Global Voices » Alexey Sidorenko

Russia: Bloggers Discuss Crying Putin

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 19:44:28 +0000

At pro-Putin rally, Vladimir Putin cried (photo, video) when heard that he apparently won in the first round of elections. This fact immediately became a hot topic among commenters. “He began to stream myrrh,” and “Moscow does not believe in tears,” a reference to the popular Soviet movie, are among the most popular reactions.

Russia: Election Violations Recorded in the North Caucasus

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 17:03:56 +0000

YouTube-user iFegor had recorded a video transmission from North Ossetia republic where two women are putting numerous ballots into the ballot boxes. In Dagestan, another user had recorded an unidentified man also stuffing ballots. Both republics are known for their unusually high (more than 90 percent) support of candidates and parties of power.

Russia: Police and Military Trucks Spotted in Moscow

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 16:58:31 +0000

Bloggers share pictures of numerous police and military trucks that flooded central streets of Moscow. Video summarizing [ru] buses and military vehicles. Photo of trucks standing next to the Red Square. Ridus.ru had compiled a big collection [ru] of pictures of special police forces.

Russia: Government Election Webcams

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 10:11:38 +0000

“Although not much can be seen, Muscovites have finally seen Russia,” write bloggers describing election webcams [ru] installed by Rostelecom company following the Dec. 2011 election. Although video capturing had not been possible initially, users developed an application [ru] to record broadcasts. Users of imageboard 2ch.so self-organized to hunt for funny videos, but instead of lulz, they found some election violations (although some funny moments were also recorded [ru]).

Russia: Absentee Voters and Election Carousels Alarm Twitterers

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 04 Mar 2012 09:48:04 +0000

Russian Twitterers report numerous ‘election carousels' (form of vote rigging when people vote several times at different voting stations). Bolshoy Gorod shares a picture [ru] of buses that allegedly are transporting ‘carousel voters.' Echo Moskvy reports [ru] 6000 voters illegally added to Strogino voting station. Users share their carousel observations via hashtag #Карусель. User Estraniero Estranio, posts a video, how carousel voting looks like [ru]. Earlier, numerous voters couldn't receive absentee certificates, documents crucial for ‘carousel voting.' List of Russian political Twitterers can be found here [ru/en].

Russia: DDoS Attack Puts Down Several Political Websites As Cyberwar Escalates

Alexey Sidorenko — Thu, 09 Feb 2012 17:06:26 +0000

On February 9, 2012, following the widely-discussed leaks of pro-Kremlin mailboxes, LiveJournal, where the leaks were published, became temporarily unavailable, Lenta.ru reported [ru]. Russian representative of Anonymous group @OP_Russia, suggested [ru] that it was a DDoS attack to hide the evidence of massive wrongdoings (including corruption, thievery, political provocations, and cybercrime) [ru] by Nashi youth movement. Later that day @OP_Russia took responsibility for taking down 3 websites of United Russia party: mos-partya.ru, er-region.ru, and er-kaluga.ru.

Russia: New .Ru Domain Registration Rules Allow Easy Domain Seizure

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 17:07:47 +0000

Andrey Rylkov Foundation writes about the first case of enforcement of the domain seizure rules in the “.ru” and “.рф” domain zones. The rules [ru] (Article 5, point 5.5) , updated on November 11, 2011 allow any law enforcement agency (like police, Federal Security Service, Prosecutor's office or Federal Drug Control Services (FDCS)) to request domain seizure without a court order. On February 3, 2012 FDCS successfully seized the domain of rylkov-fond.ru, a website of Rylkov Foundation that had severely criticized situation with drug trafficking.

Russia: The Anonymous Hacks and Publishes E-mails of Pro-Kremlin Youth Group

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 16:51:20 +0000

Read The Guardian's take on the so-called “Potupchik-gate,” a series of scandals surfaced as a result of hacking and publishing of private inbox of Kristina Potupchik [ru], press-secretary of Nashi, notorious pro-Kremlin youth group. All hacks were published by twitter-user @OP_Russia who uses Anonymous symbolics. Representatives of Anonymous, previously never seen involved in Russian online politics, had also issued an Russian/English statement on the issue.

Russia: Day of Protests Divides Citizens

Alexey Sidorenko — Sun, 05 Feb 2012 11:20:40 +0000

This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.

Despite temperatures of -20 degrees, thousands of Russians went out to the streets to participate in election demonstrations. Many, organised online, were protesting against the current election procedures and possible re-election of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Others, partly organised by pressure and bribes as well as fear of possible revolutions manifested that Putin should stay.

Bolotnaya vs Poklonnaya

Numerous demonstrations took place in nearly all big Russian cities. Most of them were of protest-oriented. Ridus.ru compiled a list of photo reports from different cities all around the country: Barnaul, Saint-Petersburg (1), Omsk, Yekaterinburg, Moscow (1, 2, 3), Kemerovo, Ivanovo, Perm, Tambov, Irkutsk, Chelyabinsk.

In Moscow, an anti-Putin demonstration started as a march and ended up at Bolotnaya square. A pro-Putin demonstration took place at Poklonnaya gora.

"We started to better warm up" poster at Bolotnaya Square, Moscow. Photo by Alexey Sidorenko

Symbols of the protesters included white ribbons, self-made posters and white balloons. In Moscow, white balloons were released at the end of the demonstration as popular musician Yuri Shevchyuk performed the song “Motherland” (see the recording of the performance here [ru]).

Many protest posters were inspired by Internet memes or quotes of Putin or his allies that circulated online due to their hypocrisy, bad grammar, or plain absurdity. Most of them were handmade with a high level of creativity, a distinctive contrast to the Soviet-style posters supporting Putin at the Poklonnaya event (see coverage [ru]).

The pro-Putin event in Moscow included some sincere supporters of Putin and his version of stability. At the same time, several cases of mass bribery and coercion were reported (1, 2). A few of my friends said that employees of public budget organisations were given a choice: either be fired or go to the event and receive a small award (depending on the source price varied from 500 to 1,000 rubles).

YouTube user Bandarlog20120204 uploaded a video shot at Kutuzovskiy prospect (next to Poklonnaya gora), where a lady distributed money to other people. When she realised she was being recorded, the lady tried to escape, thus provoking anger among those who did not manage to receive the ‘compensation' for participation.

A hard dialogue among protest groups

Pro-Putin events mostly consisted of deliberately apolitical crowds (mostly labour unions, or the Soviet-era GoNGOs). On the other hand, protest events almost in every city consisted of at least four main groups: the general public, leftists (social-democrats and communists), nationalists, and liberals. This ‘coalition of negative consensus,' however, did not work well everywhere.

The video below shows particular difficulties in finding a common ground among liberals and nationalists in Saint-Petersburg. An LGBT-activist who was given the floor was booed. After he finished, a nationalist activist came and started a speech that there should be ‘no [homosexuals] on the Russian soil.' Then, he himself was severely booed by all other participants and was forced to leave the stage and was called ‘a Nazi' and ‘a fascist.'

Lady waving to protesters. Photo by Vasiliy Maximov (Ridus.ru)

The missing network

After the demonstration was over, the Levada center published [ru] an interview with Boris Dubin, a renowned Russian sociologist, who described in detail the difference of “For Fair Elections” (FFF) movement compared to the previous protest movements:

Лет пятнадцать, наверное, как ничего похожего по скорости сплочения людей не было. Мы давно понимали, что есть 15-20, а по некоторым вопросам и 25 процентов взрослого населения, которые этот режим не принимают. Но это люди разрозненные, у них нет общих символов, нет общих лидеров. Не было понятно, как это меньшинство могло себя проявить. И вот оказалось, что в декабре, как, кстати, уже случалось в других странах в 2000-е годы, все завертелось вокруг проблемы «честных выборов», и дальше процесс пошел очень быстро.

In perhaps 15 years there was nothing that even reminded the speed of the processes of getting people united. For a long time, we had an understanding that there is 15-20, and according to some polls 25 percent, of the adult population that does not accept the regime. But they're not co-ordinated, they don't have common symbols, they don't have common leaders. It was not understandable, how this minority could reveal itself. And then it turned out that in December, as it, by the way, already happened in other countries in 2000's, everything spun around the issue of “free elections,” and the process launched really fast.

He pointed out 3 main elements of unrest: 1. it is a principal protest against contemporary socio-political regime, 2. the sense that the real election results were different, 3. the failure of the government to accept citizens as partners. He also noted an unusually high level of connectedness among the protesters:

Пришли люди, внутренне связанные, которые реально или хотя бы воображаемо солидарны друг с другом, и им интересно и важно быть вместе. А для большинства российского населения это абсолютно нехарактерно. Все-таки в основном население раздроблено, размазано, людей соединяет только телевизор и убеждение, что, какая бы плохая власть ни была, надеяться можно только на нее. Власть у нас плохонькая, но наша, примерно так большинство населения думает.

People came, internally connected, who really or at least imaginary were in solidarity with each other, and they are interested in each other and it is important for them to be together. And for the most part of Russian society this is absolutely not the case. For the most part, Russian society is atomised, dispersed, people are united only by TV and the belief that the government, as bad as it could be, is the only hope. “Government is not the best, but it's ours”; this is probably the way the majority of the population thinks.

According to Dubin's research, while 15 per cent of Russians would definitely participate in the protest actions, 44 approve such actions, and 40 per cent of the population condemns them. Dubin also discussed the role of the Internet in the protest actions: 60 per cent of the attendees of December 24 protest event (so called Sakharov demonstration) found out about the event online. 30 per cent found out about the event via their more connected colleagues. As Russian society lacks most conventional social networks (like church organizations, labour unions, etc) most people believe only their closest friends and families.

Although Dubin doesn't speak about the role of the Internet directly, it seems logical to suppose that in the absence of conventional networks, it is the Internet that has become the missing network that united so many uncoordinated ‘angry citizens.'

A Twitter parody account @igor_sechin ironically concluded [ru]:

Страна разделилась. Одна половина - за честные выборы, другая - за честные выборы Путина.

The country has divided. One half for the fair elections, the other one - for Putin's fair elections.

This post is part of our special coverage Russia Elections 2011/12.

Russia: Prices of Popular Bloggers' Posts Leaked

Alexey Sidorenko — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 23:03:20 +0000

Anonymous hackers had allegedly hacked an inbox of pro-Kremlin activist Kristina Potupchik and publicised [ru] a ‘price-list' of posts of the most popular Russian bloggers. Government-sponsored Nashi were caught several times on organizing paid campaigns aimed to influence blogosphere's opinion. The prices vary from 130 to 1000 US dollars per post.

Russia: “For Fair Elections” Protest Coordination Portal Launches

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 21:51:32 +0000

RosMiting.ru (Russian meeting), a community portal of protest actions, had launched. The portal accumulates information about protest events in various cities of Russia. It was created by the same team which started other interactive portals such as RosYama, RosPil, RosAgit, and RosVybory, politically-engaged crowdsourced communities and interactive portals developed in 2010-2012.

Russia: Ulyanovsk Blogger Wins Libel Case Against Governor

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 21:38:14 +0000

Ulyanovsk-based blogger Oleg Sofyin (LJ-user lis73) won a court case against Ulyanovsk governor Svetlana Openysheva, lenta.ru reports [ru]. Openysheva tried to sue Sofyin for publishing a post where he described a phone call during which someone named Azat threatened him if he will continue to post critical articles about Openysheva. Despite winning the case, blogger writes [ru] that people fear to support him because they're afraid of possible consequences.

Russia: Vladimir Putin Ignites a Pre-Election Debate on Nationalism

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 21:22:10 +0000

Following Vladimir Putin's article [ru] on ‘nationality question,' Dmitry Rogozin, vice-premier and former leader of semi-nationalist party “Rodina,” had published [ru] an op-ed in which he calls nationalists who participate in post-election protests to join pro-government ranks. Oleg Kashin, Kommersant reporter, analyses [ru] it as a scary perspective for non-Russians who considered Putin a some sort of defence from radical nationalists. Publicpost.ru, multiblog, summarizes [ru] nationalists' opinions despising both Putin and Rogozin for forgetting about ethnic Russians.

Russia: The Fake Political Twitter Account Phenomenon

Alexey Sidorenko — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 12:05:29 +0000

The Internet not only gives life to citizen activist groups, human bots or lolcat lovers; online anonymity provides perfect conditions for human creativity and humor. Twitter is possibly the best platform for this quality, and in the Russian context this involves mixing anonymity, humor and political reality via a number of accounts belonging either to dead politicians or to those that deliberately avoid publicity.

Faux tweeting

The first Russian fake Twitter users appeared long before other well known faux accounts, like @ArabicObama, @KimJongNumberUn or @Angela_D_Merkel. Some have developed their own particular ironic styles and have become integrated into the socio-political landscape of the Russian blogosphere.

Constantly gaining new followers, Twitter parodies represent a new literary genre: a critical, often sarcastic view on politics, provided from the historical/political perspective of the accounts' respective ‘owners.' Some definitely remind of the legacy of Kozma Prutkov, a fictional character of the mid-19th century, who mocked arrogant officials some 150 years ago. Meanwhile, some accounts (like the one of @LevSharansky) mock the opposition and the West.

The dynamics of the fake Twitter universe are overwhelming. Not only do the number of fake accounts grow, so too grows their audience. According to the follower count, the overall number of fake Twitter followers increased by 40,000 followers only in one month from 21 December 2011 - 23 January 2012.

Below is a chronology of some of the most popular fake Twitter parodies:

List of RuNet's Fake Twitter Accounts

Fake Twitter parodies

Profile picture of Lev Sharanskiy

9. @levsharansky [ru]

Lev Sharansky is a parody of a Soviet dissident (the surname refers to Ukrainian and Israeli political activist Natan Sharansky, while on the profile picture Alexander Solzhenitsyn is depicted). Unlike most fake Twitter personalities in the RuNet, this one is run by pro-Kremlin bloggers and mocks the pro-Democracy opposition.

Lev Sharansky's personality is often used in various online polls to discredit online voting (bots and human bots get commanded to vote for Sharansky in order to prove that online voting is easy to hijack).

Sample tweet [ru]:

Чем быстрее Урал, Сибирь, Дальний Восток перейдут под юрисдикцию США, тем лучше не только для россиян, но и для всего мира.

The sooner the Urals, Siberia, and Far East secedes to US jurisdiction, the better it will be not only for Russians, but also for the whole world.

Profile picture of @LeninRussia

8. @LeninRussia [ru]

This fake account of Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin [ru], is a Soviet cult object as well as the source of numerous jokes. The tweeting style includes references to atrocities commited by the Bolsheviks.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Судить людей и сажать их в тюрьмы - какая-то средневековая дикость. В конце концов, всех, кто нам с вами не нравится, можно просто сжечь.

To judge people and imprison them - it's such a medieval cruelty. At the end of the day, everyone whom we do not like can just be burnt.

Profile picture of @LeninRussia

7. @igor_sechin [ru]

Igor Sechin is a secretive ally of Vladimir Putin, now occupying the chair of Deputy Prime Minister of Russia. Sechin remains one of the least public figure in Russian politics. Exploiting this mysterious aura, his faux account mocks corruption and government officials.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Все хотят дворец за миллиард. Но только Путин нашел смелость его построить.

Everyone wants a castle worth a billion dollars. But only Putin found the courage to build it.

Profile picture of @tolstoy_lev

6. @tolstoy_lev [ru]

An account for Leo Tolstoy, the Russian literary classic, published philosophical quotes from Tolstoy's diaries wittily chosen to fit with contemporary news stories.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Как тысячелетия слагалась государственная жизнь, так, может быть, тысячелетия она будет разделываться.

As government life has been made throughout millennia, it will, probably, be dissolving the same way.

Profile picture of @SurkovRussia

5. @SurkovRussia [ru]

The fake account of Vladislav Surkov, former deputy prime minister, plays with his reportedly post-modern and art-loving nature, previously known as the “grey eminence” of the Russian politics, often going into literary explorations and drug experiments.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Если Бог зол, он насылает Сталина. Если Богу всё до лампочки, правит Брежнев. Но если Бог решил поприкалываться - на сцену выходит Путин!

If the God is angry, he sends Stalin. If the God doesn't care, it is Brezhnev. But if the God decided to have fun - here comes Putin!

Profile picture of @KremlinCherv

4. @KremlinCherv [ru]

Kremlin Worm is a meme created as the result of a scandal involving Governor Dmitry Zelenin who spotted a worm in his plate whilst having dinner at the Kremlin (read the GV story here).

Sample tweet [ru]:

Если бы меня пригласили в правительство, я бы был вице–премьером, ответственным за мелиорацию.

If they invited me to the government, I would be vice-minister for melioration.

Profile picture of @NikolayII

3. @NikolayII [ru]

This account is the tweeted diary of the last Russian czar Nicholas II. As in case of Leo Tolstoy's Twitter twin, Nicholas II mainly quotes extracts from his diaries. As many historians had noted, diaries of Nicholas II show complete detachment from wild political life around him while exposing focus on his personal life and personal experiences.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Завтракали в галерее. Вернувшись домой, читал, писал телеграммы и погулял.

Had breakfast in the gallery. After returning home, I read, wrote telegrams and went for a walk.

Profile picture of @alex_pushkin

2. @alex_pushkin [ru]

A poetic Twitter account resembling the playful style of one of Russia's most acclaimed poets Alexander Pushkin. It skillfully re-masters Pushkin's original rhymes to fit contemporary politics and make his tweets particularly ironic.

Sample tweet [ru]:

Ну что, пора. Итоги года / Привычно странная погода / Навальный, митинги, подтяжки / Год был не скучный, хоть и тяжкий

So, it's time. The totals of the year / Traditionally strange weather / Navalny, meetings and face lifts [reference to Putin's alleged plastic surgery] / The year was hard but not boring

Profile picture of @KermlinRussia

1. @KermlinRussia [ru]

A fake Russian Kremlin account led by an anonymous Moscow-based businessman, this even got into the Foreign Policy list of the best fake Twitter accounts and has managed to give several interviews, one of them in English. It is also one of the most popular Twitter accounts in the Twittersphere, having at the moment about 224,000 followers.

Kevin Rothrock describes the account's formula that can be more or less applied to the overwhelming majority of Russia's fake Twitter users:

..he regularly posts acerbic, ironic tweets mocking news stories about Russia’s leaders, often rewording the language of tweets by the official presidential Twitter account […], typically reversing or otherwise transforming the meaning of a prosaic Kremlin announcement into something embarrassing, cryptic, or downright evil.

Sample tweet [ru]:

We should make Russsia a better place to leave.

Russia: Community of Election Observers Launched

Alexey Sidorenko — Tue, 24 Jan 2012 19:24:16 +0000

Creators of popular citizen crowdsourcing projects RosYama and RosPil Alexey Navalny and Georgiy Alburov launch a new project RosVybory [ru], a community of election observers. Users submit their data to the website, then project moderators apply for the necessary observer documents and send registered users to the nearby voting ballots.