be treated as such, holding back them, following the clues which can be deduced from them, until reaching the criminals, destroying all their infrastructure, giving rise to a victory they would only recover from after several years.

But it was not done that way. Since the beginning they preferred to make a fuss of it and telling, little by little, “pieces” of truths, with a clear purpose, to put [Hugo] Chávez and Rafael Correa against the ropes in order to alleviate the continental condemnation to Colombia for its violation to international law. But now, when the relations could be patched, why this new show, seeking to create a serious controversy and a political and economic catastrophe?

Domestic support, without a doubt. What a wicked way to escape from the questioning to the legitimacy of his second term.
(…)

The same way Chávez practices that within his stronghold and Correa within his, Uribe does the same thing in this frayed Colombia, seeking foreign enemies in order to armour his domestic power. Shameful show. A period on history where our peoples needed statesmen to ensure their future, was only able to give simple rulers who, as it is known, are so small as the limited horizon of their hatreds and ambitions.

Adam Isacson provides the names of the probed personalities, including controversial senator Piedad Córdoba, as expected, and American development consultant Jim Jones. He carefully analyses the charges they may face (I encourage you to read the full post), and he ends the article this way:

But again, we don’t know enough. We really have no idea what is in those files, and the rumored allegations surfacing in Colombia’s press include some troubling possibilities, such as that of would-be facilitators having visited guerrilla camps where hostages were held. Those who have talked to the press so far - Borja, Córdoba, Lozano - insist that they have done nothing wrong and that they are willing to cooperate with authorities at the first opportunity. These investigations should proceed quickly, and the accused should promptly be able to confront the evidence against them.

Ricardo Buitrago calls the Congresspeople involved “traitors” [es] and compares the two scandals [es]:

No puede haber tampoco, presunciones o parámetros dispares, que condenen a priori la actuación de unos y justifiquen la de otros. Con la parapolitica, el país, la oposición, los medios y hasta la justicia, trazaron una rasante de medición, prejuzgamiento, juzgamiento y condena, que ahora nadie entendería, pudiera ser cambiada.

There cannot be presumptions or different standards which condemn a priori the acts of some people and justify the acts of others. With the parapolitics, the nation, the opposition, the media, and even the judiciary have traced a medition, pre-judgment, judgment and condemnation slope which now no one would understand if it is changed.

Carlos Cuentero [es] angrily criticizes the Colombian government's decision of extradition:

No creo, como dicen hoy muchos columnistas, que haya fracasado la ley de Justicia y Paz. Más bien, creo que fue todo un éxito. Porque eso fue lo que negociaron en Ralito: una farsa de verdad, un teatro de justicia y nada de reparación. Eso fue lo que pactaron a puerta cerrada, a espaldas de un país que aún desconoce sus alcances.

I don't think, as many columnists are saying today, that the Justice and Peace Law has failed. Rather, I think it was a huge success. Because that's what they negotiated in Ralito: a real farce, an illusion of justice and nothing about reparation. That's what they pacted behind closed doors, behind the back of a country which still is not aware of their reach.

On the contrary, Jaime Restrepo of Atrabilioso [es] applauds the decision and says the justice, peace, and reparation process will not be affected:

But this is an emotional ingredient: the paramilitary bosses will not stay in summer houses (as some government critics described the Itagüí maximum security prison), nor will they serve just eight years in prison (one of the things they most criticized of the Justice and Peace law), because the most useful cooperation for the American justice is the tip-off from the bosses, and the truth is that the extradited are the top and not the bottom of the narco-paramilitarism hierarchical pyramid. They can build their hopes, but they will actually have to serve more than 8 years in prison. Things being so, if they will indeed serve a sentence in maximum security prisons, what is the difference if it is a Colombian or an American prison in favour of the criminals? None. But it is evident that many of the victims see the peace process with the paramilitary as a bitter revenge against their victimizers -something understandable- which does not allow them to see that extradition is not a prize but an even stronger punishment for the criminals. In any case they will not have the privileges or the benefits they could get in Colombia, and that makes the punishment they will get in the United States stronger.

Restrepo also slams the opposition parties on their contradictions:

At the time the opposition hit the ceiling by pointing out that Uribe wanted to give benefits to his “partners” by no extraditing them and they claimed that threat could not be removed from the table. Now, when the Uribe administration decides to extradite them, then it is useless for them, and they find it inconvenient in order to achieve the truth, justice, and reparation. Nevertheless, that is an incoherent position if we take into account that they were (the opposition) who did not wanted to shut the door to the extradition and put so much pressure that they ended leaving open the possibility which is a reality today. They should not be losing sleep over that now, because the Alternative Democratic Pole and the Colombian Liberal Party have fathered the extradition of the paramilitary chiefs, the same which today they find hideous and inconvenient.

But Marsares, at equinoXio digital magazine, after slamming the Justice and Peace “joke”, believes the so-called parapolitics scandal may be over and that the second re-election of Uribe is ahead:

The government alleges that the extradited chiefs broke the Justice and Peace Law by not telling all the truth, not hand all their assets over for repairing the victims, and continue committing crimes from prison. That is true. They were delivering the “truths” little by little to the judicial authorities, containing veiled threats or simply they did not say a word claiming cynical amnesias. Nevertheless, the tip-off of their political allies and the revelation of the location of the common graves where their victims are buried are an evident gain. As for the delivering of their assets, the joke was obvious. Very few of them, if not devalued or in others’ hands. So scarce that, after doing the math, each victim would receive COP7,000 (US$4 or €2.50).
(…)
A last play is the perfect finale of the game for the Government: if the paramilitary leaders had broken the Justice and Peace Law why were not they left in hands of the Colombian ordinary justice in order to be prosecuted as any other criminal? The high sentences would have meant that the government did wished to defeat impunity. But it was not done so, perhaps because they wish to avoid new revelations. Though there is the promise that the paramilitary chiefs can continue to telling the truths in the United States, the preparation of the trial can take one year, enough time to stop the damaged caused by the parapolitical scandal, and devote firmly and with a big heart to the second re-election, safe from any danger or threat, with an ad hoc Congress.

Adam Isacson, from Plan Colombia and Beyond, also posted on the issue:

Now that they have little to lose - and probably feel that they owe nothing to Colombia’s political and economic elites - the paramilitary leadership may be more willing than before to talk about who helped them over the years, what their financial and logistical networks looked like, and perhaps what happened to their victims. From a jail cell in Miami with little hope of leniency, they have little incentive to stay quiet and protect those who helped them. The question is whether those who wish to share such information will be able to do so. President Uribe and his government must be held to the statement above. Colombian investigators must have the access to the paramilitary leaders necessary to fully and aggressively comply with the “quest for the truth.”

To Isacson, if the investigators have that access, it will be a victory for the victims. If they do not, it will become a “tragic victory for the politicians, economically powerful individuals and military officers who made paramilitarism possible in Colombia.”

The political blog Colombia Hoy [es] also added its two cents [es]:

Lo que ocurre es que una vez ante los fiscales gringos podrán negociar todo. En realidad en Colombia no les esperaban penas muy altas, por lo que en el país del norte la situación no será muy diferente, aunque es posible que allí consigan algún tipo de amparo frente a la Corte Penal Internacional. Es un buen plus. Más impunidad frente a los delitos de lesa humanidad. Más legalización de las fortunas. Más residencia legal y cambio de identidad. No suena mal.

What happens is that once [they face] the American attorneys they will be able to negotiate everything. Actually in Colombia they would not face high sentences, therefore in the northern country their situation will not be very different, though they would likely get some kind of protection from the International Criminal Court. It's a good advantage. More impunity towards their crimes against humanity. More legalization of their fortunes. More legal residence and change of identity. It does not sound bad.

Days later the extradition, it was learnt that some of the personal computers and SIM cards of the extradited paramilitary bosses were not properly seized [es] by the Colombian authorities, with some of their relatives having access to the hardware [es]. Tienen huevo [es] and Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra [es] refer to the issue.

First it was thought that the Colombian Army had killed Velandia, but as the afternoon passed, the truth came to light: it turned out Pedro Pablo Montoya, aka Rojas, one of his bodyguards, had murdered Ríos to get a reward from the Colombian government:

Montoya […] shot his boss Rios with a single bullet to the head, and then killed Ríos's girlfriend. He then cut off Ríos's right hand to take to the security forces to prove he had killed the rebel leader, a member of FARC's seven-man secretariat.

One week later, and after a controversy, on March 14, the government decided to pay Montoya and another guerrilla member a US $2.5 million reward, for the “information” which allowed Iván Ríos to be found. But according to weekly news magazine Cambio's March 13 issue, a former guerrilla gave the information which allowed the Colombian Army to infiltrate FARC's Central Bloc and, through the help of the informant, who was in contact with Rojas, to instigate the latter to kill his commander.

At the digital magazine equinoXio [es], Marsares says:

Al dificultarse su captura, se le da instrucciones para que lo mate, como efectivamente lo hizo, convirtiéndose en instigador del crimen el propio Gobierno que se coloca por encima de la ley. Sencillo. Si no puedes capturar a tu enemigo, ¡mátalo!
A Ríos se le acusaba de haber cometido delitos de lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y delitos comunes, es cierto, pero según la Constitución, debía comparecer ante los jueces de la República para luego de ser oído y vencido en juicio, imponérsele una pena. Su ejecución extrajudicial no diferencia al Gobierno de las que hace la misma guerrilla, porque ambas carecen de legitimidad y violan nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Al gobierno sólo le compete la labor de capturarlos, salvo un enfrentamiento armado que determine su muerte.

When his capture became difficult, they [the Colombian Army] instructed [Rojas] to kill him, as he indeed did, making the Government, who puts itself above the Law, the instigator of the crime. It's simple. If you can't capture your enemy, kill him! Ríos was accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and common crimes, that's true, but according to the Constitution, he should have appeared before the judges of the Republic to be, after being heard and defeated in trial, sentenced. His execution outside of the law does not differentiate the Government from those perpetrated by guerrilla, because both lack legitimacy and violate our legal system. The Government has the duty to capture them, unless there is an armed confrontation which determines their death.

Liberal Colombiano [es] seems to agree with Marsares in his blog:

No se pueden lograr buenos objetivos con malos medios. No se puede mejorar la seguridad y alcanzar promoviendo y pagando por asesinatos. La política de delaciones esta bien para DELACIONES. Nunca para asesinatos. El estado no debe pagar por el crimen de “Ivan Ríos” a menos que de verdad se demuestre que fue en legítima defensa. El derecho a la vida es inviolable e inalienable. […] Ojala que lo sucedido con Rojas lleve a algunas personas a la reflexión sobre los límites de la acción estatal.
La pregunta de fondo siempre será: que le esta permitido al Estado?

You can't achieve good goals through poor means. You can't improve security by promoting and paying for murders. The tip-off policy is fine for TIP-OFFS. Never for murders. The State should not pay for Iván Ríos' crime unless it's really proved that it was in legitimate defense. The right to live is inviolable and inalienable […] I wish what happened to Rojas leads some people to reflect about the limits of State action. The bottom question will always be: what's the State allowed to do?

Bloggings by Boz summarizes the debate. These are the pros:

Rojas did bring an end to a top FARC commander (which is the reason the reward exists), possibly saving lives in the process. Additionally, the government wants to create the incentive for other FARC combatants to desert and turn over information about their commanders, and failing to give Rojas the reward could harm that effort. This reward has the added bonus of possibly creating internal dissent within the FARC.

And here are the cons:

Most of the reasons not to give the reward focus on the fact Rojas was a FARC combatant for 16 years and confessed to murdering his commander. Private citizens murdering other citizens does not help the Colombian government's overall goal to enhance the state's legitimate authority across the country. Rewards are meant for citizens to provide information for the government to act on, not for them to act as a mercenary.

At the end, Boz finds himself

tempted to support giving the reward because I want to see the reward program work and I want to see more mid-level FARC commanders desert and turn in information about their superiors. However, a democratic state should not offer mercenary payments. It's a tough rule, but the Colombian government is not going to win back control of the state by taking short cuts.

Finally, Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra is overtly supportive of the payment [es]:

Nadie cuando se instauro la política de recompensas, previo este caso, como nadie, alcanzo nunca a imaginarse, la degradación a la que llegarían los grupos al margen de la ley y la misma sociedad. La recompensa debe pagarse. No hacerlo, seria un pésimo mensaje a miembros de la guerrilla susceptibles de delación de que el estado no cumple. Se constituiría en un retroceso en la aplicación de la política de recompensas, que ha sido fundamental, en el quiebre que ahora se vislumbra en la organización guerrillera. ¿Si el país entero se alegra por la muerte de delincuentes, cual es la razón de privar de la recompensa a quien propicia la alegría? Por lo tanto, o dejamos de ser hipócritas y aceptamos la degradación de nuestros principios, o nos convencemos que en guerra, el pago de este tipo de recompensas se mira desde otro contexto. En ambos casos, a pagar se dijo.

When the reward policy was established, no one could ever imagine to what point the illegal armed groups would go and where Colombian society would reach. The reward must be paid. Not to do it would be a dreadful message to the members of the guerrillas willing to tip-off that the State does not carry out their agreements. It would become a step back in the application of the reward policy, which has been essential getting a glimpse into the guerrilla organization. If the entire country is pleased with the death of the criminals, what's the reason to stopy the reward to those that provide that joy? Therefore, either we stop being hypocrites and accept the degradation of our own principles or become convinced that, in a war, the payment of this kind of rewards can be seen from another context. In both cases, it's time to pay.

On Wednesday it was learned that Rojas will have to answer for other crimes [es], such as “conspiracy for drug trafficking, terrorism, and multiple homicide” relating to massacres he allegedly helped to perpetrate, according to Colombia's Attorney General Office. This should keep the former FARC guerrilla in jail for a while. At the moment, Rojas is staying in a military facility in Risaralda Department, Western Colombia.

Photo by Pattoncito and used under a Creative Commons license.

On February 4, hundreds of thousands of Colombians around the world demonstrated against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, for its initials in Spanish), an event which started as a Facebook group, taking advantage of the popularity of this social network in the country (Colombia is the 9th country in active users), and soon endorsed by the media and the government. It was the main topic on the Colombian blogosphere during most of January and, of course, after the march almost everyone reacted, in addition to posting their pictures and videos.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo in Atrabilioso [es] says:

Las FARC perdieron su apellido de ejército del pueblo. Simple y contundente. Millones de personas en Colombia y el mundo le enviaron un mensaje tajante al grupo terrorista sobre sus pretendidas justificaciones de propaganda nacional e internacional en el sentido de representar a los colombianos. Que les quede claro: No representan al pueblo. Pero las FARC ganaron un apellido: ejército del Polo. Así de fácil. (…) Quedó claro: las FARC representan a múltiples sectores del Polo y ahora lo que resultará difícil será determinar a cuales si, y a cuales no….Y los ciudadanos, esos millones de colombianos y extranjeros que decidieron, POR PRIMERA VEZ EN LA HISTORIA RECIENTE DEL PAÍS, salir a las calles a emitir una rotunda condena contra los terroristas de las FARC… Quedó claro que son demasiados millones de “oligarcas” los que están contra las FARC. Si la tan cacareada oligarquía fuera tan numerosa, Colombia sería más próspera que la mayoría de países desarrollados.

FARC lost their last name of “People's Army.” Simply and bluntly. Millions of people in Colombia and around the world sent a sharp message to the terrorist group on their domestic and international propaganda-intended justifications of representing Colombians. It should be clear: they don't represent the people. But FARC have earned a last name: [Opposition leftist party Alternative Democratic] Pole's Army. Just that easy. (…) It's clear: the FARC represents several sectors within the Pole and what will turn out difficult will be to figure out which ones do they represent and which ones they do not….And the citizens, those millions of Colombians and foreigners who decided, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE COUNTRY'S RECENT HISTORY, to go out to the streets in order to condemn outrightly the FARC terrorists… It's clear there are way too many “oligarchs” who stand against FARC. If there were so many members of the “oligarchy”, then Colombia would be more prosperous than most of the developed countries.

Julián Rosero, at equinoXio [es], also criticizes the opposition party (PDA for its initials in Spanish):

La posición del PDA debió ser contundente, rápida y consecuente. Debió decir NO a la marcha del 4 de febrero hasta que los organizadores le cambien el fin, o en su defecto, organizar paralelamente, con el mismo despliegue y con un gran ahínco, una marcha con la consigna NO A TODAS LAS FORMAS DE TERRORISMO, en cuyo eslogan estén presentes las conjeturas: No a las FARC, No al Paramilitarismo y No al Terrorismo de Estado. De hecho, debió imprimir carteles en donde la conjetura que encabezara el eslogan fuera “No a las FARC”, encima de las otras dos mencionadas, para impedir que los críticos del PDA relacionen a este partido político con esta agrupación terrorista.

PDA's position should have been blunt, quick, and consistent. It should have said NO to the February 4th march, until their organizers changed its objective, or otherwise, to organize, separately, eagerly and with the same display of enthusiasm, a march with the slogan NO TO ANY FORM OF TERRORISM, including No FARC, no paramilitaries, and no State terrorism. In fact, it should have printed posters where the heading was “No to the FARC” over the other two mentioned, in order to prevent PDA critics to link this political party with that terrorist group.

Cartoonist Vladdo claims [es] that the march doesn't own its success to Facebook, but to the hate most Colombians feel toward the FARC is:

El mismo odio que ha elegido dos veces a Álvaro Uribe. Y el mismo que llevó a las emisoras de radio, canales de televisión, periódicos y revistas a dedicarse con un empeño sin precedentes a la causa del 4-F; proceso en el cual quedó claro que la crispación que producen las FARC es un tema que conquista lectores y capta audiencia. (Lástima que ese fenómeno nunca se vea con las víctimas de las AUC y sus masacres y desaparecidos; ni con los desplazados; ni con los perjudicados por los falsos positivos).

The same hate which has twice elected Álvaro Uribe. And the same who lead radio stations, television networks, newspapers and magazines to devote an unprecedented effort to the F-4 cause (February 4th march date); a process which made clear that the anger FARC produces and is an issue that attracts readers and gains an audience. (It's a shame that phenomenon can't be seen with the victims of AUC, their massacres and their disappeared; nor with the displaced people, not those affected with the false positives).

Vladdo also criticizes the ambiguous attitude of the Democratic Pole toward the demonstration, which “confused a lot of their militants, who in this kind of circumstances need a lot their leaders to instruct them”.

Colombians abroad also chimed in with their thoughts. From Los Angeles, Alexillopillo, besides wondering about the real usefulness of the demonstration and how the magnitude of the march had moved him, makes a reflection [es]:

Hace 13 años, una de mis primeras noches pagando servicio militar en Neiva escuché a un capitan decir ante todo el pelotón formado, momentos antes de enviarnos a dormir, que el ejército Colombiano era tan bueno pero tan bueno, que la guerrilla no habia podido acabar con él en mas de 40 años. Todo mundo pareció estar de acuerdo, pero yo por dentro solo pensaba “No será mas bien al revés? Que el ejército Colombiano es tan, pero tan abominablemente inepto, que no ha podido acabar con la guerrilla en mas de 40 años?” Con esa mentalidad, no es una sorpresa que la guerrilla nos desangre lentamente a su gusto.

Thirteen years ago, on one of my first nights of my military service in Neiva, I heard a captain say in front of the entire squad, moments before he sent us to bed, that Colombian army was so good that guerrilla had proved to be unable to destroy it for more than 40 years. Everyone seemed to agree, but I thought inside “Shouldn't it be the opposite way? That Colombian army was so abominably terrible that it has proven to be unable to destroy guerrilla for more than 40 years?” With that mentality, it's not a surprise that guerrilla slowly bleeds us at their will.

Though she didn't marched, Ana María Arango remarks [es]:

[L]a marcha del 4 de febrero fue una ruptura con los antecedentes de aletargamiento, apatía y negligencia en la clase media y alta colombiana frente a problemáticas políticas. Independientemente de la polarización que generó, esta marcha es un logro sin precedentes y un hecho del que nos debemos alegrar; porque además de que puso en evidencia el rechazo tan fuerte a las FARC, nos mostró que también miles de personas salieron de su comodidad y de su entorno inmediato a protestar por la violencia y el secuestro más allá de sus inclinaciones políticas.

The February 4th march was a breakthrough against the lethargy, apathy and negligence fromColombia's upper and middle-classes, in regards to political issues. Regardless the polarization it caused, this march is an unprecedented achievement and a fact we should be happy for; because, besides making clear such a strong contempt for FARC, it also showed us thousands of people who left their comfortable and their immediate environment to protest violence and kidnapping regardless of their political tendencies.

Minoría desinformada [es] slammed the politicians of the ruling party who took advantage of the march to propose Uribe's second re-election [es]:

Muchos sabíamos que eso iba a pasar -así los organizadores digan que no tenían ningún interés político- y por eso fue que decidimos de manera autónoma y consciente, no marchar. No salimos a unirnos a la multitudinaria manifestación, que sin duda marcó un hito en nuestra historia patria, no porque eso signifique que estemos de acuerdo ni remotamente con algún crimen de lesa humanidad cometido por las FARC. En muchas oportunidades en esta bitácora, la Minoría desinformada ha expresado claramente y sin dubitaciones su rechazo contundente contra esta organización armada, que nos atrevemos incluso a definir como “cartel”, porque en eso se han convertido (…) Entonces, no necesitábamos marchar para expresar nuestro repudio tantas veces mencionado. En ese sentido, respaldamos todavía a quienes ese histórico día se manifestaron en contra de la violencia en Colombia, y uno de sus causantes, sin duda, es la guerrilla de las FARC.
Pero no marchamos porque sabíamos que eso se iba a utilizar para hacer política y de la forma más oportunista y repulsiva, porque ahora el significado de esa concentración es “el respaldo a Álvaro Uribe”. No hay derecho. Cuando sabemos que esa marcha se dio porque todavía hay gente secuestrada, que no ha visto la libertad en más de 5 años y ninguna de las partes ha querido bajar su arrogancia para solucionar el conflicto de forma negociada.

A lot of us knew this was going to happen -even the organizers say they had no political interests- and that's why we decided autonomously and consciously not to march. We didn't go out to join that multitudinary demonstration, which without a doubt set a milestone in our country's history, not because that means that we remotely agree with any of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by FARC. We've expressed in several occassions on this blog our contempt for that armed organization, which we dare to define as a “cartel”, because that's what they've become. (…) Then, we didn't need to march in order to express our rejection so many times mentioned. In that sense, we still support those who demonstrated that historic day against violence in Colombia, and one of its causes, without a doubt, are the FARC guerrillas. But we didn't march because we already knew that was going to be used for campaigning so repulsively and opportunistly, because right now the meaning of that demonstration is to “support Álvaro Uribe”. They have no right. When we know that march happened because there's still people kidnapped, who haven't seen freedom for more than 5 years and no one of the parts involved want to forget their arrogance to solve the conflict in a negotiated way.

Mateo Echeverry [es] writes about the media coverage:

El cubrimiento que le dieron los medios a la marcha fue masivo, pero paradójicamente, un poco superficial. La emotividad y dimensión de la manifestación la hacían más apropiada para el deleite estético (muy apropiadamente RCN tuvo a su servicio un helicóptero que daba vueltas por todo Bogotá trasmitiendo las imágenes en vivo). Más allá de las imágenes, la información de los medios se limitó a interpretar la marcha como una señal de “unión entre los colombianos”. Lo que no hicieron fue matizar el significado que para cada marchante tenía. La imagen de la gran masa blanca desplazándose opacó las particularidades de la jornada.
Analizando los medios no resulta tan interesante la cobertura de la marcha en sí, sino, la fuerte decisión de los medios de apoyar esta marcha particular creada por un ciudadano cualquiera.

The media coverage on the march was massive but paradoxically a little shallow. The emotivity and the dimension of the demonstration made it more appropriate for the aesthetic joy ([Pro-Uribe] RCN used a helicopter which toured the Bogotá sky broadcasting live pictures). Beyond the pictures, media information limited interpretation of the march as a sign of the “unity among Colombians”. What they didn't do was to clarify the meaning it has for every one of the demonstrators. The picture of the big white mass moving hides the particularities of the day. Analyzing the media is not as interesting as the coverage on the march itself, but the strong decision by the media to endorse this particular march created by an anonymous citizen.

Marsares summarizes in a post some lessons and consequences from the march. Besides agreeing with some of the other views posted here (the critics towards PDA, the unity of Colombians expressed through their hate towards FARC, the role of the mass media in the demonstration's success), equinoXio's chief-editor remarks [es]:

Los problemas de Colombia involucran sólo a los colombianos que viven en Colombia. Los que residen en el exterior sólo participan en las fiestas patrias o en situaciones coyunturales como ésta. Es natural. Tienen sus propios problemas de supervivencia y sólo sienten al país en las noticias, la música o los recuerdos. No les queda tiempo para más. (…) La verdad, incluso para Estados Unidos, es que somos apenas un país de Latinoamérica que poco le interesa al mundo como hace poco lo resaltaba Andrés Oppenheimer. De ahí la importancia de la marcha. Por lo menos estamos unidos para enfrentar a la guerrilla y eso ya es mucho.

The problems of Colombia only involve Colombians living in Colombia. The ex-patriates only participate during the national holidays or situations like this one. It's natural. They have their own survival issues and they just feel the country on the news, the music or their memories. They have no time for anything else. (…) Actually, even for the United States, we're just a Latin American country the world is only a little interested in, as Andrés Oppenhaimer remarked. That's the importance of the march. At least we're united to confront guerrilla and that means a lot.

He is also concerned about Uribe's upcoming possible re-election:

En 2010, salvo un hecho extraordinario, se le renovará el mandato a la Seguridad Democrática (a Uribe o a un uribista), erosionándose los principios fundamentales del Estado Social de Derecho, que se fundamenta en la pluralidad, regresándose al unanimismo del pasado y a la concentración del poder, con un PDA que ingresará a la lista de proyectos fallidos de la izquierda. La Seguridad Democrática, como las telenovelas de mayor audiencia, se alarga para conservar el rating de la derecha recalcitrante y excluyente que hoy gobierna a Colombia.

In 2010, unless something extraordinary occurs, the Democratic Security's mandate will be renewed (to Uribe or one of his supporters), eroding the fundamental principles of the pluralism-based Social State of Right, and returning to the unanimity from the past and the concentration of power, with a PDA which will become part of the list of the Colombian left's failed projects. The Democratic Security, as prime time telenovelas, extends to keep the rating of the diehard, excluding right-wing that currently rules Colombia.

Finally, “Utopian chronicler” Daniel Ramos believes [es] Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez did gain something with the march:

[L]o que Hugo quiere es darle una salida política a las FARC, enseñarles principios revolucionarios (”Se puede sin secuestro, aunque un golpe de Estado es una opción válida también”), pedagogía humanitaria (”Suelten otros 3 secuestrados por favor, ahí vamos poco a poco volviéndonos una alternativa social y política”) y bases democráticas (”Compañeros, estamos jodidos en apoyo popular, ¡miren esa foto! Chamos: así no se puede seguir. Tenemos que hacer méritos a ver si algún día podemos abrir nuestro propio grupo en Facebook”). Claro, la reeducación de las FARC le tomará bastante tiempo, pero hoy en día parece que no hay nadie más capaz de hacerlo.

What Hugo wants is to give FARC a political option, to teach them revolutionary principles (”It's possible with no kidnappings, though a coup d'état is a valid option too”), humanitarian pedagogy (”Please, release another 3 hostages, we're gradually becoming a social and political alternative”), and democratic grassroots (”Comrades, we're screwed without popular support, look that picture! Chamos: we can't continue like this. We must gain recognition to see if one day we can open our own Facebook group”). Of course, FARC's re-education will take a lot of time for him, but nowadays it seems there's nobody else who can do it.

Photo by Dfinnecy and used under Creative Commons license

On Sunday 28 October, Colombians went to the polls to elect their local mayors, council members, and deputies to the departments' assemblies. These run-up to these elections were marked by violence against candidates. In some regions, political alliances that were quite unlikely one year ago, now were made possible, whereas some independent candidates won some important posts in big cities (such as Medellín or Cartagena). In Bogotá, despite a huge gaffe [ES] on a television debate one week earlier, where the candidate admitted that he would “buy votes” in order to save the city from other candidate who buys a thousand times more votes, “leftist” Samuel Moreno Rojas became the new Mayor. That election also witnessed a ‘dirty campaign' against Rojas and his main competitor Enrique Peñalosa, which included the surfacing of old interviews and even the hidden “endorsement” of President Uribe to Peñalosa. Incidentally, Moreno is grandson to Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Colombia's only dictator in the 20th century.

Plan Colombia and Beyond has an excellent summary on the elections, if you want to know the details. A slightly different, but quite interesting, point of view can be found at Bloggings by Boz.

On the local blogosphere, there were mixed reactions. At Atrabilioso [ES], journalist Jaime Restrepo refers to the victory of Moreno Rojas in Bogotá:

Samuel Moreno Rojas ganó… y de lejos, con una votación histórica de más de 900 mil votos.

El triunfo del candidato del PDA a la alcaldía de Bogotá demuestra, en primer término, que Álvaro Uribe Vélez no tiene la potestad de endosar los votos.

Pese a los discursos que pronunció el Presidente, y que eran indirectas contra Moreno Rojas, los bogotanos optaron por las propuestas del candidato del PDA y dijeron no a la reelección de Enrique Peñalosa Londoño.

Así las cosas, los ciudadanos capitalinos decidieron elegir a quien prometió la construcción del metro, a aquel que se comprometió con una amnistía para los infractores de tránsito y aseguró que no construirá peajes urbanos ni cobrará más impuestos.

[…]

Sin embargo, en estas elecciones pierde el PDA, que en la última semana de desesperación llegó a reconocer que las palabras del Presidente, en las que no mencionó ni un solo nombre, le caían como guante a su candidato a la alcaldía de Bogotá.

Uribe fue claro y reiterativo: el candidato al que apoyan las FARC en sus páginas de Internet, el que no rechaza a los terroristas, el que gaguea al momento de rechazar la compra de votos… para todos era claro que blanco es y gallina lo pone, pero el PDA, especialmente su presidente Carlos Gaviria Díaz, salió a la palestra a descalificar a Uribe y a señalarlo de participar en política.

Samuel Moreno Rojas won… by a huge difference, with a historic turnout of more than 900,000 votes. The victory of the [Alternative Democratic Pole, PDA] candidate to the Bogotá mayorship shows, first, that Álvaro Uribe Vélez can't endorse votes.
Despite the presidential speeches, which were hints against Moreno Rojas, Bogotans chose the PDA candidate's proposals and said “no” to the re-election of Enrique Peñalosa Londoño.
Things being so, the citizens of the capital decided to choose the one who promised the subway/train, the one who committed with amnesty to the traffic offenders and he assured he wouldn't create urban toll gates nor charge more taxes.
[…]
Nevertheless, in this election the PDA loses, which in the last desperate week they recognized that the words of the President, even if he didn't mention a single name, fit like a glove for their candidate to the Bogotá mayorship.
Uribe was clear and persistent: the candidate supported by the FARC on their internet websites, the one who fails in rejecting terrorists, the one who hesitates when it comes to refuse to buy votes… it was clear and obvious for everyone who he was, but the PDA, specially his president Carlos Gaviria Díaz, entered the fray to discredit Uribe and accused him of participation in politics.

Meanwhile, Marsares, based on the results for Mayorships and Governorships, remarks in equinoXio [ES] about the “frustrated” (Álvaro Uribe, the Party of the U [ruling], the Conservative Party [ruling], guerrillas), the “stagnant” (Radical Change [ruling], Alas Team Colombia [ruling], Alternative Democratic Pole [opposition], Liberal Party [opposition]) and the “winners” (the independents, sports narrator William Vinasco [third place in Bogotá election], some regional local bosses, the National Registrar of the Civil State) of the elections. At the end of his post, he claims:

Repartido el poder regional se demuestra que el uribismo es Uribe. Sin él, la lucha queda abierta y cualquier cosa puede pasar, incluyendo su segunda reelección.

The regional shared power can be proven that [so-called] ‘uribism' is [just] Uribe. Without him, the [political] struggle remains open and anything can happen, including his second re-election.

But Juglar del Zipa [ES] thinks Uribe actually “won”:

Antes, como he dicho hace un rato y hace unos años, Uribe —o los uribistas, que no sé si es lo mismo, pero supongo, ya verán, que no es así— puede beneficiarse del hecho de que la alcaldía de Bogotá esté en manos de la supuesta oposición porque así muestra, demuestra y convence a una cantidad de gente de que aquí en Colombia sí hay garantías para, como dice él, «practicar la democracia».

Before, as I've said a while ago and a few years ago, Uribe —or the ‘uribistas', which I don't know if they're the same thing, but I guess, you'll see, that it isn't so— can benefit from the fact that Bogotá mayorship fell in the hands of the supposed opposition because it shows, proves and convinces a lot of people that here in Colombia, there are indeed guarantees to, as he says, «practice democracy».

PDA-opponent Alejandro Peláez writes on Machete [ES] on Bogotá's local administrative juntas (JAL), a even more local legislative entity, equivalent to the city council but in every of the city's 20 localities:

Según los resultados electorales, el Polo Democrático Alternativo obtuvo el mayor número de curules para edil en Bogotá. Sin embargo, nadie ha manifestado que quien realmente ganó en las elecciones para las JAL no fue el Polo sino el voto en blanco.

[…]

Este fenómeno puede tener varias interpretaciones:

• El electorado no ve que las JAL cumplan un papel relevante y prefiere abstenerse de definir un candidato.
• Al elector le da pereza investigar los candidatos que se presentan y opta por el voto en blanco.

Una conclusión importante: el poder del voto en blanco es prácticamente nulo.

According to the electoral results, the Alternative Democratic Pole got the most seats for [JAL] local council members in Bogotá. Nevertheless, no one has said that the one who really won the JAL elections wasn't the Pole but the blank vote.
[…]
This can be interpreted in several ways:

• The electorate doesn't see that the JALs have a relevant role and prefers to abstain from choosing a candidate.
• The elector is lazy at researching the candidates and opts for the blank vote.

An important conclusion: the blank vote's power is practically non-existent.

El Oyerista [ES] writes about the radio coverage on the elections, claiming that while pro-Uribe RCN Radio was more “quick” and clear when giving the results, Caracol Radio did better on analyzing them. Álvaro Montes also praises [ES] Caracol Radio and Caracol Televisión (which aren't related companies since 2001, though they used to) coverage for putting left-leaning analysts. He also refers to the results in Bogotá:

Pero por lo que más me alegra es porque significó un ladrillazo en la cabeza para Uribe y el uribismo, que hicieron cuanto les fue posible para impedir un segundo periodo del Polo Democrático en la alcaldía de Bogotá y tenían sus esperanzas puestas en Enrique Peñalosa. Uribe intervino en política la semana previa a las elecciones, dijo que Samuel era el candidato de las “Far” y otras tonterías. El presidente que ha ganado dos veces gracias a la compra de votos y al constreñimiento de los electores a punta de fusil paramilitar, acusó a Samuel Moreno de “comprador de votos”. ¡Vaya!

But what makes me glad the most is that [the results] meant a brick to the head ofUribe and the ‘uribism', which did everything possible to prevent a second term for the Democratic Pole in Bogotá mayorship and they hoped Enrique Peñalosa would win. Uribe intervened in politics during the week before the polls, claimed that Samuel was the “Far[c]” candidate and other nonsense. The president who has won twice thanks to “buying votes” and by pressuring electors with the paramilitary rifle, accused Samuel Moreno of “vote buying”. Boy!

Finally, Tienen huevo [ES] mocks the “security” after the elections, by showing the pictures of the riots in some localities where losers didn't accept the defeats of their candidates.

The court, which is probing dozens of Uribe's political allies on charges they supported paramilitary death squads, accuses the president of obstructing those investigations while Uribe says it is plotting against him. In several radio interviews, Uribe said on Tuesday the court offered benefits including a reduced sentence to jailed paramilitary chief Jose Moncada in exchange for testifying that the president ordered the killing of another militia boss in 2003. He made the charge in private questioning last week and news of his testimony has just begun circulating.

Xinhua complements:

“The country needs to know if the president is an assassin or if the lawyer and Mr. alias Tasmania are liars. All we Colombians can be investigated, starting from the president, but it is necessary that the means be legal and decent,” Uribe told a press conference. […] Velazquez has received the unanimous support of the supreme court's 23 judges through a communique.Uribe said, “I believe that it is bad to obtain a deceitful confession through torture or through gifts.” High peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, said in 2004 that “Rene” confessed to him that he feared to be a victim of assassination attempts ordered by Uribe or by the government forces, and that is why he had refused to leave the concentration region.

On Sunday, it was learnt that the letter from the paramilitary chief Moncada, alias Tasmania (or perhaps Taz-Mania, since the animated television show is better known in Colombia than the Australian island), was delivered to the president by his older brother Santiago Uribe, according to national newspaper El Tiempo [ES]. As usual, this incident sparked outrage in the Colombian blogosphere and a huge controversy between president Uribe's supporters and those ones who side with the Supreme Court, especially when justice Iván Velásquez, the one accused by the president, “carries [ES] the burden of investigations of over 30 politicians for their links with former chiefs of the Self-United Forces of Colombia (AUC)”, most of them from the ruling coalition, including Mr. Uribe's own cousin, senator Mario Uribe Escobar.

Carlos Cuentero [ES] writes at El desván:

Gritos e insultos a la Corte Suprema de Justicia… ¿dictadura democrática?

Shouts and insults to the Supreme Court of Justice… a democratic dictatorship?

On the blog Atrabilioso [ES], journalist Miguel Yances makes a summary of the case and attacks some of the Colombian media:

Lo extraño de este suceso es que la opinión especializada que difunden los medios masivos, de forma casi generalizada se dedicó a descalificar, no a Tasmania ni al magistrado, sino al presidente; mientras que en la Urna Virtual de Caracol, más del 70% de quienes participaron, estuvieron de acuerdo con el proceder presidencial. ¿Por qué algunos políticos, periodistas y medios masivos -me consta que El Universal no- le cargan tanta bronca al presidente? ¿Solo por qué es buen negocio; o por venganza? La venganza la sanciona la opinión pública, y el dinero es bueno y necesario, pero hay que medir bien las formas que se usan para conseguirlo.

The strange thing about this event is that the specialized opinion spread by the mass media, in a generalized way, spent their time to discredit not Tasmania or the justice [Velásquez] but the president, whereas a virtual poll in Caracol TV shows that more than 70% of the participants agreed with the president's actions.
Why do some politicians, journalists and mass media -I can say El Universal [the daily Yances works for] have so much anger towards the president? Just because it's good for business or for revenge? Revenge is sanctioned by the public opinion, and the money is good and necessary, but the ways used to get it should be measured.

Valentina Díaz from Realidades Colombianas [ES] says:

¿Qué interés oculto tiene el presidente para seguir en la misma tónica echarle leña a la fogata contra el poder judicial y presionar para orientar las investigaciones de la Fiscalía? ¿Por qué el Comisionado de Paz asegura que “alias ‘René' no se desmovilizaba porque tenía miedo que el presidente y su amigo Ernesto Garcés lo mataran”? Por eso y mucho más hay quienes creen que estamos al borde del desplome institucional.

What hidden interest has the president to continue in the same attitude of adding fuel to the fire against the judiciary and putting pressure in order to guide the Attorney General office's investigations? Why does the Peace Commissioner claim that alias René wasn't going to demobilize because he was afraid the president and his friend Ernesto Garcés were going to kill him? Because of that and a lot more thare are some who believe we're on the brink of an institutional collapse.

At equinoXio [ES], Carlos Uribe slams the way this incident broke into the media with such intensity:

Es necesario concluir también en que alguien –persona o grupo– desconocido aún, ha sido el promotor de todo este lamentable enredo para quizás poner el debate nacional en otra parte y desviar la atención de todo el mundo, incluidos por supuesto los medios de comunicación que corren desbocados y sin criterio detrás del escándalo.Persiste, finalmente, la confirmación de que la Corte Suprema de Justicia –como le ha tocado otras veces a la Corte Constitucional– anda enfrentada a la Presidencia, porque aquí hay que incluir a todos los turiferarios. Y que el Presidente de la República no pierde oportunidad para revolver la opinión, para hacer uso y abuso de los medios de comunicación, más allá de la mesura deseable, y que sobre todo, le encanta el poder concentrado en una sola figura, la suya, que ahora comienza a ser promovida como candidata a un tercer periodo presidencial. Que Dios nos ayude, si es que ya no ha firmado un acuerdo con nuestro piadoso soberano.

It's necessary to conclude, too, that someone -a person or a group- yet unknown has promoted this regrettable mess in order to perhaps put it into the national debate elsewhere and divert everyone's attention, including of course the mainstream media which run unstoppable and without any criteria behind the scandal. It persists, finally, the confirmation that the Supreme Court of Justice -as in other times has been the Constitutional Court- is confronted with the Presidency, because here we must include all the sycophants. And that the President of the Republic misses no chance to agitate the opinion to use and abuse the mass media, beyond the desirable restraint, and that above all, he loves the power concentrated in one person, his own, which is now being promoted as a candidate for a third presidential term. God help us, if there's already no signed pact with our devout sovereign.

Tienen Huevo [ES] takes it humorously by depicting alias Tasmania as Taz and alias René as Kermit the Frog, known in Latin America as the Rana René.

Nevertheless, the fear a big earthquake will strike Bogotá someday is by no means groundless. As Víctor Solano reminds us [ES] :

Toda Bogotá se encuentra ubicada en zona de amenaza sísmica intermedia. (…) el impacto de un terremoto en Bogotá sería monstruoso debido a que las normas de arquitectura sismorresistente se adoptaron muy tarde y por eso cerca del 80 por ciento de las construcciones podrían colapsar estruendosamente.

The entire city of Bogotá is located in an intermediate seismic threat area. (…) the impact of an earthquake in Bogotá would be huge because the norms for an earthquake resistant architecture were adopted too late and that’s why 80 per cent of the buildings could collapse loudly.

Solano also criticized the media coverage and asked them to be more “responsible”. For example, some media outlets, like El Tiempo or Caracol Radio, claimed the National University of Colombia campus was evacuated, which wasn’t true (later they corrected the wrong information they provided).

The worst thing is that for almost two centuries a “prophecy” by father Francisco Margallo y Duquesne still rings in the ears of a lot of Bogotans every August, who said, “On the 31 August a year I won’t tell / successive earthquakes will destroy Santafé” (Bogotá’s colonial name, which was taken up again on 1991-2000). Although in 1917 (when several earthquakes actually struck the then big town) and in 1973 the Margallo prophecy was about to be fulfilled [ES], the last time Bogotá has been hit by a high magnitude earthquake was February 1967. In May there was an earthquake [ES] which left no victims (it was a Saturday around midnight, so I didn’t feel it). Maybe some people stayed away because of the date. In a Catholic country, is not strange to find some devote souls [ES] asking to go back to praying, as if a natural disaster was a punishment from God. The fans of the “triangle of life” hoax also show up [ES] on the forums. Of course, not everyone [ES] is so ignorant.

The office of Bogotá’s mayor has been working for years in a campaign [ES] in order to teach Bogotans what to do and how to prevent these events. Though the campaign has been praised, if you saw what happened on August 28, most people did not heed the advice. As Hodracirk's blog [ES], writes:

Ayer Bogota fue victima de una broma, que causo pánico generalizado, un flashmob conocido solo por una persona…Lo realmente sorprendente es ver lo credulos que somos, y la falta de cultura de la sociedad que cree que un terremoto se puede predecir de esa manera, incluso algunos cerca a mi casa salieron comprar víveres, adicional mente esto es una prueba para de que la ciudad esta mal preparada para afrontar una emergencia de este tipo.

Yesterday, Bogota became victim of a prank, that caused general panic, a flashmob only known to one person… It was surprising to see how gullible we are, and the lack of knowledge of a society that thinks an earthquake an be predicted this way. Even some near my house bought supplies, which shows that the city is unprepared to face an emergency like this.

After the Uribe-Moncayo meeting in the tent in Plaza de Bolívar, where the latter is remaining, Colombian president decided to speak in front of the approximately 1,000 people who went to support Moncayo. It became another of his usual “town hall meetings”. As Uribe faced the insults of some of the attendees, who started to call him “paramilitary,” “fascist,” and “liar” (he even invited a shouting young political science student to the stage), he said if FARC releases their hostages, the Colombian government would create a safe-haven for 90 days for peace talks. But Mr. Moncayo was skeptical, telling Uribe he didn't “own the lives” of the hostages and also claiming that Uribe and the FARC were playing politics with them [the hostages' relatives] in the middle of that game. The unusual debate was broadcast live, during the midday newscasts on the main television networks. While the quarrel between Uribe and the crown continued, Moncayo “leaned on his wife and wiped away tears, then limped away on his cane.”

The whole country started to debate the issue, showing a huge division between the ones seeking for a prisoner swap (a point where most agree) with or without a safe-haven (a condition which divides Colombians). The Colombian blogosphere reflects that polarization, which became more evident since Uribe took office 5 years ago.

Giovanny Acuña praises President Uribe [ES]:

Nuestro Presidente es un verdadero PATRIOTA, él lo única que desea es salvar nuestra nación y lo va logrando poco a poco, prueba de ello es la seguridad que tenemos hoy en día al viajar por nuestro país y a toda la inversión extranjera, que algunos confunden con la venta de nuestras empresas a otros países como lo hizo la señorita que intervino ayer en el debate.

El profesor Moncayo ha sido un verdadero héroe en estos 46 días y espero siga defendiendo esos nobles ideales, porqué ayer por encontrarse desesperado me dío lástima a pesar de su buen gesto de paz, al no aprovechar ese momento histórico que tuvo para estar del lado del Gobierno y no ponerse a cuestionar a la política profesada por nuestro Sr.Presidente Álvaro Uribe, persona digna de admiración y respeto. No comparto para nada el irrespeto de una parte de los manifestantes que se encontraban en la plaza y entiendo que todo fue por la rabia que algunos llevan dentro por la inoperancia de otros gobiernos, ya que debieron presentar alternativas y escuchar las propuestas que se estaban presentando.

Our President is a true PATRIOT, he only wants to save our nation and he's achieving it gradually. Proof of that is the security we have today when we travel around our country and with all the foreign investment, which some people confuse with the sale of our companies to other countries, such as the lady who took part in the debate.

Professor Moncayo has been a true hero during these 46 days and I hope he keeps defending those noble ideals, because yesterday, when he appeared desperate, I felt sorry for him despite his nice peace gesture, because he didn't seize the historical moment, when he had the chance to be close to the government side, where he did not question the policy carried by our Mr. President Álvaro Uribe, a person worthy of admiration and respect. I don't endorse the lack of respect by one side of the demonstrators who were in the square and I understand everything was caused by the anger at the ineffectiveness of the former administrations. They should show alternatives and listen the proposals being presented.

Valentina, from Realidades Colombianas [ES], has her own point of view about “the political event of the year” and the “healthy politics” Moncayo taught:

El debate verbal del jefe de la nación y el profesor y padre de familia, fue la confrontación del discurso hueco y autoritario, respaldado por centenares de guardaespaldas armados hasta los dientes y el discurrir humanitario y sencillo con al respaldo de gritos del populacho reunido en el lugar. La presión popular volvió a tener valor real y práctico.

Los comentaristas políticos coincidieron en asegurar que sucedieron cosas que nadie se habría imaginado. Que el presidente bajó, gracias a la popularidad que despertó Moncayo entre el pueblo colombiano, de su séptimo cielo a las lozas de un parque en Bogotá. Que el presidente Uribe tuvo que esperar al educador y caminante, con sus ministros y guardaespaldas, casi una hora, porque Moncayo estaba en Misa. Primero Dios y luego el presidente. Luego de unas horas y en un debate sesgado, Moncayo se fue antes de que terminara Uribe sus múltiples y agresivas intervenciones, porque estaba muy cansado y quería reposar.

[…]

La entonación conciliatoria y didáctica del educador contrastó con los rugidos intimidatorios del presidente. Como los colombianos somos muy dados a establecer ganadores y perdedores, dan como el franco ganador al Caminante y educador Gustavo Moncayo. Uribe aceptó lo que parecía imposible, está dispuesto a autorizar una zona de encuentro para negociar la paz. Vuelve y se demuestra que el pueblo es y sigue siendo suprior a sus dirigentes, como decía Gaitán.

The verbal debate between the chief of the nation and the professor and father was a confrontation between the hollow and authoritarian discourse, backed by hundreds of armed to the teeth bodyguards, and the humanitarian, and simple, who had the support of the shouting populace gathered at the place. Again, popular pressure had a real and practical value.
Political commentators agreed that things that no one would have ever imagined happened. The president backed down, thanks to the popularity Moncayo earned among Colombian people, from his seventh heaven to the crockery of a park in Bogotá. President Uribe had to wait for the walking educator, with his Cabinet and bodyguards, almost one hour, because Moncayo was attending a Mass. First God, then the President. After a few hours and in a biased debate,
Moncayo left before Uribe finished his multiple and aggressive interventions, because he was too tired and wanted to rest.
[…]
The teacher's reconciling and didactic intonation contrasted with the president's intimidating roars. As Colombians tend to set winners and losers, they concede the victory to the walker and teacher Gustavo Moncayo. Uribe accepted what it seemed impossible, he's willing to authorize a meeting zone to negotiate peace. It's proven again that the people are and continue to be superior to its leading class, as [Jorge Eliécer] Gaitán used to say.

But Hi6uera, on the contrary, praises Uribe's charisma [ES] (and Moncayo's courage and bravery):

Es gracioso observar un discurso presidencial como el de hoy. Escuchar a tantos fanáticos desgarrándose sus cuerdas vocales para gritar insultos o elogios al mandatario parece difícil de creer. Cuando veo gente descalificando al presidente de frente pienso: ¿Acaso esta gente es miope, o tal vez un poco lunática? No darse cuenta que cuando se le grita al presidente en la plaza pública lo que se está haciendo es abriéndole caminos para que él brille, para que se luzca con sus contraataques y con su plástico y eficaz discurso político; es estar ciego.

It's funny to watch a presidential speech as one today. Listening to so many fanatics with their vocal chords torn by the insults or with praises to the Colombian leader makes it hard to believe. When I see people discrediting the president to his face, I think: Are these people short-sighted or maybe a little lunatic? Not to realize that when the president is yelled at on the public square opens the way for him to shine, to show off with his counterattacks and with his plastic and efficient political discourse, this is to be blind.

On Náufrago en la sombra [ES], El Hombre del Viento wants us to listen Moncayo:

Mientras el citadino ve en la televisión a un Moncayo como la forma criolla de Gandhi, el campesino ve en él su propio retrato de dolor. Mientras que el citadino comenta sobre el profe en una cena en el parque de la 93 diciendo que eso no va a servir de nada y que le parece el colmo que invada la Plaza de Bolivar, mientras traga como cerdo platos de 50 dolares per cápita, el hombre del campo ve en él a alguien que se identifica y conmisera con las noches de zozobra de pillaje de uno y otro bando. Con las madres de muchachos que deben ir a los frentes de una batalla que nunca eligieron abanderar. Con los hijos huerfanos de facto ante la ausencia prolongada del secuestro. Con los sueños truncados de familias nacientes…

As the urban citizen sees on the TV a Moncayo as the local version of Gandhi, the peasant sees in him the portrait of his own pain. As the urban citizen comments on the ‘profe' as s/he dinners at the 93rd Street Park saying that will be useless and that his “invasion” of the Plaza de Bolívar is the last straw, the rural man sees in him someone who identifies and feels compassion with the uneasy nights of looting by both bands. With the mothers of the boys who must go to the fronts of a battle they never chose to lead. With the de facto orphans because of the extended absence of the kidnapping. With the shattered dreams of new families…

Finally, equinoXio [ES] became the scenario of an interesting debate. In his post, Marsares slams Uribe and the FARC, and defends Moncayo, who according to him got caught between arrogance and cynicism.

[E]n un irrespeto a la comunidad internacional, al país y a los familiares de los secuestrados, lanza una propuesta imposible de realizar. Una “zona de encuentro” con duración de 90 días, lugar y tiempo durante el cual se pactará la paz con las FARC. Es decir, medio siglo de conflicto se resolverá en tres meses de diálogo. Lo irrazonable de la propuesta es un indicativo de la nula intención de diálogo que le asiste al Presidente. Y para rematar le dijo a Moncayo que podía ir a Cuba a hablar con Granda, el llamado “canciller de las FARC”, pese a que el grupo guerrillero ha dicho que no los representa.
[…]Entre la soberbia y el cinismo no hay espacio para la paz. La mentira es el nombre del juego y los secuestrados… apenas una carta de la baraja, descartable, por cierto.

In a disrespectful attitude toward international community, this country, and the kidnapped's relatives, [Uribe] throws a proposal impossible to fulfill. A 90-day “meeting zone”, time and place to reach a peace agreement with the FARC. That is, a half-century conflict will be resolved in a 3-month dialogue. The insensitive proposal indicates the president has no intention to dialogue. And in order to round off it, he told Moncayo he could go to Cuba to talk with [Rodrigo] Granda, the so-called “FARC foreign minister”, even though the guerrilla group has said that he's not their representative.
[…]
Between the arrogance and cynicism there's no room for peace. Lying is the name of the game and the hostages… are only a card in the pack, a disposable one, by the way.

gerente [ES] says:

esa tristeza de Moncayo es un gran triunfo de las farc y de sus alcahuetes, porque la imagen que quedó es la de el Culebrero de palacio destruyendo con sus palabras las ilusiones del profe y de los familiares de los secuestrados.

Moncayo's sadness is a great victory for the FARC and its puppets, because the picture that remains was the Palace ‘culebrero' shattering with his words the illusions of the teacher and the hostages' relatives.

Dragón Negro [ES] defends Moncayo:

“…el presidente no es el DIOS de la vida…” esa frase…lo dijo todo.

En efecto eramos muchos los colombianos que estabamos esperando decir : “por fin” pero se ahogo en el fango de las lagrimas de estos esposos de Sandoná la ilusión . El llanto de las demás victimas jamás sera callado.

El profe tiene una caracteristica, es autentico, no lleva un libreto como el que utilizó para humillar el majestuoso.

“…the president is not the GOD of life…”, that sentence… said it all.
Indeed there were so many Colombians hoping to say “at last”, but the illusion got drowned in the tears and mud of the Sandoná spouses. The cry of the other victims will never be silenced.
The ‘profe' has a characteristic, he's authentic, he doesn't carry a script as the one used by his majesty to humiliate him.

But DieGoth slams Marsares [ES]:

Todos sabemos y no podemos autoengañarnos, que Uribe aceptó la propuesta de Europa. Las FARC NO LA ACEPTARON. Recordamos también que es mucho más lo que ha cedido Uribe que lo que han cedido las FARC hasta ahora desde el primer día en que se habló del asunto. ¿Por qué es a Uribe a quien le tienen que exigir que “empiece a ceder”?

Entonces sólo queda ceder ante la propuesta de las FARC. Ahí es donde viene lo grave de la actitud de Moncayo: desprecia la propuesta de Uribe. Hace caso omiso a la propuesta de los europeos, y en cambio le exige a Uribe que ceda… ¿a qué? Pues ni más ni menos que a la propuesta de las FARC. Es decir, que Moncayo dijo algo así como “Uribe, no haga propuestas y limítese en cambio a ceder a lo que las FARC exigen”.

Por eso la mayoría de la gente, para guayabo de Marsares, se desencantó con Moncayo ayer.

We all know, and we can't deceive ourselves, that Uribe accepted the European [French, Swiss, Spanish] proposal. THE FARC DIDN'T ACCEPT IT. We also remember that's a lot more that Uribe has given than FARC since the first day this issue is discussed about. Why do they have to demand Uribe that “starts to give in”?

Then we have no choice but give in to the FARC's proposal. That's the serious thing about Moncayo's attitude: he despises Uribe's proposal. He ignores the European proposal, and he demands Uribe to give in instead… to what? None other than the FARC's proposal. That is, Moncayo said something like “Uribe, don't make any proposals and just give in what the FARC is demanding instead”.

Pirata Subterráneo asks for a sacrifice [ES]:

El profe Moncayo pertenece a la sociedad civil que a fin de cuentas somos nosotros, los colombianos que no cargamos armas ni promocionamos a que otros la carguen. Ni la guerrilla ni los paracos nos representan. En el caso del profesor Moncayo y los secuestrados, antes que Uribe, el enemigo son las farc, por cinicos, sofistas, indolentes, mentirosos, acomodados.

‘Profe' Moncayo belongs to the civil society, which in the end means all of us, Colombians who don't carry guns nor encourage others to carry them. Neither guerrilla nor paramilitaries represent us. As for Moncayo and the hostages, before Uribe, the enemy is the FARC, because they're cynical, sophists, indolent, liars, and comfortable.

Was Moncayo's trek a wasted chance to achieve, if not peace, at least the freedom of the people kidnapped by FARC terrorists [including the three Americans]? Is that illusion, which should have united Colombians moved by the love of a father, fading out because Moncayo mixed ideology and pro- and anti-Uribe feelings? Will FARC say no to the little responde Uribe gave to Moncayo's plea? The debate continues, but these questions likely won't have answers quite soon.

equinoXio [ES] had a big special with some pictures from its “correspondents” in 5 cities (Bogotá, Medellín [twice], Cali, Manizales, and Pasto). Padrino José, writing from Cali, recalls his experience [ES]:

Hoy marcharon, estuve allí, pero lo que sentía era la soledad en que estaban las familias de los diputados, en medio de convocatorias de caudillos políticos aprovechando pancartas, banderas y muñecos llamando al rechazo, observaba la pesca en “río Cali revuelto” de algunos precandidatos en puja por las próximas elecciones. Pero lo más triste y lo que no quería escuchar era la forma en que fue tratada la hija del diputado Charry mientras leía el comunicado de agradecimiento en nombre de las familias y que fue abucheada por la turba mientras decía:

“… Nuestros muertos nos pertenecen. Gracias por movilizarse para rechazar las políticas del gobierno …”

Y son ellos, los familiares, quienes en una mezcla de dolor y soledad cobijada por una manta a la cual no se le puede objetar, tienen a mi parecer la mejor versión de los hechos: Promesas incumplidas, citas canceladas, ruegos aquí y allá en una búsqueda incansable de 5 años para su liberación y nada lo consiguió, la voluntad por parte de las partes por ayudar en el momento indicado era un derecho ya ganado y no lo recibieron, y para su sorpresa ahora cuando claman por sus muertos las voces de dolor parecieran ser interesadas y estratégicas y de seguro entorpecerán más el camino para llegar a un final.

They marched today, I was there, but what I felt was the loneliness of the deputies’ families, amidst the call from political caudillos that took advantage of banners, flags and puppets calling for rejection [of kidnappings], I saw the pre-candidates for next elections fishing in Cali river’s troubled waters. But the saddest thing and what I didn’t want to hear was the way deputy [Carlos] Charry’s daughter [Carolina] was treated while she read a grateful letter in behalf of the families and who was booed by the crowd as she said:
“… Our dead belong to us. Thank you for mobilizing to reject the government’s policies…”
And it’s them, the relatives, who in an unobjectionable mix of pain and loneliness, are sheltered by a blanket. They have, in my opinion, the best version of what happened: unfulfilled promises, cancelled appointments, pleas everywhere during a 5-year restless search for their release and nothing could be achieved. The will of the parts to help at the right moment was an already earned right and they couldn’t get it, and to their surprise, now, when they clamour for their dead, the voices of pain seem to be selfish and strategic and they will surely hold up the path to reach an ending.

In Bogotá, Marsares says [ES] that there wasn’t a big march since there were several meeting points, so there were smaller marchs all over the city. According to him, there wasn’t a big “human chain” from downtown as announced, but there were some clashes among the ones standing for a safe haven for 45 days for FARC in order for the release of the hostages and the others who claimed for a tougher policy against the terrorists. He also noticed the way some government officials were “instructing” pro-Uribe demonstrators.

Thilo Hanisch Luque posts a video and writes [ES]:

Quizás los terroristas de turno hagan oídos sordos al clamor nacional, como es la costumbre de la guerrilla. Pero al menos las familias de las víctimas se sintieron acompañadas en su dolor el día de hoy. Son más de 3000 secuestrados, aproximadamente.

Maybe the terrorists don’t hear the national clamour, as is usual with guerrillas. But at least the victims’ relatives felt [Colombians joined in] their pain today. There are approximately more than 3,000 kidnapped.

Atrabilioso’s [ES] Jaime Restrepo interrupted his vacation to celebrate and say “At last!”. A few months ago he started a campaign against kidnapping and asking for the -now unconditional- freedom of all hostages: “This is a beginning, but hope awakens amidst pain”.

Doppiafila [IT] writes in Italian “Good-bye apathy?” and analyzes three aspects of the demonstration: the intensity of the country’s reaction to the deputies’ murder, the position of the government and the role played by the two main television networks.

In questo caso è facile da riassumere: RCN e Caracol hanno promosso la marcia, ne hanno garantito il successo, l'hanno seguita minuto a minuto e l'hanno interpretata nei suoi significati a beneficio dell'85% dei colombiani che non leggono i giornali (pardon: il giornale).

È ridondante affermare che senza il lancio televisivo che hanno avuto, le marce non avrebbero avuto questo successo; superfluo anche dire che senza la diretta, l'impatto sociale sarebbe stato di molto inferiore - magari un servizio di due minuti la sera, nulla in confronto ai continui speciali dalle città più importanti. Importante però sottolineare questo lavoro di interpretazione, di premasticatura; facciamolo con un esempio banale - i cori.
Immaginiamo che due frange minoritarie intonino ciascuna uno slogan: una, filo governativa, “Uribe - Amigo - El pueblo está contigo” (Uribe Amico il popolo è con te); l'altra, d'idee contrarie, “Uribe - Paraco - El pueblo está berraco” (Uribe Paramilitare il popolo è incazzato).

Il buon giornalismo le mostrerebbe entrambe, contestualizzandole con equilibrio. Il cattivo giornalismo (quello di parte, per intenderci), si concentrerebbe su di una di esse (a seconda della parte), minimizzando l'altra. Il pessimo giornalismo farebbe dell'espressione più conveniente il centro della sua copertura, dandogli ad esempio il titolo a caratteri cubitali.

Da quello che ho potuto vedere, RCN e Caracol hanno evitato gli eccessi del “pessimo” ma sono stati ben lontani dal “buon”, facendo cosí un immenso favore ad Uribe - il quale gliene sarà riconoscente, come e quando potrà.

In this case it’s easy to summarize: RCN and Caracol have promoted the march, have guaranteed its success, have followed it minute by minute and have interpreted its meaning on behalf of the 85% of Colombians who don’t read the newspapers (sorry: the newspaper). It’s redundant to say that without the television push that they had, the march wouldn’t have had that success; it’s also superfluous to say that without the live broadcast, the social impact would be quite inferior… maybe a two minute report at night, nothing to compare with the continuous specials from the most important cities. It’s important though to comment on this work of interpretation; let’s make it with a banal example: the choruses. Let’s pretend two groups singing a slogan each: one, supportive to the government, “Uribe - Amigo - El pueblo está contigo” (”Uribe, our friend, the people is with you”); the other one, on the contrary yells, “Uribe - Paraco - El pueblo está berraco” (”Uribe, you paramilitary, the people is angry”). Good journalism would show them both, contextualized with balance. Bad journalism (the partisan one, so we understand each other) would concentrate on one of them (the second part) and minimizing the other one. Awful journalism would made the most convenient expression the centre of its coverage, giving that example the headline in red letters. Based on what I could watch, RCN and Caracol have avoided the “awful” one’s excesses, but they’ve been quite far from the “good” one, making this way a huge favour for Uribe, which will be acknowledged, sometime and somehow.

Finally, with his usual sarcasm, Bilioso slams the pretended “pacifism” of Colombians and the alleged “success” of the demonstrations, as FARC won’t return the bodies of the murdered deputies to their families and won’t stop kidnapping:

Dicen los medios masivos de enajenación que la marcha fue un éxito. Y no, no es cierto: es al revés, la marcha fue un fracaso. Si la marcha buscaba la liberación de los secuestrados entonces fue un fracaso ya que los secuestrados siguen en el monte y si la marcha buscaba la paz entonces es innecesario recalcar que fue un fracaso demoledor, otro, pues. […] Los marchantes, muy eufóricos ellos, salieron a pedir la entrega de los cadáveres de los 11 diputados del Valle asesinados por las FARC, ejército terrorista. Muy conmovedor ver a estos solidarios bogotanos pedir la entrega de los fiambres pero no recuerdo haberlos visto en el 2001 marchando en protesta por la muerte de 30 campesinos en el corregimiento de Chengue. Debe ser que se les olvidó. ¡Y eso que 30 es más que 11! Tampoco recuerdo haberlos visto en 1997 marchando en respuesta a la masacre de 49 personas en Mapiripán, masacre que duro 5 días. Es que en el mundo al revés 11 políticos son más importantes que 49 campesinos y eso que los primeros sólo tienen 22 riñones y los segundos 98. Y si de muertes espectaculares se trata tampoco recuerdo haber visto marchantes en el año 2000 cuando 15 campesinos fueron asesinados a garrote en Macayepo. ¡Qué olvidadizos! Ahora, que si de números se trata, la masacre de El Salado en el año 2000 se habría hecho merecedora de una nutrida marcha pues allí fueron asesinados a garrote y a cuchillo más de 100 personas. ¿O no? Claro que no, Bilioso güevón, ¿no ve que 100 campesinos no alcanzan a valer ni medio diputado? ¡Zoquete! Entiendo, es que 100 cultivadores que producen comida para el bogotano marchante no valen medio politiquero. Cosas de la democracia… Cositas raras como para believe it or not como que un presidente guerrerista salga a marchar por la paz. ¿Tiene sentido? Madrecita linda, ¿por qué no me pariste en Venezuela donde hay petróleo y reforma agraria?

“Mainstream” media say the march was successful. And it’s not true: it’s otherwise, the march was a failure. If the march asked for the release of the kidnapped then it was a failure because the kidnapped are still at the mountains and if the march asked for peace then it’s unnecessary to remark it was a devastating failure, another one. […] The demonstrators, quite euphoric, went to the streets to ask for the return of the corpses of the 11 Valle del Cauca deputies murdered by the FARC terrorist army. It was very moving to see these supportive Bogotans to ask for the delivery of the bodies, but I don’t remember seeing them in 2001 protesting on the death of 30 peasants in Chengue small village. They just forgot it for sure. No matter what, 30 is more than 11! I also don’t remember them marching against the massacre of 49 in Mapiripán, a 5-day massacre. In this upside down world 11 politicians are more important than 49 peasants, though the former only have 22 kidneys and the latter 98. And if we’re recalling “notable” deaths I also don’t remember seeing demonstrators in 2000 when 15 peasants were beaten to death with clubs in Macayepo. They’re so forgetful! Now, if we talk about numbers, El Salado massacre in 2000 would have deserved a huge march because more than 100 persons were killed with clubs and knives. Didn’t they? Of course not, you stupid Bilioso, don’t you see 100 peasants aren’t worth even half deputy? Jerk! I get it, 100 peasants who grow food for the demonstrators in Bogotá aren’t worth even half politico. Democracy stuff… Strange things for [Ripley’s] believe it or not such a war president going out and marching for peace. Does it make any sense? Mother of mine, why didn’t you give birth to me in Venezuela where there’s oil and land reform?

Bilioso also transcribes a bloodcurdling testimony of a survivor of a massacre perpetrated by paramilitaries.

Almost all Colombian bloggers and blog readers agree, despite FARC claims, that the lawmakers were murdered or executed, in order to blackmail the right-wing government into providing a safehaven in Florida and Pradera, Valle del Cauca department, and a “humanitarian exchange” of 60-high-profile hostages, including former presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt and three Americans. At noon, President Uribe accused the FARC of killing the deputies, because according to him, “no rescue mission was underway. They were deliberately assassinated”. Quoted by Reuters, a local analyst for a pro-Uribe think tank said “the most likely scenario is the camp was being attacked by an illegal paramilitary group and that the FARC executed the hostages”.

Camilo Mosquera “congratulates” FARC [ES]:

Felicidades a las FARC, les liberan a 180 guerrilleros y a su cónsul […] Granda y responden secuestrando al comandante de policía de Pradera. Felicitaciones a las FARC por matar a 3 personas y amedrentar a las población de Buenaventura. Felicitaciones por matar a los 11 diputados. Felicitaciones por que cada día los odiamos más. SON UNOS HIJOS DE PUTAS TERRORISTAS.

Congratulations to the FARC, 180 of their guerrillas and their consul [Rodrigo] Granda are freed and they respond by kidnapping Pradera's police commander. Congratulations to the FARC for killing 3 and intimidating the people of Buenaventura. Congratulations for killing the 11 deputies. Congratulations because everyday we hate you even more. YOU'RE TERRORIST S.O.B.'s

Thilo Hanisch Luque [ES] slams France's government (Sarkozy asked Uribe late May to free Rodrigo Granda and other guerrillas) and praises one of Uribe's proposals in order to clarify this crime:

Lamentable e infame la actitud del gobierno francés, que madrugó el día de hoy a pedir que no se intentara el rescate militar del resto de sobrevivientes secuestrados. […] La propuesta de que sea una comisión internacional de médicos y técnicos forenses la que investigue los graves delitos, muy seguramente servirá para establecer lo que los colombianos ya intuimos por experiencia, pero algunos de los “demócratas” europeos se niegan a aceptar: las Farc son un grupo terrorista, punto. Y con terroristas no se negocia, ¿o sí?

It's deplorable and vile the attitude of the French government, which hurriedly asked the [Colombian government] not to try the military rescue of the rest of the surviving hostages […] The proposal of a international doctors and forensics commission to investigate these grave crimes will surely be useful to show what we Colombians already know by intuition, but some European “democrats” refuse to accept: FARC is a terrorist group, period. And you don't negociate with terrorists, do you?

Junior Junior [ES] express his feelings to the families of the murdered hostages, but insists in a tough policy with FARC:

reitero, mi mas sentido pesame en este momento tan triste para las familias […], pero no acusen al presidente de algo que el no hizo, él no fue quien secuestro y no disparo a nadie, no permitamos que los errores del pasado los colombianos tengamos que soportarlo y no mas! a los malparidos de las Farc PLOMO y PLOMO! no hay consesiones con esas ratas que desangran al pais , es que acaso no se dan cuenta que los estan manipulando? porque hay que hacerle caso a unos malditos terroristas?

I insist, [I express] in this moment my deepest sympathies to the families [of the hostages], but don't accuse the president of doing something he didn't do, he wasn't the one who kidnapped [them] and he didn't shoot anyone, let's not allow that [because] the errors of the past we Colombians must stand this and enough! And SHOOT SHOOT the f***ing FARC! No concessions with those rats who bleed our country, don't you realize they're manipulating you? why should we take heed on some damned terrorists?

Julián Ortega Martínez angrily criticizes [ES] a press release by leftist Alternative Democratic Pole, intended to condemn the massacre:

[R]epugnante la tibia “condena” del Polo Democrático Alternativo de los hechos. ¿Por qué ni siquiera mencionan a los hijos de puta de las FARC? Después quieren que la ultraderecha fanática de la rata Fernando Londoño […] no los llame “brazo armado” de las escorias, con esa maldita posición ambigua y estúpida. Pero eso sí, al “sociólogo” Jhonson Bastidas le publican ligerito una basura de apología al delito y al terrorismo, en el que se le recrimina al PDA (o al menos a un sector del mismo) el rechazar a Tirofijo y sus asesinos. Este hampón, que no es ningún “fulano”, debería estar tras las rejas.

It's disgusting the half-hearted Alternative Democratic Pole's “condemnation” of what happened. Why they didn't even mention FARC S.O.B.'s? And then they want the ultra-right-wingers fans of Fernando Londoño (a controversial politician and columnist) to call them the “armed branch” of the FARC. But they quickly publish a trashy apology of the crime and terrorism by “sociologist” Jhonson Bastidas, where he reproaches PDA (or at least one of its factions) for rejecting Tirofijo and their killers. That criminal, who's not an unknown, should be behind bars.

In centre-left equinoXio digital magazine [ES], Marsares casts several doubts about the FARC statement and the circumstances in which the lawmakers may have been murdered. In a comment, Mornatur [ES] slams the relatives of the hostages for serving the FARC's unknowingly dark intentions:

El comunicado sale, aún sin confirmar, y de inmediato salen los familiares de los diputados presuntamente - en ese momento - muertos - lanza en ristre contra el gobierno a EXIGIR (se les reconoce la angustia, pero no se justifica la imbecilidad) el despeje de Florida y Pradera. Aparte del famoso correo electrónico, ¿qué otra comunicación tuvieron dichas personas con los terroristas? Parece claro que los criminales de las FARC no desaprovechan oportunidad para presionar el famoso despeje a través de las víctimas, mismas cuya posición ya parece a todas luces la misma de los guerrilleros, sin una luz de pensamiento ni de lógica hacia la verdadera naturaleza de los hechos, sin tener en cuenta que, como lo afirma Anmistía Internacional en su más reciente comunicado, la seguridad física de los retenidos es responsabilidad exclusiva de quien los retiene. Casi, casi pareciera que personas como Yolanda Pulecio están más interesadas en un puesto dentro del Secretariado que en un auténtico proceso de paz.

The statement is published, without a confirmation, and the relatives of the -then- allegedly dead deputies come out and instantly attack the government to DEMAND (you can understand the anguish, but you can't justify such a stupidity) the Florida and Pradera safehaven. Besides the famous e-mail, what other communication did those persons have with the terrorists? It seems clear that the FARC criminals can't waste any chance to press for the famous safehaven through their victims, the same whose position is clearly becoming the same of the guerrillas, without any rational thinking or logic through the true nature of the facts, without taking into account that, as Amnesty International claims on its most recent press release, “their physical security remains the responsibility of the group holding them”. It almost seems that people as Yolanda Pulecio (Íngrid Betancourt's mother) are more interested in a post inside [FARC's] Secretariat that a true peace process.

Italian blogger Doppiafila compares [IT] Betancourt with the murdered deputies:

In Colombia i “Diputados del Valle” sono ancora più carichi di significato di Ingrid Betancourt come simbolo del sequestro. Un po' perché in molti dicono che Ingrid “se l'è cercata”, andando a visitare San Vicente del Caguán mentre la zona era sotto controllo guerrigliero (e nonostante questi avessero pre-annunciato la loro intenzione di rapirla se fosse andata), mentre i 12 sono stati davvero portati via dal loro mondo; un po' perché l'operazione militare del rapimento fu un tale smacco per le Forze dell'Ordine colombiane da motivarle ancora di più a dare un happy ending alla vicenda; un po' perché i familiari dei sequestrati (ora: delle vittime) erano riusciti a mobilizzare i media e l'opinione pubblica nazionale. Vedremo cosa succederà.

In Colombia the “Valle deputies” are even more meaningful than Íngrid Betancourt as a symbol for kidnapping. It may be a little because a lot of people say Íngrid “asked for it” by visiting San Vicente del Caguán when that area was under guerrilla control (and even though they had announced their intentions of kidnapping her if she went), while the 12 were actually taken away from their own world; a little because the military operative for the abduction was such a failure for Colombian Forces of Order that it motivated them even more to give the incident a happy ending; a little because the relatives of the hostages (now: of the victims) were able to mobilize national media and public opinion. We'll see what happens.

Finally, Adriana [ES] blames us Colombians all owing our indolence:

Si Usted es colombiano tambien es complice de la muerte de los 11 diputados asesinados en vida hace 5 anos por las farc. Del señor Uribe por no tener la inteligencia, nobleza y humanidad para salvarlos. Somos complices por acomodarnos, por quejarnos sin hacer nada, por irnos, por quedarnos y aguantar con estoicismo hipocrita y deshumanizante. Que hacemos?

If you're a Colombian, you're also an accomplice of the death of the 11 deputies already murdered in life 5 years ago by FARC. Of Mr. Uribe for not having the intelligence, generosity and humanity to save them. We all are accomplices for adapting, for complaining without doing anything, for leaving, for staying and for tolerating with hypocritical and dehumanizing stoicism. What do we do now?

May Uribe's democratic security policy be revamped, despite of the announced cut by Democrat congresspeople on Plan Colombia? What about the parapolitical scandal? Meanwhile, Colombians live another bloody episode of the 40-year-long internal war which claims more and more victims everyday. This time, we seem united in rejecting FARC criminal actions but… will it be really useful?

Jaime Restrepo makes an analysis at Atrabilioso [ES]:

Me gustan los dos primeros días de testimonio de Salvatore Mancuso. Y si esa fue la entrada, hay buenos augurios sobre el plato fuerte, pues uno de los mayores criminales de las Autodefensas está dispuesto a contar su historia, ya sea como un acto de venganza o por cumplir con el compromiso de contar una parte de la verdad: de alguna manera la motivación es accesoria, pues lo importante es que se conozcan los intrincados lazos de los violentos con la sociedad colombiana y que estos sean evaluados por la justicia, cosa difícil, o por la historia. […] Por lo pronto hay que estar satisfechos con el despertar y tener confianza en que a lo largo de los procesos no disminuya el impulso de los jefes paramilitares para contar su historia y sus verdades: eso lo necesita Colombia.

Felipe, from El Andurrial [ES], refers to Mancuso's accusations against Vice President Francisco Santos, whose family owns Colombia's leading and only national daily newspaper. According to Mancuso, Santos suggested deceased boss Carlos Castaño to create a paramilitary bloc for Bogotá and mentioned an article wrote by Santos at El Tiempo in 1997 which seems to praise the paramilitaries. Felipe doesn't believe him that much:

Supuestamente Carlos Castaño le ofreció dirigir el Bloque Capital y la respuesta de Pacho Santos fue que él no sabia de esas cosas…Eso tiene pinta de cuento, de verdad Carlos Castaño, un estratega militar, le ofrecería a Santos que dirigiera un bloque de auto defensas? […] Habrá que ver qué pasa…Por ahora, Pacho, ese sueño 2010 – 2014 hay que archivarlo.

In contrast, Fabio Andrés Gómez [ES] does believe Mancuso:

Si la esencia de la Ley de Justicia y Paz, es que los desmovilizados digan su verdad, por qué no se les cree cuando lo hacen. Mancuso y los demás exjefes paras, saben muy bien que en las audiencias ante la Fiscalía deben decir la verdad, o sino, podrían perder los beneficios a que tienen derecho según dicha Ley.
Entonces, por qué se pone en tela de juicio lo que él ha dicho; o será que no ha dicho lo que alguien quiere que diga; ¿será tan bruto Salvatore de decir cosas que no pueda demostrar más adelante?. Haré de abogado del diablo y le creeré, así diga verdades incómodas que algunos quieren hacer ver como verdades a medias.

As all the accused denied Mancuso's allegations, Bilioso [ES] slams the supporters of the current administration, whose main politicians have been involved in the scandal and some of them are in jail. Colombians, in general, pretend to know nothing about all the crimes these people commit:

¿Y saben por qué no sabemos nada? Porque Uribe militarizó las carreteras. Con eso fue suficiente para que el país le diera el beneficio del tapujo. Los paramilitares seguirán disfrutando los beneficios de Justicia and Peace, los Santos seguirán siendo el gobierno detrás de Uribe, Londoño seguirá siendo un columnista leído y respetado y los generales seguirán disfrutando los milloncitos de su retiro. En Colombia los delitos son otros: robarse una gallina, cogerle el culo a una transeúnte o pasarse borracho un semáforo. Los demás no. Reunirse con paramilitares, tomarse fotos con reconocidos mafiosos, robarse las acciones, apoyar una masacre, robarse la tierra, expedir licencias de vuelo a los mafiosos, nada, nada es delito en el país de la motosierra porque el culebrero tiene bajo hipnosis a la gleba que va a toros, apoya equipos de fútbol y ve realities. A la chusma, a la porquería. No ven el desempleo, el estado de la salud, el desplazamiento, la educación pública, nada ven porque aquí nadie sabe nada. Todo va mejorando para ellos, claro, es que no saben nada.

Valentina Díaz from Realidades Colombianas [ES] criticized President Uribe's reaction to the Mancuso accusations against the Santos cousins, when Uribe said in a radio interview that former left-wing presidential candidate Carlos Gaviria was a guerrilla man:

¿Es malo que Mancuso sindique al vicepresidente y al ministro de defensa de estar conectado con los paracos por lo que esta indignado el señor presidente ofreciéndoles total respaldo y pregonando su pureza moral y social, pero es válido que él sindique a dirigentes de la oposición, (o cualquier se humano), de ser guerrilleros?

It is expected that Mancuso and another paramilitary bosses' confessions continue within the next few weeks. The relatives of their victims were quite disappointed, because Mancuso said little about the whereabouts of the thousands of peasants killed and cut up by AUC. President Álvaro Uribe deals with the scandal, saying he will ‘release' jailed FARC and ELN rebels and also proposed to free the jailed politicians (”to save his his friends“) because of their paramilitary ties “as long as they confess the truth”. Meanwhile, Colombians try to move on with their lives, hoping for the truth to finally show up, still suspicious of its political class, which seems to be all linked with violent groups. We'll have to wait and see, as they desperately seem to try to cover up everything in the name of the “institutions”.