Protesters holding a banner in the Red Square. Banner reads “Go f*ck yourself with your registration.” YouTube screenshot. March 25, 2013

The action was in response to legislation currently under consideration [ru] in the Russian parliament, which if adopted would create harsh penalties for any Russian citizen not registered at their current address.

“Inflatable Flats”

Currently, Russians are already required to register with the authorities within 90 days of changing address. The new bill would increase fines for failing to register from 2,000 rubles to 3,000 rubles  and up to 5,000 rubles in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Landlords or tenants who sub-let are also liable for fines of up to 7,000 rubles, while legal entities face fines of up to 800,000 rubles. Furthermore, intentionally misleading the authorities by registering a person who, in fact, doesn't reside at the property (so called “fake registration”) becomes a criminal offence carrying large fines and punishable up to 3 years in jail.

The new registration rules were first conceived in line with Putin's election promises to fight the notorious practice of registering dozens of foreign migrants in a single apartment. According to statistics cited [ru] by Duma deputies, in 2011 some 300,000 people were found to be registered at 6,400 addresses — hence the curious name of the proposed legislation, the “Inflatable Flats Law”. In Russia today there are about 10 -15 million migrant workers, many of them from poor Central Asian republics. The vibrant economies of Moscow and St. Petersburg make these cities especially popular destinations for these laborers, and their large numbers are seen as placing a serious strain on social services and provoking ethnic and cultural tensions.

The proposed legislation has been harshly criticized by Russia's online community, many of whom feel that it breaches the freedom of movement clause of the Russian Constitution. For many Russians it invokes memories of “propiska” – a Soviet-era registration permit used by Soviet authorities to control internal migration by effectively binding citizens to their place of residence. While propiska is still remembered as a painful example of limited civil liberties under communism, it was not universally disliked, as many perceived it as a way to limit economic migration.

The proposed legislation also has potential unintended consequences. According to a report in Niezavisimaya Gazeta [ru], about 7 million Russians currently reside in properties whose landlords, for various reasons, are refusing to provide them with necessary registration paperwork. Oleg Shein, an Astrakhan based politician from the “Just Russia” party, voiced a popular criticism by pointing out [ru] in a blog post that rather than foreigners, it’s ordinary Russians, homeowners and occupiers, who will be most affected by the increased penalties:

Реально закон касается вовсе не мифических “таджикских иммигрантов”, а примерно 25-30 миллионов русских, татар, калмыков, евреев, осетин и т.д., живущих не там, где написано в паспорте. В Астрахани я оцениваю число таких людей примерно в сто тысяч. [...] Причины могут быть разные: аварийный дом, трудовая иммиграция из села в город, конфликт с родственниками и т.д.

In reality the law affect not “migrants from Tajikistan”, but approximately 25-30 million [ethnic] Russians, Tatars, Kalmyks, Jews, Ossetians, etc. who do not live at the address stamped in their passports. In Astrakhan I would estimate there are around 100,000 people in this situation. [...] There may be various reasons for this: emergency housing, labor migration from villages to the city, a family conflict, etc.

Muscovites face inspections

Despite the fact that the legislation is not yet in effect, Moscow City Government has already begun to actively monitor registration of people living in housing association flats. It has introduced guidelines on its website which advise inhabitants that a district policeman with the representatives of the housing association will be visiting flats twice a month to verify registration. Communal flats have been plastered with notices asking neighbors to notify housing authorities if they suspect that large numbers of strangers may have moved into a flat in their building. Bloggers [ru] and the media [ru] report that these “raids” have already started in many districts of Moscow.

The revelations have provoked strong online reactions, as citizens are outraged about the violation of their privacy. The new rules are also seen as a bribe-seeking opportunity for corrupt law enforcement officers — people will be incentivised to pay them off rather than face fines or court procedures. An online petition [ru] against the legislation has been set up by the activist movement “No to Propiska” and already boasts 91,621 signatures (by law, upon collection of 100,000 signatures it has to be debated by the Duma). Bloggers and online communities are now issuing advice [ru] to the public about what to do should the police knock on their door and demand entry for inspection.

Putin against Putin

Many opponents of the tougher registration rules are convinced that the law is just another symptom of the ongoing crackdown on civil liberties during Putin’s third presidential term.

Popular liberal blogger Oleg Kozyrev made it clear [ru] he has no doubts about the motivation behind the bill.

Мое мнение – смысл этого закона конечно не в том, чтобы кормить участковых, а в том, чтобы повысить репрессивный характер контроля над гражданами, это шаг к тоталитарному характеру власти. Закон абсолютно в логике законов о митингах, об интернете и т.д.

In my opinion – the logic behind introducing this legislation is, of course, not to feed local police officers [through corruption], but to increase the repressive means of control over citizens, a step towards totalitarian government. This law follows the same logic as ones restricting public gatherings, censoring the Internet etc.

Blogger Sapojnik voiced [ru] similar sentiment:

Все-таки несчастная Россия – это какой-то дурной сон, поставленный на вечный “повтор”. Когда уж, наконец, клеймо “регистрации” начнут ставить всем прямо на лбу, чтоб не перетруждать ответственных работников ДэЗов?? Позор, конечно. Людей в собственной стране ходят и проверяют, как скот – есть клеймо или нет. Дожили! В 1991, когда казалось, что в страну пришла СВОБОДА – разве я думал, что опять доживу до такого маразма??

Poor Russia is like some kind of bad dream, put on eternal “replay”. When will they start putting a registration brand right on your forehead, so as not to trouble responsible government officials?? A total shame. People in their own country are being inspected like a cattle, checked if they are branded of not! This is what we've lived to see! In 1991, when it seemed that the FREEDOM came to the country, did it ever occur to me that I’d witness such madness again?

Oleg Kozlovsky reminded [ru] his readers that since the abolition of Soviet-era propiska in 1993, various restrictions and limits to freedom of movement were gradually lifted as legislators aimed to make life easier for the citizens, first allowing to remain without registration for 90 days, then allowing to register over the Internet. Now:

[...] больше государственного контроля, больше запретов, больше наказаний. [...] Так Путин отменяет то немногое, что при нем было сделано хорошего.

[...] more government control, more restrictions and more punishments. [...] Thus Putin reverses the little good that was done during his time.

It is hard not to sympathize with such pessimistic reactions. While the legislation does try to address the specific problem of large numbers of migrants registering in one flat, police inspections of people’s homes are rightly seen as unacceptable. By encouraging neighbors and district police officers to keep a close eye on residents and identify any “illegals”, the law fosters a culture of invigilation and mistrust. At the same time it fails to distinguish between foreigners and Russian citizens, and fails to address broader problems with large numbers of foreign migrants.

According to [ru] the Presidential Human Rights Council many foreign laborers are simply unable to legally obtain residency permits. President Putin is said [ru] to acknowledge that there are problems with the legislation in its current form, and recognizes that improvements have to be made before it is signed into law. Nevertheless, most politicians in the ruling “United Russia” party seem content [ru] with the bill in its current form, and so any hope for substantial change seems forlorn.

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Opinions among Russian bloggers are largely split between those who believed the sentence was just and those who accuse Russian prosecutors of showing Mirzaev undue leniency.

The Case of Rasul Mirzaev

The incident [ru] occurred when Mirzaev and his girlfriend were exiting a trendy Moscow nightclub. When Ivan Agafonov tried to flirt with Mirzaev’s girlfriend, the two men began to argue and Mirzaev landed a single blow to Agafonov’s cheek, knocking him over. In the fall, Agafonov struck his head against a metallic crate on the street, and died four days later from head trauma.

After roughly a year spent in custody, Judge Andrey Fedin sentenced Mirzaev to two years of limited freedom [ru] for negligent manslaughter. Experts in the case ruled that there was no intent to kill. Judge Fedin explained that he already served his sentence while in pretrial custody (one day of which is equivalent to two days served in a formal prison, according to Russian law), and therefore Mirzaev could walk free. The judge cited extenuating circumstances: the champion turned himself in and plead guilty, he had no prior criminal record, and he is the father of a small child.

Rasul Mirzaev, Russian Combat Sambo Championship in St. Petersburg, 26 February 2011, photo by Roma Yandolin, CC 2.0.

Huge public interest has surrounded the case. Mirzaev is a native Avar from Dagestan—an ethnic republic in Russia's North Caucasus. In the post-Soviet years, hundreds of thousands of predominantly Muslim Caucasians have moved from their ethnic republics into central Russia in search of work, which has sparked an often dramatic cultural clash with local Russian populations, who commonly blame rises in crime levels and drug-dealing on non-Russian migrants. On the day of Mirzaev’s verdict, Russian nationalists (who oppose the influx of non-Russian migrants and immigrants, as well as multiculturalism, on principle) protested in front of the court [ru]. Prominent nationalist activist Dmitri Demushkin was quickly detained [ru] by police.

The truth is on Mirzaev's side?

Immediately after the verdict was announced, social networks and blogs across the RuNet exploded with thousands of often polarized reactions.

Among the voices supportive of the verdict were mostly liberal-leaning commentators, but also some self-described Russian nationalists. Dimitry Bavyrin commented on Facebook:

Как русский националист и человек доброй воли еще раз подчеркиваю: я не просто считаю, что приговор адекватен, я считаю, что Мирзаев наказан даже больше, чем заслуживал.

As a Russian nationalist and a person of goodwill, I stress this again: I do not just think that the sentence is adequate, I think Mirzaev has been punished even more than he deserved.

Before the verdict, on November 15, when it became known that prosecution had asked the judge to sentence Mirzaev to two years, gossip blogger Bozhena Rynska wrote [ru]:

Я совсем не поклонница кавказцев, я считаю, что большинство дагов, чеченов и прочих – плохие соседи. Я считаю, что многие из них – люди дикие, дурновоспитанные, и зверьками их в России называют не случайно, и вообще, пусть не забывают, что они тут в гостях. И – да, – мне не нравится, как нагло они себя ведут в России с русскими женщинами.

Но закон есть закон. Дело Мирзаева это ПРИЧИНЕНИЕ СМЕРТИ ПО НЕОСТОРОЖНОСТИ. Мирзаев прав – его нельзя судить как кавказца. Закон един для всех.

I'm no fan of the Caucasians, [and] I consider the majority of Dagestanis, Chechens, and others [to be] bad neighbors. I consider many of them [to be] wild, badly behaved, and the fact that they are called “zveriaki” [small wild animals] in Russia is not accidental, and generally they should not forget that they are guests here. And—yes—I do not like how arrogantly they behave in Russia towards Russian women.

But the law is the law. The Mirzayev case concerns HAVING CAUSED DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE. Mirzaev is right—he cannot be judged as a Caucasian. The law is the same for everyone.

Some people were openly supportive of Mirzaev’s deed. After all, they reasoned, he was threatened and he had to defend his girlfriend and himself from an aggressive assailant.

Pro-Kremlin blogger Eduard Bagirov (@eduardbagirov) expressed this sentiment in a Twitter reaction [ru] to the verdict:

Когда на предложение отстать от девушки какая-то наглая дичь отвечает, что “сейчас и тебя сниму” – вариантов не остаётся в принципе.

When, on your request to leave the girl alone, some insolent thug answers, “I’ll take you down,” it leaves you no other choice in principle.

Russia is not for Russians?

The majority of RuNet commentators voiced anger about and dissatisfaction with the court's leniency. Many linked Mirazev’s case to another murder that provoked riots in Moscow [ru] in 2010. That unrest exploded after a Caucasian man shot and killed Russian soccer fan Ivan Sviridov. The gunman and his friends were soon arrested, but immediately released [ru] by police, after a visit from local representatives of the diaspora. Mirzaev’s sentencing also came in a wake of a series of high-profile crimes committed in Moscow by immigrants from Caucasus (including shots fired into the air [ru] during wedding celebrations, and a knife attack [ru] on a city tram).

Mirzaev’s release nurtures the commonly held perception that police and other state authorities kowtow to influential Dagestani minorities. As a proof, bloggers cite the fact that—over the course of the trial—the prosecution reduced the charges against Mirzaev from “grievous bodily harm” (which carries a prison sentence of up to 15 years) to the less serious crime of “negligent manslaughter.” They point out that Dagestani politicians have called publicly for Mirzaev’s release, giving the trial an indisputable political dimension. Despite a lack of any concrete evidence, many commentators suggest that the Kremlin was involved in negotiating the verdict.

Nationalist oppositionist Vladimir Tor (real name Vladlen Kralin) on his blog [ru] expressed feelings of helplessness against the authorities and predicted that violence would spill out into the streets.

Возможность в России легальным способом отстаивать человеческие права в борьбе с молохом государственной машины и шайтаном “малого, но гордого Канзаса” – исчезающе мала. Власть не стесняют законы – она сама их для себя пишет. Власть ощущает  угрозу своему существованию от агрессивного и нестабильного Кавказа – соизмеримых же проблем на среднерусской полосе для себя она не видит. А слезы и боль убитой русской семьи её не трогают вообще. Россия – она не для русских, как общеизвестно. [...]

Воистину, никто не делает больше для розжига “экстремизма”, чем сама же россиянская власть.

In Russia, the possibility of using legal means to defend human rights in the fight against the Moloch [see here, GV] of the State machine and the Satan of the “small but proud Caucasus” is dramatically small. Authorities aren’t constrained by the laws—they write the laws to suit themselves. The authorities feel an existential threat stemming from the aggressive and unstable Caucasus, but they fail to see comparable problems for themselves in central Russia. And they are not touched by the tears and the pain of the fallen's Russian family. Russia—it is not for the Russians, as is well known. [...]

Indeed, no one does more to stoke the embers of “extremism” than the Russian authorities themselves.

Some liberal-leaning commentators responded by juxtaposing Mirzaev's sentence with the Pussy Riot conviction. Prominent oppositionist and anti-corruption blogger Alexey Navalny reminded his readers [ru] that (only a couple of weeks earlier) the same judge sentenced Maksim Luzyanin [ru], arrested after an opposition protest that turned violent, to four-and-a-half years in prison for provoking “mass disorder.” Luzhanin, like Mirzaev, admitted his guilt and even paid the dental bill for a police officer injured in the fighting with demonstrators.

Liberal opposition politician Vladimir Milov also believes that Russian authorities often give Caucasians a free ride. Milov warned that such sentences threaten mass discontent. He blogged [ru]:

Ничего себе справедливость такая – убил человека, а тебе 2 года «ограничения свободы». Самое интересное, что это ведь системное явление – мягкие приговоры кавказцам за убийства [...]

Власти боятся диаспор, в доле с диаспорами, чувствуют в них свою опору. Не могут пойти им наперекор.

They call it justice: you killed a man, and you get two years of “limited freedom.” What's most interesting is that this is a systemic phenomenon—light sentences to Caucasians who have committed murder [...]

Authorities fear the diasporas, they're in with the diasporas, and they sense in them a source of support. They can’t possibly defy them.

Russia's best known liberal blogger, Rustem Adagamov (@adagamov), sarcastically tweeted [ru]:

Я не пойму, Мирзаеву дали Героя России или еще нет? Сколько можно тянуть?

I don’t get it. Did they award Mirzaev the “Hero of Russia” yet? How long can it take?

In another tweet, he added [ru]:

Нет судебной системы в стране, еще один пример. Был бы на месте Мирзаева Иванов или Сидоров — сидел бы лет пять, как минимум.

It’s another example that there’s no [functioning] judicial system in this country. Were Ivanov or Sidorov [common ethnic Russian names] in Mirzaev’s place, they would serve at least five years.

Justice for the well-connected

Some commentators also noted that the court's leniency was due in large part to Mirzaev being a world champion fighter. He was, after all, something of a celebrity in Russia and a household name in his native republic.

As journalist Evgeny Levkovich said on Facebook [ru]:

Плохо вовсе не то, что Мирзаеву дали два года. (…)
Плохо другое. Понятие “справедливо” у нас распространяется исключительно на чемпионов из Дагестана, чиновничьих детишек и жен, и прочей блатной нечисти. Оно никак не распространяется на политических активистов – правых и левых “радикалов”, например.

What is wrong [with this situation] is not the fact that Mirzaev got two years.
What’s wrong is the notion that justice extends solely to Dagestani champions, the wives and children of officials, and other criminal scum. But in no way does this justice extend to political activists—to right- and left-wing “radicals,” for example.

Alexey Lapshyn addressed this point on his blog [ru]:

Приговор Расулу Мирзаеву, конечно же, нужно рассматривать как следствие социального расслоения общества, а не межнациональных отношений. Сколько молодых людей на Северном Кавказе брошены в жуткие тюрьмы по обвинению (или подозрению) в экстремизме, а по сути за свои религиозные и политические убеждения! Правозащитники справедливо причисляют их к политзекам. [...] Так что разговоры о каком-то привилегированном положении кавказцев звучат там дико. Как и везде, вольготно чувствуют себя только номенклатура и причастные к миру больших денег.

Rasul Mirzaev's sentence, of course, should be seen through the lenses of the social stratification of society, not inter-ethnic relations. How many young people in the North Caucasus are thrown into a horrible prison not on charges (or suspicion) of extremism, but for their religious and political beliefs! Human rights activists rightly count them among political prisoners. [...] So this talk about some privileged status for Caucasians sounds ridiculous over there [to Caucasians living in the Caucasus]. As elsewhere [in Russia], only bureaucrats and those with big money feel safe.

The republics of the North Caucasus host a violent Islamist insurgency. “Anti-terrorist” security forces operating there are regularly accused by human rights organizations of brutalizing the locals [en] with arbitrary detentions, kidnappings, and disappearances that target people suspected of being terrorists or even harboring extremist views. Most bloggers commenting on Mirzaev's case ignored the well-documented abuses of rule of law [en] in the Caucasus. This is perhaps because Russian nationalists typically do not consider the North Caucasus to be a part of Russia. Rather, they see it as a culturally distant and foreign “neighbor.”

At the heart of the problem lies the dysfunctional Russian justice system, which corruption has corroded and nefarious influence has skewed. Few dispute that Russia's courts are a tool of the authorities, which produces a dramatic lack of trust in the impartiality of court decisions. In recent months, Russian investigators and their seemingly arbitrary prosecution of oppositionist political activists has aggravated Russia's trust deficiency. Mirzaev’s case is a stark example of how this absence of trust irreparably damages Russian society by exacerbating ethnic tensions.

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The night before Wednesday, October 10, heavy rain fell on the town of Derbent in Dagestan, a mountainous republic of Russia’s North Caucasus. Water surged through the streets forming flash floods and bringing devastation. According to the local authorities, 6 people died, buried under a mudslide; 320 houses flooded; and around 1,200 townspeople were trapped in the affected areas.

On the day of the flood, YouTube user Farid Pirahmedov captured the resulting havoc:

Photojournalist and blogger Aleksander Belenkiy, known online as macos [ru], visited Derbent ten days later; his account of what he witnessed can be found on his LiveJournal [ru].

In the disaster's aftermath, Dagestani officials visited the houses affected by the flood and deemed them once again habitable. Belenkiy's report [ru], however, paints a different picture. Some houses were destroyed completely, and many need significant repairs before they could be used as homes again. Belenkiy also describes Derbent locals working tirelessly to clear the roads and remove the mud and stones from their houses. Residents spent over a week cleaning up the town, a task that forced many to abandon their day jobs temporarily.

The town's water supply was also damaged, but a cistern with drinking water took days to arrive. In the meantime, residents had no choice but to buy bottled water. Officials finally restored potable water to Derbent a full two weeks after the flood, on October 24, according to a local news source [ru].

The locals’ commitment to helping each other stands in stark contrast to the authorities’ apparent indifference. In one of Belenkiy's photos [ru], a woman and her son can be seen cleaning a house that belongs to their neighbor, an 83-year-old literature teacher who lives alone.

Flood aftermath in Krymsk, 11 July 2012, photo by Maria Pleshkova, copyright © Demotix.

In his account, Belenkiy draws parallels [ru] between the disaster in Derbent and the devastating flood that hit Krymsk earlier this year, where at least 171 people died and thousands of houses were submerged. Several local officials had been fired when citizen complained that authorities failed to warn them of the danger.

Казалось, что “крымская” история больше никогда не должна повториться: трагедия, всколыхнувшая всю страну, долго была в центре внимания общества. В зону чрезвычайного положения под Краснодаром приезжали политики и чиновники всех мастей, тысячи волонтёров, обычных людей, которые хотели помочь. […]

То, что случилось в Дербенте, очень похоже на события в Крымске. За исключением того, что сюда не приехали волонтёры со всей России, не прислали тонн гуманитарной помощи, а местные власти, похоже, вообще никакой помощи не оказали. До сих пор, спустя неделю, люди продолжают откачивать жижу и выкорчёвывать камни из стен своих домов.

It seemed that the “Krymsk” story would never again have to be repeated: the tragedy resonated across the whole country, [absorbing] society’s attention for a long time. All sorts of politicians and officials visited the affected area, and thousands of ordinary people volunteered to help. […]

What happened in Derbent is very similar to what happened in Krymsk. Except, volunteers from all over Russia didn’t rush to Derbent, tons of humanitarian aid weren’t sent, and local authorities seemingly didn’t offer any help whatsoever. So far, a week later, people continue to pump out mud from their homes and dig out the stones [lodged] in their walls.

The lack of a strong popular response to the tragedy in Derbent is notable and disappointing. In the aftermath of flood in Krymsk, Russia saw an outpouring of volunteer efforts [ru], with civil society and representatives of different political fractions coming together to aid Krymsk's citizens. Perhaps the indifference about Derbent's suffering lies in the fact that Dagestan is a republic plagued by radical Islamist insurgency, where violence and death occurs daily.

Dagestani authorities claim to have dispatched to Derbent a volunteer work crew 180-men-strong, made up of students from the Republic’s capital, Makhachkala. (During Belenkiy's visit, this volunteer army was nowhere to be found [ru].) Dagestani officials also announced that the Republic's government refused outside help from Russia's other regions.

The most striking aspect of Belenskiy's account is the senselessness of this tragedy. Only two years ago, Derbent experienced a similar flood; torrents of water running down the very same streets. The authorities had ample time to improve anti-flood defenses, but nothing was ever done. Even the calamitous flood in Krymsk wasn’t enough to break civil servants’ negligence. Lamenting the dismal state of governance in the country, Belenkiy finished his blog post by asking rhetorically [ru]:

Вот скажите мне, сколько ещё должно случиться крымсков, сколько бесланов, чтобы наконец что-то изменилось?

Tell me, how many more Krymsks, how many more Beslans [referring to the Beslan school hostage crisis], need to happen, before something changes?

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