Global Voices » Eastern & Central Europe

Macedonia: Graffiti Art in “Times of Revived Antiquity”

Filip Stojanovski — Sat, 19 May 2012 21:59:28 +0000

A short documentary on the Macedonian graffiti scene in the context of the state-sponsored art/construction boom, made by two female scientists and bloggers–Vasilka Dimitrovska and Ilina Jakimovska–has been shown at the renowned archeological conference Buffalo TAG 2012.

Entitled “Lions, Warriors and Graffiti Artists: Counter-Culture in Times of Revived Antiquity”, the documentary juxtaposes (an important visual arts theory word!) information about the vigorous efforts of the government to impose new, polished classicist/baroque visual identity on the center of the Macedonian capital through the Skopje 2014 project (which features bronze lions), with interviews of people from the graffiti scene.

A co-author, archeologist Dimitrovska, wrote this [mk] on her blog, injecting a disclaimer often heard by people who dare to speak in public in Macedonia:

We made this documentary… in order to document with love part of the graffiti which disappeared or are about to disappear due to the new urban concepts implemented in our country, primarily in Skopje. The project has no political dimension, nor did we intend it to have any political connotation. This small project on Macedonian graffiti was made with modest finances, and we intended to present–without any censorship or montage of statements–the voices and opinions of the graffiti artists who shaped or are still shaping the visual part of this subculture, which is punishable by the laws but is also used (not abused) by the political class in power.

In the film, the interviewed artists also feel the need to decline any interest in political life. They talk about being torn between the threat of punishment if caught “writing” on their own (EUR 50 at least), and becoming a sell-out for commercial reasons or in local government projects, which sometimes involve co-opting graffiti artists to legally adorn specified public buildings. They also mention a quickly forming generation gap within the subculture.

The other co-author, ethnologist Jakimovska wrote this [mk] on her blog in 2007, in a post referencing the famous scene from the film Life of Brian:

It might sound incredible, but the graffiti are - folklore! Regardless of whether they convey messages through drawing or text, the graffiti, for those who make them and those who read them on city walls, are a form of expression and communication. If you have something hidden deep inside you, something that aches and burns you, write it on the wall, and it will speak it… Some of my favorites from Skopje include “A woman is not a woman unless she's a woman,” “Thank God I'm an atheist”…

In the past, other bloggers such as Alexx [mk] or Django [mk] wrote about Skopje graffiti. The artists featured in the documentary do not have online presence on the public internet, but sometimes publish photos of their work within Facebook.

Russia: The RuNet's Enduring Tomatoes & Tusovki

Andrey Tselikov — Fri, 18 May 2012 19:05:23 +0000

To a casual observer, the Russian protest movement seems current and contemporary. Undeniably, it is. The throngs of people. The charismatic young leaders and elder statesmen. The use of social media networks in their multitude to communicate, organize, and argue. The positioning of the protests within a global movement: from Occupy to Tahrir and the Arab Spring.

Amidst all the excitement, it is easy to forget that the core of the protests — the professional revolutionaries, the leaders, young and old, the activists and the reporters, the analysts and the bloggers, the Russian political tusovka and its online extension — has now existed for almost a decade. Few bloggers last this long. Certainly, the entire Internet infrastructure has changed several times over during the period. Nevertheless, the tusovka endures, perhaps due to the peculiarity of the Russian blogosphere and its longtime sequestration at LiveJournal.

That is not to say that the scene has ossified. On the contrary, relationships have changed, as have account names. Some figures lost prevalence; some have switched sides and opinions. But on the whole, the RuNet of the early oughts is a microcosm of modernity. Pick any recent protest organizer. Oleg Kashin has blogged on LiveJournal since 2002, the same as Sergei Parkhomenko. Ilya Yashin began in 2004 (and has been a promising young politician since). Alexey Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov’s wife, Anastasia, started blogging in 2006, a year after Ilya Ponomarev and Garry Kasparov.

Or pick a critic: former Natsbol and current DemVybor functionary Stas Yakovlev started writing in 2004, while the unabashedly pro-Kremlin Maksim Kononenko (formerly known as Mr. Parker) and Konstantin Rykov have been prominent bloggers for over a decade (though both have since abandoned LiveJournal).

Then, as now, they not only blogged on the same platform; they also argued and engaged each other in polemics. A snapshot taken seven years ago of these movers and shakers would today present many familiar faces and opinions (although notoriously flip-floppy Kashin has done his best to keep things interesting).

Screenshot of Andrei Morozov's LiveJournal, 18 May 2012.

Bearing this in mind, it is perhaps fitting that the man who last Sunday threw tomatoes at Ilya Yashin and journalist/writer Yulia Latynina was a man who did precisely the same thing seven years ago. Andrei Morozov (also known as “Murz,” who blogs at kenigtiger), wearing the same jacket he had on seven years earlier, approached a crowd of OccupyAbai protestors during the “Control Stroll” rally. He threw two tomatoes at the speakers (both missed), after which he was detained by the crowd, who mistook him for a Nashist. Oleg Kashin reported the small incident, lamenting a forgetful new crop of protestors.

Indeed, during the summer of 2005, Morozov gained RuNet notoriety for what he called the “Red Blitzkrieg.” It was the heady summer after the success of the Orange Revolution — the summer of Russian youth politics, and the summer of tomatoes. “Red Blitzkrieg” was what Morozov named the tiny Stalinist-nationalist group he had founded around the time, but the phrase referred more visibly to his strategy of throwing tomatoes at political and ideological opponents.

“Tomato terrorism,” as Morozov jokingly called it, claimed several victims that summer. The first was Yashin, then a leader of Young Yabloko and a memeber of Oborona (a youth organization modeled on Pora and Otpor). On June 20, 2005, Oleg Kashin wrote in his blog, “Today, at Kitai-Gorod, unknown parties threw tomatoes at the Oborona picket line (the tomatoes were good and fresh).” Yashin later posted the name of the assailant, identifying him a member of Dugin’s Eurasia group.

Morozov, who spent a day under arrest for the incident, responded in his blog (vandalized and deleted in 2009; an archive exists on the alternative lj.rossia.org service), claiming full responsibility and denying membership in any political group:

And in general, dear “orangists,” get used to the fact that someone can throw a tomato at you without it being some kind of political commission, but simply from the bottom of their heart, out of aesthetic considerations.

Perhaps because of the gleeful response of Russian netizens to his actions, several days later he tomatoed (”otpomidoril”) the editor of the occasionally sensationalist newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, which had published an article about World War II with which Morozov disagreed (the author controversially wrote that the USSR should have surrendered to Germany, and was “ice-creamed” by another activist on the same day). Soon after came a failed attempt (Morozov missed) of tomatoing Yulia Latynina, whose revisionism of WWII orthodoxy also angered the Red Blitzkrieg.

Ilia Yashin, a member of the Solidarity coalition, 23 November 2008, photo by Lena Lebedeva-Hooft, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

In the meantime, Morozov showed up at another Oborona action, and this time gifted Yashin the tomatoes, rather than throwing them. He followed a similar strategy at a book signing by Maksim Kononenko (whose book of Putin anecdotes was published by Parkhomenko). In August came the tomatoing of the Polish embassy (a response to a scandal involving children of Russian diplomats in Poland, for which Morozov and an accomplice spent three nights in jail), and in September the tomatoing of Echo Moskvy's offices (on general principle).

Other noteworthy incidents included an October small-sword duel (described here by Morozov’s second) between Morozov and a defender of Latynina's honor (which thankfully led to no bloodshed), as well as a failed (and ill-conceived) attempt to throw mice at an opposition rally.

In 2007, Morozov did something even crazier than usual. He had always claimed that his “tomato terrorism” was equal opportunity; that rather than singling out the liberal opposition in his actions, they just happened to be in the way. And so, one cold spring night, Morozov armed himself with a sawed-off shotgun, fired it at the Moscow office of United Russia, and blogged about it. As he had also managed to hit the FSB office located in the same building, this escapade did not end well. He was sentenced to three years in prison for the shotgun, and, under Article 280 of the Criminal Code, for extremist rhetoric in his blog (becoming one of the first Russian bloggers to serve time for extremist speech).

By the time he was released in 2009, after serving eighteen months of his sentence, “Red Blitzkrieg” had fallen apart. Morozov himself states that he has quit public politics, calling it an ineffective waste, and that personal, not political, circumstances were behind his arrest. While it appears that he still has some connections to the nationalist underground, claiming membership in the so-called “Black Blitzkrieg,” he has dismissed his ‘tomato period' as childish, which makes the May 13, 2012, incident all the more surprising.

Morozov described the impetus for his return to form in a May 12 post. “Fate itself,” he argued, brought together in one place his old opponents, Yashin and Latynina. He could “no longer stand” the concentration of “abomination” in the center of the city. ‘Action had to be taken.'

After he went to prison in 2007, Morozov fell off the RuNet radar, though he has been writing regularly since his 2009 release. Most of the protestors present at his latest action had no idea who he was. The ones who did recognize him reacted with disbelief and nostalgia. “F…, the man who threw tomatoes at Yashin was the notorious Murz? Now that's f-ing something!” tweeted Kashin. “The very same?” sentimentally asked Rykov.

There is definitely something romantic about Morozov's little acts of defiance. Of course, there are always questions. Is he a Kremlin project or his own man? Does he believe in what he says or is he just very good at “trolling”? These same questions were asked seven years ago, to no avail. Kashin later succinctly summed up the sentiment: “Today is the same day it was yesterday.“

Russia: NHL Stars Return to 2012 World Hockey Championship

Donna Welles — Thu, 17 May 2012 01:31:46 +0000

Undefeated after seven games, and boasting an All-Star lineup of Evgeni Malkin, Pavel Datsyuk, Alexander Semin, and Alexander Ovechkin, the Russian national team will face Norway in the quarterfinal round of the 2012 World Ice Hockey Championship, tomorrow on May 17.

The 2012 World Ice Hockey Championship is being held in Stockholm and Helsinki. Both cities hosted tournaments during the preliminary round, where eight teams competed for the four slots advancing to the single-elimination quarterfinals. Helsinki's group consisted of: Belarus, Canada, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the U.S., while Stockholm's had: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Russia, and Sweden.

Russia started the tournament on Saturday, May 5, with a 5-2 victory over Latvia, before going on to beat Norway 4-2 on Sunday, Germany 2-0 on Tuesday, and Denmark 3-1 on Thursday.

Russia's Emotional 7-3 Victory Over Sweden

Dmitry Mikhaylov announced in his bilinguial blog how the Russian team came from behind to beat the host country on Friday, May 11.

STOCKHOLM – In a highly anticipated match-up, Russia and Sweden met tonight at the Globe Arena in an emotional battle of undefeated teams at the 2012 IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship. Down 3-1, Russia scored six unanswered goals to win 7-3.

In response to this highly emotional victory, both the mainstream and citizen media outlets of the Russian Internet devoted dramatically increased coverage to the tournament.

Bloggers Respond to Russia's 2-0 Victory Over the Czech Republic

Planet's Sporting World discussed [ru] how, although Russia scored after only 24 seconds of play, the Czech Republic dominated much of the game, but could not capitalize. NHL Pittsburgh Penguins player Evgeni Malkin scored for Russia in the third period, before he and two of his teammates — Pavel Datsyuk and Milan Mikhalek — were charged with minor penalties.

As is often the case when mainstream outlets build attention on an event, many Russian bloggers quoted their reportage, as a way of spreading popular analyses. Ruslan's News reposted [ru] a quote from Evgeni Malkin, taken from a Vesti article:

Тяжело всё выполнить. Но, конечно, здорово сыграли. И в обороне пять минут выстояли в третьем периоде. Это, наверное, дало всплеск эмоций, и после этого мы забили быстрый гол.

It's difficult to accomplish everything. But, of course, we played great. And our defense held out for five minutes in the third period. This, probably, generated a lot of emotion, and afterwards we scored a quick goal.

News Spreads of the Return of Alexander Ovechkin & Alexander Semin

Similarly, news of the return of Alexander Ovechkin and Alexander Semin from the NHL, following the Washington Capitals' 2-1 loss to the New York Rangers, spread rapidly in both mainstream and citizen media outlets. (Evgeni Malkin's Pittsburgh Penguins and Pavel Datsyuk's Detriot Red Wings were eliminated even earlier, in the previous round of the Stanley Cup Playoffs.)

Alexander Semin scores the first goal in the World Ice Hockey Championship final, 18 May 2008, photo by Alexey Chernyadyev, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

Most bloggers framed the story as a homecoming for Ovechkin and Semin, while some Twitter users indicated their familiarity with mainstream journalism, such as Sport.rbc and Lenta.ru.

Lisbeth Armel:

Прочитала, что овечкин любит хип-хоп и r'n'b. представила. 5 минут сидела с фейспалмом.

I read that Ovechkin likes Hip Hop and R&B. I sat down and thought about it. For five minutes I just facepalmed.

Sanya Belovka:

Овечкина и Семина Ждем с нетерпением….В россии….2-1 Вашингтон домои)!!!А Овечкин В ШВЕЦИЮ!!!!

We're anxiously waiting for Ovechkin and Semin….[to be] in Russia [again]…..[He lost] 2-1 to Washington, and now he's homeward-bound.) !!! But [it turns out] Ovechkin is headed for Sweden!!!!

Ilgiz Taipov:

Приезд Овечкина и Семина по разному комментируют, кто то вспоминает его прошлогоднюю игру за сборную, и пишут типа зачем он нужен и т.п.. Надо уметь использовать потенциал этого игрока, а мы то знаем что он может играть, что потенциал у него огромный. Семин тоже хороший игрок, то что с Вашингтонгом Кэпиталз случилось это чисто тренерский просчет.

People are saying different things about the arrival of Ovechkin and Semin. Some recall how [Ovechkin] played [poorly] for last year's national team, and wonder why we need him, etcetera. We have to be able to use this player's potential, and we know that he can play — that he has enormous potential. Semin is also a good player, and what happened with the Washington Capitals was purely an issue with the coach.

Ukraine: Yulia Tymoshenko's Plight and Euro 2012

Veronica Khokhlova — Thu, 17 May 2012 01:12:02 +0000

There must be some corners on the web (e.g., here and here) where football fans are still having apolitical discussions of the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship, scheduled to take place in Poland and Ukraine from June 8 to July 1. For the past few weeks, however, the upcoming sporting event has featured prominently in arguments and discussions among those who seem more interested in the Ukrainian and European politics than sports.

Earlier this month, several European politicians, including the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, announced their plans to boycott Euro 2012 in protest against the imprisonment of ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko. However, there is no consensus among the EU officials yet on whether “to call a political boycott of the Ukraine half of the Euro 2012 football championships.”

Tymoshenko's arrest came on August 5, 2011, a little over a month after the beginning of her first trial on June 24. She was kept at Kyiv's Lukyanivska Prison (GV texts about this facility are here and here) until December 30, when she was transferred to the Kachanivska Penal Colony in Kharkiv to serve a seven-year sentence for exceeding her powers as Prime Minister. Reports of Tymoshenko's health problems and her 20-day hunger strike have dominated the recent coverage of her case. On April 19, another trial of Tymoshenko began in Kharkiv, but she refused to attend it. The hearing of this second case, in which Tymoshenko is charged with evading taxes in the 1990s, has been postponed until late May.

While the preparation for the tournament in Ukraine was marred by a number of other controversies (e.g., the cruel treatment of stray animals; accusations of hotel price gouging; and, of all things, the threat posed by the “beautiful Ukrainian women”), this latest international scandal seems to have done the most harm to Ukraine's image so far.

On May 3, the Economist asked readers in an online poll if they supported the calls to boycott the games held in Ukraine:

The apparently brutal treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko, an imprisoned Ukrainian opposition leader, has led to calls for European leaders to stay away from Ukrainian matches in the upcoming Euro 2012 football tournament, which the country is hosting jointly with Poland.

The Economist agrees with these calls. Do you?

Of the 1,834 votes cast so far, 68 percent are in favor of the boycott and 32 percent are against it.

Odessablogger - who believes that “the football is the wrong stick to hit Ukraine with given the need for EU personalities to interact directly with the Ukrainian people” - recounted some of the examples of sports and politics “colliding” in the past, and quoted from the April 28 Der Spiegel interview [en] with boxer and politician Vitali Klitschko, who opposes the boycott of Euro 2012:

“[…] This tournament is the biggest sporting event in the history of Ukraine. It has to happen. It is even an excellent opportunity to draw the world’s attention to the maladministration in our country. […]”

Odessablogger also noted Yulia Tymoshenko's stance on the boycott:

[…] In case you are wondering, the current position taken by Ms Tymoshenko herself over the matter, is that there should not be a boycott because of her, and that the Ukrainian people should see the EU leaders in Ukraine as it will encourage them to look to the EU rather than think they have been written off. […]

Marek Siwiec, a Polish politician and Member of the European Parliament, explained on his BlogActiv.eu blog why he did not support the boycott:

[…] In Poland we need to understand (and I repeated it many times) that the football championship for Ukrainians is a national question – a source of pride, regardless of political views. Ukrainians deserve to have this tournament in their country in an atmosphere of festivity, in spite of all. […]

[…] Besides, as a whole political class, just as we act together in defence of Yulia Tymoshenko, in this case we should separate sport from politics. If there was somebody in Poland who would like to take this opportunity to rob something from Ukrainians, I warn – the political costs in the mutual relations will be long lasting and serious. […]

Jonathan Hibberd of Chicken in Kiev wrote about Germany's stance on Euro 2012 in Ukraine:

Merkel boycotts Ukraine? Business as usual.

Germany has been boycotting Ukraine's interests for some time. […]

[…] Germany should in fact, albeit indirectly, accept some responsibility for what has happened here since 2010. As one leading commentator said a couple of years back, it would have meant an awful lot if Chancellor Merkel had come to Kiev and made a speech in support of Ukraine's European ambitions. Don't forget how narrowly Tymoshenko lost the Presidential election. German endorsement of a European and Euro-Atlantic choice for Ukraine might well have been enough to swing the election for her, but instead it was held against a background of resignation, that Europe didn't want Ukraine and rapprochement with Russia was paramount. Merkel was not there for her then. […]

At OpenDemocracy.net, Valery Kalnysh, deputy editor of the Kommersant Ukraina newspaper, shared this possible explanation for the German leader's position:

[…] But why, on the other hand, is Germany so active in taking up the cudgels against Ukraine? During the course of a conversation, a German journalist commented ‘It’s quite easy for Merkel to attack Ukraine and demand respect for human rights. Unlike Russia, you have no oil or gas and you’re not as strong and influential as China. It’s convenient to criticise Ukraine and it does great things for [her] popularity rating.’ […]

LEvko of Foreign Notes explained “why Ukraine's Euro 2012 [would] not be as big a success as hoped”:

[…] In previous tournaments, in my experience, many fans have made an extended holiday of their visits to countries hosting such events; days between matches being spent on the beach, sightseeing, etc. etc. In countries such as Austria/Switzerland or Portugal, where tourism is highly developed, this was an attractive proposition..but, no disrespect intended…Kharkiv? Dontesk?

Europe is currently in the deepest economic crisis since WW2. There is little cash around..not enough to pay the Ukraine's rip-off hotel prices.

Then there's the Olympic games in London later in the year - an attractive draw for sports fans.

[…] But the tsunami of bad press in Europe's mass media over the Tymoshenko affair will be the final turn-off. Fans will rather stay at home, or, at best, fly in and out for matches, just like they do for European club matches.. […]

Olga Mrinska of Regional Accents reflected [uk] on the Euro 2012 boycott scandal in the context of the general social and political situation in Ukraine:

[…] The repressive race aimed at the opposition leaders has reached its apogee in the past year, and domestic politics has become the center of attention of world leaders. […] Today's Ukraine is, above all, associated with the jailed opposition, lack of freedom of speech, kleptomaniac and lying officials. Our president must have naively (???) believed that [it's possible to endlessly mislead these “spineless” European leaders and feed them with “mañana” [empty promises] at any mention of the democratic reforms - the leaders who live in ordinary houses in the city center (Germany), ride bicycles (the Netherlands), fly regular commercial flights (Finland) and have incomparably fewer guards that he does (choose any EU country).] And when these Europeans have finally stood up […], [the Ukrainian leaders began talking] of the Cold War era and bias. In my opinion, this is a lousy excuse…

The problem isn't with the Europeans, but with the Ukrainians - the voters who have brought to power people without the intellect, without a strategic vision and without the belief in the better future for the country and its people. The problem is with the so-called elite that, just like those hotel owners, lives only in the present, without giving any thought to the future.

Despite the avalanche of negative information about Ukraine in the world media, justified in most cases, we still have a chance to [show Ukraine in a positive light] to those football fans who would attend the Euro. Out people are the last frontier and the last hope. The end result and the final assessment of the event depends on their open-mindedness, decency and hospitality. […]

Finally, a few words about the aspect of Euro 2012 that has gone largely unnoticed - [the view that the Ukrainians themselves have of the event]. Five years ago, we were promised an ocean of private investments, a new and shining infrastructure that would serve host cities for decades, an influx of tourists and billions for the economy. Instead, residents of Kyiv and other cities have experienced mainly negative consequences - destruction of parks, totally dug-up cities, closed streets, altered public transportation routes, […], growing prices, etc. […]

Russia: State TV Justifies May 6 Police Violence, Cites Spanish Bill Criminalizing Online Protest Organization as Example

Veronica Khokhlova — Wed, 16 May 2012 21:42:31 +0000

In the final segment of the report [ru] on the May 6 protest in Moscow, which ended in clashes with riot police, the Russian state-owned Channel 1 mentioned, among other things, a Spanish draft law [en] criminalizing online organization of public protests, as an example of the “much tougher” treatment of protesters by the “colleagues” of the Russian law enforcement officials “in the countries with the so-called established democracy.”

Global Voices Seeks Contributing Editor for RuNet Echo Project

Ivan Sigal — Wed, 16 May 2012 21:06:43 +0000

Global Voices is seeking a part-time Contributing Editor to support our coverage of Russian citizen media, as part of our RuNet Echo project.

The project provides comprehensive and deep reporting on and analyses of the Russian-language online community. The purpose of the initiative is to deepen our coverage and analysis of Russian-language blogospheres, online speech and social networks.

Produce original analysis, research, and reporting based on our coverage of the Russian-language Internet.
Selectively follow up stories with in-depth research into compelling topics.
Monitor target civil society initiatives, websites, and movements.

The primary focus of our coverage and analysis is Russian-language online writing from and about the Russian Federation. Secondary content may also include Russian-language content from the former Soviet Union, as it relates to the Russian Federation.

The Contributing Editor will assist in producing and editing content for the project, including regular output of stories, translation, and networking. The editor will produce and/or edit several in-depth stories per week, as well as shorter posts linking and pointing to important topics, events, and writing as it occurs. The work will involve extensive translation, analysis, and further original research and reporting when appropriate, in order to elucidate and identify trends, ideas, and social and political currents within RuNet. Analysis will also examine how content in the Russian language space relates to other online communities, languages, and cultures, and offline Russian conversation, journalism, and social and political movements.

The Project Editor will also:

Help manage an ongoing Special Coverage section to consolidate and organize content from the RuNet project.
Work closely with Global Voices' existing Russian-focused editorial editors and authors.
Cultivate relationships with Russian bloggers and writers, toward the same end.
Present at conferences and events pertaining to the Russian online world, as needed

Successful applicants will have the following qualifications:

Fluency in English and Russian. Articles will be published in English, with minimal editing. Writing samples will be required as part of the application.
Familiarity with the Russian blogosphere, Russian social networks, and Russian political, social, economic, and cultural trends.
Ability to report on, analyze, and explain the Russian online world, in English and Russian.
Have the ability to work independently, in an unstructured work environment, and to work with a virtual community.
Be computer literate, comfortable working with programmers and technical language. Programming/HTML knowledge not required but strong familiarity with the use of online social media tools (blogging platforms, aggregators, use of RSS feeds, and tagging) is important.

Interested candidates please send CV and Letter of Interest explaining why you'd be a good candidate for the job to: admin AT globalvoicesonline DOT org

Interpreting RuNet is funded by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

Macedonia: Blogging in Estonian about Skopje Marathon/Half-Marathon

Filip Stojanovski — Tue, 15 May 2012 22:35:30 +0000

Sandra Jürs blogged in Estonian about her participation in the Skopje Marathon/Half-Marathon [mk, en] on May 6, 2012.

Russia: Duma Deputy Wants Criminal Liability for Extremist Tweets

Kevin Rothrock — Tue, 15 May 2012 12:42:31 +0000

Yesterday, on May 14, Aleksandr Khinshtein [en], a Duma deputy and member of United Russia ('the party of power'), wrote a letter to Yuri Chaika [en], the Prosecutor General of Russia. In that letter, Khinshtein noted the “recent sharp rise in the number of calls for acts of violence against state officials and police officers” appearing in online social networks. Twitter and Facebook, he argued, “have effectively transformed into an instrument to coordinate the actions of extremists, becoming a channel for the dissemination of detailed instructions to their supporters.” The letter begins [ru]:

Прошу Вас принять меры к владельцам и пользователи аккаунтов в различных социальных интернет-сетях (русскоязычные сегменты Twitter и Facebook), активно содействовавшим в организации массовых беспорядков 6 мая 2012 года в г. Москве.

I ask you to take measures against the owners and users of accounts on various online social networks ([such as] the Russian language segments of Twitter and Facebook), who actively administered the organization of mass unrest on May 6, 2012, in Moscow.

Khinshtein added that bloggers are also using these services to advocate violence against “the legally elected President” and Russia's “constitutional order.” (Twitter user Lucius Aevus, for instance, wrote [ru] on April 24, “Buy weapons, stockpile food, join up, and kill Putin.”) Khinshtein called specifically for (1) the prevention of the further spread of such illegal, extremist online appeals, (2) the criminal prosecution of individuals who use social networks to disseminate extremism, and (3) any other measures legally necessary.

Screenshot of Khinshtein's official Duma webpage, 15 May 2012.

Hours after news of this petition caused a stir in the media, Khinshtein responded by publishing the full text of his letter to Chaika, claiming [ru] that his initiative is not a plea for political censorship. Khinshtein did not, however, publish the supplementary materials he attached to the letter, where he cataloged dozens of examples of bloggers advocating illegal activity. The list, to which online newspaper Gazeta.ru has access and has graciously summarized [ru], focuses on nationalist and liberal democratic oppositionists — some anonymous and others well-known.

First on the list is self-described “ultra-right” anonymous blogger odinzavseh (”one for all”), whom Khinshtein links to soccer hooligans, like the ones infamous for inciting a small ethnic riot in Moscow in December 2010. On Twitter, odinzavseh has called on protesters to beat up Putin-supporters and public figures Sergei Minaev and Konstantin Rykov. He also allegedly encouraged oppositionists to attack government buildings with Molotov cocktails on the night of May 8. Both these tweets were later deleted, though evidence of the former can still be found [ru] on Yandex. In what seems particularly outrageous to many bloggers, Khinshtein has claimed, as well, that retweeting (reposting another user's message) also carries criminal liability. Odinzavseh, for instance, retweeted user LailaMooore's call [ru] on protesters to slash the tires of police vans and bring weapons to protests.

Not one to exclude Russia's homegrown social networks, Khinshtein also cited “The Moscow Front,” a nationalist group based [ru] on VKontakte that advocated attacks on government buildings near Chistye Prudy on May 7. As soon as these allegations went public, the group published its thanks to Khinshtein for the “free publicity.” Several members immediately posted anti-Semitic comments, complaining, for example [ru], “You know, Khinshtein's Jewish snout pisses me off.”

Also gracing the list is Mikhail Svetov, Twitter user msvetov, a Russian student living in Japan, who has been an active virtual participant in the opposition protests. During the May 6 “Million Man March” at Bolonatia Square, Svetov tweeted:

Не выбрасывайте омоновские шлемы в реку, надевайте их на себя. Это броня, она вас защитит от полицейских дубинок.

Don't throw the police helmets into the river: wear them yourselves. They're armor, and will protect you from their nightsticks.

and:

Отнимайте у ОМОНа щиты, каски, дубинки, это уравнивает ваши шансы. Не нападайте на них, но отнимайте амуницию.

Take away the police's shields, helmets, nightsticks — this evens your chances. Don't attack them, but take away their ammunition.

Khinshtein also accused oppositionists Vitaly Shushkevich and Artem Chapaev of online extremism. On May 7, Chapaev tweeted:

Думаю, частью стратегии должна стать дальнейшая радикализация масс, чтобы перейти к тактике ощутимой городской герильи.

I think that further radicalization of the masses should become a part [of the opposition], in order to transition to urban guerilla tactics.

That same day, Shushkevich used his Twitter account to encourage [ru] protesters to bring coins to Chistye Prudy and throw them at police and “Nashists” (members of the pro-Kremlin youth). He also reposted several unsavory messages from Twitter users gruppa_voina, ponny1, papumaria, and moskless, including calls to spread the fear that “Moscow is out of control.”

The always irreverent artist collective Gruppa Voina [en] responded in typical fashion, quipping [ru] that its followers would soon be confronted by Khinshtein himself:

Друзья, вы все шутки шутите - но не забывайте - за КАЖДЫЙ РЕТВИТ с вас спросит @khinshtein в комнате допросов ближайшей к вашему дому тюрьмы

Friends, you're all having a laugh, but don't forget that for EVERY RETWEET Khinshtein will question you in the interrogation room of the prison nearest to your home.

Petr Verzilov, husband of Pussy Riot's imprisoned Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and a Voina member, sarcastically welcomed [ru] Khinshtein's efforts, saying that criminalizing retweets could become the “next step in the development of civil society and legal consciousness in our country.”

Aleksei Navalny is also on Khinshtein's list — included for a May 3 tweet [ru] that joked about burning down the Mayor's office. Navalny quoted the text of a Sergei Udaltsov tweet, altering the final line into a mock appeal for arson:

Чиновники из мэрии вышли на связь, обещают в течение часа согласовать марш. Если обманут – сожжем мэрию.

Officials from the Mayor's office have been in contact. They promise to approve the [May 6] march within an hour. If they're lying, we'll burn down city hall.

In reality, Udaltsov had written [ru]: “If they're lying, we'll make an announcement through the orgkomitet.”

Some RuNet voices have insisted that Khinshtein is asking the Prosecutor General to do something fundamentally beyond its legal authority, and is only causing a stir to grab a moment's publicity. In a series of identical tweets addressed to prominent RuNet bloggers, Yuri Suetin posted the scan [ru] of a letter from May 2011, where the FSB informs a certain Dmitri Goriugin that Russian law enforcement agencies are incapable of deleting or banning posts from Twitter. (Goriugin had apparently complained about personal insults directed at him, published online by pro-Kremlin blogger fritzmorgen — an account that ironically Twitter has since suspended.) Other users, however, were quick to point out that Khinshtein is citing anti-extremism laws that carry far more extensive police powers than Criminal Code 130 (to which Goriugin appealed).

Russian politician, Yuri Chaika, 8 December 2009, photo by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

Khinshtein's appeal to Chaika coincides with a draft project [ru] introduced to the Duma yesterday by United Russia deputies. The project denounces protesters who attacked police at Bolotnaia Square on May 6, and advocates criminal prosecution of those “responsible.”

The state's response to Khinshtein's letter will be an interesting test of the lengths to which the Kremlin is prepared to pressure oppositionists in their use of online social media. Services like Twitter and Facebook are widely credited with energizing the protest movement — indeed, the feasibility of recent mass demonstrations seems to have required these instruments. Likewise, heightened public scrutiny on the extremist content of oppositionists' blog posts and tweets will test the maturity and accountability of a space that until now has hosted language often violent and legally dubious according to Russian legislation.

Russia: Website Appears Publishing Civil Servants' Incomes

Siân Sinnott — Tue, 15 May 2012 04:22:41 +0000

The project “Public Profit” [ru] was established so that anyone interested could access information about the salaries of civil servants and state deputies. The information is compiled using public records and disclosed in accordance with Russian law.

In addition to general information about incomes, other interesting statistics can be found on the site, such as reports on individual government departments, as well as data about which civil servants own the biggest apartments.

Several of the facts revealed are nothing short of amazing.

Screen shot of Public Profit's website, 15 May 2012.

For example, Alexander V. Gilderman [ru], Deputy of the Administrative Department of Regional Sustainment, owns a house with land covering 4,433 square meters (1.1 acres).

However, the champion of real estate holdings is Igor I. Shuvalov [ru], whose total income exceeds 14,652,000 rubles (approximately 505,240 U.S. dollars), which only makes up less than 4% of his total family income.

The gap between spouses' earnings is a separate reason to reconsider the traditional family paradigm; Igor Suvalov's wife earns almost 25 times more than him, and Mrs. Sukhenko earns 60 times more than her husband, although their income is more modest by far.

The champion of all Russia's civil servants is Yuri Trutnev, who has earned a record-breaking 114 million rubles (3.7 million U.S. dollars) and change (and, in his case, there is more than a little change). Unfortunately, his income fell in 2010, but let's hope things will be okay. For now, his wife and four children (judging by their income declarations) can get away with not working for now.

Apart from that, we can only be happy for these people!

See the original article here [ru].

Ukraine, France: The Future of Franco-Ukrainian Relationship

Veronica Khokhlova — Sun, 13 May 2012 00:01:41 +0000

Odessablogger comments on the statements made by Ukrainian political scientists regarding the future of the Franco-Ukrainian relationship following the election of François Hollande as the President of France.

Lithuania: Alleged Child Abuse Case

Veronica Khokhlova — Sat, 12 May 2012 23:36:13 +0000

At OpenDemocracy.net, Violeta Davoliūtė draws attention to “some of the more sober realities of life in today’s Lithuania,” highlighting a highly publicised case of alleged child abuse that is “being played out against a background of mob rule, support from politicians and complicity on the part of the police.”

Serbia: May 6 Elections Results

Veronica Khokhlova — Sat, 12 May 2012 23:14:26 +0000

Eric Gordy of East Ethnia sums up the results of the first round of the elections in Serbia and predicts what is to come after the May 20 runoff: “Assuming that Tadić defeats Nikolić by his usual narrow margin in two weeks, a government that looks a lot like the previous one, only less stable and more corrupt, and lots of signs that there is a good number of angry people in a system that remains pretty lopsided and pretty dysfunctional. No signs that things will get much better, but happily no signs that they will get a whole lot worse.”

Russia: Yavlinsky Stir Reveals Opposition Rift

Kevin Rothrock — Fri, 11 May 2012 12:41:14 +0000

On May 10, Grigory Yavlinsky [en] controversially wrote [ru] in his LiveJournal blog that the Russian opposition's recent turn to more confrontational tactics is a bad omen for democracy. Yavlinsky, born the same year as Vladimir Putin, is one of Russian politics' oldest faces. He played a pivotal role in the immediate post-Soviet period, authoring important elements of Russia's transition to a free-market economy. Since the 1990s, Yavlinksy has been the face of Yabloko [en], Russia's original liberal democrat political party. In the Putin era, Yavlinsky's party has remained a curious outlier to both “systemic politics” and “nonsystemic politics,” having lost its Duma presence in 2007 but remaining an officially registered party that is still viewed by many oppositionists as compromised and pro-establishment.

Grigory Yavlinskiy, economist and politician, 15 Jan 2011, photo by Skilpaddle, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

True to Yabloko's troubled past and present, Yavlinksy's May 10 blog post has upset many and pleased relatively few. While he made a point of praising protesters' bravery and placing “main responsibility” on the authorities ('those who falsify elections, propagate corruption and thievery,' etc.), many have focused exclusively on Yavlinsky's criticisms of the protest movement. Lenta.ru, for instance, ran an article [ru] titled, “Yavlinsky Declares Protests Meaningless.”

Yavlinsky's concerns with the new developments in Moscow protests center on spiking violence and a perceived drift away from politics. He writes:

При этом я считаю, что если у организаторов есть расчет на то, что жестокость омоновцев будет мультиплицировать количество желающих с ними сражаться, то это неверный расчет. Опыт Триумфальной показывает, что мультипликации не получится. Наоборот, люди перестанут ходить на митинги и шествия, если там льется кровь, если их там избивают. Неужели кто-то полагает, что можно чего-то добиться лобовым столкновением, гражданской войной?

[…]

САМИ ПО СЕБЕ ГРАЖДАНСКИЕ МИТИНГИ, АКЦИИ, ГУЛЯНИЯ И ПРОЧИЕ ФЛЕШМОБЫ, ПРИ ВСЕЙ ИХ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЙ ДОСТОЙНОСТИ, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИ НИЧЕГО НЕ ИЗМЕНЯТ И В СИЛУ СВОЕЙ БЕСПОМОЩНОСТИ БУДУТ ЧАСТО ПЕРЕРАСТАТЬ В ДРАКИ И СХВАТКИ. Разрастание насилия сделает ситуацию во всех отношениях гораздо хуже.

If organizers are counting on the brutality of riot police to multiply the number of people wishing to join their fight, I think that's a flawed count. The experience of Triumfalnaia [Square] shows that no such multiplication occurs. On the contrary, people stop coming to rallies and marches, if blood is being spilled there, or if people are being beaten. Do some people really believe that anything can be accomplished with a head-on collision, or a civil war?

[…]

BY ITSELF, CITIZEN DEMONSTRATIONS, RALLIES, WALKABOUTS, AND SIMILAR FLASHMOBS (WITH ALL THEIR HUMAN DIGNITY) WILL NOT CHANGE ANYTHING POLITICALLY, AND BY VIRTUE OF THEIR OWN IMPOTENCE WILL OFTEN ESCALATE INTO FIGHTING AND CRACKDOWNS. The spread of violence will make the situation much worse in every respect.

As an alternative to this brand of dissent, he proposes a response “personal, programmatic, idealogical, organized, professional, moral, AND POLITICAL,” saying that a gradual, long-term approach is the only real option:

Надо начинать заниматься серьезной политикой , выигрывать выборы и брать власть. Долго? Да, шесть лет очень долго, но раньше и мы ничего не успеем. И следует понимать - альтернатив будет не одна, а три: левая, демократическая и националисты. Какая победит - скажет народ.

We have to take up serious politics, win elections, and take power. Will it be a long time? Yes, six years is very long, but we'll not manage this any sooner. And it's worth understanding that there won't be just one alternative, but three: leftist, democratic, and nationalist. Which wins out, the people will say.

Reactions to Yavlinsky's comments have varied. Some bloggers have been less than polite. Anti-Putin LiveJournal user i_l_d responded [ru] simply: “Go screw yourself, Yavlinsky.” Nationalist blogger sinn-fein-front wrote [ru] gloatingly:

Ну вот и Явлинский, отчисливший Навального за национализм, в своем блоге на Эхе Москвы признал националистов равноценной силой протеста. Что ж, отрадно. Один за одним падают бастионы русофобии в публичной политике

Well look here: Yavlinsky, who expelled Navalny [from Yabloko] for his nationalism, has in his blog acknowledged that nationalists are equal members of the protest [movement]. Well, how pleasant. One by one, the bastions of russophobia in public politics are falling.

Prominent blogger Rustem Adagamov [en], linking to the above-mentioned Lenta.ru article (not Yavlinsky's original text), tweeted [ru]:

Вот и Явлинский! http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/yavl/ “Надо начинать заниматься серьезной политикой” Вау, а 16 лет до этого—это что было?

And here's Yavlinksy! [link to the Lenta.ru story] “We have to take up serious politics.” Wow, and the last 16 years — what was all that?

Dmitri Ivanov, a political satirist from the website CarambaTV.ru [ru], a webtv project, tweeted [ru]:

Явлинский заявил о бессмысленности митингов. Митинги заявили о бессмысленности Явлинского

Yavlinsky has declared the meaninglessness of the protests. The protests have declared the meaninglessness of Yavlinsky.

Despite the backlash against a politician infamous for upsetting pro-Kremlin and oppositionist figures alike, support for Yavlinsky also exists on the RuNet. Some of his supporters are predictable, like Ivan Bolshakov, a deputy chairman of Yabloko's Moscow branch, who faulted [ru] critics for taking Yavlinsky's words out of context:

И каким же надо быть простачком (или сознательным дискредитатором?), чтобы этот смысл извратить до «Явлинский – против митингов» и фактически приравнять заявление Явлинского к позиции Путина его дружков!?

What kind of simpleton (or conscious discreditor) does one have to be to distort this into ‘Yavlinksy is against the demonstrations' and equate his statement with the position of Putin and his buddies!?

Vladimir Milov [en], another prominent oppositionist politician who briefly served in the Russian government as Deputy Energy Minister in 2002, is another figure who has publicized his disdain for street confrontations. He tweeted [ru] a mild attack on Lenta.ru and announced his support for Yavlinsky's comments:

Вот образчик типичного наглого хипстерского вранья http://www.lenta.ru/news/2012/05/10/yavl/ а вот оригинал, с которым я полностью согласен http://gr-yavlinsky.livejournal.com/43985.html

Here's a sample of some typical, obnoxious, hipster baloney [link to Lenta.ru story] and here's the original, with which I agree entirely [link to Yavlinsky's blog].

In the aftermath of parliamentary elections, between December 2011 and February 2012, the Russian opposition experienced an explosion of mass popularity that disadvantaged professional politicians like Yavlinsky and Milov, whose careers (or ‘activism,' if one prefers) are fixed on evolutionary improvements to Russian society and governance. Theirs is the politics of policy and statecraft — what critics view as regime-collaboration and allies see as realistic, constructive work.

Current developments in Russia's protest movement have widened the gap between populist dramatics and nuts-and-bolts politics. Consequentially, Yavlinsky's blog-post scandal is symptomatic of a growing rift between guards Old and New. And, yet, men like Milov are fairly young. (He turns forty this summer.) The question is less about age than temperament and tactical preferences. Does one work ‘within the system' for gradual change — a relatively thankless task with only distant satisfaction — or, to borrow a phrase from Yavlinsky, opt for more aggressive “head-on collisions”?

Europe: Economic Crisis Fuels Rise in Anti-Immigration Politics

Ariane Defreine — Thu, 10 May 2012 20:31:35 +0000

The French presidential election may be over, but the fact that outgoing president Nicolas Sarkozy chose immigration as a core theme of his campaign [fr] is still the subject of much debate on the Web. Many netizens have wondered whether his choice to flirt with the far-right wing of his electorate helped temper his defeat or whether, on the contrary, it was one of the reasons his electorate deserted him [fr].

Given the apparent waning appetite of European voters for multiculturalism, singling out immigration as the root of the global economic crisis has proven fruitful for far-right parties across the continent.

African refugees by Vito Manzari on Flickr (CC BY 2.0)

If this rhetoric sounds familiar, it's because it has affected the old continent, when in times of crisis, in a cyclical pattern for centuries. Valérie, on her blog 'Crêpe Georgette', recounted the chronology of perceptions on immigration in France [fr] from the first half of the 19th century until today:

S’il est une idée en vogue, c’est bien de penser que les anciennes vagues d’immigration (italiennes, polonaises, espagnoles, belges …) se sont parfaitement intégrées au contraire des vagues, plus récentes, maghrébines et africaines.
Les anciennes vagues d’immigrés étaient travailleuses, ne posaient aucun problème et les français les ont d’ailleurs parfaitement acceptées, entend-on souvent.
Constatons donc que les propos actuels sur les immigrés les plus récents ne sont qu’une répétition d’idées reçues anciennes et qui se sont exercées à l’encontre de toutes les communautés migrantes (qu’elles viennent de province ou de pays étrangers).

If there is but one fashionable idea, it is the belief that the old immigration waves (from Italy, Poland, Spain, Belgium…) are now fully integrated in our society, as opposed to the more recent immigration waves from Maghreb and Africa.
We often hear “the former immigration waves were related to labour, did not cause any issue, and were indeed perfectly accepted by the French.”
Let us then recognise that current comments on the most recent immigration waves are the mere reiteration of old stereotypes which all migrant communities have faced (whether they originated from the countryside or from foreign countries).

Valérie drew a parallel between allegations that Italian and Spanish immigrants did not and could not be integrated, and those against today's immigrants from Eastern Europe and Africa:

Toutes les populations d’immigrés – mais aussi les populations pauvres de manière générale – sont vues au cours des siècles comme sales, non intégrées, se vautrant dans la luxure et des coutumes exotiques. Ce qu’on entend à l’heure actuelle sur les quartiers « islamisés », « envahis » de femmes en burqa avec 10 enfants n’est que la répétition, comme vous le constatez, de propos tenus sur toutes les vagues d’immigration précédentes. L’italien lui aussi fait une cuisine infâme, trop d’enfants et se vêt d’oripeaux. Le polonais se ridiculise avec son catholicisme particulier et à se tenir debout pendant la messe alors que le bon français est assis.

All immigrant populations - but also the poor in general - have been deemed throughout the centuries to be dirty, non-integrated, indulging in lust and other exotic customs. As you may observe, what is said today about the ‘islamicised' neighbourhoods, 'swamped' with women wearing the burqa and their tens of children, is only repeating comments of all the previous waves of immigration. The Italian immigrant also cooks dreadful food, has too many children, and dresses in rags. The Polish immigrant is ridiculed for his peculiar brand of Catholicism and his habit of standing up throughout mass whereas proper French people remain seated.

Economic downturn not the only reason

Nevertheless, the economic downturn alone cannot explain the attractiveness of anti-immigration arguments. In an editorial on the future of multiculturalism in France, Julie Owono highlighted that:

The reason for the growing worry over the future of Europe is not simply related to the crisis. Contrary to what some politicians were quick to explain on the evening of the first round, it seems that the French who gave their vote to extremism do not suffer that much from the immigration scourge. French analysts have found that, while the latter represents a major concern for 62 per cent of National Front voters, areas where the party has received a significant number of votes do not have a particularly high immigration rate.

A European phenomenon

Foreigners in Europe by Digital Dreams on FlickR License-CC-BY

Politicians singing this weathered old tune against immigration are not limited to France. In Greece, the Neo-Nazi party known as Golden Dawn took advantage of the country's economic difficulties and broke through during the most recent general elections. In Great Britain, a commenter posting under the name James reacted to the fact that Cameron, Merkel, and Sarkozy declared the failure of multiculturalism in Europe:

She [Merkel] wanted People from richer nations to embrace and train poorer region folk! It hasn't worked, its cost us all billions and its getting more expensive year on year! Would you rather have a farmer from romania working in britain, claiming to be poor and sending all the money home to build a mansion! thats whats happening.

Valérie said she is no longer surprised by recycling of anti-immigration rhetoric. She suggested in her blog some reading to open up the debate:

Pour combattre les craintes face aux immigrés maghrébins et africains, on gagnerait à lire les textes du 19eme et du début du 20eme pour comprendre comment se fondent ces peurs et comment l’on ne fait que répéter les mêmes idées ayant cours dans les siècles précédents. Conseils de lecture :

- Conseillé par Melle S. : A. SAYAD « L’immigration ou les paradoxes de l’altérité » (1. L’illusion du provisoire et 2. Les enfants illégitimes).
- Gérard Noiriel, « Le creuset français ».
- Laurent Dornel, « La France hostile. Histoire de la xénophobie en France au XIXe siècle ”

To address anxieties over immigrants from Maghreb and Africa, one would gain from reading texts from the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries in order to understand the foundations of such fears and how the same arguments are being used throughout the centuries. Suggested reading:

- Suggested by Melle S. [fr]: A. Sayad, Immigration or the Paradoxes of Alterity [fr] (1. The illusion of the ephemery and 2. The illegitimate children)
- Gérard Noiriel, The French Melting-Pot
- Laurent Dornel, Hostile France. A History of Xenophobia in France in the 19th Century [fr]

Russia: Ustream.tv Attacked Over Russian Blogger

Andrey Tselikov — Thu, 10 May 2012 00:41:55 +0000

On the morning of May 9, 2012, unknown parties launched a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack on the live feed website Ustream.tv. According to Victoria Levy of Ustream.tv, the attack took place from thousands of unique IPs, based in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Iran. It was centered on one particular user, reggamortis1 [ru], who for the past four days has been covering opposition rallies and protests in Moscow.

Although Ustream.tv began operating normally after ten hours of downtime, the reggamortis1 channel remained inaccessible for several more hours. CEO Brad Hunstable said in an interview with Global Voices that this was the most serious DDoS attack on the website ever.

Screenshot of Ustream.tv's homepage featuring reggamortis1's coverage of the protests in Moscow.

Ustream.tv makes it very easy to run live-streaming broadcasts from smart-phones, making it an invaluable resource for bloggers around the world. It reaches 55 million people monthly, and a staggering 125 hours of content are uploaded to the site per minute. Ustream’s mission, says Mr. Hunstable, is to provide a platform for people to share stories and build communities.

True to this mission, Russian citizen journalists like Kirill Mikhailov, aka reggamortis1, who also tweets at @reggaemortis1 [ru] and blogs at reggae-mortis.livejournal.com [ru], have been utilizing the service to report on recent Russian protests in lieu of coverage by official Russian television networks.

One such live broadcast, by user vova-moskva [ru], gained traction through Twitter on March 5. It covered the situation on Pushkinskaya Square in Moscow during the rally against Vladimir Putin’s reelection.

Mikhailov blogged about the need for such action [ru] on February 29:

From every square we will need to maintain constant coverage and concentrate it in one place. But that’s for the future.

At this point Mikhailov was slightly behind the times. The Ustream.tv channel of Ridus, a Russian citizen journalism platform, has been posting live feeds of protests starting last December, and has since collected well over two million live views.

This type of guerilla reporting is in line with the general trend of internet-based news coverage in Russia. For example, tvrain.ru [ru] is a liberal-leaning online television channel that often interviews opposition leaders and hosts them on its talk shows. It recently provided a platform [ru] for new opposition darling Ksenia Sobchak after her political debate show had been forced out from mainstream television.

On the other side of the barricades, MinaevLive [ru] is a live-streaming “internet-show” run by Sergei Minaev, a Russian writer and blogger with reputed ties to the Kremlin. His from-the-rooftops YouTube coverage of the May 6 March of the Millions was a four-hour bird’s eye view of the conflict and its development. (A compressed and sped-up 4-minute YouTube version is located here.)

The current DDoS attack on Ustream.tv is consistent with other attacks on Russian opposition websites and social networks. RuNet Echo has previously covered DDoS attacks against Russian opposition media and blogs during the Russian parliamentary elections last December. Ridus’ Ustream.tv channel was likewise DDoS’d on December 6 and January 6.

Attacks on online media were most recently repeated during the March of the Millions. “The tvrain.ru website isn’t working, and so are the sites of Slon [slon.ru] and Echo Moskvy [echo.msk.ru],” tweeted @tvrain [ru] on May 6.

On the same day, General Director of Kommersant, Demian Kudriavtsev, warned on his Facebook [ru] that the daily newspaper’s website was under a DDoS attack. Echo’s Varfolomeev gave the same reason [ru] for his site’s erratic behavior.

Perhaps because of this Mikhailov, an opposition activist from Ufa [ru] who charmingly calls himself “Navalny’s battle-hamster,” doesn’t put all of his eggs in one basket. Although he has been using Ustream.tv since April 15 [ru], during the May 9 attack on his channel he switched to a Bambuser.com account (Bambuser is a streaming service similar to Ustream) to continue his coverage. On his blog he also lists the Ustream channel of his colleague, romanpomych, whose stream was up while Mikhailov’s was down.

Before his current project, Mikhailov had been covering the Astrakhan hunger strike (Global Voices coverage is here and here), in which he participated as one of the strikers. Incredibly, he is conducting another hunger strike [ru] at the moment, even as he is running around Moscow and reporting. Amidst all of this activity, Mikhailov has found time to write an email [ru] to Ustream.tv, in which he implicates the Russian government and the youth group Nashi in the attacks:

[…] Russia actively tracks the current events thanks to your website. This is the only source of communication, thanks to which we will find out how Putin is killing our citizens. […] Your site currently doesn’t work only because of these bastards – kremlin.ru and nashi.su. These people, under Putin’s orders, rob the people of information and are trying to hide the mayhem happening in the capital of Russia and are conducting a DDoS attack against ustream.tv.

Brad Hunstable also finds the attack very disturbing. To him, someone is trying to take away the right of global citizens to speak and be heard, in essence subverting his company’s mission. Currently, Ustream.tv is debating the best response to the situation. In the meantime, and in a gesture of defiance, they have added a Russian-language option to the website: