Senegalese authorities have expelled Chadian journalist and blogger Makaila Nguebla, an opponent of his country's President Idriss Déby [en] who has ruled Chad for more than two decades, to neighboring Guinea after refusing to grant him political refugee status.

Nguebla, who was living in exile in Senegal's capital city of Dakar since 2005, was deported on May 8, 2013. He settled in Senegal after being arrested in Tunisia in 2005; thanks to international pressure, Tunisian authorities did not deport him back to Chad, as he explains in this YouTube video:

Global Voices had the opportunity to interview Nguebla by phone after he was expelled. He began by telling the story of his transfer to Conakry, the capital city of Guinea:

Mes ennuis ont commencé le lendemain du départ du ministre de la Justice tchadien Jean-Bernard Padaré au Sénégal où il était venu rencontrer les autorités en vue du procès de l’ancien président tchadien Hissène Habré. Jean-Bernard Padaré a rencontré le ministre de la justice et chef de l’état sénégalais seul sans la présence d’aucun autre officiel tchadien. Il a quitté Dakar le dimanche 5 mai. Le lundi 6 mai, la Division de la surveillance du territoire sénégalaise (DST) me convoque pour le mardi 7 mai à 15H. Je me rends à la convocation en présence d’Amnesty International Sénégal à qui il est demandé de quitter les lieux. Je reste donc seul avec eux.
Ils me mettent dans un avion pour Conakry dans la nuit du mardi au mercredi. Une « maman » me voyant pleurer durant le vol me prend sous son aile : elle m’aide à passer les formalités de police une fois à Conakry – les autorités sénégalaises n’avaient pas informé leurs homologues guinéens. Je suis actuellement logé chez cette dame dans les mêmes conditions que les Guinéens : coupures d’électricité le soir et connexion internet avec une clé qui marche à peine.

Makaila Nguebla (MNG): My troubles began the day after Chadian Minister of Justice Jean-Bernard Padaré left Senegal where he had come to meet the authorities in connection with the trial of former Chadian President Hissène Habré. Jean-Bernard Padaré had a private talk with the minister of justice and the Senegalese head of state without the presence of any other Chadian official. He left Dakar on Sunday, May 5. Monday, May 6, the Surveillance Division of Senegal summoned me to their offices for Tuesday, May 7 at 3 p.m. I went to the appointment accompanied by members of Amnesty International Sénégal who were asked to leave. Therefore, I remained alone with them. They put me on a plane to Conakry on the night of Tuesday to Wednesday. A “Mama” who saw me crying during the flight took me under her wing. She helped me through the police formalities once we arrived in Conakry–the Senegalese authorities had not informed their Guinean counterparts of my arrival. I am currently staying with this lady and I live in the same conditions as the Guinean people: power cuts in the evening and Internet connection with a key that barely works.

Global Voices (GV): How would you explain that Senegal, who has never expelled any political protesters, gave in so easily on something that looks like pressure from the Chadian authorities?

Makaila Nguebla : Le conflit au Mali a donné une nouvelle autorité à Idriss Deby, notamment parce que l’armée tchadienne est la seule à connaître parfaitement le terrain et la seule des armées africaines à être en mesure de soutenir effectivement l’armée française. De plus, grâce à l’argent du pétrole tchadien, Idriss Deby a pu contribuer au financement de la campagne de Macky Sall au Sénégal. Dans les négociations sur le dossier Hissène Habré, il est demandé que l’on me livre aux autorités tchadiennes. J’ai été arrêté en Tunisie en 2005 je ne dois qu’à la pression internationale de ne pas avoir été expulsé vers le Tchad.

MNG: The conflict in Mali [en] has given Idriss Deby a new weight, especially due to the fact that the Chadian army is the only one to perfectly know the ground and the only African army able to effectively support the French army. In addition, due to the money earned with the Chadian oil, Idriss Deby was able to support financially [Senegal President] Macky Sall‘s [en] campaign when he was running for president. During the negotiations on the Hissène Habré case, it was requested that I should be handed to the Chadian authorities. I was arrested in Tunisia in 2005. I owe it to international pressures that I wasn't deported back to Chad.

GV: Do you feel safe in Guinea?

Makaila Nguebla : Non. J’ai rencontré le Ministre des droits de l’homme de la Guinée qui m’a dit qu’il ne peut pas garantir ma sécurité dans le contexte actuel de son pays. Depuis plusieurs années, la Guinée traverse une période difficile. Les élections législatives n’ont pu se tenir après les dernières élections présidentielles. Et il y a depuis plusieurs semaines des manifestations de l’opposition.

MNG: No. I met with the Guinean Minister of Human Rights and he told me that he could not guarantee my safety in the current context of his country. For several years now, Guinea has been in a dire situation. The general elections could not be held following the last presidential election. And there have been opposition protests [en] for several weeks now.

GV: You told me earlier that you are staying with the lady that you met on the plane. But where do you stand when it comes to your administrative status with the Guinean authorities?

Makaila Nguebla : Ce matin [samedi 11 mai], accompagné de membres du Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne et du HCR, j’ai pu introduire une première demande de statut de réfugié.

MNG: On Saturday, May 11, escorted by some members of the National Council of Organizations of the Guinean Civil Society and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, I was able to proceed with an initial application for political refugee status.

Meanwhile, the Senegalese blogosphere called for Nguebla's return to Senegal, especially on Twitter under the hashtag #FreeMakaila. Cheikh Fall, the blogger behind citizen media monitor Sunu2012, rallied behind Nguebla:

Non seulement ceci constitue une atteinte aux droits de Makaila Nguebla qui n’a aucune attache en Guinée et s’est construit sa vie au Sénégal depuis 8 ans, mais ceci est une atteinte à la liberté d’expression de tous les Sénégalais : si les autorités commencent à livrer des opposants aux régimes dictatoriaux, elles n’hésiteront pas à s’en prendre à leurs propres opposants sur n’importe quel prétexte.

Not only is this a violation of Makaila Nguebla’s rights who has no tie to Guinea and has built his life in Senegal for the past eight years, but this is an attack on freedom of speech for all Senegalese: if the Senegalese authorities are starting to deliver opponents to their dictatorial regimes, they will not hesitate to go after their own opponents under any pretext.

The Senegalese government issued a statement three days after Nguebla was expelled through its spokesman, saying:

Sa présence était simplement tolérée. Mais sous certaines conditions : qu'il s'abstienne de faire un certain nombre de choses et de déclarations que le gouvernement sénégalais estime contraires à sa volonté de vivre chez nous.

His presence was merely tolerated. But under certain conditions, to refrain from doing a number of things and statements that the Senegalese government considers contrary to his desire to live among us.

African Twitter users quickly responded. Fall (@cypher007) noted:

@cypher007: « Situation irrégulière, Présence tolérée sous conditions … » Depuis quand un statut pareil existe au #Sénégal?

@cypher007: “irregular situation, presence tolerated under certain conditions …” Since when does such a statute exist in #Senegal?

User “wirriyamu2011″ (@wirr2011) theorized in a series of nine tweets that the Senegalese government has deliberately unsettled Nguebla for eight years in order to be able to pressure him if necessary.

BBC journalist Yacouba Ouédraogo (@Bambyam) replied to one of those tweets, referencing former leader of Chad Hissène Habré, whose rule was characterized by widespread atrocities but was allowed to live in Senegal for years after he was deposed:

@Bambyan: Quand on a offert le gîte à Habré et à mains ensanglantées, on peut continuer à “tolérer” un parleur.

@Bambyan: If you offered Habré a shelter despite the blood on his hands, you can go on “tolerating” a talker.

Several Twitter users also noted that the government spokesman [en] ironically holds the position of Minister of Good Governance and that this former journalist who had been abused under former President Wade is reduced to defend shameful practices.

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Anna Gueye · View original post [fr] · comments (4)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Hello, World – welcome to a special edition of the Global Voices Podcast.

On Tuesday, March 12, 2013 the college of cardinals assembled at the Vatican to elect the new head of the Roman Catholic church, following the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI on February 28. On Wednesday evening the Cardinal Protodeacon emerged onto the central balcony as St. Peter's Basilica and uttered the words “Habemus Papam!” (“We Have a Pope!”), and presented Pope Francis.

With two African cardinals considered at one point to be potential successors to Pope Benedict XVI, we spoke with Steve Sharra and Abdoulaye Bah from our Africa team about the possibility of an African pope, the continent's expectations of the next pope, and why cardinals at this week's papal conclave might have played games like volleyball.

Global Voices has a cardinal! Author Abdoulaye Bah with director Nanni Moretti on the set of the film “We Have a Pope”

Did you like the public domain Gregorian chants featured in the podcast? Get yours from Partners in Rhyme.

Thanks to Laura Morris for her support in producing this show!

Written by Georgia Popplewell · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

The conflict in the north of Mali pits the Malian army and its allies against many rebels groups fighting for greater autonomy or independence in the region. These groups include Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in Western Africa, and Ansar Dine, and Tuareg nomads who belong to the political and military Azawad National Liberation Movement.

Let's try to look at what the real causes of the war in Mali are [fr]:

Tout était en place pour que le Mali s’effondre et que le Sahel explose. Affaibli par les politiques d’austérité du FMI, longtemps paralysé par la Françafrique, victime du réchauffement climatique et de multiples sécheresses, le Mali est devenu l’une des pièces centrales du nouveau grand jeu sahélien. Revendication touarègue, djihadistes enrichis par le narcotrafic, déstabilisation libyenne et ambiguïtés algériennes, financements occultes saoudiens, stratégie à court terme des États-Unis et de l’Union européenne… Voici toutes les raisons de la guerre.

Everything was ripe for Mali to collapse and for Sahel to explode. Weakened by austerity policies that had been imposed by the IMF [fr], paralyzed for so long by the policies of Françafrique, and a victim of global warming [fr] and multiple droughts [fr], Mali became one of the key players in the great new Sahelian game. The Tuareg demands; the Jihadis who had become powerful from drug trafficking; the destabilization of Libya and the uncertainty in Algeria; hidden investments from Saudi Arabia; short-sighted strategies of the United States and Europe… These are all the reasons for the war.

Timbuktu residents protest against extremism on Wikipedia CC-License-2.0

How did modern Mali come to be? Mouhamadou el Hady Ba and Pierre Amath Mbaye in their work “The Malian crisis and lessons for Senegal” [fr] explain how Mali emerged from the post-colonial failure of a federation in the region [fr]:

Conscients des risques liés à une fragmentation de la région et suivant leur idéal panafricaniste, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Mamadou Dia, Modibo Keïta et d’autres dirigeants avaient pourtant formé l’idée de reprendre l’ensemble constitué par l’administration coloniale, l’Afrique Occidentale Française, en le portant vers l’indépendance sous la forme d’une fédération. … l’opposition marquée des autorités françaises de l’époque associée à celle de Félix Houphouët Boigny futur Chef de l’Etat ivoirien, réduiront cette fédération à un face à face entre le Soudan français (aujourd’hui Mali)  et le Sénégal, au sein de la Fédération du Mali . Cette tentative échouera sur fond d’options politiques différentes et de compétition pour le pouvoir, avec, en arrière-plan, l’engagement du Mali aux côtés des partisans algériens, lors de leur guerre d’indépendance. Le 20 aout 1960, voit donc s’éteindre avec la dissolution de la Fédération du Mali …

Keenly aware of the risks tied to a fragmented region, and following their Pan-African ideals, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Mamadou Dia, Modibo Keïta and other leaders still had the idea to carry on with the group that had made up the colonial administration known as l’Afrique Occidentale Française, by pushing for independence as a federation. …However, there was strong opposition from the French authorities, which at the time were linked to Félix Houphouët Boigny — an eventual Head of State of Côte d'Ivoire. This gave rise to a power struggle between French Sudan (today Mali) and Senegal, within the Mali Federation. This attempt at federation would eventually fail based on various political options and power struggles, while the Malian engagement in support of Algerian independence played out in the background. August 20, 1960, ends with the dissolution of the Federation of Mali…

Eros Sana on bastamag.net continues in his article, Mali : les véritables causes de la guerre (Mali: the Real Causes of the War [fr]) describing how Mali then experienced a brief window of socialism before a military coup brought a dictator to power:

Nous sommes en 1960, le Mali accède à l’indépendance. Le premier président malien, Modibo Keïta, instituteur et panafricaniste, élu démocratiquement, a à peine le temps d’entamer une profonde réforme agraire avant d’être renversé en 1968 lors d’un coup d’état mené par Moussa Traoré, soutenu par la France. [Les vingt-trois ans de règne seront sanglants]. Moussa Traoré ne se contente pas d’appauvrir et d’affamer son peuple, il mène aussi une forte répression contre la minorité Touareg du Mali. Les Touaregs représentent environ 2 % de la population malienne. Ils sont également présents au Niger, au Burkina-Faso, en Mauritanie, en Libye et en Algérie.

We are in 1960, Mali is gaining independence. The first president of Mali, Modibo Keïta, teacher and Pan-Africanist, democratically elected, barely has time to begin sweeping agricultural reforms before being overthrown in 1968 during a France-backed coup d’état orchestrated by Moussa Traoré. (The 23 years of rule that followed would be bloody). Moussa Traoré was not happy with simply impoverishing and starving his people, he also carried out powerful repressive measures against the Tuareg minority group in Mali. The Tuaregs represented about 2 percent of the Malian population. They are also present in Niger, Burkina-Faso, Mauritania, Libya and in Algeria.

Mouhamadou el Hady Ba and Pierre Amath Mbaye add another important factor to the equation: the rise of drug trafficking [fr]:

L’Afrique de l’ouest est ainsi devenue un espace stratégique de négoce des stupéfiants, à la suite du renforcement de la répression aux Etats-Unis et au Canada. Cette situation va amener les narcotrafiquants à se redéployer vers l’Europe en trouvant de nouvelles routes, et à exploiter le potentiel de corruptibilité de l’Administration des Etats de la région pour assurer leur tranquillité. En 2009, la drogue était expédiée de Colombie, du Venezuela et du Brésil, et arrivait par les ports de Guinée Bissau et du Cap-Vert au Nord, et ceux du Ghana au Sud. Les cargaisons étaient ensuite réparties entre le Nigéria, la Guinée, le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, puis, remontaient vers le Maroc et l’Algérie. En novembre de la même année, le monde entier découvrait l’atterrissage clandestin dans le nord du Mali d’un triréacteur Boeing 727 chargé de cocaïne, l’évènement donnant lieu à une affaire popularisée sous le nom d’Air Cocaïne, avec des ramifications en Amérique du sud et en Europe. Un symbole stupéfiant d’insertion de l’Afrique dans l’économie mondialisée, pourrait-on dire avec malice, si la situation n’était à ce point inquiétante.

And so, West Africa became a strategic point for the drug trade, following heightened efforts to snuff it out in the US and Canada. This situation would eventually cause drug traffickers to focus their efforts more on Europe by finding new routes, and to exploit the state administrations of the region that were susceptible to corruption, in exchange for guaranteeing peace. In 2009, drugs were exported from Colombia, Venezuela, and Brasil, and arrived at ports in Guinea-Bissau and Cape-Verde in the north, and at those of Ghana in the south. The cargo was then split up between Nigeria, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania, and reassembled once again near Morocco and Algeria. In November of the same year, the entire world would come to know of the clandestine landing of a three-engine Boeing 727 loaded with cocaine. The event gave rise to a scandal popularly known as Air Cocaine, which had repercussions in South America and Europe. A confounding symbol of Africa's insertion in the world economy, one may say mischievously, if the situation had not been so perplexing.

With respect to Saudi influence, Sahel expert Maurice Freund explained in an interview on website Afrik.com that Islamic extremism began to take root more than two decades ago when Saudi-financed organizations helped Malian people where their government failed them. “It's too late for Mali, we should have acted 20 years ago!” he said:

Il y a déjà plus de 20 ans, je rencontrais des Pakistanais et des Soudanais financés par les Saoudiens qui prêchaient le wahhabisme sous forme d’organisation humanitaire, en effectuant la construction de puits, de mosquées. Ils comblaient les carences des autorités dans le domaine social. D’où la prolifération des djihadistes. Le développement du wahhabisme dans le nord-Mali a commencé il y a déjà 25 ans.

More than 20 years ago now, I met Pakistanis and Sudanese people financed by Saudis. They preached [ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam] Wahhabism through humanitarian organizations by building wells and mosques. They made up for the shortcomings of the authorities on the social level. Hence the proliferation of the Jihadist movement. Wahabbism in the north of Mali began 25 years ago.

While trying to trace the genesis of the Djihadi movement in Sahel,  Abou Djaffar explains on his blog that:

En 1996, pourtant, il ne s’agissait même pas d’un front secondaire, mais simplement de l’arrière-cour de la guerre civile algérienne.

In 1996, however, it wasn't even a question of a being secondary front in the Algerian civil war, but it was in fact the Algerian civil war that just extended in the backyard.

Repercussions [fr] of the overthrow of Muammar Kadhafi, who supplied Mali with large amounts of funding, during the Libyan Civil War in 2011 added to the volatile situation brewing in Mali, Eros Sana writes:

En plus d’investissements lourds, Kadhafi multiplie les financements à petite échelle : écoles, dispensaires ou routes dans l’ensemble du Mali. Lorsque Kadhafi et son régime disparaissent, ce sont d’un côté de très nombreuses armes et des centaines d’hommes aguerris qui s’exilent dans le Sahel ; et de l’autre, des flux de plusieurs centaines de milliers d’euros qui se tarissent. Pour un pays dont plus de la moitié de la population vit avec moins d’un dollar par jour, c’est une importante manne qui s’envole. Après avoir appuyé militairement le renversement du régime libyen, les puissances de l’Otan auraient dû prévoir ce vide causé par la chute du colonel et le combler. Cela n’a pas été fait.

Aside from large investments, Kadhafi increased financing on the smaller scale: schools, health centers, roads throughout all of Mali. When Kadhafi and his regime disappeared, there was, on one side a large number of weapons, and hundreds of hardened men who were exiled in the Sahel region; and on the other side the evaporation of several hundred thousands of euros that had once flowed in. For a country where half of the population lives on less than one dollar a day, it is an important source of bread and butter that disappears. After having lent military support to the overthrow of the Libyan regime the NATO forces should have foreseen this vacuum that was was caused by the fall of the Colonel and worked to address it. That was not done.

Twitter user @Abdou_diarra foresaw on his blog the creation of new regions [fr] in northern Mali prior to the military coup that would overthrow President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012:

Blogger ASKIAMOHAMED writes about the Tuareg [fr] and their demands::

Elle commence le 17 janvier 2012 soit 2 mois avant le coup de force à Bamako, les rebelles attaquent Menaka, Tessalit et Aguel’hoc avant d’y être chassés par l’armée malienne.
Un véritable jeu de chaises musicales a lieu durant près de un mois dans les villes à la frontière algérienne entre l’armée, le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) ainsi que le groupe Ansar Dine et leurs alliés d’ al Qaida au Maghreb islamique.

Le massacre de militaires maliens par les rebelles et leurs alliés à Aguel’hoc, à l’arme blanche va profondément choquer le peuple malien et mettre à jour les failles de l’armée et l’animosité de cette rébellion.

Début avril le coup d’état consommé le MNLA et leurs alliés islamistes contrôlent les deux tiers du Mali, l’armée malienne désorganisée par le coup ayant déserté.

En effet le coup d’état a désorganisé la chaine de commandement de l’armée et a mis à jour la fragilité de cette dernière et a donc conduit à cette débandade ou « retrait stratégique ».

Le MNLA proclame l’indépendance de cette zone le 6 avril 2012 car elle considère que c’est le berceau de la civilisation touareg, un fait inédit dans l’histoire car aucun peuple nomade ne s’est jamais réclamé d’un territoire avec des frontières bien dessinées.

De plus historiquement sur cette terre il y avait l’empire Songhaï fondé à Koukia au 7ieme siècle, par les Sonrhaïs, et les Berbères et dirigés par le chef Za el-Ayamen, qui fuyaient devant l’invasion arabe.

Ce métissage entre Sonrhaïs et Berbères donnera la dynastie des Dia. Puis vint la dynastie de Sonni ali ber et des Askia avec Gao pur capitale, avant de sombrer au 16ieme siecle sous l’invasion marocaine. Il y a également eu l’empire peul du Macina et l’empire toucouleur au 19ieme siècle. De plus de nombreuses tribus, Bozos (pécheurs) et dogons peuplaient cette zone.

Donc il n’y a aucune légitimité historique à cette demande.

It begins on the January 17, 2012, about two months before the showing of force at Bamako, the rebels attack Menaka, Tessalit, and Aguel’hoc before being driven out by the Malian Army.

A bonafide game of musical chairs takes place for almost one month in the towns on the Algerian border between the army, the National Azawad Liberation Movement (MNLA) as well as the group Ansar Dine and their Al-Qaeda allies from the Islamic Maghreb.

The massacre at knifepoint of Malian soldiers by Malian rebels and their allies at Aguel’hoc, severely shocks the Malian people and bring to light the failings of the army and the bitterness of this rebellion.

At the start of April, the coup [against President Amandou Toumani Touré] already executed, the MNLA and their Islamic allies control two-thirds of Mali. The Malian army, having been taken by the surprise by the coup, have deserted.

In fact, the coup ambushed the chain of command within the army and highlighted its vulnerability thereby driving this disbanding or “strategic withdrawal”.

The MNLA proclaims the independence of this zone on the April 6, 2012 because it believes that the region is the cradle of the Tuareg civilization, an unprecedented act because no nomadic people have ever claimed a territory with precisely defined borders.

Moreover, historically in this region there was the Songhai empire founded at Koukia in the 7th century by the Songhai and Berbers and led by chief Za el-Ayamen. They fled before the Arab invasion.

The mixing of Songhai and Berber people would eventually give rise to the Dia dynasty. After this came the Sonni Ali Ber dynasty and the Askia with Gao being the capital, before succumbing, in the 16th century to the Moroccan invasion. There was also the Massina Empire and the Toucouleur Empire of the 19th century. Not to mention various tribes, Bozos (a tribe of fishermen) and Dogons inhabited this zone. Therefore, there is no historical legitimacy to this demand.

It is in this context that France is intervening [fr] in its former colony to oust the Islamists, a move known as Operation Serval.

Though some think that France's intervention in Mali is driven purely by self interest, such as the author of this article entitled Nouvelles de la turbulence (News of the Unrest) [fr], such speculation [fr] should be treated with caution:

… il y aurait plus d’uranium au Mali qu’au Niger, et après avoir sécurisé les ressources libyennes (en excluant les émergents), les Français chercheraient à faire de même dans le Sahel. … qu’on ne fait pas de guerre pour des ressources qui ne sont encore que spéculatives, puisqu’on n’en connaît pas la quantité réelle et qu’on n’en voit pas encore la couleur. Arguments assez naïfs mais peut-être corrects pour le cas d’espèce.

Supposedly, there could be be more uranium in Mali than in Niger, and after having secured the Libyan resources (not counting those currently being currently explored), the French would be seeking to do the same thing in the Sahel region. …We wouldn't go to war for “potential” resources unless we knew the real quantity and quality of these resources. The resource-speculating arguments might be naive at first but perhaps not entirely off-base in this case.

Wirriyamu responds in this article Ne pas laisser dire (3) [fr] (Do not let it be said):

Je suis convaincu désormais que certains trouvent totalement anormal le soutien de l’opinion malienne, et au-delà africaine, à cette intervention. Ils mettent cette adhésion le plus souvent sur le dos de la naïveté ou de l’ignorance, c’est selon. Ce qui montre que beaucoup, trop nombreux à mon goût, pensent encore que les Africains n’ont pas leur place sur le chemin de l’histoire qui se fait sans eux, hors d’eux. Bref, ils subissent tout.

I am now convinced that some find the support of the Malian public, not to mention African support for this intervention, to be completely abnormal. They usually place the blame for this support squarely on the back of naivete or ignorance, as the case may be. This shows that many — too many for my taste — still think that Africans have had no active role in the course of history [fr]. It happens without them. In sum, they are victims.

Written by Anna Gueye · Translated by Danielle Martineau · View original post [fr] · comments (2)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

They must take notice that their biggest problem now is the unemployed, destitute youth without a hope for a better tomorrow. This youth has nothing to lose anymore and is ready to fight for better governance, an independent justice system, free and transparent elections and paying jobs.

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Rakotomalala · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

The Holy Father, Pope Benedict XVI. Photo Catholic Church (England and Wales) on Flickr, licence CC by-nc-sa/2.0

Varied opinions, with underlying admiration

In a well-reported article from Togocouleurs blog entitled ‘Must the Pope Die Pope?’, Charles Lebon wrote that [fr]:

La nouvelle est tombée ce 11 février comme un coup de tonnerre dans un ciel serein. Ce coup aurait été moins violent si c’était le décès du pape, qui, dans ce cas et trop souvent prévisible, obligeait les journalistes à attendre sous les fenêtres du saint homme en agonie avec micro, camera et bougie. Mais ce n’était pas le cas. Il s’agit de la démission du souverain pontife au sens de : « renoncer à sa charge ».

Diery Diallo’s blog quoted Father Jacques Seck of Dakar [fr] :

Je dis que je suis heureux que le Saint-Père (Pape Benoît XVI) ait pris cette idée personnellement. Les hommes de Dieu que nous sommes (…) ne sont pas des fonctionnaires qui travaillent. Je suis heureux que le Saint-Père à la tête de l’Eglise nous donne l’exemple. Les évêques, Cardinaux, Pape, ne sont pas des fonctionnaires, quand ils ne peuvent plus ils cèdent la place aux autres », a réagi Abbé Jacques Seck sur les ondes de la Rfm. Rappelons que le Pape Benoit XVI a annoncé sa démission de ses fonctions de Pape pour le 28 février 2013. Il a donné comme raison, son âge avancé qui ne lui permet plus d’exercer le ministère Pétrinien.

On the facebook page of Radio France International, a widely-listened to station in Francophone Africa, many reactions were posted [fr] during a programme dedicated to this event:

Many Africans seem to wish their leaders would be inspired by the courageous act of Pope Benedict XVI. Source photo:
commons.wikimedia.org

From Conakry in Guinea Hilal Sylla [fr] wrote that:

Pour peu que cela ait du sens, cette démission de Benoit XVI me renvoie au Film culte sur l'église et les illuminatis. Une façon de dire que l'église n'a plus de force dans un monde dominé par tant de perversion. Une question : la fin du monde n'est-elle pas proche?

For Samuel Azabho [fr] from Kisangani in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

Cette démission est normale par le fait de l'age. son pontificat est positif dans la mesure où il est le précurseur de la lutte contre la pédophilie. je pense qu'il était un homme de décision. Et celui qui doit venir après lui doit relever le défis de l'avenir de l'église catholique et de toute l'humanité peu importe sa race et ses origines.

From Yaoundé, Ben Mbele remarked that [fr]:

nous pouvons cependant dire ke le pontificat de benoit xv1 n'a pa été un fleuve trankil, de son discours sur l'islam et la violence en passant par le scandal des prêtres pédophiles et enfin du débat sur le mariage gay,au demeurant notons ke la décision salutaire de benoit xv1 fera un précédent car il lancera le débat sur la modification du droit canon en matière du mandat du pape, personnellement il ne faut pa trop attendre du nouveau pape en matière d’émancipation sur certains sujets car la plus part des cardinaux actuels ont été nommé par benoit xv1 et jean paul 2 eux très conservateurs.

Alpha Ulrick Marcellus from Brazzville, in Congo thought that [fr]:

La décision du Pape est courageuse. Il ne démissionne pas mais il renonce, il renonce au ministère pétrinien. Une décision qui n'est pas facile à prendre. Son pontificat a été à mon avis celui des grandes épreuves, des discours aux vérités sans détours et choquant. Benoit XVI à donné le meilleur de lui-même, dans la direction d'une Église en conflit avec un monde de plus en plus excentrique. Pour le futur Pape plaise à Dieu de choisir celui qui est apte, valide à prendre des décisions courageuses contre les déviations que le monde légalise pour préserver l'intégrité de la foi et de l'Église.

The BBC also broadcast special programmes about Francophone Africa, which were played by local radio stations. The BBC’s facebook page about Africa has more than 17,000 fans [fr]. During the programme about this resignation, Africa Live on February 16, many Africans gave their points of view. Michel Djadji Anigbe from Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, wrote that [fr]:

Relativement à la décision de démission du Pape, son motif me laisse perplexe et pantois. Comment un grand intellectuel tel que lui a pu accepter ce pontificat avec tous les sacrifices que cela demande. Surtout avec ce que son prédécesseur, le vénérable Pape Jean Paul II , a fait du sien. De plus, son argument est trop facile avec le scandale qui nous a été servi par l'affaire de son majordome. Et quand on sait aussi que le Vatican n'est pas ignorant et étranger à tous ce qui passe actuellement dans le monde.

Didier Didou Mady posed an interesting question [fr]:

Le rejet de la démission du Pape est-il envisageable au regard du droit canon? Quoi de plus normal que les touristes au Vatican visite à la fois le pape et l'ex-pape. Difficile d'avoir un pape infatigable!

An Example for some African leaders?

Africa has many badly run countries. Is this linked to the fact that on this continent we also find heads of State who have been in power the longest?:

• Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 89, in power in Zimbabwe since 1980
• Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, 71, head of Equatorial Guinea since 1979
• Paul Biya, 80, leader of Cameroon since 1982
• José Eduardo dos Santos, 71, president of Angola since 1979
• Denis Sassou Ngesso, 80, leader of Congo from 1979 to 1992 and continuously from 1997

Many Africans have commented on the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI by relating it what has happened on their own continent. Josiane Kouaghe from Cameroon wrote [fr] on his blog:

Passés ces moments de disputes, les vraies questions s’imposent. Et les comparaisons ne tardent pas à suivre. «Ah…Il me rappelle Nelson Mandela. Tu te rappelles, en 1999, quand il a démissionné après seulement cinq ans? », demande Éric Ntomb, 64 ans, à son ami. «Tu parles Éric. C’est la même chose avec le pape. Il n’est là que depuis 2005. Si seulement nos dirigeants africains pouvaient faire comme lui», répond l’ami en poussant un long soupir. L’ami dit haut ce que des millions de personnes pensent bas. Et je vous arrête. Ne dites pas que le pape a démissionné parce qu’il est un homme de Dieu. Non!  Il dirigeait le plus petit et puissant État du monde.

Josiane Kouagheu then reviewed the list of African presidents who resigned their duties voluntarily:

• Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon in 1982
• Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal in November 1980 at the age of 74
• Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania, in November 1985

However, by far the most famous of all African leaders to leave power voluntarily was unquestionably Nelson Mandela, in 1999, a fact which has invited these comparisons between Mandela and Pope Benedict XVI.

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Jane Ellis · View original post [fr] · comments (1)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Written by Ndesanjo Macha · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

A History of Impunity 

Prof. Tierno Siradiou Bah, Guinean historian and executive director of the Camp Boiro Internet Memorial, wrote on his blog:

Arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, fake trials, and executions became a routine. Military barracks turned into detention centers and killing grounds. Thousands of political prisoners disappeared there. The country itself became a global prison. Everyone was a potential target of the ‘revolutionary’ secret police, including children and the elderly. The terror peaked in 1976. Then, in a series of provocative and self-destructive speeches, Sekou Touré incited to ethnic warfare and genocide against the main ethnic group: the Fulɓe [fr]. 
Located in the center of Conakry, the Camp Boiro National Guard Barracks was the epicenter of the Guinean Gulag. It is estimated that more than 50,000 political prisoners disappeared there. The purges targeted the country's brightest minds but also the entrepreneurs, the unions leaders, women…

The army in Guinea via Abdoulaye Bah's article from October 2, 2011 (CC-license-NC-2.0)

From Sékou Touré to Today

Since his death, other dictators have ruled the country. They also subjected civilians to extrajudicial violence under different pretexts: union or student demonstrations, revolts by women against miserable conditions and living costs, etc.

In 2011, ACAT France [Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture] together with numerous militant Guinean human rights organisations carried out an investigation across the country and published a study on the torturer phenomenon in Guinea called “Torture: Force is Law”. Following this inquiry, ACAT France launched an online petition, “Guinea: Stop the Torture” [fr], addressed to President Alpha Condé, which comes to an end on December 31. It reads [fr]:

[...] la torture reste une pratique courante dans le pays, que ce soit à l’encontre de détenus de droit commun, à l’occasion de répressions de manifestations ou pour sanctionner les militaires suspectés de sédition. Dans un contexte politique qui reste tendu, les autorités feront-elles le choix de rétablir l’état de droit ou de laisser prévaloir l’impunité ?

[...] torture remains a common practice in the country, whether against common law prisoners, whilst controlling demonstrations or punishing soldiers suspected of sedition. In a political situation which remains tense, will the authorities choose to restore the rule of law or will they allow impunity to prevail?

The most notorious example of this violence, which has attracted international attention, are the massacres that took place on September 28, 2009, and the following days. Amnesty International details the facts [fr] on its website:

Le 28 septembre 2009, les forces de sécurité guinéennes avaient abattu plus de 150 manifestants non armés durant un rassemblement de l’opposition dans ce même stade. Plus de 40 femmes avaient été violées en public, au moins 1 500 personnes avaient été blessées et beaucoup d’autres avaient disparu.

On September 28, 2009, the Guinean security forces had killed more than 150 unarmed protesters during an opposition rally. More than 40 woman were raped in public, at least 1,500 people were injured, and many others disappeared.

Nathalie Zajde, a lecturer at the Université de Paris VIII and responsible for the psycho-social unit in the Mother and Baby Centre in Conakry, wrote [fr] on lemonde.fr, a French daily newspaper's website, on the second anniversary of the September 28 massacres:

Je ne sais si Mme Nafissatou Diallo a été ou non victime de violences sexuelles à l'hôtel Sofitel de New York en mai. En revanche, je sais, et nous sommes très nombreux à en avoir les preuves, que plus de 100 femmes guinéennes, dont une majorité de Peules, ont été le 28 septembre 2009 et les jours qui ont suivi, victimes de viols atroces et de tortures commis par des militaires, gendarmes et responsables politiques guinéens dont certains clairement identifiés, et qu'à ce jour, exactement deux ans après les terribles événements, aucun n'a été arrêté, ni même convoqué par des juges.

I do not know if Ms. Nafissatou Diallo [fr] was a victim of sexual violence in the hotel Sofitel New York [fr] in May. But I do know, and there are many of us who have proof, that more than 100 Guinean women, most of them Fulani, were, on September 28, 2009, and the following days, victims of rape and torture carried out by Guinean soldiers, policemen and politicians, some clearly identified, and that to this day, exactly two years after those awful events, not one person has been arrested or tried by judges.

Impunity still Rampant Today 

The United Nations and the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) have each sent an inquiry mission to Guinea to evaluate the extent of the violence and draw up a list of those responsible.

In 2011, HRW wrote:

Personne n’a encore eu à rendre des comptes deux ans après que les forces de sécurité guinéennes eurent abattu des manifestants non armés lors d’un rassemblement de l’opposition à Conakry, la capitale, rappelle aujourd’hui Human Rights Watch. Le gouvernement guinéen doit faire davantage pour s’assurer que justice soit faite pour les victimes du massacre du 28 septembre 2009.

No one has been held to account two years after Guinean security forces gunned down unarmed protesters at an opposition rally in Conakry, the capital, Human Rights Watch said today. The Guinean government needs to do more to ensure justice for victims of the massacre on September 28, 2009.

However, according to the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Guinean Organisation for the Defence of Human Rights (OGDH), the UN's inquiry commission submitted its report to the Security Council in July, 2012, recognising that this was a crime against humanity and calling for referral to the International Criminal Court.

None of the people who controlled the security forces during this violence has been questioned. The OGDH notes [fr]:

Nous assistons impuissants à la promotion de certains présumés auteurs de la barbarie à de hautes fonctions civiles et militaires.

We remain powerless to the promotion of certain alleged perpetrators of this barbarity in high civil and military positions.

Among the soldiers who were in positions of power and were promoted by President Alpha Condé, is Lieutenant Colonel Tiégboro Camara, charged [fr] by the Guinean courts last February and promoted to the post of Secretary General solely in charge of special services, the fight against drugs and organised crime, with the rank of minister.

The last case of violence took place on November 9, 2012, when Ms. Aissatou Boiro was shot after finishing her work investigating a case of high-level corruption. She was going home when armed men blocked her car and shot her in broad daylight. An article on HRW's website says:

Les hommes ont surgi d’un autre véhicule qui s’était arrêté de manière à bloquer la voiture d’Aissatou Boiro et ont tiré deux fois sur leur victime. Les amis et la famille d’Aissatou Boiro ont rapporté qu’elle avait reçu des menaces de mort [...]

The men got out of another car that had been positioned to block Aissatou Boiro's car and they shot their victim twice. Boiro's family and friends have confirmed that she had received death threats [...]

Her colleagues told HRW that she was investigating a suspected embezzlement of more than 13 million Guinean francs of public money (1.8 million US dollars).

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Georgi McCarthy · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

The army has often held a crucial but ambiguous role in the running of the political process in Africa. Between the years 1950 and 2000, 53 African countries have suffered 85 military coups leading to regime change. After a period of respite in the 1990s, the African continent was once more that with the most military coups in the first decade of the 21st century with 27 takeover attempts. Being both a factor in consolidation or destabilisation of regimes [fr], the army is blamed in many countries and does not seem to know how to adapt to this change in people’s mentalities.

The Army of Madagascar supported Rajoelina during his seizure of power in March 2009 – Public Domain via Topmada

A Question of Competence and Remuneration

In Mali, the lack of resolution in the conflict in the North of the country was the main reason invoked by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo to remove Amadou Toumani Touré from power. However, since the military coup of 22 March 2012, the army remains powerless regarding reclaiming North Mali and seems resigned to wait for help from international armed forces to chase the Islamic groups from the area. If Captain Sanogo gives the impression of having left the civil authorities and the interim president, Dioncounda Tractor, to assume leadership of the country, he is nevertheless a major figure of the current transition and remains at the head of the CNRDRE military junta.

Captain Sanogo, Leader of the Military Junta, photo via @Youngmalian

Captain Sanogo began his military training in the Kati Military Academy in Mali then continued it in the United States, firstly in Lackland,Texas then at Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Wachica in Arizona. During Sanogo’s brief period at the head of the country, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, MNLA, linked to various Islamic groups including the AQMI, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, conquered half of North Mali and declared independence for Azawad. If there is a debate about Sanogo’s military competences, there is little doubt that he has not acquired the necessary political competence in light of his multiple interference and unilateral decisions regarding the management of the country. Here is a video interview given by Sanogo after having handed power to the interim president by MrMaliweb [fr]:

In Madagascar the army played a crucial role in the advent of the ongoing political crisis there. A video captured during Rajoelina’s takeover tells of the unfolding of the military coup and the army’s role in the taking of power:

The Tananews website wrote of how the army of Madagascar sacrificed its mission [fr] all because of a problem with remuneration:

Money and corruption have played a significant role in supporting this interminable crisis.
Under the eyes of the whole world, the army of Madagascar will have much to do to restore its tarnished image.
A number of officers have preferred to sacrifice their honour and pride to accede to positions which are here today, gone tomorrow! Are they proud to wear their new stripes, attributed to them by an illegal power?
Let’s hope they ask themselves the question [...] To save our country, there are no two ways about it:
Either the army of Madagascar takes itself in hand and comes to swell the ranks of the Vahaoaka;
Or the army of Madagascar continues to act as puppets..

Juvence Ramasy, political scientist in Madagascar, published an article on the role of the armed forces in political and democratic stability for CODESRIA, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. He explained [fr]:

In order for the political neutrality of the army to be really effective, the demilitarisation of political power must be achieved, because the retreat of military personnel from the direct exercise of executive power and the subordination of the military to civil decisions is not sufficient to assure this political neutrality. This retreat has been achieved through the third wave of democratisation. However, the transition goes wherever the militaries go.

Mathieu Pellerin, researcher at the French International Relations Institute, IFRI, explained that during each crisis, political players in Madagascar try to curry favour with the armed forces [fr]:

The army of Madagascar has a legalistic tradition [...] This is not to say however that the army plays no part, quite the opposite. I would describe it as the force of deterrence because of the threat that it poses. Each side knows it will have to submit to its will. In 2002, the development of Marc Ravalomanana’s reservist forces has weighted the balance of power. [..] Andry Rajoelina has surrounded himself with military personnel, including the general of the retreat, Dollin Rosoloa, who was Chief of Staff for the Mayor of Antananarivo, Madagascar’s largest city, and generals Blake and Organes who used to serve under Marc Ravalomanana. They should therefore have an influence on certain sections of the army of Madagascar.

In his book “Madagascar, le coup d'Etat de mars 2009” [fr], Professor Solofo Randrianja explained the mechanism of the army’s corruption [fr] during the current crisis:

Rajoelina gives various benefits [to the military] to ensure their support and loyalty. The granting of loans of 3.2 billion ariary across the armed forces during 2009 Independence Day celebrations is a product of this mindset [...] to ensure that this clientelist redistribution does not continue, it is necessary that the institution of the military be under democratic control and no longer under civilian control.

An Army often Divided and Under Pressure

In Côte d'Ivoire, after a civil war which has left scars, the army, Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, FRCI is still under pressure from militia faithful to the old Gbagbo regime. Confrontations took place in August 2012 [fr] near the capital, Abidjan, leading people to fear a reduction in public safety. Richard Banegas, professor at Ceri-Sciences-Po, stated that the disturbances were justified [fr]:

Many of the Gbagbo ex-militia are still at large, in Ghana or Liberia, even in Abidjan, in relative secrecy. The most radical have a Messianic warmongering mindset sowing a ‘rhetoric of return’ of their leader. [...] What is more, reforms for a national army are well underway, but sometimes hide growing numbers of soldiers who have come from the pro-Ouattara rebellion, to the detriment of an ordered and therefore more just hierarchy.

In Guinea, the military coup of December 2008 led Captain Moussa Dadis Camara to power. His regime came to an end during the country’s first ever democratic elections in 2010, but not before a bloody suppression in 2009 which killed more than 1,000 during an anti-junta demonstration. Internal divisions within the army are still palpable with regard to current tensions.

In Mauritania, leading figure in the 2005 and 2008 military coups and current president Mohamed Ould Aziz was recently shot at, which led to his evacuation to France. Rumours abound regarding the origin of these shots and measures that soldiers could take if Aziz’s convalescence abroad lasts longer than predicted.

The return of Pretorianism, that is, corrupt military despotism, is an unmentionable fact in many African countries. As Juvenal Ramasy stated, demilitarisation of politics coupled with depolitisation and professionalism of the army must take place urgently in these countries where democracy is still fragile.

Written by Rakotomalala · Translated by Jane Ellis · View original post [fr] · comments (1)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Written by Rakotomalala · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

“You can't say that our neighbours are more intelligent than us, but they have had forthright leaders who have maintained the basis of a modern administration system and laid the foundations of an educational system which gives their citizens the means to take on international competition.”

(more…)

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Carol Osborne · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Guinea's transition from the notorious military regime of Moussa Dadis Camara (which ended in January 2010) towards a democratic political system with the elected President Alpha Condé has not gone smoothly. The country is still experiencing strong internal divisions as indicated by the attempted coup d'etat against the president on 18 July, 2011. The rule of law is still under construction and there are numerous accounts of torture within the military.

ACAT- France, the French branch of The International Federation of Action by Christians for the abolition of torture and execution, launched an online petition called “Stop the Torture” addressed to President Alpha Condé of Guinea. This petition is part of a campaign whose aims are:

to advance the rule of law in Guinea, to influence freedom surrounding torture, to denigrate inhuman treatment and make President Alpha Condé act by arranging the necessary measures.

This campaign follows a field survey conducted jointly in 2011 by ACAT-France and three NGO's engaged with local human rights issues: AVIPA (Association of Victims, Relatives and Friends from September 28, 2009), MDT (The Same Rights for All) and OGDH (Guinean Organisation for the Defence of the Rights of Man and Citizen). A report published in November 2011 has revealed that:

torture remains a common practice in the country, whether against prisoners on the occasion of demonstrators suppression or to punish military suspected of insubordination.

The following video of UFDG2010, testifies the violence committed by security forces against opposition demonstrators:

As well, Human Right Watch, in its report 2012 on Guinea, deals with the consequences of an attack at the residence of the Head of State in July 2011 which:

has resulted in the arrest of at least 38 people, including 25 soldiers. The arrests and detention of certain military arms personal were accompanied by physical abuse and in some cases torture. This has highlighted the persistent division based on ethnic and regional factors within the army, as well as the frailness of the political process.

The report continues:

The emergence of a militia recruited within the same ethnic group as the president has equally raised concerns.

These are “Donzos“, armed traditional hunters, originating from the region of President Alpha Condé. In a press release issued on infoguinee.com, the collective of political parties for transition completion has condemned their use in the repression against civilian members of the opposition:

According to the collective, during the peaceful march on 27th September, security forces backed by members of the “Donzos” militia have killed five people, injured hundreds, some severely, including pregnant women and children.

Another report from HRW talks about the worsening of relations between the main ethnic groups, for which poor governance is hold partially responsible:

These include the failure by the government to discipline members of security services for ethnic slurs against the Peuls; discriminatory appointment practices which have resulted in the assignation by the president of a disproportionate number of individuals from the Malinké ethnic group and at times partisan use of the security services and judiciary to restrict and punish members of the political opposition for exercising their right to freedom or peaceful assembly.

After the massacre that took place at the stadium on the 28 September, 2009, none of the responsible security forces and perpetrators, that have been included in the lists established by investigation of HRW and the UN Commission of persons suspected to have committed crimes against humanity, have been worried, instead they have been promoted:

Two years later, none of the supposed leaders have been arrested and “we watch powerless at the promotion of some of the presumed authors of barbaric acts into high civil and military positions”, laments the Guinea Organisation for the Defence of Human Rights (OGDH). The organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that among the newly promoted is “Lieutenant Colonel Claude Pivi as Minister of the Presidential Security” and “Lieutenant Colonel Moussa Tiégboro Camara as Director of the National Agency for fight against drugs, organised crime and terrorism”.

In an environment of impunity, the judges of Conakry have proved courageous and were hailed by 10 NGO's protecting human rights for having charged Lieutenant Colonel Moussa Tiégboro Camara in February 2012 as responsiblefor the bloody repression of the events in 28 September, 2009, in Conakry:

Our organisations welcome the charging in February 2012 of Lieutenant Colonel Moussa Tiegboro CAMARA for his alleged role in the serious violations of human rights carried on September 28th 2009 in the stadium of Conakry. Moussa Tiegboro CAMARA, who holds the status of minister and is currently director of the National Agency for fight against drugs, organised crime and terrorism, was extensively interviewed today in the court hearing by the judges in charge of the case.

But as proof of the impunity culture still prevailing in Guinea, this powerful character still occupies the same function with full impunity.

The web site Guinee58.com has published a note of Naby Laye Camara dealing with the consequences of ethnically-based recruitment in a mining forest area of Guinea:

After police violence on the night of Friday to Saturday in the south-east of the country that ended with five dead during a protest of villagers condemning the recruitment policies of the Brazilian mining society Vale, Guinea has been the scene of new clashes in the north-east at Siguiri on Tuesday 7th August.

Representatives of the Commission for Human Rights (HCDH), the UN at Conakry, Tthe NGO “Lawyers without Borders Guinea” (ASF-Guinea), ‘PACEM IN TERRIS', the Catholic Church of N’Zérékoré and a journalist from Renaissance Radio have co-produced a joint report after visiting the village disclosing:

As for those in support of such arguments as the maintenance of order and the detention of strikers, they need to know that the selected timings (at midnight and three days after the strike), the means employed (12 vehicles, the nature of arms, the numbers of police and military forces) and the methods used (firing live ammunition on houses and hangars, burning of properties, public abuse and extra-judicial executions…) prohibit any person truly aware of basic human rights to believe such declarations.

On 27 August, 2012, in order to prevent an unauthorised demonstration by the opposition, the counter-demonstrators threw stones at them and the security forces raided the headquarters of the opposition parties and the homes of their leaders. Attacks against the media activists coming from the ruling party militants were also reported.

The video shows the intervention of Brigadier General Ibrahima Baldé following the opposition protests.

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Dieyna Ba · View original post [fr] · comments (4)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

A solution to the Mali crisis seems to be vanishing as time goes by. It has been five months now that the country has been divided into two parts: the South is ruled by a fragile [fr] government while the North, which includes the historic cities of Timbuktu and Gao, is the theater of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb‘s (AQIM) expansion in the Sahel.

North Mali indirectly in the hands of AQIM

In April 2012, after the cities of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal had fallen, the Tuareg rebellion group National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) unilaterally proclaimed the secession of the northern part of the country.

Mali begins Touareg dialogue. Image by Flickr user Magharebia (CC BY 2.0).

Currently, the region is under the influence of four [fr] different groups: the MNLA, Ansar Dine, which defines itself as Salafist, the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), and AQIM.

However, a report [fr] by AFP, suggests that it is actually AQIM that coordinates and funds the three other organisations; this suspicion is reinforced by the alleged presence in Mali of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a founding member of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC), which became the AQIM.

In March 2012, israeldefense.com wrote about Belmokhtar's visits to Libya, and already reported fears of a possible AQIM expansion in the Southern Sahara:

According to Mali’s security sources, the leader of al-Qaeda's North African branch, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has been in Libya for several weeks with the goal of procuring arms. (…) Malian security sources claim that Belmokhtar's activities in Libya confirm the premise that AQIM intends to extend its sphere of influence and that “terrorists will do anything to create a sweeping network in the Sahel and the Sahara.”

Political and diplomatic deadlock

It appears that AQIM is consolidating its grip on Northern Mali.  On August 9, Koaci.com reported that members of the Mujao cut the hand [fr] off of an alleged thief in the city of Ansogo. This followed the July 30 stoning of an unwed couple in the region of Kidal.

To date, regional response  to the crisis have been muted. While West African leaders appointed Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, as a mediator [fr] in this crisis after the March 22 Mali coup, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) has yet to send military forces to restore the territorial unity of Mali.

And while Afrik.com [fr] reports that the de facto Malian government and ECOWAS have reached an agreement aimed at resolving the crisis, military intervention remains the preferred option of many netizens. Thierno A. Diallo from neighboring Guinea writes on his blog [fr]:

Ce qui se passe au Mali est grave. Notre pays, frontalier au sud et pas tellement éloigné de cette zone de non-droit a tout à perdre d'une victoire des fanatiques à nos portes. Le landernau politique guinéen, la tête dans le guidon des interminables législatives voulues par Alpha Condé, risque d'avoir un réveil en sursaut très douloureux. La zone la plus proche géographiquement et donc  la plus menacée étant la Haute-Guinée.

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by the International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide. This post was first published on the ISN blog, see similar stories here.

Written by Julie Owono · comments (2)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Jenny Sin · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Written by Rakotomalala · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper

Written by Abdoulaye Bah · Translated by Abdoulaye Bah · View original post [fr] · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper