Global Voices » Andy Yee

The Future of Sino-US Relations: Ask Andrew Nathan

Andy Yee — Sat, 19 May 2012 17:28:33 +0000

Xiaomi (twitter: xiaomi2020) is organizing an interview with Andrew Nathan, an internationally renowned expert on US-China relations from Columbia University. Submit a question or vote on a question that's already been asked here. Xiaomi is one of the organizers of Yizhe, a group which translates western journalism on China.

Why do I wish to see Hong Kong's independence

Andy Yee — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 14:05:26 +0000

Amid a series of social and cultural clashes between Hong Kong and Mainland Chinese, Hong Kong netizen Marie Meow has written an open letter (English translation here) on Facebook exploring the reasons, possibilities and limitations for a Hong Kong independent from China. The letter has gone viral on the Hong Kong Internet, attracting lots of positive feedback.

Hong Kong Rethinks its Relationship with Mainland China

Andy Yee — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 14:27:07 +0000

2012 will see the 15th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to mainland China. But Hong Kongers have little mood for celebration. A survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong in December 2011, found that the number of respondents who view themselves as Hong Kongers is more than double the number who view themselves as Chinese.

Over the years, it has been a received wisdom that blessing from the mainland underpins the development of Hong Kong. This is most apparent when China’s support helped Hong Kong endure the 2003 SARS epidemic crisis and the 2009 global financial meltdown. However, after recent social and cultural clashes with the mainland, the Hong Kong public is now questioning that wisdom.

Comical presentation of Professor Kong Qingdong, by Hong Kong cartoonist Cuson Lo

In January 2012, hundreds of Hong Kongers protested outside luxury store Dolce & Gabbana, which allowed mainland Chinese tourists but not local residents to take photos in front of the store. In a separate incident, disputes broke out between Hong Kong passengers and mainland tourists who ate on a train. It turned into a public fury when Peking University professor Kong Qingdong added fuel by saying that Hong Kong people are “running dogs”.

In fact, in recent months, news headlines in Hong Kong are all about how mainlanders ‘invade’ the city. Local hospitals are stretched to the limits as pregnant women from the mainland crossed the border to give birth with the hope of securing a Hong Kong passport for their offspring. Mainland buyers exhausted the Hong Kong baby milk powder market amid food scandals in China. And as millions of Chinese tourists visit the city every year, it seems that all local residents could feel is their disregard of civic values and rule of law.

Last year, Hong Kong netizens made a popular music video named Locust World, which described mainland Chinese as “locusts” who like to “jump queues, spit in public”, “shout in restaurants, hotels and shops” and would use up the city’s resources. A version with English subtitle could be found here:

A view which is very common among mainlanders is that “without China’s economic support, Hong Kong would have been dead long ago.” But many Hong Kongers now think that the “mainland invasion” has done more harm than good to Hong Kong. Certain sectors, like retail, finance and real estate, have benefited greatly from mainlanders, but the inflation and housing bubbles created make the rest suffer. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s public system is yet to be prepared for a large influx of mainlanders. There is also a fear of the erosion of traditional Hong Kong values like the rule of law.

These views are now prevalent among Hong Kong bloggers and social critics. It is a complex challenge facing Hong Kong, one interlaced with local vs. mainland and poor vs. rich conflicts.

At Asia Sentinel, Alice Poon, a former real estate professional and author of Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong, explores the value gap between mainland and Hong Kong, and the fact that only a narrow range of sectors could benefit from closer relationship with the mainland:

The unbridgeable gap seems to be between (Hong Kongers’) acceptance and (most mainlanders’) rejection of or aversion to universal values like rule of law, democracy, equality and liberty. It is not through the latter’s fault that they find these values alien; it’s just because they have been living under a political system that has infiltrated them with the idea that those are not Chinese values and therefore no good for them. The system has taught people that all they need worry about is the economy and how to make money and practically nothing else. Morals aren’t important. Corruption can be tolerated. There is of course no lack of intellectuals in China who have refused to be brainwashed and who truly embrace universal values, but most of them unfortunately are rewarded with either political exile or incarceration.

It goes without saying that the only Hong Kong people who welcome mainland tourists, immigrants and shoppers are developers and their cronies (real estate agents, contractors etc.), especially those who are large shopping mall landlords. Even for retailers, whether or not they can benefit from the influx depends on whether the products they sell are mainlanders’ favorites. As for the rest of Hong Kongers, all they can feel towards the swamping inflow is resentment.

Meanwhile, however, the influx of Chinese capitals and tourists could have some damaging long-term effects on Hong Kong’s economy. Stanley5’s Blog explains:

正正是因為「自由行」、中資企業來港上市，以及給境外人士投資地產，搞到香港白白失去產業轉型的機會。現在香港只有金融、地產與旅遊服務業，大量人才與資金被吸過去，地價租金又被推高，以至製造業消亡，其他產業也一蹶不振，就連我最愛的港產片也快要消失了。我經常說：論出口品牌，韓國有SAMSUNG，台灣有 HTC，新加坡也有CREATIVE，香港有什麼？山寨機？莎莎？屈臣氏？米蘭站？

It is because of Hong Kong’s dependence on mainland tourists, the listing of Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong, and Chinese investments in real estate that it loses the opportunity to transform itself. Today, Hong Kong can only boost its finance, real estate and tourism services industries, which suck in a large amount of resources and talents. The real estate bubble leads to the death of the manufacturing industry. Other industries and products, like my favourite Hong Kong films, are also dying. I always say: in terms of export brands, South Korea has Samsung, Taiwan has HTC, even Singapore has Creative. What does Hong Kong have? Copycat phones? Sa Sa? Watson’s? Milan Station? [Note: The latter three are Hong Kong retailers.]

但令我討厭的是，現在不少來自大陸的所謂「遊客」，其實並非來旅遊，也非欣賞香港，而是為了「辦貨」、帶水貨，賺兩地貨幣的匯率差價，還有不少人是挪用公款、洗黑錢 (例如 D&G 要保護的人)。但最難頂的是他們部分人的惡劣舉止與財大氣粗。你叫我要包容，我告訴你，他們很多人根本就沒有「自由行」的資格！

But what annoys me is that many of the so-called “tourists” from mainland come here not to tour, but to buy products only to resell them for a profit in the mainland. And a large number of them do this with black money (like those under Dolce & Gabbana’s protection). And what is most disgusting is their rude behavior. If you tell me to be tolerant, I would say that many of them do not qualify to be “tourists”!

Profile image of @leungmantao

If the abundance of natural resources is an economic curse for some countries, the closeness to Chinese spending power is another form of curse for Hong Kong. Hong Kong has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world. This is where you can find the world’s third-most expensive shopping strip, while over 100,000 people have to live in 6ft by 2ft “cage homes”. As Hong Kong has gotten more and more wealthy, many local residents are left behind. Prominent social critic Leung Man To draws our attention to the decline of Venice as an ominous warning for Hong Kong:

想當年威尼斯衰落之後，只能憑觀光賺錢；但遊客一多，物價便升，地租更是貴得離譜，於是漸漸逼退老居民，終於鬧到今日這步田地，好端端一座輝煌千年稱霸地中海的貿易大城只剩下可憐的六萬個倖存者。至少在飲食上，如今我能看到香港「威尼斯化」的迹象，「價廉物美」變得愈來愈難，又貴又不好吃的地方反而日益增多；要是肯一擲千金，選擇倒是不少。眼見茶餐廳「餐蛋麵」那兩片餐肉愈切愈薄，北上定居的人群愈去愈多，你叫香港人怎能不生氣？怎能不感到危機四伏？

After its decline, Venice could only depend on tourism for income; but as visitors become numerous, prices of commodities and real estates skyrocketed. This drove away the local residents. Today, only 60,000 residents remain in this glorious city which once dominated the Mediterranean for a thousand years. I can see Hong Kong following the path of Venice, at least from its restaurants. It is increasingly difficult to find “value for money” eating out places, but it’s not hard to find places which are expensive but so-so. Of course, you still have many choices if you are willing to pay. As the piece of meat in the “meat-egg noodles” you get in restaurant becomes thinner, and more and more people around you migrate to the mainland, how can we not feel angry? How can we not feel perilous?

That being said, while Hong Kong could blame the mainland for all the social issues, it might have more to do with the policy failures of the Hong Kong government. In the opinion of blogger Grey Reporter:

香港作為一富裕城市，但貧富差距之驚人，基層生活的匱乏，以至中產的生活質素也好不到那裡。公義、多元性、市容、環保、文化創意…等都跟真正富裕城市相去甚遠，這一切和內地人也沒有關係。

As a prosperous city, Hong Kong has shockingly high inequality. The grassroots population lacks basic security, and the middle class is not much better. Justice, diversity, city planning, environmental protection, culture and innovation…… in all these regards, Hong Kong lacks behind other cities which can justly call themselves rich. All these have nothing to do with the mainlanders.

政府無長遠計劃鼓勵主流港跟少數族裔以至新移民共融，也沒有魄力去長遠解決香港的醫療人手不足，房屋及各項福利如教育學額不足等問題，仍是採取頭痛醫頭，腳痛醫腳，以及自生自滅的方式。於是，造成資源不足所出現的民粹意識，不深究政府的規劃缺失，把矛頭指向「外來者」爭資源。

The government has no long-term planning to encourage minority groups or immigrants from mainland to integrate into the Hong Kong society. It also lacks a comprehensive and long-term approach to tackle the lack of resources in health care, housing and education. It views them in bits and pieces. In the end, when cracks appear in the public system, populist opinion directs their anger at the “outsiders” who steal away their fair share. But what we should criticize is the government’s failure to plan for the long-term.

In the end, he hopes that ordinary Hong Kong people could realize the fact that they, like most mainlanders, live in an unjust political system under which the rich and the powerful collude. They share the same destiny, that is, to end this injustice:

其實香港人和內地人有著共同命運，就是對抗中共強權及與之勾結的富豪權貴，結束專制和不公義的執政狀況。相比之下，一些內地人的「不文明」舉動算不了甚麼。畢竟如果認為香港是一個包容的社會，便應該抱以寬容及「循循善誘」的態度。要知道，三、四十年前的香港也「文明」不了多少(現在也不見得香港人人文明守禮)，大家還不是如此走過來。

Actually, Hong Kongers and mainlanders share the same destiny – to end the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party and the collusion between the rich and the powerful. Relatively speaking, the “uncivilized” behaviors of some mainlanders do not matter much. After all, if Hong Kong calls itself an inclusive society, it should be more tolerant and patient. Thirty or forty years ago, Hong Kong was not much better (and not all Hong Kongers now are civilized). We have gone through the same path.

Unhappy Hong Kong Envious of Taiwan's Democracy

Andy Yee — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 14:38:15 +0000

Having witnessed Taiwan's 2012 presidential election, Derrick Tao, a Hong Kong photographer, made a video (with English subtitles) to contrast democratic development of the two societies. As a prosperous but undemocratic city state, “Hong Kong could either join Taiwan as pioneers of freedom and democracy in the Chinese societies”, or “accept the status quo and let go of her ideals and beliefs.”

China: Leadership jockeying ahead of the 18th Party Congress

Andy Yee — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 02:51:51 +0000

As the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party approaches, Joshua Rosenzweig ponders about who will become the next head of the Central Politico-Legal Commission (CPLC). Dubbed the “security czar”, the position oversees all legal enforcement authorities and has heavy influence on the rule of law in China.

China’s Stability Machine and the Detention of Chen Guangcheng

Andy Yee — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 19:15:20 +0000

Chen Guangcheng, a blind human rights activist and self-taught lawyer in China, has been in house arrest at his home in Linyi prefecture, Shandong province since September 2010 after spending four years and three months in prison. A well-known activist for uncovering forced sterilizations and abortions and other abuses of the family planning policies by the Linyi authorities against nearly 7,000 women, he was sentenced in 2006 for “willfully damaging property” and “organizing mobs to disrupt traffic”.

A video released in February 2011, shows Chen saying that he has been living under 24 hour surveillance since his release. He was subject to beating after the video's release and has suffered from deteriorating health conditions afterwards. Since then, foreign journalists, human rights advocates and other brave individuals and citizens have been trying to visit Chen, but all were turned back by strong security guarding Chen’s village, with reports of attack by hundreds of unidentified men and thugs.

Campaign poster to free Chen Guangcheng

As renewed attention was brought to Chen Guangcheng in October after waves of visit to his village were turned back by violence and beatings, Chinese bloggers and writers are now turning their attention to the stability machine behind Chen’s detention.

In an important article [zh] published in Caijing Magazine in May 2011, it was reported that China’s budget for internal stability maintenance for 2011 is 624 billion yuan, a rise of 13.8% over last year and exceeding the defense budget of 601 billion yuan. Another important article published by the same magazine in June 2011 (and translated by Dui Hua Human Rights Journal) describes the “gray market” opportunities presented to local officials in China’s quest for stability:

Local governments’ fear of petitioning has led to a huge stability-preservation “market” that includes capital liaison offices, security contracts, and “payoffs” and results in all types of rent-seekers, brokers, and thugs out foraging for themselves. Appetites whetted by the favors that can be had in this rent-seeking arena, the capital liaison offices, security companies, and petitioning officials all [seek ways to] protect and expand the “stability-preservation pie.” As this “market” continues to grow, even things that have nothing to do with “stability preservation” can be categorized as “stability preservation” in order to “collect more rents.”

It has been pointed out that stability maintenance fee on Chen Guangcheng now reaches 50 million yuan. Chen's case is a perfect example of this type of rent-seeking. Jia Jia, a columnist and media professional, has written a precise summary [zh] (originally posted but censored in his Tencent weibo) of why the local government goes to such lengths to detain a blind activist:

陈光诚在入狱前，其频繁的维权举动，被地方政府认为是当地最大的“麻烦制造者”。不论是残疾人权利还是农业税费问题，陈光诚曾让地方饱尝“依法办事”之“苦果”，陈氏之入狱也成为必然。从年初流出的视频来看，陈氏虽在幽禁之中，但并未因此屈服，并未对政府做出任何承诺。

陈氏之不合作，当然成为地方的“心腹大患”。此人若令其自由，则临沂地方又必须“依法办事”，必须面对陈光诚在众多问题上的较真。尤其是那些在施政过程中有明显违法行为的官员，自然会要求沂南县加紧防范。禁止外人探访，恐怕是为了防止一些重要的不利信息被传递出去。

临沂地方的计生黑幕，也是不能见光之事。一旦暴露，会引起举国上下对计生政策的再检讨。这攸关基本国策，动摇不得。一位临沂地方官员在微博上就陈光诚事件发言，“可见党中央的决策是英明的”。这说明对陈光诚的处理意见来自最高层，这种处理意见跟地方政府不谋而合。执行中央支持的、且有利自身的政策，何乐而不为呢。

最后，也是最重要的理由，维稳经费已经成为当地政府的巨大财源之一。当地政府抱着“拥寇自重”的心理，不断向上级勒索维稳经费。对于一个雁过拔毛的官僚科层体制来说，这种财源来得简便而理直气壮。当地政府也倾向于夸大陈氏事件与外界、与国外的联系，使得处于信息屏蔽区的最高层级，由于担心事件国际化，不敢放松对陈氏的管制。

直接负责看守陈光诚的村民，每月有固定一千六百元的月薪，这是一笔不少的收入。在当地，看守陈光诚是一件抢手且热门的工作。这批人通常又是村镇领导直接选拔的亲朋好友，对他们来说，撤哨就意味着收入骤减。这种“村镇利益集团”倾向夸大探访网友对他们工作的“干扰”，以获取更多的财政支援。

如果没有利益驱动，恐怕很难让临沂市、沂南县、双堠镇、东师古村四级政府，如此地对陈光诚抱有这么大的兴趣。陈光诚才是他们的“财神爷”。于是，在各种利益的交织与绑架之下，陈氏全家成为不用坐牢的囚徒。而这种维稳体制也陷入了自身制造的怪圈之中：越维越不稳。

In the eyes of the local government, Chen Guangcheng is a troublemaker. Whether it is the rights of the disabled or agricultural tax problems, Chen’s activism pushes the government to act according to law. Hence, he must be imprisoned. As the video released early this year shows, Chen was confined in his home, but he never compromises or makes any promise to the government.

His non-cooperative attitude is a serious problem for local authorities. If he is free, the Linyi government would have to play by the law and deal with him seriously. In particular, officials who have broken the law must have asked the authorities to step up the defense. The prohibition of outside visits is probably to prevent sensitive information from leaking out.

Linyi’s family planning policy is also a shady area. Once exposed, it will trigger a nation-wide debate. This concerns a basic national policy which is undebatable. A Linyi local official said on weibo, “we can see that the decision of the Party’s Central Committee is wise.” This shows that decision on Chen’s handling comes fro the very top. This fits the local government: executing the center’s decision while implementing a policy beneficial to itself.

Lastly, and most importantly, stability maintenance is one of the largest source of income for the local government. By keeping alive a toublemaker, the Linyi government can blackmail the upper levels for more resources. In a strict and bureaucratic system, one can ask for such kind of resources confidently. The local government also tends to exaggerate the links of Chen Guangcheng within and outside China. Because the central government is unfamiliar with local conditions and fears the internationalization of the event, it is reluctant to relax control on Chen.

There is a fixed monthly salary of 1,600 yuan for villagers responsible for guarding Chen Guangcheng. This is a lot of income for them. Locally, this is a sough-after job. These people are usually close friends and relatives of village leaders. For them, withdrawl of the control means a reduction of income. This “village interest group” tends to exaggerat the interference of visitors in order to seek more financial support.

If there is no economic motivation, we could not imagine that the four levels of government, from Linyi city, Yinan county, Baihe town to Dongshigu village, could show such a big interest in Chen Guangcheng. Chen is their “God of Wealth”. Therefore, in this intertwined web of interests, Chen and his family are held hostage without being prisoners. And the stability maintenance system has also fallen into a vicious circle: the more you maintain stability, the more unstable it becomes.

As Jia has pointed out, the local government of Linyi has used Chen Guangcheng as a bargaining chip for rent-seeking. Xiao Han, a professor at the China University of Politics and Law, has written an essay (originally posted but censored in his blog) exploring stability maintenance from the perspective of behavioral economics. Below is an extract on how the local government intentionally creates a tense atmosphere in order to bargain with the center:

在維穩體系中，越是將事態描述得聳人聽聞，對於維穩執行者越有利，這種利益既是權力上的利益，也是經濟上的利益。古代中國有所謂「養寇自重」的謀略，即剿匪的將領並不在第一時間以集中優勢兵力的方式消滅或擊潰「匪眾」，而是以佯打放生、虛抬匪情的「拖」字訣向上級要求更多的財政支持與權力授予，維穩體系存在著類似特性。在陳光誠事件中，臨沂地方當局除了拘禁、毆打陳光誠及其家人以外，還對探訪、看望陳光誠者暴力圍毆、非法綁架與拘禁，除了是一種對陳光誠的支持者的恐嚇與威脅和實際攻擊之外，其背後就可能還存在著上述動機：刻意製造緊張氣氛以向上級申言其作惡的正當性——因為這一切都能夠幫助他們獲得更多的經濟支持和權力授予。然而，由於這一切過於離譜，作惡過於囂張，終於導致輿論的全面譴責以及人們的無畏探訪，這一結果雖然使得陳光誠的處境產生微弱的改善，但探訪者的處境並未改善，而且從維穩立場這一視角它已實現了作惡者所要達到的目的，即他們所虛張的嚴重的「匪情」是實情。臨沂地方當局的上級維穩者雖然知道這一切都是維穩體系以及具體執行者的惡果，但他們被綁在同一條利益戰車上，所以不可能揭穿，尤其不可能向陳光誠支持者「示弱」。

In the stability maintenance system, the more sensational the situation, the better it is for executors of stability maintenance. This brings power as well as economic benefits. In ancient China, there is a strategy of keeping the mobs close in order to strengthen oneself. Generals will not destroy bandits immediately, but will keep them alive in a fight-and-release tactic in order to keep asking for resources from the top. The stability maintenance system exhibits similar characteristics. In the Chen Guangcheng case, the Linyi authority not only beats up Chen and his family, it also kidnaps and detains visitors. This not only serves as an intimidation to Chen’s supporters, but is also a way to create tension in order to legitimize its violence. This can help them gain supports and power from the top. However, as all this is too outrageous, it leads to a condemnation from the pubic and waves of fearless visits. This results in a slight improvement in Chen’s situation, but visitors are still subject to harsh treatments. From the point of view of stability maintenance, the local government has already achieved its evil aim: to exaggerate the seriousness of the situation. Although the superiors of the Linyi authority know that this is a bad consequence of the stability maintenance system and its specific implementation, they are already tied to the same vested interests and can by no means display “weakness” towards Chen.

Elsewhere, blogger Gu Xi at my1510.cn explains why Chen Guangcheng is an easy target for the local government to turn into an economic opportunity, and points out that Chen’s case is just the epitome of the numerous stability maintenance dilemmas in China:

既然维稳费用大部分由中央承担，地方政府则无“节制消费”的内生动力，这是其一。其二，被维稳的对象、那些上访、聚众乃至上诉法律的问题人物固然让基层政府头痛，但换个角度，却变成了他们“屯积居奇”、向上索要更多费用的的筹码。以陈光诚为例，临沂政府领导又不是傻子，怎会不知陈光诚一个盲人没有任何破坏能力、又为何这样如临大敌？——这正是陈光诚之于地方政府的价值所在：没有实际的“危害”，容易“收拾”，同时级别甚高，可凭此一人获取巨额拨款。其三，在人事任免上，如果出现纰漏，则地方长官会被罢免，既然有上面两条做铺垫，当地官员何不顺水推舟，保了乌纱帽又舔了上面的屁沟？这是从中央与地方的行政机理来考虑。以我曾工作过的天津滨海新区政府为例，每年年末都要由新区政府组织“维稳会”，向下属功能区传达维稳要求。

As most of the stability maintenance budget comes from the Central Government, local governments have no motivation to moderate its consumption. On the other hand, although the presence of petitioners and troublemakers is a headache for local governments, they can be bargaining chips when asking for more resources from higher authorities. In the case of Chen Guangcheng, the Linyi government knows that a blind person cannot cause much damage, but it acts as if facing a deadly enemy. Why? This is where the value of Chen Guangcheng lies: no actual “harm”, easy to “deal with”, and huge funding can be obtained by just controlling one person. Finally, given the above benefits, it would be logical for local officials to choose the safe way and suppress Chen so as to avoid any “accidents” and gain financial benefits at the same time. This all follows from the administrative organization of central-local relations. For example, I have worked in the Tianjin Binhai area government. At the end of each year, we will organize a “stability maintenance conference” to convey stability requirements to local districts.

这种伪造一个“利益共同体”然后获取“合法性”的手段，在临沂体现的淋漓尽致。“陈光诚黑洞”，就是各种维稳微观环境的缩影。当地政府为了监禁陈光诚，以1600元/月的价格雇佣当地村民，村民们因为这工作薪水颇丰、非常清闲、又能时不时抢夺贵重财物、甚至暗合了暴虐的欲望，于是抢着做这份工。一旦陈光诚案被破解，这一部分人的生活来源将被马上切断。所以从这个角度看，最不喜欢陈光诚获取自由的，应该是这些拿着卑微俸禄的职业打手。在诸多维稳事件中，由“维稳专业户”组成的利益共同体，我称之为“黑洞利益”。这一共同体有着拱卫维稳机制的最强愿望，同时也是“战斗”在第一线的走狗。这个特殊利益圈殊无破解的可能性。

How this forged “interest” gains legitimacy is vividly illustrated in Linyi. The “Chen Guangcheng blackhole” is the epitome of a variety of micro-stability maintenance events in China. In order to watch over Chen Guangcheng, local authorities employ villagers at the salary of 1,600 yuan per month. Because this job is leisurely and provides opportunities of robbery (or even satisfies their desire for violence), it is very popular. Once Chen’s case is cracked, this income source will be gone. From this perspective, these thugs are the ones who do not want to see Chen get free. In numerous stability maintenance events, I describe these vested interest groups of stability professionals as “black hole interests”. They have the strongest desire to keep the stability machine running, and are the front line running dogs in this “battle”. The prospect of this stability interest group being destroyed is slim.

As Li Huafang, a researcher and publisher, points out in his blog at Caijing magazine, there is no easy way out of Chen's case. Releasing Chen is the best way out of the vicious circle of stability maintenance, but the local government, which is not really accountable to the public, would not abandon this income source easily. On the other hand, while the case is gaining international media attention, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without much local knowledge, is reluctant to apply pressure for fears of offending the powerful backers behind Linyi's local government and family planning authorities. It remains to been seen if waves of citizen visits to Chen's village could continue and gather nation-wide attention for Chen's release.

China: “Do you have memories from before you were kidnapped?”

Andy Yee — Mon, 10 Oct 2011 16:01:08 +0000

A girl plays the violin for change at a train station in Beijing. Screenshot from documentary trailer shot in November 2010

If you’ve ever visited a Chinese city, you will see children begging or performing with musical instruments near train stations or on crowded streets for spare change. What you’ve witnessed is the tip of a serious and tough problem in China – the kidnapping and selling of children.

In early 2009, the public security authorities in China have implemented an anti-kidnapping campaign. At the end of 2010, official figures (not necessarily reliable) showed that 9,165 cases of trafficked women and 5,900 cases of trafficked children were uncovered; 9,388 children and 17,746 women were rescued, and 3,573 criminal kidnapping gangs were destroyed.

The true number of kidnapped children is likely to be much higher than the number rescued. According to some estimates, as many as 70,000 children in China are abducted by gangs each year.

What is fuelling this child kidnapping? Thanks to the one-child policy, and Chinese traditions placing huge pressure on families to have sons, stolen children are often sold into new families. On the other hand, kidnapped girls are often sold into areas where there is a surplus of unmarried men. Still many others are sold into street performance, begging or prostitution.

Telling their story

The child kidnapping issue is the theme of an upcoming documentary called “Living with Dead Hearts: The Search for China's Kidnapped Children” by Charles Custer.

Custer is an American strongly interested in China. Currently based in Beijing, he runs the successful blog ChinaGeeks, which offers translation and analysis of the China blogosphere. For his documentary, Custer wants to go beyond statistics and analysis. By focusing on the personal and emotional side of the stories, he wants to attach real faces to these social problems.

At the end of last year, Custer launched a fundraising appeal on Kickstarter to make the documentary. Following generous responses of more than 100 people, the project has successfully raised more than $8,500, and Custer has since then spent much of his free time tracking, interviewing and filming parents and kidnapped children.

This month, the film crew has put together an update together with an early trailer of the film:

Their goal is for viewers abroad to be able to relate to Chinese people as individuals after watching the documentary. They would be able to see, for example, how the parents of kidnapped children feel with questions like, “When did you discover your daughter was missing? Could you tell us more about your daughter’s character and hobbies? What methods have you tried to look for her apart from reporting to the police and the school? How do you plan to keep looking?” Or how kidnapped children feel as adults: “Do you have memories from before you were kidnapped? Do your current “parents” remember from whom you were purchased? And how do they feel about it now?”

If you care about this issue, you can see how Custer is progressing on the documentary at the dedicated website www.livingwithdeadhearts.com, or learn more about kidnapped children in a special section of ChinaGeeks.org. If you wish to show your support, visit the Chinese charities Baby Come Home and Xinxing Aid, which support kidnapped and street children in various ways.

China: Interview with a digital dissident

Andy Yee — Sun, 25 Sep 2011 05:27:49 +0000

Tom from Seeing Red in China interviews Xiaomi (twitter: @xiaomi2020), one of the organizers of Yizhe, a group which translates Western journalism on China so that they are more accessible to ordinary Chinese. Though not politically-oriented, some members of the group were identified by authorities because they translate news considered too sensitive domestically.

China: A water calligraphy dot matrix printer

Andy Yee — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 10:20:47 +0000

Danwei has produced a video interview with Nicholas Hanna, a media artist who has built a tricycle that can paint Chinese characters with water on the ground as it moves. The machine is inspired by Beijingers who practice Chinese calligraphy with water brushes on the ground in parks.

China: “Free Lunch” for Rural Students via Micro-Donations

Andy Yee — Mon, 05 Sep 2011 14:59:52 +0000

Students at Hongban Primary School enjoy lunch. Photo from fundraising page, shared by @anna313 on Weibo

The wealth gap between China’s urban and rural regions has badly skewed China’s education. Due to lack of funding, rural students in China are disadvantaged by systemic problems in areas like teaching, management, infrastructure and educational resources. In the poorest regions, even feeding school children so they have enough energy for learning can be a real challenge.

According to research released in March 2011 by the China Development Research Foundation of the Chinese State Council, poverty in the western provinces of China has led to malnutrition and developmental delays among primary school students. In a sample of 1,458 students aged 10-13 from rural boarding schools in Ningxia, Guangxi and Yunnan, 12% have growth retardation and 9% are underweight.

Liang Shuxin

To tackle this problem, Guangzhou-based charity activist Liang Shuxin started the project “Free Lunch” on 1 April 2011, in collaboration with the semi-official Guizhou Youth Development Foundation. This is a project of the Micro Foundation, an NGO founded by Liang in 2010 with the aim of harnessing the power of the Internet to improve rural education in China.

The explosive growth in the number of Internet users in China allows unlimited possibilities. The popularity of Internet tools like Weibo (China’s Twitter-like service) and web portals facilitate the involvement of a large number of people. At the heart of the project is the concept of “micro donations”. For example, the project has set up a virtual shop on the platform Taobao, where netizens can buy two lunch meals for school kids for just RMB 5.00 (around $0.80 USD). To ensure transparency and accountability, the project has also created a blog with stories, photos and feedback about how the donations are used.

The project has achieved some real successes. Since April this year, it has supplied lunch meals for the 205 students at Hongban Primary School in Guizhou province. Over two thirds of students at the school cannot enjoy a proper lunch due to financial difficulties and long distances from home. In collaboration with local authorities, a “love snack shop” will be built next to the school to supply free lunch for needy students over the next few years. Similar projects will be gradually implemented across the impoverished regions of Guizhou.

The civil-official collaboration is planned to continue for three years, and aims to raise RMB 10 million (more than $1.5 million USD) this year. In an interview with China's Southern Daily newspaper, Liang admitted that there are a number of challenges, such as the sustainability of donations and the building up of a proper lunch supply system. He thinks that the problem of malnutrition among rural students ultimately needs to be solved with governmental initiatives. It is for this reason he has picked the semi-official Guizhou Youth Development Foundation as a partner, which has extensive professional educational networks. Nevertheless, he does believe that a civil organization like Micro Foundation could add vitality to the collaboration by way of its creative, communicative and integrative abilities over the Internet.

China: Guangdong Model Making a Comeback?

Andy Yee — Fri, 02 Sep 2011 17:20:33 +0000

Back in July this year, the two ‘cake theories’ articulated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) chiefs of Guangdong province and the Chongqing municipality stirred a public debate about different social development models in China.

During the tenth Guangdong Provincial CPC Congress in July, Wang Yang said, ‘Building up the society now has an important place. We need to emphasize on people’s well being. But we need to focus on the economy if we are to make a bigger cake. In other words, our focus is on making a bigger cake, not how to divide the cake.’

This is exactly opposite to what Bo Xilai, CPC chief of Chongqing, said earlier when he emphasized the importance of achieving wealth distribution and common prosperity, ‘we need to divide the cake properly while making the cake bigger.’

Guangzhou's Canton Tower by Flickr user Colin Zhu (CC BY-SA 2.0)

As a promising contender in the 2012 leadership succession, and with his big push of socialist values and revolutionary culture earlier this year, Bo Xilai and his Chongqing model has attracted much attention in media and political circles for a while. But Wang Yang has spoken out more freely in recent months on the more liberal Guangdong model, with his speech above being one such example.

In fact, there are many differences between the Guangdong and Chongqing models. In an earlier post on Global Voices, Oiwan Lam has highlighted a detailed feature from China’s Public Consensus Net, which compares the two models in areas of politics, economics, culture and public policy. As one of the earliest provinces to reform since 1978, Guangdong has a relatively liberal and democratic tradition. The Guangdong model is seen as an ideological alternative to the state-centric Chongqing model.

As the Guangdong model is making a comeback, a number of commentators have criticized the Chongqing model for its authoritarian and non-democratic characteristics.

Hu Ping, a New York-based human rights advocate, thinks that without political liberalization, the Chongqing model’s claim to solve social inequality is an illusion. In an article [zh] written for the Human Rights in China Biweekly, he first provokes readers with two fables:

俄国大文豪托尔斯泰讲过一个小寓言：两只小熊得到一张饼，不知怎样才能分得公平。狐狸走过来说：让我帮你们分。狐狸把饼一撕两块，一块大一块小，分给两只小熊。一只小熊叫起来：他那块大，不公平！狐狸看了看说：嗯，那块是大了点。狐狸于是把那块大的拿过来咬了一口。这下，另一只小熊又叫起来了：我这块小啦，他那块大，不公平！于是，狐狸又把那一块拿过来咬一口。就这样，左一口，右一口，一张饼让狐狸吃去了一半；到头来，两只小熊都只分到了差不多大的一小块。这则寓言告诉我们：千万别以为专制政府能替我们把饼分得公平，因为它首先会趁机把大块的饼吃到自己的肚子里。

The great Russian writer Tolstoy told us a fable: two cubs got a piece of biscuit, and didn’t know how to divide it. The fox came over and said: let me help you. The fox divided the biscuit into two parts, one bigger and one smaller, and gave them to each of the cub. One cub shouted, ‘it’s not fair, his share is bigger!’ The fox had a look and said, ‘yeah, that one is bigger,’ and then took a bite off the bigger piece. Afterwards, another cub shouted, ‘mine is smaller, and it’s not fair!’ Again, the fox took the bigger piece and enjoyed another bite. In this way, the fox consumed a big portion of the biscuit, leaving the cubs with equally small portions. This fable teaches us never to depend on an authoritarian government to share the biscuit fairly, because it will take the first opportunity to put a big chunk into its stomach.

英国哲学家哈灵顿也讲过一个关于分饼的小寓言：两个姑娘得到一张饼，商量怎样才能分得公平。一个姑娘建议说：“我来分，你来挑；或者，你来分，我来挑。”这则寓言告诉我们：公平的秘诀在于分权。

British philosopher Harrington also left us a fable about division: two ladies got a piece of biscuit, and discussed how they could share it fairly. One lady suggested, ‘I divide, and you choose; or, you divide, and I choose.’ This fable teaches us that the secret of fairness lies in the sharing of power.

He then explains why political liberalization is necessary before the debate about efficiency and fairness can proceed in China.

按照那些学者专家的看法，做蛋糕与分蛋糕之争就是效率与公平之争。其实不然。我们知道，很多西方经济学家谈到经济公平时，他们主要关心的是收入差距。毛时代的中国，收入差距不大，那是否意味着毛时代的中国做到了经济公平呢？答案当然是否定的。因为所谓经济公平，其不言而喻的前提是制度的公平，是权利的平等。在毛时代，中共是用非法的手段剥夺富人的合法财产，因此当然是极不公平的。

According to the experts, the debate between making and dividing the cake is one between efficiency and fairness. But it’s not. We know that when Western economists talk about economic fairness, they are concerned about income disparity. In Mao Zedong’s China, income difference was not big. Can we say that economic fairness was achieved in Mao’s China? The answer is no. This is because the prerequisite for economic fairness is institutional fairness and equality of rights. Under Mao, the government deprived of the wealth of the rich through extra-legal means. This was extremely unfair.

必须看到，今日中国的贫富差距，不但在程度上很悬殊，而且在性质上尤其恶劣。中国的贫富悬殊问题与众不同，它既不是历史造成的，也不是市场造成的，而主要是专制权力造成的。在中国，穷人之穷，在很大程度上是因为他们的财产被权势者所强占；富人之富，在很大程度上是因为他们利用权力抢走了别人创造的财富。重庆政府主张通过强化税收建立社会保障系统来解决贫富悬殊问题，但这种做法的前提是承认富人拥有的财产基本上是合法的，来路是清白的。

We need to realize that income inequality in today’s China is not only huge, but is also a fundamental evil. It is neither created by history nor market. It exists because of authoritarian power. In China, people are poor because their wealth are stolen by those in power; people are rich because they use their power to steal other people’s wealth. Chongqing government proposes to ease social inequality through strengthening of tax collections and social security. But this proposal presumes that the assets of rich people are acquired through legal and proper means.

然而尽人皆知，在中国，那些先富起来的人，尤其是那些权力集团中先富起来的人，其财产基本上是不合法的，来路是不清白的。中共先是以革命的名义抢劫，然后又以改革的名义分赃。这分明是对人民的两次大掠夺。所以，要在今日中国实行经济公平，主要还不是通过强化税收建立社会保障系统，而是把权势集团掠夺的财产归还给被掠夺的人民。重庆模式的分蛋糕理论，恰恰是对两次掠夺的肆意否认，充其量是略有节制的榨取而已，哪里谈得上公平呢！

Of course, everyone knows that the assets of those who first got rich, especially the power interest groups, are of dubious or illegal origins. Historically, the Chinese Communist Party first robbed the people in the name of revolution; it then legalizes the booty in the name of reform. The people have been robbed twice. Therefore, to achieve economic fairness in China today, there is no use strengthening tax collections and social security. The way is to return the assets of power interest groups to the people. The Chongqing model is a blunt refusal to admit that the people have been robbed twice. At best, it is a slight moderation of the stealing. How can it be treated as fair!

Suisheng Zhao, China specialist at the University of Denver, writes at the public policy blog East Asia Forum that the Chongqing model finds support among the Chinese leadership because it is an affirmation of the China model of state capitalism, in contrast to the Western model of liberal democratic capitalism. However, it is not a solution to China’s intensifying social problems because it neglects the building up of democratic and legal institutions based on liberal values:

For all its glitter and shimmer, the China model has some clear faultlines that are responsible for China’s many social and political problems. For example, without accountability, the authoritarian state’s ability to make quick decisions has often come with high economic and environmental costs, leading to irrational and distorted investment, waste of resources and environmental deterioration. In addition, without an opposition party to keep watch on privileged state officials, a combination of authoritarian politics and the market economy has produced corrupt crony capitalism (权贵资本主义) in which power and money are closely connected. Acting to protect and enrich specific interests, the state has come to infringe upon ordinary people’s rights. Arbitrary land acquisitions are prevalent and workers have to endure long hours and unsafe conditions, causing discontent within society.

This is not to say that the Guangdong model is a significant departure from the China model. Nevertheless, with more emphasis on market and civil society, Juntao He thinks that it should be more open-minded and rational than its rival model. Recalling his commentary back in June on China Elections and Governance, run by the US human rights group Carter Center:

Rapid economic growth and relative social stability under an authoritarian regime constitute the “China model”, for several years a hot topic in academia and media circles. Ding Xueliang, a sociology professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, explicates six pillars supporting China’s pathway: Leninist party, party-led military forces, authoritarian regime, Chinese-style social control system, state-manipulated ideology, and a regulated market economy.

The Guangdong and Chongqing models do not differ significantly from this definition. They share the same structure but weight each component differently. In Guangdong, the market and civil society often manage social issues. But in Chongqing, even the smallest matters are government matters.

In the China model, market norms and authoritarianism are closely intertwined, at some times supporting and at other times undercutting each other. The market requires equality, rule of law and democracy. But authoritarianism centralizes all power into the government. The contradiction between the two mechanisms is the origin of Chinese social tension. The Guangdong model unites both sides of the coin. It makes innovations to the current system against existing tensions, with the goal of eventually reducing government involvement and enhancing the role of the market in social progress. Under the current political atmosphere, the Chongqing model will prevail for a while. But in the long run, the Guangdong model helps China adapt better to a global market economy.

Malaysia: Video salutes Generation 709

Andy Yee — Fri, 02 Sep 2011 14:11:18 +0000

Following the formation of Generation 709 by young Malaysians to call for free and fair elections in the country, the Cantonese-speaking Malaysian music group EVYbody has created a video (with Chinese and English subtitles) to salute everyone who dares to stand up for their rights.

China: Soaring number of female political prisoners

Andy Yee — Mon, 29 Aug 2011 04:33:17 +0000

The Dui Hua Foundation's Human Rights Journal explores the issue of the fast growing number of female political prisoners in China. This presents unique challenges, including male-on-female violence, childbirth in prison, and the overcrowding of women's prisons.

China: The broken education system in the countryside

Andy Yee — Mon, 29 Aug 2011 02:56:42 +0000

Tom, an American who works in education in rural China and blogs at Seeing Red in China, shares his first-hand teaching experience in the Guangxi province, and analyses some of the systemic problems in the educational system of China's countryside.

China and Britain: how do they compare?

Andy Yee — Sat, 27 Aug 2011 04:50:31 +0000

A British who has settled in China recounts his observations about the differences between the daily life in China and Britain, and how Britain has changed since he last visited there a year ago: “Great Britain is my home, and I love it, but it does feel like many of the qualities that made it Great are declining.”