Several media outlets in Africa have already reported the case of two South African men who married each other in the ‘traditional’ style:

However, in Francophone Africa, where homosexuality is still severely penalised in several countries, this event has not been copied.

In Abidjan, capital of Côte d’Ivoire, there has mostly been a jokey tone to comments. On Facebook people joked about the subject, making allusions to emigration by family regrouping:

“Le Mariage pour tous voté à Paris; Enjaillement [réjouissance] dans certaines rues de Babi. Djo le frère Madou peut venir marier [épouser] son frère ABLO et partir avec lui à Bengue, le frère DIGBEU peut venir épouser son ami SERI et PARIS est gagné…

The Côte d’Ivoire is one of the few countries in the region which does not penalise homosexuality. In a short film on YouTube, several Ivoirian internet users nonetheless underlined their fears and a showed a moderate point of view.

Some Ivoirians expressed their incomprehension of homosexuality and the possible consequences of the legalisation of gay marriage:

@MyMaLuyDealBi : Après ce sera au tour de la polygamie pour tous j’espère. Oui c’est cela aussi le mariage, en France ou ailleurs

@Lord225: La prochaine etape c'est d'adopter les enfants que les couples normaux auront fait. Pfff Grand N'importe Quoi #directAN

Gay people in Africa continue to be subject to violence and are sometimes even in danger of death. Homosexuality is still against the law in nearly 40 African countries, the most aggressively so being Uganda and Liberia.

Written by Philippe Léveillée · Translated by Jane Ellis · View original post [fr] · comments (1)
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Preparing a new thatched roof in Mali. Photo by Jean-Marc Desfilhes on flickr (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

As Western economies struggle with rising debt and unemployment, their approach to development and cooperation with low-income countries and emerging markets has taken a twist. It is becoming more clear that sustainable development should not be based on external wealth or redistribution, but must instead be generated at home.

Foreign investment and remittances have long been identified as a crucial source of revenue for poor populations in countries like Mali or Cape Verde. Entire villages have been built out of remittances in Mali, for instance, mainly from immigrants to France. However, this does not mean that these countries are being helped to develop sustainably.

For most African countries, the positive ability to attract capital is often negated by lenient fiscal policies towards foreign investors that strip countries of public revenues to build up their economies. This trend seems was still on the rise worldwide in 2007 according to an OECD report “Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investments”.

A report by Matthew Martin and Nils Bhinda from Development Finance International shows that in Tanzania, for instance, the influx of private capital from global mining companies increased the volume of gold and diamonds sales. However, this failed to produce the expected social benefits, such as increased government revenues or public investment in social infrastructure. In fact, various tax exemptions and fiscal incentives ended up costing Tanzania $140 million USD from 2005-2008.

Remittances: Money at what cost?

A  growing number of poor households worldwide are subsisting on remittances, according to the World Bank. Still the question remains: can these seemingly successful flows of migrants and money secure sustainable development and reduce poverty in the most affected countries?

Remittances from abroad to Mali amounted %3.7 of the countries GDP for the year 2005-2006, and according to some estimates remittances significantly decreased the number of poor in Mali and also reduced inequality. Cape Verde is another nation that has seemingly benefited from emigration as the country with the highest per capita remittances of any African country. With remittances amounting to 8% of the country's GDP, it has even overcome the challenge of establishing banking institutions for the poor on its many islands thanks to financial capital from migrants in Portugal, Brazil and the USA.

Because of such statistics, many international development institutions have attempted to design development policies based on remittance flows, by trying to convert this “subsistence” money into capital for infrastructure. There are some caveats to consider though.

Despite the growth of remittance flows, one should keep in mind that the very concept of remittances originates from a major outcome of global poverty: economic migration. Those who choose to leave their country are often exposed to risks and dangers during the transition (illegal border transfer, human traffickers, social and cultural isolation).

Moreover, remittances from migrants are highly dependent on the economic growth of the host countries. When unemployment in host countries rises, it frequently affects the type of labor available to most immigrants, putting both them and families back home at further risk of precariousness.

Finally, the peer-to-peer nature of remittances is both a blessing and a curse. As Hein de Haas writes in an article for Third World Quarterly in 2005:

The much-celebrated micro-level at which remittances are transferred is not only their strength, but also their main weakness, since this also implies that individual migrants are generally not able to remove general development constraints.

Because of the lack of incentives for locally-produced added value, it appears that remittances based on value created abroad can never be the sole base of a sustainable development strategy for low income countries.

Good measures for sustainable development

There are some measures that can be implemented to support foreign direct investment and remittances towards a more sustainable world.

First, transparency and accountability. With respect to foreign investments, governments should offer proper projections of the benefits for public finance, or projects should not be allowed to take place. Financial policies should encourage a permanent check and balance system for both private and public flows with an obligation of transparency for the source of the revenues and their further use. Transparency, in the form of regular and mandatory publications to civil society should be mandatory.

Low income countries often resort to the setting up Industrial Free Zones (IZF) to spur industrialization and create jobs in strategic locations with mineral resources. The creation of these zones have often led to economic and social instability through a constant race to lower costs, geographical mobility and low-quality production. Therefore if a government chooses to implement an IZF, it should also plan for a rapid conversion of labor and production capacity to evolve with markets.

This concept is all the more important because so far there has been no concerted effort to integrate local products of low income countries and services in global trade. Inter-regional trade should remain the main goal because it provides geographical proximity and reduces vulnerability to the whims of highly mobile multinational companies.

With respect to migration and remittances, a drawback of global inequality is the tendency of qualified students from low income countries to remain in richer countries to pursue careers, a phenomenon also known as the “brain drain“. As the recession takes its toll on employment in Western countries, a “reverse brain drain” effect has emerged for Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco and other countries where there are competitive salaries and working conditions.

It would make sense for policymakers worldwide to start to embrace a simple idiom to ensure sustainable development: the creation of wealth through added value and redistribution must start at home. Policies based on short term incentives, social inequities or external wealth injection might spur growth temporarily, but it is doubtful that they will sustain poverty reduction in the long run.

Written by Rakotomalala · comments (1)
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[All links forward to french articles unless otherwise stated]

As rebel leader Michel Djotodia solidifies his control as the new Central African Republic President [en] and the rebel coalition of Séléka announce their control of capital city Bangui, it is important to understand why the failure of the January 2013 Libreville peace deal [en] between the rebels and then-President Francois Bozize, was predictable.

The original Libreville peace deal, as signed in 2008, stipulated that the opposition that signed the deal would participate in the governing body.

As the Séléka rebels broke the original deal and advanced towards Bangui, France declined François Bozizé's request for army assistance last December to halt the rebels’ advance. This, in turn, forced the Central African President to sign the new Libreville agreements which now imposed a prime minister from the political opposition in a newly formed government. This new government had little chance to succeed because of several shortcomings: one of them is that multiple ministry positions were created to dilute the effective power of the prime minister, another reason is that the rest of the items on the agreement were not followed through (freeing of political prisoners and new census for the electoral lists).

Furthermore, since the signing of the Libreville agreement, the army of pro-Bozizé neighbouring Chad, has been fighting Islamist groups in Mali. Chad and its army has long been an instrumental ally for Bozizé [en] in reaching power and controlling the rebellion.  But Chad's commitment in Mali, stirred another rebellion against Chadian president Idriss Déby himself which wants to remove him from power. It became impossible for Chad to provide further support to Bozizé's army and weakened his grasp on power tremendously.

With this context in mind, let's look at the state of the CAR as the coalition of Séléka submitted a list of eleven demands to President Bozizé while regaining control of several cities.

The French government then called for an emergency meeting at the UN.

Rebels in Central African Republic via wikipedia CC-BY-2.0

On his blog,  Francis Laloupou writes about the challenging birth of a nation in his post Centrafrique, Etat zéro ( translation: Central African Republic, Ground Zero) :

Le premier président centrafricain, Barthélémy Boganda, disparu en 1959, quelques mois après son élection … avait dans un élan visionnaire … imaginé une parade aux prévisibles errements de son pays en militant, en vain, pour la création d’un Etat unique d’Afrique centrale comprenant la Centrafrique, le Cameroun, le Congo et le Gabon.

The first president of the CAR, Barthélémy Boganda, died in 1959, a few months after his election. He had a vision. He imagined a way to prevent the predictable mishaps of his young country. He tried in vain to create a single Central African state that would encompasse CAR, Cameron, Congo and Gabon.

He particularly deplores a history of power struggle between incompetent leaders:

… la Centrafrique aura mis en scène, aux yeux du monde, le spectacle de son inexorable déchéance. Une effarante descente aux abîmes, orchestrée par des régimes aussi indigents que caricaturaux. … Bokassa autoproclamé empereur avec la bienveillance de son compagnon de chasse Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, avant d’être renversé en 1979 par ce dernier … Afin d’éviter toute vacance du pouvoir, l’Elysée avait pris soin d’aménager une place au sieur David Dacko dans l’un des aéronefs transportant vers Bangui les soldats de l’opération « Barracuda ». Déjà, l’histoire bégayait en Centrafrique : Giscard d’Estaing réinstallait au pouvoir, en lieu et place de Bokassa, David Dacko, lui-même ancien chef d’Etat, renversé en 1965 par… Bokassa. Deux ans après, en 1981, David Dacko, qui n’a pas inventé la poudre, sera la victime d’un nouveau putsch portant au pouvoir le général André Kolingba …

… The CAR has displayed in the eyes of the world a show of its inexorable decline. A frightening descent into the abyss, orchestrated by regimes as deficient as cartoonish. … Bokassa, the self-proclaimed emperor,  got the silent approval for his self-proclamation from his hunting companion french president then Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, before being overthrown in 1979 with a push from the same companion the latter. Indeed, in  order to avoid a power vacuum, the french president has arranged for mister David Dacko to take over. In fact, he was in one of the aircraft carrying troops to Bangui during operation « Barracuda ». History was already repeating itself in CAR: Giscard d’Estaing put David Dacko back in power instead of Bokassa; Backo was the former head of state who was overthrown in 1965 by, you guessed it, Bokassa. Two years later, in 1981, David Dacko who was not the sharpest knife in the drawer, fell victim of a new coup by General André Kolingba …

Later on,  Laponou argues that elections in CAR were “democratic” only in name :

En 1993, la Centrafrique, à l’instar de nombre de pays africains, opte pour le multipartisme, et Ange-Félix Patassé accède au pouvoir à la faveur d’élections « démocratiques ».

In 1993, CAR, like many other African countries, opted for a multi-party system, and Ange-Félix Patassé came to power after “democratic” elections.

Sylvain Andzongo explains how many African leaders live in fear of being overhrown. He writes in a post BOZIZÉ, DEBY, SASSOU, OBIANG: Des putschistes dans la hantise d'être victimes de putsch (Bozize, Deby, Sassou and Obiang: the putchists who fear of becoming victims of coups):

Le 15 mars 2003, alors que soit ex-compagnon Ange Félix Patassé est en voyage au Niger, M. Bozizé rentre d'exil et s'empare de Bangui sans coup férir.

March 15, 2003, while his ex-companion Ange Félix Patassé is in holiday in Niger, Mr.Bozizé returned from exile and seized Bangui without resistance.

Joseph Akouissone highlights an important point in his blog post: Centrafrique: Annus Horribilis:

François Bozizé s’est emparé du pouvoir en Centrafrique avec l’aide décisive du gouvernement tchadien. Depuis, la République Centrafricaine vit sous la tutelle d’Idriss Déby, Président du Tchad.

François Bozizé seized power in CAR with the decisive help of the Chad government. Ever since, Central African Republic lives under the guardianship of Idriss Déby, president of Chad.

François Bozizé remained in power for the next ten years. Centrafrique-presse argues in the post:  Mine de rien, le soudard Bozizé fête ce 15 mars 2013, le 10ème triste anniversaire de son coup d’état (Without much ado, former soldier Bozize has now celebrated on March 15, 2013 the 10th anniversary of his sad military coup):

Il avait prétendu au début que c’était juste pour mettre de l’ordre dans le pays … Entre temps, il a organisé deux mascarades électorales en 2005 puis en 2011 qu’il a prétendu avoir gagnées et se prépare à briguer un troisième mandat après 2016 lorsque la rébellion de Séléka est venue faire vaciller son pouvoir en décembre dernier…
En dix ans de gestion du pays, Bozizé a mis la RCA sens dessus dessous ; la RCA est à feu et à sang. Il n’y a plus d’état, plus d’armée, plus assez à manger, plus de pays quasiment. La misère et la pauvreté sont le lot quotidien des fils du pays. Le territoire est mis en coupe réglée et dépecé par des bandes armées étrangères, ougandaises, soudanaises, tchadiennes, sud-africaines …

At first he claimed that it (the coup) was just to keep the country safe … By then, he has organized two fraudulent elections in 2005 and 2011 that he claimed to have won and prepares to seek a third term in 2016, although Séléka rebellion has shaken up his power…
In ten years of running the country, Bozizé has turned CAR upside down and the country is ablaze. There is no more state, no army, not enough food and nearly no more country. Misery and poverty are the daily ongoings of the country's children. The land is being fleeced and butchered by foreign armies from Uganda, Sudan, Chad, South Africa …

The civilian population remains the victim of this conflict. This Red Cross video presents the growing insecurities in the country:

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Dieyna Ba · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
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Following the tragedy, several politicians reacted [fr] to the news, and in doing so, have highlighted just how tough the living conditions can be for talibs.

Hady Ba [fr] explains, on his blog, what being a talib [fr] entails:

Traditionnellement au Sénégal, les parents confiaient leurs enfants à des érudits pour qu’ils leur apprennent d’abord à mémoriser le Coran puis, au fur et à mesure qu’ils grandissent, les sciences religieuses. Durant les premières années de cet apprentissage, ces enfants ne sont pas nourris par le marabout auquel ils sont confiés mais par la communauté toute entière. Chacun de ces enfants a une écuelle et, trois fois par jour, ces élèves qui sont appelés talibés (oui, c’est la même racine arabe que taliban J) font le tour des maisons de la ville ou du village et reçoivent des poignées de nourritures qu’ils recueillent dans ces écuelles et mangent …  Cette éducation était faite pour former des hommes stoïques se contentant de ce qu’ils ont, résistant à la faim et indifférents aux plaisirs de ce bas monde. Elle s’inscrivait dans une certaine vision du monde et dans un réseau social tel que toute la communauté se sentait responsable des enfants errants.

In Senegal, parents would traditionally entrust the care of their children to scholars who would teach them to memorize the Quran and then, as the children grew older, theology. During the first few years of their studies, these children would not be fed by the marabout [translator's note: Quran teacher] to which they were assigned, but by the entire community. Each of these children had a bowl and, three times a day, these students – which are know as ‘talibs’ (yes, the word comes from the same Arabic root as ‘Taliban') – would go from door to door among the houses of the town or the village, receiving handfuls of food that they would gather in their bowls to eat … The tradition was meant to be educational – it was intended to form stoic men who, content with what they have, would resist hunger and be indifferent to the pleasures of this base world. The tradition was based on a particular world-view and on social networks through which the the whole community felt responsible for the wandering children.

Over the course of the last few decades, however, the hardships faced by the talibs have started to become excessive. In its article ‘La détresse des enfants talibés‘ [fr; translator's note: the plight of  talib children], Sentinelles, a Swiss NGO, explains:

Les talibés survivent dans des daaras (écoles coraniques), souvent des habitations de fortune, inachevées, sans eau ni électricité, où les enfants, en surnombre, privés d'hygiène et de soins, s'entassent pour dormir, généralement à même le sol ou parfois sur des nattes, les uns collés aux autres. Beaucoup de daaras fleurissent ainsi, avec à leur tête des marabouts recherchant plus des profits personnels que le bien-être des talibés, devenus pour eux une source de revenus. Ils sont à la merci de leur «maître» qui a tous les droits sur eux. Le sévices corporels violents sont courant durant l'enseignement religieux. Au Sénégal, à peu près n’importe quel musulman peut se dire marabout, et il n’existe aucune loi régissant les daaras, contrairement aux établissements scolaires. Les marabouts sont vénérés et jouissent d’un véritable pouvoir sur la population.

The talib survive in the daaras (Quran schools) – often unfinished, makeshift shelters, without water or electricity, where children, deprived of hygiene and basic care, crowd together to sleep, usually on the floor or sometimes on mats, each child pressed up against the next. Many daaras thrive in this way – under the management of marabouts who are more concerned with their own profits than the talibs’ welfare, the students having become a source of income for their teachers. The talibs are at the mercy of these “masters”, who may do with them what they please – violent beatings are common during a talib's religious education. In Senegal, nearly any Muslim can become a marabout, and – in contrast to other types of schools – there is no law governing the daaras. The marabouts are revered and enjoy very real power over the population.

In response to this tragedy, the government has given instructions on the immediate banning of the practice of begging, believing that at the heart of the problem lies the exploitation of children by organized begging. Leral.net has quoted [fr] Abdoul Mbaye, Prime Minister of Senegal, as follows:

Selon Abdoul Mbaye, cette « mendicité organisée et cette exploitation des enfants en leur faisant vivre des conditions terribles et des risques doivent cesser ». À l’en croire, « c’est parce que les ressortissants sénégalais ne sont pas dupes que certains marabouts vont aller [chercher des enfants] jusque dans les pays limitrophes en Gambie, en Guinée Bissau et au Mali. Le Président de la République a donné des instructions fermes : de telles pratiques doivent cesser. Les marabouts véreux seront chassés et punis… »

According to Abdoul Mbaye, this “organized begging and this exploitation of children by making them live in risk and in terrible conditions must stop.” According to him, “it is because Senegalese nationals are not gullible that some marabouts go [looking for children] in the neighboring countries of Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Mali. The President has given clear instructions on this issue: such practices must stop. Corrupt marabouts will be sought out and punished …

However, as the columnist Dom Bochel Guégan [fr] has pointed out, this is not the first time that the Senegalese government has taken such measures. She would like to believe that the prohibition on begging by children will be effective, however [fr]:

Il est tentant pour certains parents, tentant ou seule issue possible, de confier leur enfant en espérant qu'ainsi, il aura de quoi manger…

Sans compter tous les gamins venus de l'étranger, de Guinée ou d'ailleurs et qu'il faudra rendre à leurs familles, si on les trouve…

En 2010 déjà, Abdoulaye Wade, alors président de la République avait lui aussi annoncé la fin de la mendicité de ces mêmes talibés, poussé par la pression internationale des bailleurs de fond qui avaient posé ce préalable à toute autre aide financière.

La promesse n'aura pas tenu longtemps. Durant quoi ? deux, trois semaines nous avons effectivement constaté la disparition de ces gamins des rues, avant qu'ils ne reviennent, tous, et que les choses reprennent comme avant.

It is tempting for some parents to entrust their children [to a marabout] in the hope that this way, they will not starve. Indeed, this may sometimes be the only possible solution…

Not to mention all the children who have come from abroad – from Guinea or elsewhere – that would need to be returned to their families once they are found…

Already in 2010, Abdoulaye Wade, then President of the Republic, had announced an end to talibé begging. He had been driven by pressure from international donors who had set this as a precondition to further financial aid.

The promise did not last long. How long? We saw the streets kids disappear for two or three weeks and then they came back, all of them, and things once again became as they had been before.

These are not the only difficulties facing the government. As Hady Ba and Dom Bochel Guégan have pointed out, there was also swift backlash from religious leaders. They cite two instances of such opposition:

Quran teachers from Touba, Darou Moukhty and Diourbel have been reported [fr] as stating:

« Aucun daara ne sera fermé… Nous refusons le diktat de l’Etat… L’Etat est dans une logique de règlements de comptes… Le talibé est un petit mendiant et l’Etat un grand mendiant … Nous sommes prêts à regrouper 6.666 daaras pour des prières destructrices … ».

“Not a single daara (ed's note: school in wolof) will be closed … We reject the government's diktat … The government is out to settle scores  … While the talibé is a small beggar, the government is a bigger beggar … We are ready to bring together 6,666 daaras to pray for its destruction … “.

The Rufisque daara Quran teachers' regional collective was reported [fr] to have held a press conference in which they threatened mystical combat against the President.

Some commentators have suggested that the government might introduce religious instruction into the general school curriculum. Serigne Mansour Sy Djamil [fr], a member of parliament and a religious leader, has argued that the government is responsible for the Medina fire. He has accused the government of abandoning Quran schools, leaving them to face poverty so that it can fund its republican [secular] education agenda.

Photograph of a child in a Senegal street taken Dom Bochel Guégan. (reproduced with her permission)

One netizen has reacted [fr] as follows on Facebook:

Ce matin [12 mars]  encore j'ai croisé des enfants, nus pieds, vêtus d'un simple tee-shirt trop grand, l'interdiction n'est bien évidemment pas respectée. Le premier ministre a dit hier que les lois étaient déjà existantes (vrai) et qu'il suffisait de les appliquer. Yako, fokon, espérons.

Still this morning [March 12], I bumped into children, barefoot, wearing nothing but an oversized T-shirt – the prohibition is clearly not being respected. The Prime Minister said yesterday that the necessary laws were already in place (true) and that these need only to be applied. Yako fokon which means let's hope.

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Joel Gilbourd · View original post [fr] · comments (1)
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British security firm G4S will rake in enormous profits due to the crisis taking place in Mali, Libya and Algeria. Recognized as the biggest security firm in the world, the group was downgraded at the time of the Olympic Games in London last year, as a result of its inability to meet the terms of a government contract. However, with the growing instability in Northern and Western Africa, it is expected that the firm will make a strong recovery in the near future.

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Theodora Rowlands · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
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The conflict in the north of Mali pits the Malian army and its allies against many rebels groups fighting for greater autonomy or independence in the region. These groups include Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa, and Ansar Dine, and Tuareg nomads who belong to the political and military Azawad National Liberation Movement.

Let's try to look at what the real causes of the war in Mali are [fr]:

Tout était en place pour que le Mali s’effondre et que le Sahel explose. Affaibli par les politiques d’austérité du FMI, longtemps paralysé par la Françafrique, victime du réchauffement climatique et de multiples sécheresses, le Mali est devenu l’une des pièces centrales du nouveau grand jeu sahélien. Revendication touarègue, djihadistes enrichis par le narcotrafic, déstabilisation libyenne et ambiguïtés algériennes, financements occultes saoudiens, stratégie à court terme des États-Unis et de l’Union européenne… Voici toutes les raisons de la guerre.

Everything was ripe for Mali to collapse and for Sahel to explode. Weakened by austerity policies that had been imposed by the IMF [fr], paralyzed for so long by the policies of Françafrique, and a victim of global warming [fr] and multiple droughts [fr], Mali became one of the key players in the great new Sahelian game. The Tuareg demands; the Jihadis who had become powerful from drug trafficking; the destabilization of Libya and the uncertainty in Algeria; hidden investments from Saudi Arabia; short-sighted strategies of the United States and Europe… These are all the reasons for the war.

Timbuktu residents protest against extremism on Wikipedia CC-License-2.0

How did modern Mali come to be? Mouhamadou el Hady Ba and Pierre Amath Mbaye in their work “The Malian crisis and lessons for Senegal” [fr] explain how Mali emerged from the post-colonial failure of a federation in the region [fr]:

Conscients des risques liés à une fragmentation de la région et suivant leur idéal panafricaniste, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Mamadou Dia, Modibo Keïta et d’autres dirigeants avaient pourtant formé l’idée de reprendre l’ensemble constitué par l’administration coloniale, l’Afrique Occidentale Française, en le portant vers l’indépendance sous la forme d’une fédération. … l’opposition marquée des autorités françaises de l’époque associée à celle de Félix Houphouët Boigny futur Chef de l’Etat ivoirien, réduiront cette fédération à un face à face entre le Soudan français (aujourd’hui Mali)  et le Sénégal, au sein de la Fédération du Mali . Cette tentative échouera sur fond d’options politiques différentes et de compétition pour le pouvoir, avec, en arrière-plan, l’engagement du Mali aux côtés des partisans algériens, lors de leur guerre d’indépendance. Le 20 aout 1960, voit donc s’éteindre avec la dissolution de la Fédération du Mali …

Keenly aware of the risks tied to a fragmented region, and following their Pan-African ideals, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Mamadou Dia, Modibo Keïta and other leaders still had the idea to carry on with the group that had made up the colonial administration known as l’Afrique Occidentale Française, by pushing for independence as a federation. …However, there was strong opposition from the French authorities, which at the time were linked to Félix Houphouët Boigny — an eventual Head of State of Côte d'Ivoire. This gave rise to a power struggle between French Sudan (today Mali) and Senegal, within the Mali Federation. This attempt at federation would eventually fail based on various political options and power struggles, while the Malian engagement in support of Algerian independence played out in the background. August 20, 1960, ends with the dissolution of the Federation of Mali…

Eros Sana on bastamag.net continues in his article, Mali : les véritables causes de la guerre (Mali: the Real Causes of the War [fr]) describing how Mali then experienced a brief window of socialism before a military coup brought a dictator to power:

Nous sommes en 1960, le Mali accède à l’indépendance. Le premier président malien, Modibo Keïta, instituteur et panafricaniste, élu démocratiquement, a à peine le temps d’entamer une profonde réforme agraire avant d’être renversé en 1968 lors d’un coup d’état mené par Moussa Traoré, soutenu par la France. [Les vingt-trois ans de règne seront sanglants]. Moussa Traoré ne se contente pas d’appauvrir et d’affamer son peuple, il mène aussi une forte répression contre la minorité Touareg du Mali. Les Touaregs représentent environ 2 % de la population malienne. Ils sont également présents au Niger, au Burkina-Faso, en Mauritanie, en Libye et en Algérie.

We are in 1960, Mali is gaining independence. The first president of Mali, Modibo Keïta, teacher and Pan-Africanist, democratically elected, barely has time to begin sweeping agricultural reforms before being overthrown in 1968 during a France-backed coup d’état orchestrated by Moussa Traoré. (The 23 years of rule that followed would be bloody). Moussa Traoré was not happy with simply impoverishing and starving his people, he also carried out powerful repressive measures against the Tuareg minority group in Mali. The Tuaregs represented about 2 percent of the Malian population. They are also present in Niger, Burkina-Faso, Mauritania, Libya and in Algeria.

Mouhamadou el Hady Ba and Pierre Amath Mbaye add another important factor to the equation: the rise of drug trafficking [fr]:

L’Afrique de l’ouest est ainsi devenue un espace stratégique de négoce des stupéfiants, à la suite du renforcement de la répression aux Etats-Unis et au Canada. Cette situation va amener les narcotrafiquants à se redéployer vers l’Europe en trouvant de nouvelles routes, et à exploiter le potentiel de corruptibilité de l’Administration des Etats de la région pour assurer leur tranquillité. En 2009, la drogue était expédiée de Colombie, du Venezuela et du Brésil, et arrivait par les ports de Guinée Bissau et du Cap-Vert au Nord, et ceux du Ghana au Sud. Les cargaisons étaient ensuite réparties entre le Nigéria, la Guinée, le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, puis, remontaient vers le Maroc et l’Algérie. En novembre de la même année, le monde entier découvrait l’atterrissage clandestin dans le nord du Mali d’un triréacteur Boeing 727 chargé de cocaïne, l’évènement donnant lieu à une affaire popularisée sous le nom d’Air Cocaïne, avec des ramifications en Amérique du sud et en Europe. Un symbole stupéfiant d’insertion de l’Afrique dans l’économie mondialisée, pourrait-on dire avec malice, si la situation n’était à ce point inquiétante.

And so, West Africa became a strategic point for the drug trade, following heightened efforts to snuff it out in the US and Canada. This situation would eventually cause drug traffickers to focus their efforts more on Europe by finding new routes, and to exploit the state administrations of the region that were susceptible to corruption, in exchange for guaranteeing peace. In 2009, drugs were exported from Colombia, Venezuela, and Brasil, and arrived at ports in Guinea-Bissau and Cape-Verde in the north, and at those of Ghana in the south. The cargo was then split up between Nigeria, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, and reassembled once again near Morocco and Algeria. In November of the same year, the entire world would come to know of the clandestine landing of a three-engine Boeing 727 loaded with cocaine. The event gave rise to a scandal popularly known as Air Cocaine, which had repercussions in South America and Europe. A confounding symbol of Africa's insertion in the world economy, one may say mischievously, if the situation had not been so perplexing.

With respect to Saudi influence, Sahel expert Maurice Freund explained in an interview on website Afrik.com that Islamic extremism began to take root more than two decades ago when Saudi-financed organizations helped Malian people where their government failed them. “It's too late for Mali, we should have acted 20 years ago!” he said:

Il y a déjà plus de 20 ans, je rencontrais des Pakistanais et des Soudanais financés par les Saoudiens qui prêchaient le wahhabisme sous forme d’organisation humanitaire, en effectuant la construction de puits, de mosquées. Ils comblaient les carences des autorités dans le domaine social. D’où la prolifération des djihadistes. Le développement du wahhabisme dans le nord-Mali a commencé il y a déjà 25 ans.

More than 20 years ago now, I met Pakistanis and Sudanese people financed by Saudis. They preached [ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam] Wahhabism through humanitarian organizations by building wells and mosques. They made up for the shortcomings of the authorities on the social level. Hence the proliferation of the Jihadist movement. Wahabbism in the north of Mali began 25 years ago.

While trying to trace the genesis of the Djihadi movement in Sahel,  Abou Djaffar explains on his blog that:

En 1996, pourtant, il ne s’agissait même pas d’un front secondaire, mais simplement de l’arrière-cour de la guerre civile algérienne.

In 1996, however, it wasn't even a question of a being secondary front in the Algerian civil war, but it was in fact the Algerian civil war that just extended in the backyard.

Repercussions [fr] of the overthrow of Muammar Kadhafi, who supplied Mali with large amounts of funding, during the Libyan Civil War in 2011 added to the volatile situation brewing in Mali, Eros Sana writes:

En plus d’investissements lourds, Kadhafi multiplie les financements à petite échelle : écoles, dispensaires ou routes dans l’ensemble du Mali. Lorsque Kadhafi et son régime disparaissent, ce sont d’un côté de très nombreuses armes et des centaines d’hommes aguerris qui s’exilent dans le Sahel ; et de l’autre, des flux de plusieurs centaines de milliers d’euros qui se tarissent. Pour un pays dont plus de la moitié de la population vit avec moins d’un dollar par jour, c’est une importante manne qui s’envole. Après avoir appuyé militairement le renversement du régime libyen, les puissances de l’Otan auraient dû prévoir ce vide causé par la chute du colonel et le combler. Cela n’a pas été fait.

Aside from large investments, Kadhafi increased financing on the smaller scale: schools, health centers, roads throughout all of Mali. When Kadhafi and his regime disappeared, there was, on one side a large number of weapons, and hundreds of hardened men who were exiled in the Sahel region; and on the other side the evaporation of several hundred thousands of euros that had once flowed in. For a country where half of the population lives on less than one dollar a day, it is an important source of bread and butter that disappears. After having lent military support to the overthrow of the Libyan regime the NATO forces should have foreseen this vacuum that was was caused by the fall of the Colonel and worked to address it. That was not done.

Twitter user @Abdou_diarra foresaw on his blog the creation of new regions [fr] in northern Mali prior to the military coup that would overthrow President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012:

Blogger ASKIAMOHAMED writes about the Tuareg [fr] and their demands::

Elle commence le 17 janvier 2012 soit 2 mois avant le coup de force à Bamako, les rebelles attaquent Menaka, Tessalit et Aguel’hoc avant d’y être chassés par l’armée malienne.
Un véritable jeu de chaises musicales a lieu durant près de un mois dans les villes à la frontière algérienne entre l’armée, le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) ainsi que le groupe Ansar Dine et leurs alliés d’ al Qaida au Maghreb islamique.

Le massacre de militaires maliens par les rebelles et leurs alliés à Aguel’hoc, à l’arme blanche va profondément choquer le peuple malien et mettre à jour les failles de l’armée et l’animosité de cette rébellion.

Début avril le coup d’état consommé le MNLA et leurs alliés islamistes contrôlent les deux tiers du Mali, l’armée malienne désorganisée par le coup ayant déserté.

En effet le coup d’état a désorganisé la chaine de commandement de l’armée et a mis à jour la fragilité de cette dernière et a donc conduit à cette débandade ou « retrait stratégique ».

Le MNLA proclame l’indépendance de cette zone le 6 avril 2012 car elle considère que c’est le berceau de la civilisation touareg, un fait inédit dans l’histoire car aucun peuple nomade ne s’est jamais réclamé d’un territoire avec des frontières bien dessinées.

De plus historiquement sur cette terre il y avait l’empire Songhaï fondé à Koukia au 7ieme siècle, par les Sonrhaïs, et les Berbères et dirigés par le chef Za el-Ayamen, qui fuyaient devant l’invasion arabe.

Ce métissage entre Sonrhaïs et Berbères donnera la dynastie des Dia. Puis vint la dynastie de Sonni ali ber et des Askia avec Gao pur capitale, avant de sombrer au 16ieme siecle sous l’invasion marocaine. Il y a également eu l’empire peul du Macina et l’empire toucouleur au 19ieme siècle. De plus de nombreuses tribus, Bozos (pécheurs) et dogons peuplaient cette zone.

Donc il n’y a aucune légitimité historique à cette demande.

It begins on the January 17, 2012, about two months before the showing of force at Bamako, the rebels attack Menaka, Tessalit, and Aguel’hoc before being driven out by the Malian Army.

A bonafide game of musical chairs takes place for almost one month in the towns on the Algerian border between the army, the National Azawad Liberation Movement (MNLA) as well as the group Ansar Dine and their Al-Qaeda allies from the Islamic Maghreb.

The massacre at knifepoint of Malian soldiers by Malian rebels and their allies at Aguel’hoc, severely shocks the Malian people and bring to light the failings of the army and the bitterness of this rebellion.

At the start of April, the coup [against President Amandou Toumani Touré] already executed, the MNLA and their Islamic allies control two-thirds of Mali. The Malian army, having been taken by the surprise by the coup, have deserted.

In fact, the coup ambushed the chain of command within the army and highlighted its vulnerability thereby driving this disbanding or “strategic withdrawal”.

The MNLA proclaims the independence of this zone on the April 6, 2012 because it believes that the region is the cradle of the Tuareg civilization, an unprecedented act because no nomadic people have ever claimed a territory with precisely defined borders.

Moreover, historically in this region there was the Songhai empire founded at Koukia in the 7th century by the Songhai and Berbers and led by chief Za el-Ayamen. They fled before the Arab invasion.

The mixing of Songhai and Berber people would eventually give rise to the Dia dynasty. After this came the Sonni Ali Ber dynasty and the Askia with Gao being the capital, before succumbing, in the 16th century to the Moroccan invasion. There was also the Massina Empire and the Toucouleur Empire of the 19th century. Not to mention various tribes, Bozos (a tribe of fishermen) and Dogons inhabited this zone. Therefore, there is no historical legitimacy to this demand.

It is in this context that France is intervening [fr] in its former colony to oust the Islamists, a move known as Operation Serval.

Though some think that France's intervention in Mali is driven purely by self interest, such as the author of this article entitled Nouvelles de la turbulence (News of the Unrest) [fr], such speculation [fr] should be treated with caution:

… il y aurait plus d’uranium au Mali qu’au Niger, et après avoir sécurisé les ressources libyennes (en excluant les émergents), les Français chercheraient à faire de même dans le Sahel. … qu’on ne fait pas de guerre pour des ressources qui ne sont encore que spéculatives, puisqu’on n’en connaît pas la quantité réelle et qu’on n’en voit pas encore la couleur. Arguments assez naïfs mais peut-être corrects pour le cas d’espèce.

Supposedly, there could be be more uranium in Mali than in Niger, and after having secured the Libyan resources (not counting those currently being currently explored), the French would be seeking to do the same thing in the Sahel region. …We wouldn't go to war for “potential” resources unless we knew the real quantity and quality of these resources. The resource-speculating arguments might be naive at first but perhaps not entirely off-base in this case.

Wirriyamu responds in this article Ne pas laisser dire (3) [fr] (Do not let it be said):

Je suis convaincu désormais que certains trouvent totalement anormal le soutien de l’opinion malienne, et au-delà africaine, à cette intervention. Ils mettent cette adhésion le plus souvent sur le dos de la naïveté ou de l’ignorance, c’est selon. Ce qui montre que beaucoup, trop nombreux à mon goût, pensent encore que les Africains n’ont pas leur place sur le chemin de l’histoire qui se fait sans eux, hors d’eux. Bref, ils subissent tout.

I am now convinced that some find the support of the Malian public, not to mention African support for this intervention, to be completely abnormal. They usually place the blame for this support squarely on the back of naivete or ignorance, as the case may be. This shows that many — too many for my taste — still think that Africans have had no active role in the course of history [fr]. It happens without them. In sum, they are victims.

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Danielle Martineau · View original post [fr] · comments (2)
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If we were to judge the impact of the intervention in Mali by the jubilant euphoria of liberated populations, then it should be obvious that by deploying so slowly, African countries failed Mali once again ….. All the posturing by African heads of state and yet they could not achieve a single action of their own to slow down the Islamists in Mali.

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Abdoulaye Bah · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
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The Malian army has committed serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) during the ongoing conflict against armed groups, including extrajudicial executions of civilians, according to testimonies collected by Amnesty International during a ten days mission in Mali.

(more…)

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Abdoulaye Bah · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
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French soldier in Mali wearing a scarf with death's head motif – from odieux connard – public domain

In fact, this image of a French soldier wearing a scarf with a depiction of death’s face has become a symbol to mark the start of French military operations in Mali. But why has this soldier made such an impression on the imaginations of Net surfers?

Reasons for the Controversy

Operation Serval is unfolding to a mixed reception of welcome greetings from the majority of the Malian population and accusations of neocolonialist intervention from others. Its goal is two-fold: protect the civilian population and take back cities being held by Jihadist groups. This explains why the French army is facing a huge challenge in terms of a communications strategy. But should we really be having a scandal over a scarf when an armed conflict that will claim many victims is taking place? This is what the author of the blog “Odieux Connard” points out in his post, “the scarf of war”:

Aussi, l’indignation a fait son chemin, et l’un après l’autre, de courageux militants du web se sont sentis dans l’obligation de hurler au scandale et de demander à l’état-major de réagir pour que soit sanctionné l’individu dont le choix d’imprimé sur le foulard le faisait ressembler à « Ghost », personnage portant un passe-montagne à l’imprimé proche et tiré du jeu vidéo « ultra violent » Call of Duty. [..] Heureusement, nombreux ont été celles et ceux à tenter de désamorcer la polémique en affirmant que le militaire ne faisait que « se protéger du sable », ce qui est un argumentaire pertinent, tant en fait qu’il le porte pour se protéger sur sable, du soleil ou même fumer la pipe ne change pas grand chose, le vrai problème étant que visiblement, il y a des gens à qui on a pas dû bien expliquer en quoi consistait la guerre.

Thus, indignation has made the rounds, and one after another, brave militants of the Web have felt obligated to cry scandal and ask the military brass to do something to punish the man whose choice of scarf design made him look like Ghost, a character wearing a similar-looking balaclava in the “ultraviolent” video game, Call of Duty…. Fortunately, there were many who tried to calm the waters by asserting that the soldier was just “protecting himself from the sand,” which is a valid point. But whether he was wearing it to protect against the sand, the sun, or to smoke a pipe doesn’t really matter. The real problem is that clearly, some people were not told exactly what a war is all about

Obsession with War Imagery

This aggravated focus on the image that the military intervention might project is also annoying to Electrosphère. He writes:

Cette image devint vite du pain béni pour une bienpensance de tout poil qui, étrangement, ne trouva rien à redire sur l'arme porté par ce soldat ou sur ses activités quotidiennes. Il est donc utile de rappeler certaines réalités du métier de légionnaire et de la guerre aux moralisateurs 2.0 (et autres bienpensants sous Windows/Android/iOS) qui « veulent en savoir plus mais pas trop », et ce, peu importe que l'on approuve, désapprouve ou questionne l'intervention française au Mali contre les milices djihadistes. On peut sincèrement s'interroger sur les fondements d'une polémique visant un foulard qui susciterait tout au plus de l'indifférence, de l'hilarité, des sarcasmes ou de l'admiration dans la cour d'un lycée à Paris ou lors d'un vernissage à Lyon. Je suis d'autant plus frappé que la hiérarchie militaire (dans des bureaux feutrés et chauffés/climatisés à Paris) veut infliger des sanctions à ce soldat

The image has quickly become a gold mine for the politically correct of all stripes who, strangely, have no objections to the weapon being carried by this soldier or his daily actions. So this is a good time to recall certain realities about the job of legionnaire and the act of war to the sanctimonious 2.0 (and other PC people using Windows/Android/iOS) who ‘want to know more, but not too much,’ regardless of whether you approve, disapprove, or question the French intervention in Mali against the Jihadi militias. You really have to wonder about the reasons for a controversy based on a scarf that, at most, might draw indifference, laughter, sarcasm, or admiration in the halls of any high school in Paris or artist’s opening in Lyon. I am even more surprised that the military structure in its cozy, climate-controlled offices in Paris wants to apply sanctions to this soldier.”

Aurélien Legrand would like people not to be so quick on the draw in reacting to the slightest hint of poor taste appearing on the web:

Ce qui me dépite le plus, c’est l’épidermisme réactionnel, les torrents de bonnes pensées déversés aussi sec sur le Net avec une élaboration qui aurait bénéficié d’un peu de maturation. [..] Notre environnement culturel ne nous aide pas. Lors de la prise d’otages d’In Amenas, il fut lâché sur les chaines d’informations des vidéos prises au téléphone portable, et ce en un temps record. Images désertiques, corps abattus.. [..] On veut de l’info, on veut que ça claque, mais pas trop quand même.

What annoys me the most is the knee-jerk reaction, the torrents of correct thinking gushing immediately over the Net when their words would have benefited from a bit of mulling over first. Our cultural milieu doesn’t help. During the hostage-taking in In Amenas, videos taken by cell phones were released to the media in record time. Barren images, beaten bodies… We want information, we want it to be striking-just not too striking.”

Unfortunately, the conflict in Mali looks like it is going to last a while. So it will be interesting to see if the debate over events will surpass the debates over the combatants' outfits and finally come around to the stakes and consequences for the local population.

Written by Rakotomalala · Translated by Diana Rhudick · View original post [fr] · comments (1)
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A daily skype conversation (in french)  between Awa Traoré in Bamako and Anne Morin in France (via @annagueye)

Anne Morin and Awa Traoré exchange on daily life in Bamako, fragile wages, cost of living and political uncertainty as the war rages on in the country.

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Jihadis venture capitalism extended to an even more lucrative business: kidnapping western hostages all over the Sahara yielded over 90 Million Euros over a decade [..] The modus operandi was very simple: why get killed trying to create an Islamist emirate in “apostate-ruled” neighboring countries when you can build your own sanctuary AND have the West pay for it?

Nasser Weddady unpacks the reasons for the current troubles in Mali. He opines that the roots of the problem are more complex than the existing narratives in the media lead us to believe.

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The French military intervention in Mali, known as Operation Serval [en] started on January 11, 2013 following the advance of terrorists groups towards Bamako. Lauded by a substantial part of the Malian population [en] and many outside observers, the military intervention diverts, however, from the non-interventionist line professed by French President Hollande in Africa.

View L'intervention militaire étrangère au Mali in a larger map
Google interactive map of the Malian conflict by Jeune Afrique

Francis d'Alençon wonders why French interventions in Africa do not raise protests around the world:

Bizarre, bizarre… L’intervention française au Mali ne dérange personne alors que des actions américaines similaires soulèveraient des tempêtes de protestation… De l’avantage de ne pas être une super puissance.

This is odd… The french intervention in Mali does not bother anyone whereas similar actions by the USA would have raised a storm of protests.. There are perks to not being the world's top super power.

To illustrate his point, he quotes from the Cech newspaper Lidové noviny :

Les Français sont intervenus plus de 50 fois en Afrique depuis 1960. Ils ont combattu au Tchad, dans la guerre non déclarée avec la Libye, protégé les régimes de Djibouti et de République Centrafricaine des rebelles, empêché un coup d’état aux Comores, sont intervenus en Côte d’Ivoire. Que ce soit pour préserver des intérêts économiques, protéger les ressortissants français ou démontrer le statut de grande puissance du pays, les locataires de l’Élysée, de gauche comme de droite, ont fréquemment manifesté leur penchant pour les actions unilatérales. … Pourtant personne n’a jamais protesté. … Si les États-Unis intervenaient avec une telle véhémence, il y aurait des protestations interminables en Europe. Et les ambassades américaines verraient défiler des diplomates fâchés, à commencer par les Français.

The French have now intervened more than 50 times in Africa since 1960. They fought in Chad, in the war with Libya, protected regimes in  Djibouti and the Central African Republic from rebels, prevented a coup in the Comoros and intervened in Côte d'Ivoire. Whether to preserve economic interests, protect French nationals or showcase the still imposing power of France, the main tenants of the Palais de l'Élysée, either from the left or from the right wings, have frequently expressed their penchant for unilateral action. But … nobody has ever protested. If … the United States intervened in such a manner, there would be an endless sequence of protests in Europe. U.S. embassies would see angry diplomats coming through their doors, starting with the French ones.

Map of the Tuareg rebellion in Azawad, Northern Mali showing rebel attacks as of April 5, 2012 (CC-BY-3.0)

Below is a chronology of these interventions [There are indeed quite a few of them but contrary to what the Cech newspaper stated, there were less than 50 french interventions in Africa ]. It is based on two articles:  one is a review written by  Nestor N’Gampoula  for Oeil d'Afrique and  another one by Jean-Patrick Grumberg for Dreuz Info. Grumberg adds that most of the French interventions in Africa took place on former colonial soil :

In 1964, airborne french troops landed in Libreville, Gabon after an attempted coup against the regime back then.

From 1968 to 1972, French troops took part in the fight against the rebellion in the Tibesti region in northern Chad.

In 1978 in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), 600 French legionnaires went into the town of Kolwezi, in the south-east to help thousands of Africans and Europeans threatened by Katangan rebels. The mission was in response to a call for help made by President Mobutu Sese Seko to help his country. The operation cost the lives of five legionnaires, but allowed the evacuation of 2700 Westerners.

In 1979 in CAR, Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa is removed by French paratroopers during the Operation Barracuda.

From 1983-1984 in Chad, France undertook Operation Manta, a 3,000 men strong operation to face armed rebels supported by Libya. Two years later, another French military action, composed of mostly aerial attacks called “Operation Epervier“, was deployed after an anti-government attack.

In Comoros in 1989, after the assassination of President Ahmed Abdallah and the takeover of the country by the French mercenary Bob Denard, about 200 French soldiers arrived in the country to force them to leave the country.

In 1990, Paris sends troops to Gabon in Libreville and Port-Gentil in reinforcement of the French contingent after violent riots erupted. The operation allowed the evacuation of some 1,800 foreigners.

In 1991 in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), the Belgian and French troops managed to evacuate foreigners after violent riots and looting occurred in the country.

In 1991 still, French troops based in Djibouti help the Afar rebellion to disarm Ethiopian troops that had crossed the border following the overthrow of Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam.

In 1994, French and Belgian soldiers evacuate Europeans while Rwanda Hutus massacred hundreds thousands of Tutsis. Later in the year, some 2,500 French soldiers, supported by african troops, launched “Operation Turquoise“, described as a humanitarian effort, in Zaire and in eastern Rwanda.

In 1995, a thousand men involved in Operation Azalea ended another attempted coup against Comorian President  Said Mohamed Djohar by Bob Denard.

In 1996 in the Central African Republic (CAR), operation Almandin secured the safety of foreigners and the evacuation of 1,600 people after the army mutinied against President Ange-Félix Patassé. The following year in 1997, specifically after the murder of two French soldiers, a French operation against the mutineers was mandated in Bangui (Central African Republic).

The same year, 1997, some 1,200 French soldiers rescued French and African expatriates during fighting between the Congolese army and supporters of the military leader Denis Sassou Nguesso, now President of the Republic of Congo.

In 2002, French forces undertook Operation Licorne to help Westerners trapped by a military uprising that effectively divided Côte-d’Ivoire in two regions.

In 2003, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Operation Artemis in Ituri  secured the area and put an end to ongoing massacres. This was followed by the deployment of 2,000 peacekeepers,  80% of which were French.

In 2004 in Côte-d’Ivoire, France destroyed the small Ivorian airforce after government forces bombed a French base.

In 2008 a new French intervention strengthens the regime of Chadian President Idriss Deby and evacuated foreigners while rebels from neighboring Sudan attacked.

In March 2011 in Libya had the French airforces were the first to bomb Gaddafi forces after the vote at the United Nations authorized intervention in Libya to protect civilians caught up in the rebellion against Gaddafi. NATO took command of the overall mission on March 31, a mission that helped the Libyan rebels to defeat the forces of the government and take power.

In 2011 in Côte-d’Ivoire,  French forces alongside UN forces tip the balance in favor of Ouattara during the civil war. The war broke out after the refusal of Laurent Gbagbo to resign and accept the verdict of the election that pronounced Alassane Ouattara as president.

France had decided to break with his role as “policeman of Africa” by refusing to intervene again in the Central African Republic  where François Bozizé (former army chief who came to power by overthrowing the elected president Ange-Félix Patassé on March 15, 2003) faced a rebellion uprising. Little did he know that the events in Mali would force his hands :

In 2013 in Mali,  French bombarded Islamist rebels after they tried to expand their powerbase  towards the Malian capital, Bamako. France had already warned that control of the north of Mali by the rebels posed a threat to the security of Europe.

At the same time, France has mounted a commando operation to try to save a French hostage held by al Shabaab militants in Somalia, also allied with al-Qaeda. The hostage was  killed by the militants.

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Rakotomalala · View original post [fr] · comments (6)
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We must regroup so that airplanes can tell us apart from the targeted ismalists fighters who will be on the move.

Tuareg refugees in Borj and Timeaouine in Northern Mali are hurrying to gather around their family members in order to avoid airstrikes by French planes against islamist groups, Tamoudre reports [fr]. Tamoudre adds that Tuaregs are in favor of the military intervention but that they should be part of the post-intervention stabilization.

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The year 2012 was marked by armed conflicts in Mali, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in the Central African Republic (CAR). There were elections in Senegal, as well as in Quebec and France. Demonstrations for change took place in Chad as well as Madagascar and Togo. Debate raged on topics such as immigration, the economic crisis and equal marriage rights. All this took place against a backdrop of major changes in the ways of sharing information.

In the first part of our 2012 review, we recap what was an eventful year in Francophone countries with the help of Global Voices contributors:

The future of Mali  (by Marc-André Boisvert) 

A long chain of events completely devastated the country in 2012 as a Tuareg rebellion was followed by a military coup and the fall of North Mali, which was subsequently captured by Islamist groups. There have been endless political military shake-ups: during this one year, Mali's well-polished international image as a model of democracy and development has been completely shattered, leaving the country destabilised, broken and neglected.

Mali begins Touareg dialogue. Image by Flickr user Magharebia (CC BY 2.0)

A year ago in Mali tweets, facebook posts and blogs were mainly personal. At the start of 2012 the only political content was from candidates honing their campaign strategies for the presidential elections (subsequently cancelled) expected to take place that April.

During 2012 Malians took over social networks. More effective than the mainstream media, internet users shared images of amputations committed by Islamists under the hashtag #Mali and exchanged views on the new powers, notably on messaging list Malilink.

The Northern Citizens Collective (COREN) and the Cri de Cœur collective mobilised Malians and their allies to send humanitarian aid to occupied regions. Social networks were no longer simply a tool for sharing people's impotence faced with the atrocities occurring, rather, they were used to organise people, to rise up and refuse to accept the situation.

The people of Mali weren't just waiting around for outside intervention – the internet is proof of that.

Passing crisis of transformation of society? 

The economic crisis was the central theme of the 2012 French election. After nearly four years of the crisis the question was, rather that it being a temporary crisis, were we witnessing a structural transformation of society and the way it functions?

Innovative ideas emerged on the possible ways society could evolve with regard to the current economic context. Stanislas Jourdan enlightened us with ideas exchanged on various approaches which could transform the existing paradigms. The direct democracy team initiative for a guaranteed basic income in Switzerland was part of this:

L'initiative populaire « pour un revenu de base inconditionnel » propose d'inscrire dans la constitution fédérale « l'instauration d'une allocation universelle versée sans conditions » devant «permettre à l'ensemble de la population de mener une existence digne et de participer à la vie publique ». La loi réglerait le financement et fixerait le montant de cette allocation. Le revenu de base est inconditionnel : il n'est subordonné à aucune contre-prestation. [..] Comment le financer? Par l'impôt direct sur le revenu et la fortune, par l'impôt indirect sur la consommation (la TVA), par un impôt sur les transactions financières, et surtout par le transfert des ressources consacrées au financement de l'AVS, de l'AI, de l'aide sociale et des autres revenus de substitution inférieurs au montant du revenu de base.

Human reasons to work by freeworldcharter.org via active rain used with permission

The Occupy Movement was started in North America, and among other aims, worked to remove debt from families and students by crowdfunding, similar to the way that governments aided the banks during the subprime mortgage crisis:

[It] would create fiat money in the same way as with Quantitative Easing, but would direct that money to the bank accounts of the public with the requirement that the first use of this money would be to reduce debt. Debtors whose debt exceeded their injection would have their debt reduced but not eliminated, while at the other extreme, recipients with no debt would receive a cash injection…

Rebels without a cause?

Whether the M23 rebels in the DRC, the Seleka Coalition in the Central African Republic or Islamist groups in Mali, groups rarely claim a clear political ideology or uniformity of operation between their various factions. These armed groups have strongly expanded their spheres of influence in 2012, establishing a definite lever for negotiations in the stabilisation process in their respective regions. As noted by Julie Owono, the timing of the progression of attacks in the CAR suggests that financial stakes have changed the deal regarding short-term objectives of the Seleka rebels. In the DRC, Anna Gueye detailed the complex historical context of the M23 rebellion and its recent evolution. The financial stakes in the Kivu and Katanga regions are extremely high. The tragic new feature in 2012 was the expansion of the conflict and the humanitarian disaster to areas with high potential for intensification of the violence. The remarkable initiatives of the civilian population did much to protect the health and the social cohesion of populations weakened by these conflicts.

Written by Rakotomalala · Translated by Jane Ellis · View original post [fr] · comments (2)
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Lawless and godless men — who hide behind Shariah and demands for Tuareg independence — are now beating and raping women and conscripting children to fight their “holy” war. And the greatest tragedy is that people are starting to get used to it [..] President Obama must not allow northern Mali to become a hotbed of terrorists and drug traffickers that poses a danger to the entire world. The United States has intervened in less dire situations. I call upon its conscience. Please help us get our families out of their wretched distress.

Oumou Sall Seck, mayor of Goundam, in northern Mali wrote about the need for the United States to intervene in Mali in an op/ed for the NY Times. Dr Akory Ag Ikhnane disagrees and suggests that a “military operation would quickly make all these movements forget their differences.”

Written by Rakotomalala · comments (0)
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