From Manila Standard Today
Monday, November 17, 2008

SUBJECT: No cheers for democracy, as outlook for Philippines worsens

By Juan T. Gatbonton, Editorial Consultant

Filipinos are increasingly pessimistic about our country’s prospects. And the reason is that they see no easy way of resolving the basic flaw in our national condition— which lies in the way people with political influence are able to extract wealth without effort from the economy.

Even the most patient and most hopeful among us now seem to regard the imposition of an authoritarian regime as a workable alternative to our anarchic democracy. Meanwhile, more and more families are voting with their feet: Migrating “for the sake of the children.”

Shoddy showcase

Our shoddy “showcase of democracy in Asia” does have a measure of constitutionalism; a free and easy press; what passes for a political opposition; and periodic elections. But the system is unable to generate coherent public policies; corruption is brazen and mass poverty continues to perpetuate itself.

Of course, the Philippines is not alone in its disillusion with representative processes. In Thailand, the big-city middle class, too, is frustrated by its inability to prevail against the rural masses, who keep returning the party of the populist Thaksin Shinawatra to a majority in parliament. But at least the Thais have in their revered monarch a moral arbiter of last resort.

Washington SyCip, who’s a kind of Makati elder statesman, calls ours a “premature democracy.” We have the minimum political entitlements without also having the economic entitlements that enable us to exercise those political rights with responsibility.

Below a certain individual income level, SyCip argues, constitutionalism and multiparty electoral competition do not work. People sell their votes: the rich dominate the state, extracting from it rents and privileges that enable them to make more money to buy even more votes the next time around.

At the local level, the law is what the political boss says it is. And while the tolerance for state abuse is higher in the poor countries, it is not limitless. Eventually something’s got to give—and our country’s close to the breaking point.

Our neighbors did it differently

The difficulty arises from the way we’re trying to develop contrary to the East Asian model, which puts economic development first and political development later.

States that liberalize their economies before they open up their political systems—by insulating their technocracies from political interference—have a better chance at building durable and resilient democracies. As the open economy develops, it begins to impose its own restraints on the political system—raising the political costs of arbitrariness and the abuse of power.

The concept of private property and free markets together creates a private realm—civil society—outside the state’s domain. And it is this initial act of separation between the public and private realms that initiates the evolution of limited government.

Nostalgia for the strongman

We had two chances at setting these “economy-first-politics-later” priorities during this last generation—first under the strongman Ferdinand Marcos (1972 to 1986) and then under the EDSA revolutionary, Corazon Aquino (1986 to 1992). But both times the weakness of the Philippine state prevented it from carrying out its own dirigiste policies.

Marcos modelled his economic policies after those of the Korean strongman, Park Chung Hee (1961 to 1979). But the austere Park’s disciplined state did not allow its own enrichment to derail its development effort. He demanded from the Korean conglomerates export growth equal to the privileges he granted them. The Marcos technocracy became little more than a fig leaf for crony capitalism.

Mrs. Aquino ruled by decree for over a year. She might well have carried out a radical land reform program (as she had promised during the “snap-election” campaign), which is best undertaken in one rapid and comprehensive package that denies reactionary interests time to mobilize opposition. But she waited for the new Congress to do so. Dominated predictably by landlord interests, the post-EDSA legislature passed a land reform law riddled with loopholes that remains uncompleted even after 20 years.

No alternative to slow reform

Our longing for a benevolent authoritarian has a basic flaw. How are we to find—and install—this selfless individual who would kick-start our country toward prosperity and social justice?

All our neighbors who turned to “soft” authoritarianism were spurred by outside threats. Taiwan and South Korea were engaged in civil wars. Thailand faced a Communist Indochina; Malaysia ethnic and Indonesia ideological conflicts. Singapore was a Chinese island in a sea of potentially hostile Malays.

Our relative isolation—and the American umbrella—spared us similar fears (and reasons for unifying). Our political elite had abandoned nationalism early on to the radical Left—so that it recognizes no public motive save self-interest. Consider how quickly strongman rule degenerated into profligacy.

The weakness of the Philippine state itself limits our authoritarian option. Park Chung Hee, paragon of authoritarian development, himself warns that, in the absence of a strong state, we will find it difficult to carry out even nationalistic goals.

My own feeling is that because of the downright incoherence of the Philippine State, we Filipinos have no alternative to developing little by little over time. Building state capacity must become our first priority. And already there are civic groups organizing a “People Power” movement to elect a good president, instead of bringing down a bad one. Their model is the Pampanga “electoral miracle” of 2007, when an aroused Kapampangan middle class nominated a parish priest for governor against two dynastic politicians.

可是每每回想历史, 一个大国在”改革新思维”中短短数年就解体, 却让人扼腕。东欧各国在新思维的感召下以各种方式演变，过上了所谓的自由生活，演变成欧盟下的政治经济新附庸，俄罗斯老派官僚和新生精英权贵们的争权夺利甚至用上了大炮, “全民选举”名义下叶利钦上台，以休克疗法的快速私有化, 快速培养出一批暴富官僚和资本大鳄，使俄罗斯人民生活地更加屈辱。乌克兰、格鲁吉亚等伙伴纷纷抱上了美国和北约的大粗腿，甚至蒙古也让亲美派掌了权。俄罗斯穷得连库尔思克核潜艇也救不上来，航母或出租或卖废铁换钱，芭蕾演员沦落到东欧或远东跑场子打工。。。这时的西方媒体一方面感叹俄罗斯的没落，一方面额手称庆和平结束冷战，不战而屈俄罗斯之兵。

普京上台执政后改革除弊大刀阔斧，10年时间又重塑了一个新俄罗斯，以致于西方感叹：“俄罗斯的民主和人权以及政治改革都在倒退！”尽管普京的改革改变了俄罗斯，使之加入金砖四国令世人刮目相看，但还是遭受西方民主人士的攻击，因为他们更欣赏前面叶利钦时代的仰美国鼻息的“新政”。

08宪章到底会把中国带上一条什么样的发展之路？会使中国变成怎样？有识之士不妨认真思考一下，看看前东欧国家，看看苏联的解体，看看泰国、肯尼亚、菲律宾、希腊，想想中国的未来。在此仅先提出几个大胆的预想问题，算做抛砖引玉：
– 08宪章会不会让达喇实现“大藏区”的“真正自治”？如何对付“疆独”？
– 08宪章下如何对待台独势力？中国大陆能实现和台湾的和解实现和平统一吗？
– 08宪章会不会加快中国经济转型，从而实现可持续的发展，有效应对金融危机和出口困境？
– 08宪章会如何进行农村、农业和农民的改革，使低收入人群得到实惠，实现长期脱贫？
– 08宪章下中国如何举办奥运会？还会举办吗？
– 08宪章下多党政治下的中国会不会加入WTO？很多重大决策会不会因而长期议而不决？
– 08宪章下各级地方与中央的关系和利益如何协调？
– 08宪章下如何消除和避免行政腐败？如何避免“反腐”变成党派权力之争的工具？
– 08宪章下是不是FLG又会复活了？甚至变成一个“某某党”？
– 08宪章下军队听谁指挥？怎么发展现代国防来保障国家利益和国土安全？
– 08宪章下如何解决中印、中俄、南海、东海、克什米尔、越南的领土、领海纠份？

过了两天，有朋友告诉我，上面已经对零八宪章作出定性，说是国内敌对势力勾结海外民运的活动，图谋颠覆政权。这些天来，不断有消息称，全国各地都有签名者被警方以涉嫌颠覆国家政权的罪名被传唤。

这样的定性和罪名是荒谬的，但在中国并不新鲜。虽然这种指控在法理上完全站不住脚，不值一驳，但考虑到当局已经用这种口实对签名者施压，极有可能用这样的罪名对刘晓波定罪，我还是要从法理的角度说明我为什么在零八宪章上签名，为什么签名是合法的，而威胁、阻止和镇压是非法的。

当我面临一份零八宪章的草案并被请求签名支持时，我做的第一件事是阅读文本，我以下列标准衡量、判断：一、它是否符合我的价值观，即符合中国人民的利益，符合人类文明的公认准则；二、它是否与中国现行宪法的精神和条文一致，与中国已经签署的联合国宣言、公约一致，与中国已经承诺的国际义务一致；三、它是否有即刻提倡的当下必要性。

我在零八宪章上签了名，这是一个公民理性的、负责的决定，这个决定一旦作出，任何威胁、警告、惩罚都不能改变，不论它们表现为赤裸裸的暴力，还是以国家和法律的名义。

在零八宪章上签名的合法性无可质疑地有宪法和法律依据。中华人民共和国宪法第二章第三十五条规定：”中华人民共和国公民有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行、示威的自由。”公民以”零八宪章”这样的言说形式表达自己的价值立场、对国家政治生活的建言、对未来的期盼，正是在运用宪法保障的正当权利。

在中国，历来有一种违宪地剥夺公民言论自由的借口，”欲加之罪、何患无辞”的手法，如果在言论、文本中挑不出毛病，就说背后另有图谋和用心，毛泽东”反右” 时”天下大乱、取而代之”的说法就是典型例证，但这在法理上是站不住脚的，因为这种主观臆想或蓄意诬陷缺乏法律上有效的证据。

显而易见，判断人们在宪章、宣言、呼吁、公开信等等文件上签名是否合法的唯一根据是文本的内容，签名者必须，也只需要对文本负责。从言论自由的原则出发可知，这类签名天然就是合法的，言论涉嫌犯罪只发生在极少数例外情况，即言论涉及煽动以暴力推翻现存的政府或社会制度，危及国家或公共安全等，必须注意，这样的危害必须是直接的、清晰可见的，而不是七弯八拐、间接又见接地”分析”和”推论”出来的。

只对文本负责，意味着签名是否合法与签名组织者和其他签名者的身份、背景无关，与他们在其他场合表明的观点、活动无关，也与掌权者是否喜欢无关。而我们历来熟悉的做法是，先把签名活动的组织者或其他一些签名者抹黑，从而把整个签名活动抹黑，达到吓退其他人的目的。通常的口实是”有组织”、”有预谋”、”有海外背景”，但拿不出证据。其实，从法理上严格说来，”有组织”、”有预谋”、”有海外背景”等等只是政治宣传的说辞，它们并不等同于非法，需要其他过硬的证据，才能证实”有组织”、”有预谋”、”有海外背景”的活动也是非法活动。法治社会中，不能靠虚声恫吓定罪。

很长时间以来，一种吓唬人的方法是，任何事情只要弄得和国内或海外”民运份子”沾边，似乎其非法性就不证自明。从宪法和法律的角度看，这种靠名称或标签定罪的手法极其可笑。我们不必说海外呼应零八宪章的人士以余英时先生领衔，而余先生是享誉全球的华人学者。我们需要辨析的是，不论”民运份子”是带褒义还是贬义的称谓，他们是不是合法公民，他们有没有权利与其他公民一道表达共同的观点？在我的心目中，刘晓波是文学博士、学者，如果他本人不反对，称他为”民运份子”也可以，但是，”民运份子”并不天然就是”敌对势力”。再说了，把格外关注中国民主前途的人说成是敌对势力，除了说明自己的立场是反民主的以外，不说明任何问题。

在一个法治国家，判断合法还是非法，唯一的根据是宪法和法律，以及该国认可的国际公约，撇开这些标准，另行发明一个”民运份子”的标签作为是否合法的根据，这本身就是一种违宪行为。

最后，聚焦到核心问题，称零八宪章的签名者”涉嫌颠覆国家政权”，有什么法理上的根据？零八宪章的哪一条、哪一款，哪一段文字包含有图谋”颠覆国家政权”的内容？零八宪章的哪一条、哪一款，哪一段文字的内容超出了言论自由的范围，可以等同于”颠覆国家政权”的行动？

零八宪章在表达了自己的价值立场和政治诉求之后，在结语中总结自己的意图和要求时说，”政治民主化变革不能再拖延下去”，请问，这是非法的吗，这是在煽动在”颠覆国家政权”吗？这是在和执政党不时许诺的”推进政治体制改革”对着干吗？

我要问那些滥加罪名的人：重申宪法、《世界人权宣言》和《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》中载明的人权和公民权，就是”涉嫌颠覆国家政权”，你们把这个国家政权的性质看成是什么，这就是你们的价值观和政治立场吗？

因为零八宪章而拘押刘晓波是非法的，传讯和恐吓众多签名者是非法的，一经比对中华人民共和国宪法第二章第三十五条，其非法性显而易见。而诬称或定性零八宪章非法，则找不到任何法理依据。目前严重的、大规模的非法行为不会因为行动由穿着警察制服的人员实施，不会由于使用了国家的名义而改变性质。

这是一场合法与非法的较量，有人在明目张胆地侵犯、践踏公民的言论自由权，从而违反宪法。

这是一场真正的爱国者与反对国家的人的较量，有人想把中国的合法公民变成唯唯诺诺、俯首帖耳的臣民，妄图强加给他们可怕的、莫须有的罪名，有人要把祖国忠诚的儿女打成国家的敌人。

零八宪章的合法性不言而喻，其遭遇雄辩地证明了它的必要性和意义。

――《纵览中国》首发