Peru's fluctuating relationship with neighboring Chile is conflicted. One day, the Presidents of the two countries are shaking hands like great friends. Then, the following day, there's news about an incident on the border, or something that affects (as we see it) the peaceful coexistence between the two countries. We discussed this subject in an article [1] (ES) in February, but it might be time to revisit the issue.
A little over a month ago there was some commotion related to a documentary titled Epopeya, about the war in 1879 between Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. Before it was shown on Chilean TV, it got pulled. Blog del Morsa [2], (ES) republishes an interview with a Peruvian sociologist in The Peru Chile conflict according to Sinesio López [3]. Sinesio López, among other interesting things, says:
¿Tan frágiles son las relaciones entre Perú y Chile como para que nuestro embajador haya solicitado la suspensión de un documental sobre la Guerra del Pacífico?
Ahí hay que diferenciar algo. Lo que los peruanos tendríamos que reclamar es la devolución de todo lo saqueado por Chile durante la Guerra del Pacífico. Por ejemplo, el patrimonio bibliográfico documental que estaba en la Biblioteca Nacional, el cual constituye la memoria del Perú.
Eso deberíamos reclamar y no la suspensión de documentales.
Claro. Tengo la impresión de que lo que se quiere es defender a una élite incapaz y corrupta que no supo construir acá un estado-nación, que mantuvo al indio excluido y que no pudo, incluso, organizar una Fuerza Armada institucional para enfrentar una situación como la guerra de 1879.
Is the relationship between Peru and Chile so fragile our Ambassador requests the cancellation of the transmission of a documentary on the War of the Pacific?
Something needs to be pointed out. What we Peruvians need to demand is the return of everything looted by Chile during the War of the Pacific. For example, the documents and bibliographic cultural heritage, the memory of Peru, from the National Library .
That's what we should be demanding, not pulling a documentary off the air.
Of course. I get the sense what is being defended is a useless and corrupt elite who didn't know how to create a nation-state here, who excluded the Indian, and who couldn't even organize institutional Armed Forces to confront situations such as the war of 1879.
The post ends with a link to a video of the documentary, also seen here [4].
Bloguiarquía [5] (ES) writes about the subject as well. In As a result of Epopeya and the Peru-Chile problem, [6] he discusses comparison of this conflict with the one between France and Germany and their current good relations.
El objetivo de este post era señalar que una comparación entre ambos casos no era el más adecuado, ya que se ignora sus diferentes antecedentes, que conllevaron consigo distintos incentivos para cooperar. Deseo que los problemas con Chile se acaben, sea o no necesario llegar a los niveles de integración de la UE. Los incentivos a la integración en el caso europeo costó millones de vidas humanas.
The objective of this post is to point out that comparing both cases doesn't make sense, since it doesn't take into account the different origins [of the conflicts]. In turn, they had different incentives for cooperation. I want the problems with Chile to end, with or without reaching the degreee of integration as in the EU. The incentives for European integration cost millions of lives.
Another interesting post on the subject, not just regarding the documentary but how Peruvians view this war, is Peru, Chile, and the legacy of the War of the Pacific [7] written by Martín Tanaka on his blog Virtù e Fortuna [8] (ES). He analyzes what historians in both countries have to say on the matter, and discovers those versions aren't necessarily in keeping with the version of the war taught in schools.
Cada país cuenta la historia de la Guerra del Pacífico a su manera. Por ello, un buen punto de partida es leer qué dicen los historiadores latinoamericanistas más serios. … ¿Qué es lo que vamos a encontrar? Para mí, lo más importante es que la idea de que Chile, para la década de 1870, era un “Estado nación consolidado”, con instituciones fuertes, con una clase “dirigente, no sólo dominante”, un país integrado dentro de un gran proyecto nacional, sin conflictos internos mayores, es simplemente falsa. Diría que esa es la imagen que la historiografía nacionalista chilena ha construido como parte de su “versión oficial” (no es lo que dice la historiografía chilena más seria) y que absurdamente los peruanos repetimos, creo que por ignorancia y porque empata muy bien con nuestra “idea crítica nacional”, la del mendigo sentido en un banco de oro, sometido por poderosos intereses extranjeros y por unas élites indolentes, del que todos se aprovechan.
¿Por qué perdimos la guerra? Yo no creo que haya que rebuscar en explicaciones alambicadas y poco sustentadas sobre la constitución nacional de los países. Si bien soy sociólogo, creo que las explicaciones sociológicas deberían venir después de las militares, si y solo solo si es que resultan insuficientes. Creo que la explicación es simple: las fuerzas armadas chilenas eran más profesionales y estaban mejor equipadas, punto. Y esto era consecuencia de su mayor desarrollo relativo. No tiene nada de raro que el más fuerte venza en una guerra.
Creo que nuestra autoestima nacional quedó mellada porque, en vez de pensar que perdimos porque el otro ejército era superior, nos quedamos con la idea de que perdimos porque fracasamos como Estado nación, porque no estábamos integrados, todo por culpa de unas élites irresponsables, sin considerar que en Chile la situación no era tan distinta, en realidad. Lo que pasa es que este discurso servía bien como crítica a las élites oligárquicas tradicionales, es decir, era un argumento político. … Estas ideas me parecen importantes para no estar “acomplejados” frente a los chilenos. De hecho, a pesar de que nos ganaron la guerra, el Perú se recuperó rápidamente a inicios del siglo XX. Y si miramos varios indicadores de cómo estábamos a inicios de la década de los años setenta, estábamos a la par, un poco por debajo, pero no mucho.
Each country tells the history of the War of the Pacific their own way. Because of this, a good starting point is to read what the most serious Latin Americanist historians have to say [on the matter]. What will we find? Most importantly for me is the notion that, by the 1870s, Chile was a “consolidated nation-state” with strong institutions, a “leading, and not only dominating,” class, an integrated country with a great national vision, and without major internal conflicts, is false.
I would say this is the image painted by nationalist Chilean historians as part of the “official version” (it is not what the most serious Chilean historians have to say) and Peruvians absurdly repeat it, due to ignorance I think, and because it ties in very well with our [own] “national critical idea,” that of being the poor man seated on a bar of gold, dominated by powerful foreign interests and lazy elites, the one everyone takes advantage of.
Why did we lose the war? I don't think you have to seek flowery and poorly-based explanations regarding the national constitution of both countries. Although I'm a sociologist, I believe sociological explanations should come after military ones; if, and only if, those are not sufficient. I think the explanation is simple: the Chilean armed forces were more professional and better equipped, period. And, this was a result of Chile's relative greater development [at the time]. There is nothing odd when the stronger opponent wins the war.
I think our national self-esteem was wounded because, instead of realizing we lost because the other army was better, we got stuck thinking we lost because we were a failure as a nation-state, because we weren't integrated –all the fault of some irresponsible elites–without considering that in Chile the situation was not really so different.
This discourse served well as a criticism of the traditional oligarchical elites; that is, it was a political argument. …These ideas seem important so we don't have so many “complexes” with regards to Chile. In fact, despite their winning the war, Peru quickly recovered at the beginning of the 20th century. And, if we look at various indicators of how we were doing at the beginning of the 1970s, we were [almost] equal; a little below Chile, but not by much.
I quote extensively in this article because it summarizes many ideas that are the bases of how we perceive our neighbors to the south, and vice-versa. It is difficult to construct a relationship between both countries when the perception of “loser and winner” is floating around. It is also difficult when other interests are at play, as the blog marcayuq – crónicas desde un avispero [9] (ES) mentions in Enough historical manipulation!!!!! [10].
¿Cuál es el interés en todo ello? Movilizar la atención de la ciudadanía, quienes hinchados de torpe nacionalismo se dejan llevar tal cual corderitos. Felizmente no son todos… Evidentemente, para nadie de la prensa se le escapa la idea de que hablar de la guerra del Pacífico siempre aumenta el rating. … Lo más interesante es darnos cuenta, quiénes están detrás de todo esto, como para que el tema estalle y cree de la nada una crisis política en ambos países. Lo que
sucede en el Perú es que el tema de la Guerra del Pacífico se ha convertido en un evento comercial y político, altamente beneficioso para quienes lo utilizan. … La guerra del Pacífico no fue más que una guerra de intereses económicos en pos del salitre peruano, boliviano e incluso, chileno. La post guerra con Chile, que parece nunca acabar, es también otra guerra de intereses económicos y políticos. No nos dejemos engañar.
What's the purpose of all of this? Grab the attention of the public who, tired of clumsy nationalism, allow themselves to be led like sheep. Fortunately, not everyone. …Clearly, no one in the media misses the point that talking about the War of the Pacific boosts ratings. …More interesting is finding out who was behind all this so it exploded, creating a political crisis in both countries out of nothing. In Peru, the War of the Pacific has become a complete commercial and political event, highly beneficial for those who employ it. …The War of the Pacific was nothing more than a war of economic interests for Peruvian, Bolivian, and even Chilean, nitrates. The seemingly never-ending post-war with Chile is another war of economic and political interests. Let's not allow ourselves to be fooled [otherwise].
All this psychosocial manipulation has to have some real basis, and sometimes the things our neighbors do are, to put it mildly, very curious. Those who are distrustful have taken to wonder what lies behind all these small acts and attitudes. In his post Chile back on attack [11] in Actualidad Económica del Perú [12] (ES), Alan Fairlie Reinoso tells us:
El Canciller chileno Foxley vuelve a la carga, amenazando y señalando de manera impertinente que si el gobierno peruano nocumple con su compromiso de congelar el tema de límites marítimos, no habrá un avance en los vínculos económicos y de migraciones.
La actitud no sólo refleja soberbia, sino un reclamo explícito a un compromiso que habría adquirido el gobierno peruano y esta incumpliendo. Demuestra que la creación de la Región Arica – Parinacota desconociendo no sólo el problema de límites marítimos, sino de los límites terrestres definidos en el Tratado del 29, no era un hecho aislado. A la actitud cordial y concesiva del Perú, se ha respondido con desplantes, y con una actitud agresiva del que habiendo recibido todo lo exigido, quiere
más.La reacción del Canciller peruano es correcta, pero insuficiente. Esta muy bien que se recuerde que no habrá futuro armonioso en el siglo XXI sin la solución de los límites marítimos. Pero, se debe dar una respuesta digna que acompañe esa declaración, y no poner de nuevo la otra mejilla.
Chilean [Minister of Foreign Relations] Foxley is back on attack, with impertinent signals and threats to the Peruvian government that if Peru doesn't follow through on its committment to freeze the maritime boundary issue, there will be no advances in economic and immigration matters.
This attitude is not only haughty, but there's an explicit demand the Peruvian government comply with a commitment it supposedly made and is not carrying out. It demonstrates the creation of the Arica-Parinacota Region [in Chile], which ignored not only the issues with the maritime boundaries but also those with the land boundaries as defined in the Treaty of 1929, was not an isolated incident. Peru's cordial and conciliatory attitude has been met with rudeness and an agressive attitude by one who, having received everything demanded, wants more.
The reaction of the Peruvian Minister is correct but insufficient. It's good to remember that, without solving the maritime boundary [dispute], there will be no harmonious future in the 21st century. A fitting response accompanying that declaration should be given, instead of once again turning the other cheek.
In the posts, Peru-Chile: Dangerous back and forth [13] and Our [14]assymetries with Chile: What are we gaining Mr. Minister? [14] (ES) the same author delves more deeply into the subject from the economic and commercial exchange perspective, without setting aside the political backdrop.
Joan Tincopa of the blog Población, Desarrollo y Ordenamiento Territorial [15] (ES) republishes an editorial which appeared in the Lima daily El Comercio [16] and in her post dated April 22 [17], gives us the historical counterpoint of the situation:
Ha sido muy oportuna la acción de la cancillería peruana de enviar a la ONU la Ley de Líneas de Bases de Dominio Marítimo, saliéndole así al frente a las pretensiones chilenas de apropiarse indebidamente de territorio que, sin lugar a dudas, le pertenece al Perú.
No solo intenta apropiarse de un área de terreno equivalente a cuatro manzanas a orillas del mar, sino también, siguiendo la línea del paralelo, proyectarla 200 millas mar adentro, con lo cual el área se incrementa exponencialmente. En el documento presentado a la ONU se precisa que la frontera con Chile es el Punto de la Concordia y no el Hito 1 como pretende nuestro vecino del sur. Para ello han venido creando confusión al mezclar dos asuntos que corren por vertientes
separadas: la frontera terrestre y la marítima.El límite terrestre está perfectamente delimitado por el Tratado de Lima de 1929, el Protocolo Complementario y las actas de la respectiva comisión bilateral demarcatoria de 1930. Hay incluso croquis y mapas firmados por el jefe de la delegación chilena, Enrique Brieba, que no admiten cuestionamiento ni discusión (ver mapa 1).
Sin embargo, Chile pretende establecer que el límite no empieza en la orilla del mar y desconocer lo que firmó en las actas de la comisión demarcatoria con referencia al Punto de la Concordia: “Este punto de intersección del arco trazado con la orilla del mar será el inicial de la línea divisoria entre Perú y Chile” (El [enfasís] es nuestro). Y claro, si ambos países llegan al mar, el límite tiene que empezar en su orilla. Pretender soslayarlo es contrario a toda lógica y no podría tener otro sentido que el de aprovecharse de la situación.
The sending to the UN [of the issue regarding] the Maritime Domain Base Lines Law by the Peruvian [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] was a timely action. This way, Peru meets head-on Chilean pretensions of improperly trying to appropriate territory that, without a doubt, belongs to Peru.
Not only does [Chile] attempt to appropriate territory on the coast equivalent to four [square] blocks, but also, to project itself 200 miles into the ocean by following the line of latitude, thereby increasing the area exponentially. In the UN document, the border with Chile is fixed at the [marker known as] the Point of the Concord and not at Marker One, as our southern neighbor contends. As a result, they've been creating confusion by mixing two issues that flow along separate courses: the land border and the maritime one.
The land boundary is perfectly fixed by the 1929 Treaty of Lima, the Complementary Protocol, and the acts of the 1930 Bilateral Commission on Demarcation. There are even sketches and maps signed by the head of the Chilean delegation, Enrique Brieba, that prevent questions or arguments (see map).
Nonetheless, Chile contends the boundary doesn't begin on the coast, and ignores what it signed to on the Commission on Demarcation documents with regards to the Point of the Concord: “The point where this sketched arc intersects with the coast will be the beginning of the dividing line between Peru and Chile” (The [emphasis] is ours.) And of course, if both countries meet on the coast, the boundary has to begin there. To pretend otherwise goes against all logic and couldn't have any purpose other than of taking advantage of the situation.
Those who desire can read more articles about the border problem by different Peruvian columnists in the abovementioned blog.
When former [Peruvian] presidential candidate Ollanta Humala supported a protest march to the border with Chile, it created even more controversy about these issues. Fernando Obregón writing in Pospost [18] (ES) did not view this turn of events with a positive eye. In Ollanta Humala seeks a psychosocial war with Chile [19] (ES), he doesn't mince words:
Cual integrante de una barra brava, piensa ir con la casaquilla nacional y buscar camorra en el hito que divide el Perú con Chile, justo en visperas de que se cumpla un aniversario más de la
guerra que ambos países sostuvieron hace casi 128 años. El acto, es un sicosocial que busca echar sombras contra el próximo encuentro que sostendrán el presidente de Perú, Alan García y la presidenta de Chile, Michelle Bachelet y ya es motivo de preocupación por los medios de ambos países.
Like a member of a gang of hooligans, he plans on going [wearing] the national jersey to look for trouble at the marker that divides Peru from Chile, precisely on the eve of the anniversary of the war both countries fought 128 years ago. This psychosocial act seeks to cast shadows on the upcoming meeting between Peruvian president Alan Garcia and the president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, and is already a cause for concern in both countries’ media.
This position created a debate with Carlos Quiróz in the comments section of his blog, Peruanista [20] (ES/EN), who in Why I support the March to Tacna [21] expressed his support for Humala's attitude and towards the march as an act of civic protest:
Un partido político de oposición ha organizado y apoyado este evento cívico (el Partido Nacionalista y su líder Ollanta Humala), y es por eso que el gobierno peruano les ha dado la espalda. Una jueza peruana ha prohibido a Humala a que se una a la marcha y varios miembros del gobierno de Lima, -incluyendo el mismo canciller- han criticado esta acción, por el hecho de ser organizado por un partido de oposición. No solo se oponen a la marcha, si no que acusan a los activistas de irresponsables, permitiendo que el gobierno de Chile se dé el lujo de advertir a los peruanos que no marchen hacia la frontera.
No por atacar la posición política de Humala y los nacionalistas, se debe ignorar que esta marcha es un acto positivo de acción cívica, y por ello merece el respaldo de todos los peruanos quienes deberían unirse en bien de protejer sus intereses, en vez de continuar atacándose unos a otros. El reclamo por un poco de mar no es simplemente una acción revanchista, sino una acción honorable que hace justicia a tantos que murieron defendiendo la integridad del territorio peruano, el cual es una de las bases de la institucionalidad de Perú como país.
An opposition party (the Nationalist Party and its leader Ollanta Humala) organized and supported this civic event which is why the Peruvian government has turned its back on it. A Peruvian judge has prohibited Humala from joining the march and various members of the government in Lima –including the [Minister of Foreign Affairs]– have criticized it, [solely] because it is organized by an opposition party. Not only are they against the march, but they also accuse the activists of being irresponsible, allowing the Chilean government to give itself the luxury of warning Peruvians from not marching to the border.
While attacking Humala and the Nationalists’ political positions, one shouldn't ignore the fact this march is a positive civil action, and as such deserves the support of all Peruvians who should unite to protect their interests, instead of continually attacking each other. The demand for a bit of ocean is not merely a vengeful action, but an honorable action that brings justice to so many who died defending the integrity of Peruvian territory, which is one of the bases of the institutionality of Peru as a nation.
In another post titled, One Piece of News, Two Versions (Regarding the March to Tacna) [22], Carlos includes two videos of the march in question, one from Peruvian, the other from Chilean, television. For his part, Javier [23] added some of his photos related to the march in Tacna at Flickr [24].
Finally, Amanda Ortíz [25] (ES) writing in Tacna. A March for Peruvianism [26], provides a chronology of the events that took place during the march. And while this subject won't end here, this post will. Until next time.
The image illustrating this post is from Javier [23].
Article translated by Alejandro García [27].