There is no doubt that 2008 has been one of the worst year for the Marxist guerrilla founded in 1964. Just 5 weeks ago it was confirmed that Pedro Antonio Marín, aka Manuel Marulanda Vélez or Tirofijo (”Sureshot”), its top commander, had died on March. The death of FARC's number 2, Édgar Devia, aka Raúl Reyes, unleashed a diplomatic crisis which caused the breaking of diplomatic relations with Ecuador and Nicaragua (the latter restored since). Other top bosses have been captured, killed or delivered themselves. On February 4 a huge demonstration against FARC was held.

Adam Isacson, from Plan Colombia and Beyond, writes about the “anti-FARC strategies” that have and have not worked:

[W]hat has worked over the past few years?

• Putting a much greater focus on intelligence aimed at the guerrillas’ top leadership (and hostage captors). This includes both signals intelligence to intercept their communications, and human intelligence in the form of informants and infiltrators.
• Making clear to the guerrilla rank-and-file, through public-relations campaigns and the testimonies of previous deserters, that those who surrender to the government will not only not be tortured or disappeared (as too often happened in the past), but they will get job training, perhaps a stipend, and the promise of a new life.
• Increasing the security forces’ presence in population centers and main roads and (though there is much room for improvement here) making these forces’ main mission protecting citizens instead of treating them as suspects.

What is interesting about these strategies is that, with the exception of increasing manpower and protective presence, they are relatively inexpensive. Compared to big-ticket items like fumigation and “Plan Patriota”-style military offensives, these efforts make up only a sliver of Colombia’s defense budget (and only a sliver of U.S. assistance). Planners of future aid packages to Colombia should take note.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo writes on Atrabilioso [es]:

Sin duda, el rescate militar de 15 secuestrados en poder de la estructura militar de las FARC es el más duro golpe propinado a los áulicos y servidores del totalitarismo “humanitario” en Colombia. La operación Jaque demostró con hechos que un rescate militar exitoso es posible y que las cacareadas justificaciones, según las cuales eso equivalía a condenar a muerte a los secuestrados, eran solo arengas que buscaban que las FARC, y sobre todo sus socios políticos, obtuvieran ganancias del secuestro. Quedaron sin argumentos aquellos servidores de las FARC que cada día se consagraban a presionar al Gobierno para que cediera a las condiciones que imponían los terroristas para liberar a los secuestrados: son 15 seres humanos que han sido rescatados sin despejes que dejarían a miles de colombianos a merced de los terroristas por cuenta de los intereses de los “humanitarios”.

Undoubtedly, the military rescue of the 15 kidnapped held by FARC's military structure is the hardest blow given to the aulics and servants of the “humanitarian” totalitarism in Colombia. Operation Jaque demonstrated that a successful military rescue is possible and that the widespread justifications, of those claiming that it was a death sentence for those kidnapped, were just harangues seeking that the FARC, and above all their political partners, wanted to profit from kidnapping. Those FARC servants who everyday pressured the Goverment to give in to the conditions imposed by the terrorists to release the kidnapped ended without arguments: there are 15 human beings rescued without safe havens which would have let thousands of Colombians at the mercy of the terrorists because of the interests of the “humanitarians”.

Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra praises President Álvaro Uribe and his administration [es]. He writes that the rescue raises the possibility that Uribe will be reelected as president. However, the rescue also draws attention to the role of Colombia's neighbors.

Alejandro Peláez attacks [es] the “Bolivarian coalition”:

El Ministro de Defensa ecuatoriano celebra el rescate, pero se lamenta que no fuera realizado dentro de un proceso de paz y, como cereza del postre, la maquinaria de propaganda chavista empieza a circular la versión de que a Ingrid la libretió el Gobierno colombiano. Estuve buscando la reacción de los “comités de solidaridad con Ingrid” y no dicen nada. Se quedaron sin jueguito ahora que la liberaron y van a tener que encontrar una nueva causa para subir al Mont Blanc. Paradójicamente, las palabras de Ingrid fueron el más duro golpe para los opositores que usaban su imagen y dolor para mover una agenda política.

The Ecuadorian Defence Minister celebrates the rescue, but regrets it was not carried out within a peace process and, as the cherry on the top, the Chavista propaganda machine begins to pass around the theory that Íngrid was “scripted” by the Colombian government. I was searching for the reaction of the “support committees for Íngrid” and they say nothing. They were left without nothing to play now that she was released and they will have to find a new cause to climb Mont Blanc. Ironically, Íngrid's words were the hardest blow for the opposition leaders and supporters which used her image and her pain to promote a political agenda.

Italian blogger Doppiafila gives his two cents [it]:

Da questa gioia deve nascere qualcosa di buono. Il 2 Luglio del 2008 é un grande giorno. Chissá che Ingrid Betancourt non possa essere per la Colombia come Nelson Mandela per il Sudafrica: ha pagato il prezzo della credibilitá ed a quanto pare é riuscita a mantenere la luciditá; chissa.
Le FARC hanno perso una grande occasione, e si staranno mangiando le mani. Il loro ciclo é finito, non saranno loro a cambiare il futuro del Paese. Speriamo non puntino al “colpo di coda”, magari con qualche attentato urbano da centinaia di morti - sarebbe inutile. Per Uribe, Santos, i Generali e compagnia una grande vittoria: hanno mantenuto la promessa della “mano dura”, e questo la gente lo capisce - e lo premia. Ora devono solo decidere come “passare all'incasso”.

From this joy something good should be born. July 2, 2008 is a big day. Maybe Íngrid Betancourt could not represent for Colombia the same thing Nelson Mandela for South Africa: she has paid the price of credibility and from what it seems she has achieved her lucidity; maybe.
The FARC lost a big chance, and they must be eating their hands. Their cycle is over, they will not be the ones who will change the future of the country. We hope they don't aim a “last attempt” -probably with an urban attack with hundreds of victims - would be useless. For Uribe, Santos, the generals and company it's a great victory: they have kept their promise of “hard hand”, and this is understood -and rewarded- by the people. Now they just should decide how to “to charge for it.”

Meanwhile, journalist Víctor Solano states that Ms Betancourt necessarily “overshadows” the others' rescue [es]:

Haciendo un barrido por todos varios medios de comunicación vemos con ‘alborozo’ la noticia del rescate producto de una astucia de los cuerpos de inteligencia de Colombia para ‘robarse’ a los secuestrados y llevarlos a la libertad. En prácticamente todos los medios se establecen tres niveles de importancia y hasta se señala textualmente: “Ha sido rescatada Ingrid Betancourt; también los tres norteamericanos y 11 militares”. La forma en que se revela la información a la opinión pública es normal, mas no significa que sea la forma ideal. A la hora de la verdad, cualquiera de los 15 rescatados tiene tanta importancia como ser humano. Pero resulta absolutamente normal dadas las formas de la noticiabilidad/espectacularidad con que se ha cubierto este drama. Para muchos, el drama del secuestro en Colombia y otras partes del mundo solo ha tenido un rostro: el de Ingrid.

Doing a quick check through all the mass media we see the ‘rejoice' for the news of the rescue with the shrewdness of Colombian intelligence agents to 'steal' the kidnapped taking them to freedom. Practically all the media have established three levels of importance and even textually headlining: “Íngrid Betancourt has been rescued; as well as the three Americans and 11 soldiers.” The way the information is revealed to the public opinion is the usual one, but it does not mean it is the ideal one. Actually, any of the 15 rescued has the same importance as a human being. But it turns absolutely normal given the forms of noticeability / spectacularity this drama has been covered. For a lot of people, the drama of kidnapping in Colombia and other parts of the world has only had one face: Íngrid.

Paola Vargas, a new blogger at equinoXio [es], writes, among other things, about the media coverage of the arrival of the released to Bogotá [es] (she also does not seem very convinced by the rescue operation):

El cubrimiento mediático no podía desligarse del sentimentalismo que mueve este país desde hace unos años. Noticias Caracol no resistió la tentación de hacer sonar las letras de nuestro himno nacional, el segundo mejor del mundo después del francés según el mito urbano (¡qué ironía!), cuando Íngrid (y solo ella) salió del avión que transportaba a los otros once uniformados. El canal RCN, por su parte, lucía orgulloso la bandera colombiana. Sin embargo, unos y otros convencían con el mismo discurso: las fuerzas militares han triunfado gracias a la pericia del presidente Uribe y del ministro de defensa, la guerra se acabará pronto, etc.

The media coverage couldn't separate itself from the sentimentalism that has been part of this country over the past few years. Noticias Caracol couldn't resist the temptation to play the lyrics of our national anthem, the second best of the world after the French one according to the urban legend (what an irony!), when Íngrid (and just her) came out from the plane carrying the other 11 soldiers and policemen. RCN TV, on the other hand, was proudly wearing the Colombian flag. Nevertheless, both were convinced with the same discourse: the military forces have prevailed thanks to President Uribe's and Minister of Defense's skillfulness, and that the war will soon be over, etc.

The blog Colombia Hoy [es] comments [es]:

Las FARC reciben un nuevo golpe político y militar. Si es cierta la versión oficial, lo que hay detrás de la liberación es una operación de inteligencia impecable. Inteligencia militar habría manejado el engaño con gran maestría. Está por verse cuál fue el papel jugado por los emisarios de Francia y Suiza que llegaron al país hace dos días, y si estos gobiernos formaron parte del engaño. Como sea, lo cierto es que queda en evidencia una vez más la fragilidad militar de las FARC y su vulnerabilidad frente a las infiltraciones y el engaño. Pareciera más que una coincidencia que tanto en el bombardeo al campamento de Reyes como en este caso, existe el antecedente de la visita de un agente de inteligencia francés a los campamentos guerrilleros.

FARC received a new political and military blow. If the official version is true, what lies behind the release is an impeccable intelligence operation. [Colombia's] Military intelligence handled the plot with great mastery. It remains to be seen the role of the French and Swiss envoys who arrived two days ago, and if these governments took part on the plot. Anyway, the truth is again FARC's military fragility and its vulnerability toward infiltrations and deceptions have become evident. It seems more than a coincidence that both in the bombing of Raúl Reyes camp and this case, there's the precedent of the visit of a French intelligence agent to the guerrilla camps.

There are still around 3,000 kidnapped people in Colombia, around 700 of them being held by FARC. We want all of them free and safe.

On Sunday morning, teleSUR broadcast a video [es] sent by FARC where Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, aka “Timoleón Jiménez” or “Timochenko”, in a 12-minute speech, celebrated FARC's 44th anniversary and confirmed Sureshot's death on March 26 “of a heart attack, in the arms of his companion.” There are several doubts about where this video, using 3 cameras and editing facilities, was recorded. Some claim, because of the vegetation [es] and the uniform Londoño was wearing [es], it was shot in Venezuela.

Boz provides some context by telling us who's who in FARC's Secretariat, Adam Isacson from Plan Colombia and Beyond sees 3 likely post-Marulanda “scenarios”:

1. Disintegration (25% probability). Call this the “Shining Path” scenario: after the group loses its founder, it disintegrates. Discipline, command and ideological direction largely disappear with the maximum leader.
(…)
2. Greater cohesion and increased military action (35% probability). For the FARC, Marulanda’s latter years have resembled Cuba during Fidel Castro’s last years in office, or China awaiting Mao’s death in the mid-1970s. While a new generation awaited its turn to lead, the aging founder continued to hold ultimate decision-making power, refusing to change course - and perhaps losing touch with reality - while his creation stagnated. If Marulanda’s chosen successor, Alfonso Cano, is actually able to command the remaining top FARC leaders - a big “if” - the FARC could become more dangerous.
(…)
3. Partial fragmentation (40% probability). With Marulanda gone, a power struggle could begin within the next tier of the FARC’s leadership. There may be purges and schisms as moderates and hard-liners vie for control of the group. (…) Like bandits and drug cartels that came before, this rump would be easier for Colombia’s military to defeat within the next five to ten years.

Isacson later published a post on the questions arising from news of Marulanda's death, regarding Minister Juan Manuel Santos' presidential aspirations, FARC troop morale, and the supposed “ascension” of FARC's “political” faction.

Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra [es] seems to agree with Isacson in the third “scenario”:

[El] haber mantenido en secreto la muerte de su máximo comandante, confirma el temor, sobre las reacciones de militantes rasos y mandos medios al conocer la noticia. El anciano militante, era el factor de cohesión y aglutinamiento en las filas subversivas, por lo que se prevén deserciones, pugnas y divisiones al interior del organismo delictivo. Las FARC, están en su peor momento y virtualmente derrotadas. Muy seguramente, como en el paramilitarismo, quedaran reductos de narcotraficantes disfrazados de militantes subversivos.

The fact they kept the death of their top commander a secret confirms the fear of the reactions of low-ranking fighters and middle-ranks after learning the news. The militant old man was the cohesion and gathering factor in the subversive ranks, therefore desertions, internal struggles, and divisions in the criminal organization are expected. The FARC is going through their worst moments and is virtually defeated. Surely, as it happened with the paramilitaries, some drug-traffickers strongholds disguised as subversive guerrillas will remain.

Italian blogger Doppiafila [it] thinks that Minister Santos has “launched” his presidential campaign for 2010:

L'annuncio (e le modalitá con cui viene dato) segna il lancio “ufficioso” della candidatura di Juan Manuel Santos alla presidenza nel 2010. Resta da vedere se il tutto avviene d'accordo o alle spalle di Uribe. Di certo, il Ministro della Difesa va bene agli USA: antichavista, politico ed oligarca tradizionale, il fatto che venga ora associato alla “sconfittta delle FARC” non puó che far comodo.

The announcement (and the way it was announced) marks the “off-the-record” launch of Juan Manuel Santos's candidacy for the presidency in 2010. We'll have to see if everything that happened with Uribe's agreement is on his back. If true, the Defense Minister is a good fit for the USA: an anti-Chávez, traditional politician and oligarch, the fact he's now associated to the “FARC's defeat” can't be a comfortable one.

According to some media outlets [es], President Álvaro Uribe was somewhat upset because he likely was going to announce Sureshot's death himself later the same day to “all the media, not just one”.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo [es], from Atrabilioso, criticizes presidential adviser José Obdulio Gaviria's statements on the death of the FARC leader, who claimed “they no longer exist”:

Que ‘Tirofijo’ esté muerto no significa que las FARC hayan descendido con él al sepulcro, pues las estructuras terroristas, aunque deterioradas, siguen vivas y con capacidad de cometer crímenes contra los colombianos: además de las estructuras en el exterior (sorprendente la parafernalia que armó Telesur en menos de 24 horas para difundir la noticia del mediocre terrorista muerto) las milicias urbanas continúan activas y dos o tres terroristas pueden detonar carros-bomba, comprar secuestrados o seguir practicando el plan pistola (sicarios que disparan contra miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad).

The fact that Tirofijo is dead does not mean that FARC have descended with him to the sepulchre, because the terrorist structures, though deteriorated, are still alive and hold the capacity to perpetuate crimes against Colombians: besides their structures abroad (it's surprising all the show teleSUR put together in less than 24 hours to spread the news of the the mediocre dead terrorist), the urban militias are still active, and two or three terrorists can detonate car bombs, buy hostages or continue to practice the “pistol plan” (hit men who shoot members of the security forces).

equinoXio's Marsares comments on the “last death of Tirofijo” [es]:

Gracias a Marulanda y su degradada organización, la mayoría del pueblo colombiano cerró filas en torno a uno de los gobiernos más corruptos de la historia, comprador de conciencias, protector de paramilitares, cuidandero de las grandes fortunas. Gracias a las FARC la izquierda democrática es satanizada y nos preparamos para la segunda reelección de un régimen excluyente que a cada paso destruye la legitimidad del Estado. Dicen que Marulanda murió de un infarto. También debió ayudar la soledad y la derrota. Su castillo de 44 años derrumbado, su enemigo más fuerte que nunca, con millones en las calles gritando “no más FARC”, con sus hombres robándose la plata, matándose para cobrar recompensas, entregándose o simplemente soñando con dinosaurios. ¿Estará en el infierno, como lo desea el ministro Santos? No lo creo. El infierno lo dejó aquí. Y como siempre, Marulanda volvió a escaparse.

Thanks to Marulanda and his degraded organization, the majority of the Colombian people rallied around one of the most corrupt administrations in history, buyer of consciences, protector of paramilitaries, protector of the big fortunes. Thanks to the FARC the democratic left is demonized and we're preparing for the second re-election of an exclusionary regime which with every step destroys the legitimacy of the State. They say Marulanda died by a stroke. Loneliness and defeat must also have helped. His 44-year castle collapsed, his enemy stronger than ever, with millions on the streets shouting “no more FARC”, with his men stealing their money, killing each other to claim rewards, surrendering or simply dreaming about dinosaurs Will he be in hell, as Minister Santos wishes? I don't think so. Hell left him here. And, as usual, Marulanda escaped again.

The blog Colombia Hoy [es] analyzes the implications of Marulanda's death on the guerrilla command succession and a political negotiation with the government:

Sin la muerte de Reyes, la transición del mando se hubiera producido de una manera natural, pero en las actuales circunstancias no parece muy viable que Cano consiga mantener la unidad de unos frentes cada vez más debilitados, aislados y asediados.
(…)
Aprovechará el gobierno la coyuntura para ofrecerle a las FARC una salida política que no puedan rechazar? Entenderá el gobierno que es preferible ofrecer una salida negociada a unas FARC débiles y ad portas de una posible implosión, que buscar su destrucción definitiva al costo de su atomización en grupos aislados y la prolongación indefinida del conflicto armado? Es posible que el triunfalismo dentro del gobierno y el odio contra las FARC sea un obstáculo para encontrar salidas que sean menos costosas en términos de vidas humanas e inclusive económicos.

Without [Raúl] Reyes's death, the command transition would have taken place naturally, but with the current circumstances it is not quite feasible that [Alfonso] Cano [new FARC top commander] manages to maintain the unity of fronts that have been increasingly weakened, isolated, and besieged.
(…)
Will the government take advantage of the current situation to offer the FARC a political solution they can't reject? Will the government understand that it is better to offer a negotiated solution to a weakened and soon-to-be imploded FARC guerrilla group than seeking their definitive destruction at the price of its atomization in isolated groups and the indefinite continuation of the armed conflict? It is possible that the triumph inside the government and hatred towards the FARC had become an obstacle to find less expensive solutions in terms of human lives and even economic costs.

Álvaro Ramírez Ospina, besides being distrustful on FARC's confirmation of Sureshot's death, remembers how the way one referred to the guerrilla leader had changed with the times [es]:

Tirofijo es tan viejo como la guerra de guerrillas en Colombia. Fue campesino, y por efecto de su incorporación a la política y las armas, pasó a ser bandolero (en la época de la llamada “Violencia”, años 50 y 60); luego se convirtió en guerrillero, bandido, criminal y recientemente alcanzó la “diploma” de terrorista, por obra y gracia de la clasificación establecida por el gobierno de Bush.

Tirofijo is as old as the guerrilla war in Colombia. He was a peasant and, because of his incorporation to politics and arms, he went on to become a gangster (at the time of La Violencia, 1950s and 1960s); then he became a guerrilla, a bandit, a criminal, and recently achieved the terrorist “diploma” by the power of the classification established by Bush government.

Utopian chronicler Daniel Ramos refers to the passionate speech by Timochenko [es]:

[C]uando escuchaba a Timochenko diciendo que la humanidad no conocía a otro líder de la magnitud de Tirofijo, primero pensé en los grandes líderes (Jesucristo, Buda, Gandhi, Lincoln, Bolívar, etc.) y luego en que Timo estaba hablando evidentemente en otro contexto, estaba lanzando un nuevo tag a la nube de las FARC. La crónica utópica de las FARC es triste, dolorosa, de reseñar. Creo que la declaración de Timo es una clave para comprender por qué salió tan mal: la pérdida total de las proporciones. Imaginémonos una guerrilla de 10.000 hombres que se quiere tomar el poder en un país donde 12 millones de habitantes salen a manifestarse para decirles “No más”. Ningún presidente colombiano ha obtenido tal cantidad de votos. La maquinaria del Estado, los medios de comunicación, la publicidad desbordada de las campañas electorales nunca han sido capaces de convocar a tantos colombianos alrededor de un mismo propósito. Un genio político como Marulanda –al decir de Timo— jamás debió desestimar este indicador de legitimidad.

When I was listening to Timochenko say that humanity had not known a leader of the magnitude of Tirofijo, I first thought about the great leaders (Jesus Christ, Buddha, Gandhi, Lincoln, Bolívar, etc.) and then on the fact that Timo was evidently speaking in another context, he was releasing a new tag to the FARC's tag cloud. FARC's utopian chronicle is sad and painful to review. I think Timo's statement is a key to understanding why it went wrong: the total loss of proportions. Let's imagine a 10,000 men guerrilla army, who wants to seize power in a country where 12 million people go out into the streets to demonstrate to say to them “No more.” No Colombian president has obtained such amount of votes. The State machinery, the mass media, the burst of the electoral campaigns advertising have never been able to gather so many Colombians around a common purpose. A political genius such as Marulanda -as Timo claims- should have never dismissed such an indicator of legitimacy.

Thumbnail photo by Bastian and used under a CC license.

Jaime Restrepo praises INTERPOL and the Colombian government, and states that the chain of custody was not broken as the opposition claims:

INTERPOL has confirmed it: the files and contents of the three laptops seized in FARC strongman Raúl Reyes’s camp were not modified, nor adultered or deleted by the Colombian authorities. This is the second blow against FARC and its allies in a little more than two months, because INTERPOL’s certification implies an independent warranty that the proofs found at the Ecuadorian camp were not contaminated. If the Colombian government had not taken the decision to ask an audit on the devices and their content, the opposition -specially the people mentioned in the Reyes dossier- would be screaming that Uribe and his “thugs” manipulated the information to start a persecution on his political opponents, for sure.

Marsares claims the press conference was a show and that Colombian president Álvaro Uribe was seeking domestic support so that the people would ignore the scandals involving his government, just as Chávez and Correa do in their own countries:

What are [they] looking for? It is not to show the collusion of FARC with Venezuelan and Ecuadorian governments. If it were so, the evidence should be treated as such, holding back them, following the clues which can be deduced from them, until reaching the criminals, destroying all their infrastructure, giving rise to a victory they would only recover from after several years.

But it was not done that way. Since the beginning they preferred to make a fuss of it and telling, little by little, “pieces” of truths, with a clear purpose, to put [Hugo] Chávez and Rafael Correa against the ropes in order to alleviate the continental condemnation to Colombia for its violation to international law. But now, when the relations could be patched, why this new show, seeking to create a serious controversy and a political and economic catastrophe?

Domestic support, without a doubt. What a wicked way to escape from the questioning to the legitimacy of his second term.
(…)

The same way Chávez practices that within his stronghold and Correa within his, Uribe does the same thing in this frayed Colombia, seeking foreign enemies in order to armour his domestic power. Shameful show. A period on history where our peoples needed statesmen to ensure their future, was only able to give simple rulers who, as it is known, are so small as the limited horizon of their hatreds and ambitions.

Adam Isacson provides the names of the probed personalities, including controversial senator Piedad Córdoba, as expected, and American development consultant Jim Jones. He carefully analyses the charges they may face (I encourage you to read the full post), and he ends the article this way:

But again, we don’t know enough. We really have no idea what is in those files, and the rumored allegations surfacing in Colombia’s press include some troubling possibilities, such as that of would-be facilitators having visited guerrilla camps where hostages were held. Those who have talked to the press so far - Borja, Córdoba, Lozano - insist that they have done nothing wrong and that they are willing to cooperate with authorities at the first opportunity. These investigations should proceed quickly, and the accused should promptly be able to confront the evidence against them.

Ricardo Buitrago calls the Congresspeople involved “traitors” [es] and compares the two scandals [es]:

No puede haber tampoco, presunciones o parámetros dispares, que condenen a priori la actuación de unos y justifiquen la de otros. Con la parapolitica, el país, la oposición, los medios y hasta la justicia, trazaron una rasante de medición, prejuzgamiento, juzgamiento y condena, que ahora nadie entendería, pudiera ser cambiada.

There cannot be presumptions or different standards which condemn a priori the acts of some people and justify the acts of others. With the parapolitics, the nation, the opposition, the media, and even the judiciary have traced a medition, pre-judgment, judgment and condemnation slope which now no one would understand if it is changed.

Carlos Cuentero [es] angrily criticizes the Colombian government's decision of extradition:

No creo, como dicen hoy muchos columnistas, que haya fracasado la ley de Justicia y Paz. Más bien, creo que fue todo un éxito. Porque eso fue lo que negociaron en Ralito: una farsa de verdad, un teatro de justicia y nada de reparación. Eso fue lo que pactaron a puerta cerrada, a espaldas de un país que aún desconoce sus alcances.

I don't think, as many columnists are saying today, that the Justice and Peace Law has failed. Rather, I think it was a huge success. Because that's what they negotiated in Ralito: a real farce, an illusion of justice and nothing about reparation. That's what they pacted behind closed doors, behind the back of a country which still is not aware of their reach.

On the contrary, Jaime Restrepo of Atrabilioso [es] applauds the decision and says the justice, peace, and reparation process will not be affected:

But this is an emotional ingredient: the paramilitary bosses will not stay in summer houses (as some government critics described the Itagüí maximum security prison), nor will they serve just eight years in prison (one of the things they most criticized of the Justice and Peace law), because the most useful cooperation for the American justice is the tip-off from the bosses, and the truth is that the extradited are the top and not the bottom of the narco-paramilitarism hierarchical pyramid. They can build their hopes, but they will actually have to serve more than 8 years in prison. Things being so, if they will indeed serve a sentence in maximum security prisons, what is the difference if it is a Colombian or an American prison in favour of the criminals? None. But it is evident that many of the victims see the peace process with the paramilitary as a bitter revenge against their victimizers -something understandable- which does not allow them to see that extradition is not a prize but an even stronger punishment for the criminals. In any case they will not have the privileges or the benefits they could get in Colombia, and that makes the punishment they will get in the United States stronger.

Restrepo also slams the opposition parties on their contradictions:

At the time the opposition hit the ceiling by pointing out that Uribe wanted to give benefits to his “partners” by no extraditing them and they claimed that threat could not be removed from the table. Now, when the Uribe administration decides to extradite them, then it is useless for them, and they find it inconvenient in order to achieve the truth, justice, and reparation. Nevertheless, that is an incoherent position if we take into account that they were (the opposition) who did not wanted to shut the door to the extradition and put so much pressure that they ended leaving open the possibility which is a reality today. They should not be losing sleep over that now, because the Alternative Democratic Pole and the Colombian Liberal Party have fathered the extradition of the paramilitary chiefs, the same which today they find hideous and inconvenient.

But Marsares, at equinoXio digital magazine, after slamming the Justice and Peace “joke”, believes the so-called parapolitics scandal may be over and that the second re-election of Uribe is ahead:

The government alleges that the extradited chiefs broke the Justice and Peace Law by not telling all the truth, not hand all their assets over for repairing the victims, and continue committing crimes from prison. That is true. They were delivering the “truths” little by little to the judicial authorities, containing veiled threats or simply they did not say a word claiming cynical amnesias. Nevertheless, the tip-off of their political allies and the revelation of the location of the common graves where their victims are buried are an evident gain. As for the delivering of their assets, the joke was obvious. Very few of them, if not devalued or in others’ hands. So scarce that, after doing the math, each victim would receive COP7,000 (US$4 or €2.50).
(…)
A last play is the perfect finale of the game for the Government: if the paramilitary leaders had broken the Justice and Peace Law why were not they left in hands of the Colombian ordinary justice in order to be prosecuted as any other criminal? The high sentences would have meant that the government did wished to defeat impunity. But it was not done so, perhaps because they wish to avoid new revelations. Though there is the promise that the paramilitary chiefs can continue to telling the truths in the United States, the preparation of the trial can take one year, enough time to stop the damaged caused by the parapolitical scandal, and devote firmly and with a big heart to the second re-election, safe from any danger or threat, with an ad hoc Congress.

Adam Isacson, from Plan Colombia and Beyond, also posted on the issue:

Now that they have little to lose - and probably feel that they owe nothing to Colombia’s political and economic elites - the paramilitary leadership may be more willing than before to talk about who helped them over the years, what their financial and logistical networks looked like, and perhaps what happened to their victims. From a jail cell in Miami with little hope of leniency, they have little incentive to stay quiet and protect those who helped them. The question is whether those who wish to share such information will be able to do so. President Uribe and his government must be held to the statement above. Colombian investigators must have the access to the paramilitary leaders necessary to fully and aggressively comply with the “quest for the truth.”

To Isacson, if the investigators have that access, it will be a victory for the victims. If they do not, it will become a “tragic victory for the politicians, economically powerful individuals and military officers who made paramilitarism possible in Colombia.”

The political blog Colombia Hoy [es] also added its two cents [es]:

Lo que ocurre es que una vez ante los fiscales gringos podrán negociar todo. En realidad en Colombia no les esperaban penas muy altas, por lo que en el país del norte la situación no será muy diferente, aunque es posible que allí consigan algún tipo de amparo frente a la Corte Penal Internacional. Es un buen plus. Más impunidad frente a los delitos de lesa humanidad. Más legalización de las fortunas. Más residencia legal y cambio de identidad. No suena mal.

What happens is that once [they face] the American attorneys they will be able to negotiate everything. Actually in Colombia they would not face high sentences, therefore in the northern country their situation will not be very different, though they would likely get some kind of protection from the International Criminal Court. It's a good advantage. More impunity towards their crimes against humanity. More legalization of their fortunes. More legal residence and change of identity. It does not sound bad.

Days later the extradition, it was learnt that some of the personal computers and SIM cards of the extradited paramilitary bosses were not properly seized [es] by the Colombian authorities, with some of their relatives having access to the hardware [es]. Tienen huevo [es] and Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra [es] refer to the issue.

First it was thought that the Colombian Army had killed Velandia, but as the afternoon passed, the truth came to light: it turned out Pedro Pablo Montoya, aka Rojas, one of his bodyguards, had murdered Ríos to get a reward from the Colombian government:

Montoya […] shot his boss Rios with a single bullet to the head, and then killed Ríos's girlfriend. He then cut off Ríos's right hand to take to the security forces to prove he had killed the rebel leader, a member of FARC's seven-man secretariat.

One week later, and after a controversy, on March 14, the government decided to pay Montoya and another guerrilla member a US $2.5 million reward, for the “information” which allowed Iván Ríos to be found. But according to weekly news magazine Cambio's March 13 issue, a former guerrilla gave the information which allowed the Colombian Army to infiltrate FARC's Central Bloc and, through the help of the informant, who was in contact with Rojas, to instigate the latter to kill his commander.

At the digital magazine equinoXio [es], Marsares says:

Al dificultarse su captura, se le da instrucciones para que lo mate, como efectivamente lo hizo, convirtiéndose en instigador del crimen el propio Gobierno que se coloca por encima de la ley. Sencillo. Si no puedes capturar a tu enemigo, ¡mátalo!
A Ríos se le acusaba de haber cometido delitos de lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y delitos comunes, es cierto, pero según la Constitución, debía comparecer ante los jueces de la República para luego de ser oído y vencido en juicio, imponérsele una pena. Su ejecución extrajudicial no diferencia al Gobierno de las que hace la misma guerrilla, porque ambas carecen de legitimidad y violan nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Al gobierno sólo le compete la labor de capturarlos, salvo un enfrentamiento armado que determine su muerte.

When his capture became difficult, they [the Colombian Army] instructed [Rojas] to kill him, as he indeed did, making the Government, who puts itself above the Law, the instigator of the crime. It's simple. If you can't capture your enemy, kill him! Ríos was accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and common crimes, that's true, but according to the Constitution, he should have appeared before the judges of the Republic to be, after being heard and defeated in trial, sentenced. His execution outside of the law does not differentiate the Government from those perpetrated by guerrilla, because both lack legitimacy and violate our legal system. The Government has the duty to capture them, unless there is an armed confrontation which determines their death.

Liberal Colombiano [es] seems to agree with Marsares in his blog:

No se pueden lograr buenos objetivos con malos medios. No se puede mejorar la seguridad y alcanzar promoviendo y pagando por asesinatos. La política de delaciones esta bien para DELACIONES. Nunca para asesinatos. El estado no debe pagar por el crimen de “Ivan Ríos” a menos que de verdad se demuestre que fue en legítima defensa. El derecho a la vida es inviolable e inalienable. […] Ojala que lo sucedido con Rojas lleve a algunas personas a la reflexión sobre los límites de la acción estatal.
La pregunta de fondo siempre será: que le esta permitido al Estado?

You can't achieve good goals through poor means. You can't improve security by promoting and paying for murders. The tip-off policy is fine for TIP-OFFS. Never for murders. The State should not pay for Iván Ríos' crime unless it's really proved that it was in legitimate defense. The right to live is inviolable and inalienable […] I wish what happened to Rojas leads some people to reflect about the limits of State action. The bottom question will always be: what's the State allowed to do?

Bloggings by Boz summarizes the debate. These are the pros:

Rojas did bring an end to a top FARC commander (which is the reason the reward exists), possibly saving lives in the process. Additionally, the government wants to create the incentive for other FARC combatants to desert and turn over information about their commanders, and failing to give Rojas the reward could harm that effort. This reward has the added bonus of possibly creating internal dissent within the FARC.

And here are the cons:

Most of the reasons not to give the reward focus on the fact Rojas was a FARC combatant for 16 years and confessed to murdering his commander. Private citizens murdering other citizens does not help the Colombian government's overall goal to enhance the state's legitimate authority across the country. Rewards are meant for citizens to provide information for the government to act on, not for them to act as a mercenary.

At the end, Boz finds himself

tempted to support giving the reward because I want to see the reward program work and I want to see more mid-level FARC commanders desert and turn in information about their superiors. However, a democratic state should not offer mercenary payments. It's a tough rule, but the Colombian government is not going to win back control of the state by taking short cuts.

Finally, Ricardo Buitrago Consuegra is overtly supportive of the payment [es]:

Nadie cuando se instauro la política de recompensas, previo este caso, como nadie, alcanzo nunca a imaginarse, la degradación a la que llegarían los grupos al margen de la ley y la misma sociedad. La recompensa debe pagarse. No hacerlo, seria un pésimo mensaje a miembros de la guerrilla susceptibles de delación de que el estado no cumple. Se constituiría en un retroceso en la aplicación de la política de recompensas, que ha sido fundamental, en el quiebre que ahora se vislumbra en la organización guerrillera. ¿Si el país entero se alegra por la muerte de delincuentes, cual es la razón de privar de la recompensa a quien propicia la alegría? Por lo tanto, o dejamos de ser hipócritas y aceptamos la degradación de nuestros principios, o nos convencemos que en guerra, el pago de este tipo de recompensas se mira desde otro contexto. En ambos casos, a pagar se dijo.

When the reward policy was established, no one could ever imagine to what point the illegal armed groups would go and where Colombian society would reach. The reward must be paid. Not to do it would be a dreadful message to the members of the guerrillas willing to tip-off that the State does not carry out their agreements. It would become a step back in the application of the reward policy, which has been essential getting a glimpse into the guerrilla organization. If the entire country is pleased with the death of the criminals, what's the reason to stopy the reward to those that provide that joy? Therefore, either we stop being hypocrites and accept the degradation of our own principles or become convinced that, in a war, the payment of this kind of rewards can be seen from another context. In both cases, it's time to pay.

On Wednesday it was learned that Rojas will have to answer for other crimes [es], such as “conspiracy for drug trafficking, terrorism, and multiple homicide” relating to massacres he allegedly helped to perpetrate, according to Colombia's Attorney General Office. This should keep the former FARC guerrilla in jail for a while. At the moment, Rojas is staying in a military facility in Risaralda Department, Western Colombia.

Photo by Pattoncito and used under a Creative Commons license.

On February 4, hundreds of thousands of Colombians around the world demonstrated against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC, for its initials in Spanish), an event which started as a Facebook group, taking advantage of the popularity of this social network in the country (Colombia is the 9th country in active users), and soon endorsed by the media and the government. It was the main topic on the Colombian blogosphere during most of January and, of course, after the march almost everyone reacted, in addition to posting their pictures and videos.

Journalist Jaime Restrepo in Atrabilioso [es] says:

Las FARC perdieron su apellido de ejército del pueblo. Simple y contundente. Millones de personas en Colombia y el mundo le enviaron un mensaje tajante al grupo terrorista sobre sus pretendidas justificaciones de propaganda nacional e internacional en el sentido de representar a los colombianos. Que les quede claro: No representan al pueblo. Pero las FARC ganaron un apellido: ejército del Polo. Así de fácil. (…) Quedó claro: las FARC representan a múltiples sectores del Polo y ahora lo que resultará difícil será determinar a cuales si, y a cuales no….Y los ciudadanos, esos millones de colombianos y extranjeros que decidieron, POR PRIMERA VEZ EN LA HISTORIA RECIENTE DEL PAÍS, salir a las calles a emitir una rotunda condena contra los terroristas de las FARC… Quedó claro que son demasiados millones de “oligarcas” los que están contra las FARC. Si la tan cacareada oligarquía fuera tan numerosa, Colombia sería más próspera que la mayoría de países desarrollados.

FARC lost their last name of “People's Army.” Simply and bluntly. Millions of people in Colombia and around the world sent a sharp message to the terrorist group on their domestic and international propaganda-intended justifications of representing Colombians. It should be clear: they don't represent the people. But FARC have earned a last name: [Opposition leftist party Alternative Democratic] Pole's Army. Just that easy. (…) It's clear: the FARC represents several sectors within the Pole and what will turn out difficult will be to figure out which ones do they represent and which ones they do not….And the citizens, those millions of Colombians and foreigners who decided, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE COUNTRY'S RECENT HISTORY, to go out to the streets in order to condemn outrightly the FARC terrorists… It's clear there are way too many “oligarchs” who stand against FARC. If there were so many members of the “oligarchy”, then Colombia would be more prosperous than most of the developed countries.

Julián Rosero, at equinoXio [es], also criticizes the opposition party (PDA for its initials in Spanish):

La posición del PDA debió ser contundente, rápida y consecuente. Debió decir NO a la marcha del 4 de febrero hasta que los organizadores le cambien el fin, o en su defecto, organizar paralelamente, con el mismo despliegue y con un gran ahínco, una marcha con la consigna NO A TODAS LAS FORMAS DE TERRORISMO, en cuyo eslogan estén presentes las conjeturas: No a las FARC, No al Paramilitarismo y No al Terrorismo de Estado. De hecho, debió imprimir carteles en donde la conjetura que encabezara el eslogan fuera “No a las FARC”, encima de las otras dos mencionadas, para impedir que los críticos del PDA relacionen a este partido político con esta agrupación terrorista.

PDA's position should have been blunt, quick, and consistent. It should have said NO to the February 4th march, until their organizers changed its objective, or otherwise, to organize, separately, eagerly and with the same display of enthusiasm, a march with the slogan NO TO ANY FORM OF TERRORISM, including No FARC, no paramilitaries, and no State terrorism. In fact, it should have printed posters where the heading was “No to the FARC” over the other two mentioned, in order to prevent PDA critics to link this political party with that terrorist group.

Cartoonist Vladdo claims [es] that the march doesn't own its success to Facebook, but to the hate most Colombians feel toward the FARC is:

El mismo odio que ha elegido dos veces a Álvaro Uribe. Y el mismo que llevó a las emisoras de radio, canales de televisión, periódicos y revistas a dedicarse con un empeño sin precedentes a la causa del 4-F; proceso en el cual quedó claro que la crispación que producen las FARC es un tema que conquista lectores y capta audiencia. (Lástima que ese fenómeno nunca se vea con las víctimas de las AUC y sus masacres y desaparecidos; ni con los desplazados; ni con los perjudicados por los falsos positivos).

The same hate which has twice elected Álvaro Uribe. And the same who lead radio stations, television networks, newspapers and magazines to devote an unprecedented effort to the F-4 cause (February 4th march date); a process which made clear that the anger FARC produces and is an issue that attracts readers and gains an audience. (It's a shame that phenomenon can't be seen with the victims of AUC, their massacres and their disappeared; nor with the displaced people, not those affected with the false positives).

Vladdo also criticizes the ambiguous attitude of the Democratic Pole toward the demonstration, which “confused a lot of their militants, who in this kind of circumstances need a lot their leaders to instruct them”.

Colombians abroad also chimed in with their thoughts. From Los Angeles, Alexillopillo, besides wondering about the real usefulness of the demonstration and how the magnitude of the march had moved him, makes a reflection [es]:

Hace 13 años, una de mis primeras noches pagando servicio militar en Neiva escuché a un capitan decir ante todo el pelotón formado, momentos antes de enviarnos a dormir, que el ejército Colombiano era tan bueno pero tan bueno, que la guerrilla no habia podido acabar con él en mas de 40 años. Todo mundo pareció estar de acuerdo, pero yo por dentro solo pensaba “No será mas bien al revés? Que el ejército Colombiano es tan, pero tan abominablemente inepto, que no ha podido acabar con la guerrilla en mas de 40 años?” Con esa mentalidad, no es una sorpresa que la guerrilla nos desangre lentamente a su gusto.

Thirteen years ago, on one of my first nights of my military service in Neiva, I heard a captain say in front of the entire squad, moments before he sent us to bed, that Colombian army was so good that guerrilla had proved to be unable to destroy it for more than 40 years. Everyone seemed to agree, but I thought inside “Shouldn't it be the opposite way? That Colombian army was so abominably terrible that it has proven to be unable to destroy guerrilla for more than 40 years?” With that mentality, it's not a surprise that guerrilla slowly bleeds us at their will.

Though she didn't marched, Ana María Arango remarks [es]:

[L]a marcha del 4 de febrero fue una ruptura con los antecedentes de aletargamiento, apatía y negligencia en la clase media y alta colombiana frente a problemáticas políticas. Independientemente de la polarización que generó, esta marcha es un logro sin precedentes y un hecho del que nos debemos alegrar; porque además de que puso en evidencia el rechazo tan fuerte a las FARC, nos mostró que también miles de personas salieron de su comodidad y de su entorno inmediato a protestar por la violencia y el secuestro más allá de sus inclinaciones políticas.

The February 4th march was a breakthrough against the lethargy, apathy and negligence fromColombia's upper and middle-classes, in regards to political issues. Regardless the polarization it caused, this march is an unprecedented achievement and a fact we should be happy for; because, besides making clear such a strong contempt for FARC, it also showed us thousands of people who left their comfortable and their immediate environment to protest violence and kidnapping regardless of their political tendencies.

Minoría desinformada [es] slammed the politicians of the ruling party who took advantage of the march to propose Uribe's second re-election [es]:

Muchos sabíamos que eso iba a pasar -así los organizadores digan que no tenían ningún interés político- y por eso fue que decidimos de manera autónoma y consciente, no marchar. No salimos a unirnos a la multitudinaria manifestación, que sin duda marcó un hito en nuestra historia patria, no porque eso signifique que estemos de acuerdo ni remotamente con algún crimen de lesa humanidad cometido por las FARC. En muchas oportunidades en esta bitácora, la Minoría desinformada ha expresado claramente y sin dubitaciones su rechazo contundente contra esta organización armada, que nos atrevemos incluso a definir como “cartel”, porque en eso se han convertido (…) Entonces, no necesitábamos marchar para expresar nuestro repudio tantas veces mencionado. En ese sentido, respaldamos todavía a quienes ese histórico día se manifestaron en contra de la violencia en Colombia, y uno de sus causantes, sin duda, es la guerrilla de las FARC.
Pero no marchamos porque sabíamos que eso se iba a utilizar para hacer política y de la forma más oportunista y repulsiva, porque ahora el significado de esa concentración es “el respaldo a Álvaro Uribe”. No hay derecho. Cuando sabemos que esa marcha se dio porque todavía hay gente secuestrada, que no ha visto la libertad en más de 5 años y ninguna de las partes ha querido bajar su arrogancia para solucionar el conflicto de forma negociada.

A lot of us knew this was going to happen -even the organizers say they had no political interests- and that's why we decided autonomously and consciously not to march. We didn't go out to join that multitudinary demonstration, which without a doubt set a milestone in our country's history, not because that means that we remotely agree with any of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by FARC. We've expressed in several occassions on this blog our contempt for that armed organization, which we dare to define as a “cartel”, because that's what they've become. (…) Then, we didn't need to march in order to express our rejection so many times mentioned. In that sense, we still support those who demonstrated that historic day against violence in Colombia, and one of its causes, without a doubt, are the FARC guerrillas. But we didn't march because we already knew that was going to be used for campaigning so repulsively and opportunistly, because right now the meaning of that demonstration is to “support Álvaro Uribe”. They have no right. When we know that march happened because there's still people kidnapped, who haven't seen freedom for more than 5 years and no one of the parts involved want to forget their arrogance to solve the conflict in a negotiated way.

Mateo Echeverry [es] writes about the media coverage:

El cubrimiento que le dieron los medios a la marcha fue masivo, pero paradójicamente, un poco superficial. La emotividad y dimensión de la manifestación la hacían más apropiada para el deleite estético (muy apropiadamente RCN tuvo a su servicio un helicóptero que daba vueltas por todo Bogotá trasmitiendo las imágenes en vivo). Más allá de las imágenes, la información de los medios se limitó a interpretar la marcha como una señal de “unión entre los colombianos”. Lo que no hicieron fue matizar el significado que para cada marchante tenía. La imagen de la gran masa blanca desplazándose opacó las particularidades de la jornada.
Analizando los medios no resulta tan interesante la cobertura de la marcha en sí, sino, la fuerte decisión de los medios de apoyar esta marcha particular creada por un ciudadano cualquiera.

The media coverage on the march was massive but paradoxically a little shallow. The emotivity and the dimension of the demonstration made it more appropriate for the aesthetic joy ([Pro-Uribe] RCN used a helicopter which toured the Bogotá sky broadcasting live pictures). Beyond the pictures, media information limited interpretation of the march as a sign of the “unity among Colombians”. What they didn't do was to clarify the meaning it has for every one of the demonstrators. The picture of the big white mass moving hides the particularities of the day. Analyzing the media is not as interesting as the coverage on the march itself, but the strong decision by the media to endorse this particular march created by an anonymous citizen.

Marsares summarizes in a post some lessons and consequences from the march. Besides agreeing with some of the other views posted here (the critics towards PDA, the unity of Colombians expressed through their hate towards FARC, the role of the mass media in the demonstration's success), equinoXio's chief-editor remarks [es]:

Los problemas de Colombia involucran sólo a los colombianos que viven en Colombia. Los que residen en el exterior sólo participan en las fiestas patrias o en situaciones coyunturales como ésta. Es natural. Tienen sus propios problemas de supervivencia y sólo sienten al país en las noticias, la música o los recuerdos. No les queda tiempo para más. (…) La verdad, incluso para Estados Unidos, es que somos apenas un país de Latinoamérica que poco le interesa al mundo como hace poco lo resaltaba Andrés Oppenheimer. De ahí la importancia de la marcha. Por lo menos estamos unidos para enfrentar a la guerrilla y eso ya es mucho.

The problems of Colombia only involve Colombians living in Colombia. The ex-patriates only participate during the national holidays or situations like this one. It's natural. They have their own survival issues and they just feel the country on the news, the music or their memories. They have no time for anything else. (…) Actually, even for the United States, we're just a Latin American country the world is only a little interested in, as Andrés Oppenhaimer remarked. That's the importance of the march. At least we're united to confront guerrilla and that means a lot.

He is also concerned about Uribe's upcoming possible re-election:

En 2010, salvo un hecho extraordinario, se le renovará el mandato a la Seguridad Democrática (a Uribe o a un uribista), erosionándose los principios fundamentales del Estado Social de Derecho, que se fundamenta en la pluralidad, regresándose al unanimismo del pasado y a la concentración del poder, con un PDA que ingresará a la lista de proyectos fallidos de la izquierda. La Seguridad Democrática, como las telenovelas de mayor audiencia, se alarga para conservar el rating de la derecha recalcitrante y excluyente que hoy gobierna a Colombia.

In 2010, unless something extraordinary occurs, the Democratic Security's mandate will be renewed (to Uribe or one of his supporters), eroding the fundamental principles of the pluralism-based Social State of Right, and returning to the unanimity from the past and the concentration of power, with a PDA which will become part of the list of the Colombian left's failed projects. The Democratic Security, as prime time telenovelas, extends to keep the rating of the diehard, excluding right-wing that currently rules Colombia.

Finally, “Utopian chronicler” Daniel Ramos believes [es] Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez did gain something with the march:

[L]o que Hugo quiere es darle una salida política a las FARC, enseñarles principios revolucionarios (”Se puede sin secuestro, aunque un golpe de Estado es una opción válida también”), pedagogía humanitaria (”Suelten otros 3 secuestrados por favor, ahí vamos poco a poco volviéndonos una alternativa social y política”) y bases democráticas (”Compañeros, estamos jodidos en apoyo popular, ¡miren esa foto! Chamos: así no se puede seguir. Tenemos que hacer méritos a ver si algún día podemos abrir nuestro propio grupo en Facebook”). Claro, la reeducación de las FARC le tomará bastante tiempo, pero hoy en día parece que no hay nadie más capaz de hacerlo.

What Hugo wants is to give FARC a political option, to teach them revolutionary principles (”It's possible with no kidnappings, though a coup d'état is a valid option too”), humanitarian pedagogy (”Please, release another 3 hostages, we're gradually becoming a social and political alternative”), and democratic grassroots (”Comrades, we're screwed without popular support, look that picture! Chamos: we can't continue like this. We must gain recognition to see if one day we can open our own Facebook group”). Of course, FARC's re-education will take a lot of time for him, but nowadays it seems there's nobody else who can do it.

Photo by Dfinnecy and used under Creative Commons license

On Sunday 28 October, Colombians went to the polls to elect their local mayors, council members, and deputies to the departments' assemblies. These run-up to these elections were marked by violence against candidates. In some regions, political alliances that were quite unlikely one year ago, now were made possible, whereas some independent candidates won some important posts in big cities (such as Medellín or Cartagena). In Bogotá, despite a huge gaffe [ES] on a television debate one week earlier, where the candidate admitted that he would “buy votes” in order to save the city from other candidate who buys a thousand times more votes, “leftist” Samuel Moreno Rojas became the new Mayor. That election also witnessed a ‘dirty campaign' against Rojas and his main competitor Enrique Peñalosa, which included the surfacing of old interviews and even the hidden “endorsement” of President Uribe to Peñalosa. Incidentally, Moreno is grandson to Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Colombia's only dictator in the 20th century.

Plan Colombia and Beyond has an excellent summary on the elections, if you want to know the details. A slightly different, but quite interesting, point of view can be found at Bloggings by Boz.

On the local blogosphere, there were mixed reactions. At Atrabilioso [ES], journalist Jaime Restrepo refers to the victory of Moreno Rojas in Bogotá:

Samuel Moreno Rojas ganó… y de lejos, con una votación histórica de más de 900 mil votos.

El triunfo del candidato del PDA a la alcaldía de Bogotá demuestra, en primer término, que Álvaro Uribe Vélez no tiene la potestad de endosar los votos.

Pese a los discursos que pronunció el Presidente, y que eran indirectas contra Moreno Rojas, los bogotanos optaron por las propuestas del candidato del PDA y dijeron no a la reelección de Enrique Peñalosa Londoño.

Así las cosas, los ciudadanos capitalinos decidieron elegir a quien prometió la construcción del metro, a aquel que se comprometió con una amnistía para los infractores de tránsito y aseguró que no construirá peajes urbanos ni cobrará más impuestos.

[…]

Sin embargo, en estas elecciones pierde el PDA, que en la última semana de desesperación llegó a reconocer que las palabras del Presidente, en las que no mencionó ni un solo nombre, le caían como guante a su candidato a la alcaldía de Bogotá.

Uribe fue claro y reiterativo: el candidato al que apoyan las FARC en sus páginas de Internet, el que no rechaza a los terroristas, el que gaguea al momento de rechazar la compra de votos… para todos era claro que blanco es y gallina lo pone, pero el PDA, especialmente su presidente Carlos Gaviria Díaz, salió a la palestra a descalificar a Uribe y a señalarlo de participar en política.

Samuel Moreno Rojas won… by a huge difference, with a historic turnout of more than 900,000 votes. The victory of the [Alternative Democratic Pole, PDA] candidate to the Bogotá mayorship shows, first, that Álvaro Uribe Vélez can't endorse votes.
Despite the presidential speeches, which were hints against Moreno Rojas, Bogotans chose the PDA candidate's proposals and said “no” to the re-election of Enrique Peñalosa Londoño.
Things being so, the citizens of the capital decided to choose the one who promised the subway/train, the one who committed with amnesty to the traffic offenders and he assured he wouldn't create urban toll gates nor charge more taxes.
[…]
Nevertheless, in this election the PDA loses, which in the last desperate week they recognized that the words of the President, even if he didn't mention a single name, fit like a glove for their candidate to the Bogotá mayorship.
Uribe was clear and persistent: the candidate supported by the FARC on their internet websites, the one who fails in rejecting terrorists, the one who hesitates when it comes to refuse to buy votes… it was clear and obvious for everyone who he was, but the PDA, specially his president Carlos Gaviria Díaz, entered the fray to discredit Uribe and accused him of participation in politics.

Meanwhile, Marsares, based on the results for Mayorships and Governorships, remarks in equinoXio [ES] about the “frustrated” (Álvaro Uribe, the Party of the U [ruling], the Conservative Party [ruling], guerrillas), the “stagnant” (Radical Change [ruling], Alas Team Colombia [ruling], Alternative Democratic Pole [opposition], Liberal Party [opposition]) and the “winners” (the independents, sports narrator William Vinasco [third place in Bogotá election], some regional local bosses, the National Registrar of the Civil State) of the elections. At the end of his post, he claims:

Repartido el poder regional se demuestra que el uribismo es Uribe. Sin él, la lucha queda abierta y cualquier cosa puede pasar, incluyendo su segunda reelección.

The regional shared power can be proven that [so-called] ‘uribism' is [just] Uribe. Without him, the [political] struggle remains open and anything can happen, including his second re-election.

But Juglar del Zipa [ES] thinks Uribe actually “won”:

Antes, como he dicho hace un rato y hace unos años, Uribe —o los uribistas, que no sé si es lo mismo, pero supongo, ya verán, que no es así— puede beneficiarse del hecho de que la alcaldía de Bogotá esté en manos de la supuesta oposición porque así muestra, demuestra y convence a una cantidad de gente de que aquí en Colombia sí hay garantías para, como dice él, «practicar la democracia».

Before, as I've said a while ago and a few years ago, Uribe —or the ‘uribistas', which I don't know if they're the same thing, but I guess, you'll see, that it isn't so— can benefit from the fact that Bogotá mayorship fell in the hands of the supposed opposition because it shows, proves and convinces a lot of people that here in Colombia, there are indeed guarantees to, as he says, «practice democracy».

PDA-opponent Alejandro Peláez writes on Machete [ES] on Bogotá's local administrative juntas (JAL), a even more local legislative entity, equivalent to the city council but in every of the city's 20 localities:

Según los resultados electorales, el Polo Democrático Alternativo obtuvo el mayor número de curules para edil en Bogotá. Sin embargo, nadie ha manifestado que quien realmente ganó en las elecciones para las JAL no fue el Polo sino el voto en blanco.

[…]

Este fenómeno puede tener varias interpretaciones:

• El electorado no ve que las JAL cumplan un papel relevante y prefiere abstenerse de definir un candidato.
• Al elector le da pereza investigar los candidatos que se presentan y opta por el voto en blanco.

Una conclusión importante: el poder del voto en blanco es prácticamente nulo.

According to the electoral results, the Alternative Democratic Pole got the most seats for [JAL] local council members in Bogotá. Nevertheless, no one has said that the one who really won the JAL elections wasn't the Pole but the blank vote.
[…]
This can be interpreted in several ways:

• The electorate doesn't see that the JALs have a relevant role and prefers to abstain from choosing a candidate.
• The elector is lazy at researching the candidates and opts for the blank vote.

An important conclusion: the blank vote's power is practically non-existent.

El Oyerista [ES] writes about the radio coverage on the elections, claiming that while pro-Uribe RCN Radio was more “quick” and clear when giving the results, Caracol Radio did better on analyzing them. Álvaro Montes also praises [ES] Caracol Radio and Caracol Televisión (which aren't related companies since 2001, though they used to) coverage for putting left-leaning analysts. He also refers to the results in Bogotá:

Pero por lo que más me alegra es porque significó un ladrillazo en la cabeza para Uribe y el uribismo, que hicieron cuanto les fue posible para impedir un segundo periodo del Polo Democrático en la alcaldía de Bogotá y tenían sus esperanzas puestas en Enrique Peñalosa. Uribe intervino en política la semana previa a las elecciones, dijo que Samuel era el candidato de las “Far” y otras tonterías. El presidente que ha ganado dos veces gracias a la compra de votos y al constreñimiento de los electores a punta de fusil paramilitar, acusó a Samuel Moreno de “comprador de votos”. ¡Vaya!

But what makes me glad the most is that [the results] meant a brick to the head ofUribe and the ‘uribism', which did everything possible to prevent a second term for the Democratic Pole in Bogotá mayorship and they hoped Enrique Peñalosa would win. Uribe intervened in politics during the week before the polls, claimed that Samuel was the “Far[c]” candidate and other nonsense. The president who has won twice thanks to “buying votes” and by pressuring electors with the paramilitary rifle, accused Samuel Moreno of “vote buying”. Boy!

Finally, Tienen huevo [ES] mocks the “security” after the elections, by showing the pictures of the riots in some localities where losers didn't accept the defeats of their candidates.

The court, which is probing dozens of Uribe's political allies on charges they supported paramilitary death squads, accuses the president of obstructing those investigations while Uribe says it is plotting against him. In several radio interviews, Uribe said on Tuesday the court offered benefits including a reduced sentence to jailed paramilitary chief Jose Moncada in exchange for testifying that the president ordered the killing of another militia boss in 2003. He made the charge in private questioning last week and news of his testimony has just begun circulating.

Xinhua complements:

“The country needs to know if the president is an assassin or if the lawyer and Mr. alias Tasmania are liars. All we Colombians can be investigated, starting from the president, but it is necessary that the means be legal and decent,” Uribe told a press conference. […] Velazquez has received the unanimous support of the supreme court's 23 judges through a communique.Uribe said, “I believe that it is bad to obtain a deceitful confession through torture or through gifts.” High peace commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, said in 2004 that “Rene” confessed to him that he feared to be a victim of assassination attempts ordered by Uribe or by the government forces, and that is why he had refused to leave the concentration region.

On Sunday, it was learnt that the letter from the paramilitary chief Moncada, alias Tasmania (or perhaps Taz-Mania, since the animated television show is better known in Colombia than the Australian island), was delivered to the president by his older brother Santiago Uribe, according to national newspaper El Tiempo [ES]. As usual, this incident sparked outrage in the Colombian blogosphere and a huge controversy between president Uribe's supporters and those ones who side with the Supreme Court, especially when justice Iván Velásquez, the one accused by the president, “carries [ES] the burden of investigations of over 30 politicians for their links with former chiefs of the Self-United Forces of Colombia (AUC)”, most of them from the ruling coalition, including Mr. Uribe's own cousin, senator Mario Uribe Escobar.

Carlos Cuentero [ES] writes at El desván:

Gritos e insultos a la Corte Suprema de Justicia… ¿dictadura democrática?

Shouts and insults to the Supreme Court of Justice… a democratic dictatorship?

On the blog Atrabilioso [ES], journalist Miguel Yances makes a summary of the case and attacks some of the Colombian media:

Lo extraño de este suceso es que la opinión especializada que difunden los medios masivos, de forma casi generalizada se dedicó a descalificar, no a Tasmania ni al magistrado, sino al presidente; mientras que en la Urna Virtual de Caracol, más del 70% de quienes participaron, estuvieron de acuerdo con el proceder presidencial. ¿Por qué algunos políticos, periodistas y medios masivos -me consta que El Universal no- le cargan tanta bronca al presidente? ¿Solo por qué es buen negocio; o por venganza? La venganza la sanciona la opinión pública, y el dinero es bueno y necesario, pero hay que medir bien las formas que se usan para conseguirlo.

The strange thing about this event is that the specialized opinion spread by the mass media, in a generalized way, spent their time to discredit not Tasmania or the justice [Velásquez] but the president, whereas a virtual poll in Caracol TV shows that more than 70% of the participants agreed with the president's actions.
Why do some politicians, journalists and mass media -I can say El Universal [the daily Yances works for] have so much anger towards the president? Just because it's good for business or for revenge? Revenge is sanctioned by the public opinion, and the money is good and necessary, but the ways used to get it should be measured.

Valentina Díaz from Realidades Colombianas [ES] says:

¿Qué interés oculto tiene el presidente para seguir en la misma tónica echarle leña a la fogata contra el poder judicial y presionar para orientar las investigaciones de la Fiscalía? ¿Por qué el Comisionado de Paz asegura que “alias ‘René' no se desmovilizaba porque tenía miedo que el presidente y su amigo Ernesto Garcés lo mataran”? Por eso y mucho más hay quienes creen que estamos al borde del desplome institucional.

What hidden interest has the president to continue in the same attitude of adding fuel to the fire against the judiciary and putting pressure in order to guide the Attorney General office's investigations? Why does the Peace Commissioner claim that alias René wasn't going to demobilize because he was afraid the president and his friend Ernesto Garcés were going to kill him? Because of that and a lot more thare are some who believe we're on the brink of an institutional collapse.

At equinoXio [ES], Carlos Uribe slams the way this incident broke into the media with such intensity:

Es necesario concluir también en que alguien –persona o grupo– desconocido aún, ha sido el promotor de todo este lamentable enredo para quizás poner el debate nacional en otra parte y desviar la atención de todo el mundo, incluidos por supuesto los medios de comunicación que corren desbocados y sin criterio detrás del escándalo.Persiste, finalmente, la confirmación de que la Corte Suprema de Justicia –como le ha tocado otras veces a la Corte Constitucional– anda enfrentada a la Presidencia, porque aquí hay que incluir a todos los turiferarios. Y que el Presidente de la República no pierde oportunidad para revolver la opinión, para hacer uso y abuso de los medios de comunicación, más allá de la mesura deseable, y que sobre todo, le encanta el poder concentrado en una sola figura, la suya, que ahora comienza a ser promovida como candidata a un tercer periodo presidencial. Que Dios nos ayude, si es que ya no ha firmado un acuerdo con nuestro piadoso soberano.

It's necessary to conclude, too, that someone -a person or a group- yet unknown has promoted this regrettable mess in order to perhaps put it into the national debate elsewhere and divert everyone's attention, including of course the mainstream media which run unstoppable and without any criteria behind the scandal. It persists, finally, the confirmation that the Supreme Court of Justice -as in other times has been the Constitutional Court- is confronted with the Presidency, because here we must include all the sycophants. And that the President of the Republic misses no chance to agitate the opinion to use and abuse the mass media, beyond the desirable restraint, and that above all, he loves the power concentrated in one person, his own, which is now being promoted as a candidate for a third presidential term. God help us, if there's already no signed pact with our devout sovereign.

Tienen Huevo [ES] takes it humorously by depicting alias Tasmania as Taz and alias René as Kermit the Frog, known in Latin America as the Rana René.

Nevertheless, the fear a big earthquake will strike Bogotá someday is by no means groundless. As Víctor Solano reminds us [ES] :

Toda Bogotá se encuentra ubicada en zona de amenaza sísmica intermedia. (…) el impacto de un terremoto en Bogotá sería monstruoso debido a que las normas de arquitectura sismorresistente se adoptaron muy tarde y por eso cerca del 80 por ciento de las construcciones podrían colapsar estruendosamente.

The entire city of Bogotá is located in an intermediate seismic threat area. (…) the impact of an earthquake in Bogotá would be huge because the norms for an earthquake resistant architecture were adopted too late and that’s why 80 per cent of the buildings could collapse loudly.

Solano also criticized the media coverage and asked them to be more “responsible”. For example, some media outlets, like El Tiempo or Caracol Radio, claimed the National University of Colombia campus was evacuated, which wasn’t true (later they corrected the wrong information they provided).

The worst thing is that for almost two centuries a “prophecy” by father Francisco Margallo y Duquesne still rings in the ears of a lot of Bogotans every August, who said, “On the 31 August a year I won’t tell / successive earthquakes will destroy Santafé” (Bogotá’s colonial name, which was taken up again on 1991-2000). Although in 1917 (when several earthquakes actually struck the then big town) and in 1973 the Margallo prophecy was about to be fulfilled [ES], the last time Bogotá has been hit by a high magnitude earthquake was February 1967. In May there was an earthquake [ES] which left no victims (it was a Saturday around midnight, so I didn’t feel it). Maybe some people stayed away because of the date. In a Catholic country, is not strange to find some devote souls [ES] asking to go back to praying, as if a natural disaster was a punishment from God. The fans of the “