Global Voices » Eastern & Central Europe

Bulgaria: The Strongest Earthquake Since 1917

Rayna St. — Tue, 22 May 2012 08:58:58 +0000

A 5.6 magnitude earthquake, the strongest since 1917, shook Bulgaria's capital Sofia and the perimeter zone of around 100 km last night, followed by a number of strong aftershocks. No victims have been reported so far. The website Earthquake Reports has published live updates and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook were the first ones to spread the news. The hashtag #земетресение (”earthquake”) is used to communicate on the event through Twitter.

Russia: The RuNet's Top 10 Slang Words

Augis Barkov — Tue, 22 May 2012 04:46:47 +0000

Understanding political discussions in the Russian blogosphere requires a certain fluency in RuNet slang. For anyone interested in grasping the nuances of online satire and blogger arguments (or for those who seek to “troll” their own virtual opponents), the following list of ten popular slang terms should be particularly useful:

1. Зомбоящик (zombobox) characterizes television as an evil device that turns its users into zombies. In RuNet discourse, the TV industry is assumed to be a tool of the authorities, the main purpose of which is to stultify the brains of viewers and distract them from political struggle. This effect is supposedly achieved by systematically feeding TV addicts a barrage of propaganda, as well as unintelligent programming and mind-numbing commercials.

Here is one example of zombobox humor: an English-subtitled parody of the Russian daily news (disclaimer: profane language):

2. Ботокс (botox) is one of Putin’s nicknames, earned because of rumors that he has received several botox injections in recent years, presumably to preserve a more youthful appearance. After a televised interview in 2011, the unusual smoothness of Putin's face led “#ботокс” to become one of the most popular hashtags on Russian Twitter.

Garry Kasparov, leader of the oppositionist movement “The United Civil Front,” prominently utilized the botox meme to mock Putin's tears [en], shed after his most recent presidential victory.

Вчера, я думаю, это была не слеза, это вытекал ботокс. Он чувствовал свой конец. И в наших силах приблизить его. Мы будем праздновать освобождение страны от оккупантов. Перед тем, как построить свободную страну, надо прибраться – надо смыть эту лужу ботокса с карты России. За Россию без Путина!

Yesterday, I think it was not a tear, but Botox that flowed out. He felt his end [approaching]. And we can bring it closer. We will celebrate the liberation of our country from the occupiers. [But] before we build a free country, we must clean up the place — we must wipe this puddle of Botox off the map of Russia. For a Russia without Putin!

3. Айфончик (iPhonchik) is a popular nickname for former President (and now Prime Minister) Dmitri Medvedev. In 2010, Medvedev became the first Russian citizen to own an iPhone 4, which he received as a personal gift from Steve Jobs (see video below). Medvedev's well publicized enthusiasm for the device, as well as his attachment to his iPad, has led observers to compare him to a child giddy about a new toy. As a result, the nickname iPhonchik (a diminutive for “iPhone”) has stuck.

4. Хомячки (hamsters) is an insult typically directed at Russian oppositionist bloggers. The term originally competed for popularity with the word “lemmings,” which ultimately fell out of vogue. “Hamsters” is meant to imply that bloggers who claim to have independent points of view (a common self-defense in online debates) are in fact quite susceptible to manipulation and groupthink. Hamsters' comments on blog posts are often derided for being formulaic and unpatriotic. During an unsanctioned rally immediately after the December 2011 parliamentary elections, Aleksei Navalny said:

Они могут смеяться в своём зомбоящике. Они могут называть нас микроблоггерами или сетевыми хомячками. Я - сетевой хомячок! И я перегрызу глотку этим скотам. Мы все вместе это сделаем.

They can laugh in their zombobox. They can call us microbloggers or Internet hamsters. I am an Internet hamster! And I will gnaw at the throats of these bastards. We will all do it together.

5. Кремлядь (kremliad) is a combination of two words, Кремль (Kremlin) and блядь (bliad) — an obscenity with almost universal application, but here translates to something like “whore.” Kremliad is the collective name for people who make their living by serving the interests of Putin and his entourage: the directors of the zombobox, the corrupt journalists, the ideologists of United Russia and Nashi, various pro-Putin celebrities, and — to some extent — even the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Two years ago, Boris Nemtsov, a well-known and outspoken critic of the Kremlin, used this word in the title of a blog post [ru]: “Кремлядь — позор нашей страны” (Kremliad — The Disgrace of Our Country).

6. Либераст (liberast) is a slur that applies to people with liberal, pro-Western political views. According to this stereotype, “liberasts” promote Western concepts about universal values and human rights ‘at the expense' of Russian national interests.

The term is a mix of two words: либерал (liberal) and педераст (pederast, a common homophobic insult in Russia), dovetailing with the country's widespread homophobia [en]. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, for instance, recently argued that Russia's Christian Orthodox heritage ruled out the possibility of ever accepting homosexuality as Western Civilization has in recent decades.

7. Поцреот (potsreot) is a deviation of the word “patriot,” with the first syllable changed to “pots” (which means “dick” in Yiddish).

Potsreots are so named for their ostentatious public displays of love for Russia and the state authorities. Their archetypal enemies are Americans and Jews. Potsreots are commonly ridiculed for paradoxically endorsing contradictory arguments simultaneously. For example, some will deny the Holocaust, but at the same time say that “Hitler was right in exterminating Jews.”

Ironically, many ardent potsreots prefer to live abroad, loving their Motherland from a safe distance.

8. Рашка (Rashka) is a derogatory name that some Russians use to identify their own country. The word is a combination of a backwards Russification of the English word “Russia” (distinct from the Russian name, “Rossiia”) and the “ka” Russian diminutive. The term is often employed by expat bloggers in the context of Russia's political and social dysfunctionality.

"Rashka lives according to its own laws." An anonymous image widely circulated online. 22 May 2012.

9. Совок (sovok) is a person who maintains a Soviet mindset, Soviet ideology, and Soviet habits. Sovoks are stereotypically slavish, socially-dependent, anti-democratic, intolerant of others' opinions, and — in general — stupid, evil, and jealous people.

10. Пиндос (pindos) is an anti-American slur. In the Soviet period, “pindos” was common in military and criminal circles as a general-use obscenity due to its phonetic proximity to other Russian profanities. After the war in Yugoslavia, Russian troops operating in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Kosovo started using “pindos” as a nickname for American soldiers. Now, on the RuNet, the term has come to describe Americans in general.

Bulgaria: Discussing the “European Idea”

Ruslan Trad — Mon, 21 May 2012 20:41:22 +0000

Young Bulgarians and guests from Italy, with support of the New Bulgarian University and project “Beautiful Europe” [bg] will meet on May 23 to discuss the “European idea” and what Europe means to Bulgarians at an event called “Blue Night” - an evening dedicated to the European idea [bg]. The event comes just one day before one of the brightest Bulgarian holidays - the Day of Slavic writing and culture.

Bulgaria: Calling for National Protest Against Shale Gas Extraction

Ruslan Trad — Mon, 21 May 2012 20:36:19 +0000

Activists in Bulgaria have called for national protests against shale gas extraction on May 22. There is a Facebook event [bg] “National protest against shale gas and changes in Forest Law!”. Tensions are growing after The Greens' activist posted a video [bg] showing a secret meeting between the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) representatives and Chevron officials.

Macedonia: Graffiti Art in “Times of Revived Antiquity”

Filip Stojanovski — Sat, 19 May 2012 21:59:28 +0000

A short documentary on the Macedonian graffiti scene in the context of the state-sponsored art/construction boom, made by two female scientists and bloggers–Vasilka Dimitrovska and Ilina Jakimovska–has been shown at the renowned archeological conference Buffalo TAG 2012.

Entitled “Lions, Warriors and Graffiti Artists: Counter-Culture in Times of Revived Antiquity”, the documentary juxtaposes (an important visual arts theory word!) information about the vigorous efforts of the government to impose new, polished classicist/baroque visual identity on the center of the Macedonian capital through the Skopje 2014 project (which features bronze lions), with interviews of people from the graffiti scene.

A co-author, archeologist Dimitrovska, wrote this [mk] on her blog, injecting a disclaimer often heard by people who dare to speak in public in Macedonia:

We made this documentary… in order to document with love part of the graffiti which disappeared or are about to disappear due to the new urban concepts implemented in our country, primarily in Skopje. The project has no political dimension, nor did we intend it to have any political connotation. This small project on Macedonian graffiti was made with modest finances, and we intended to present–without any censorship or montage of statements–the voices and opinions of the graffiti artists who shaped or are still shaping the visual part of this subculture, which is punishable by the laws but is also used (not abused) by the political class in power.

In the film, the interviewed artists also feel the need to decline any interest in political life. They talk about being torn between the threat of punishment if caught “writing” on their own (EUR 50 at least), and becoming a sell-out for commercial reasons or in local government projects, which sometimes involve co-opting graffiti artists to legally adorn specified public buildings. They also mention a quickly forming generation gap within the subculture.

The other co-author, ethnologist Jakimovska wrote this [mk] on her blog in 2007, in a post referencing the famous scene from the film Life of Brian:

It might sound incredible, but the graffiti are - folklore! Regardless of whether they convey messages through drawing or text, the graffiti, for those who make them and those who read them on city walls, are a form of expression and communication. If you have something hidden deep inside you, something that aches and burns you, write it on the wall, and it will speak it… Some of my favorites from Skopje include “A woman is not a woman unless she's a woman,” “Thank God I'm an atheist”…

In the past, other bloggers such as Alexx [mk] or Django [mk] wrote about Skopje graffiti. The artists featured in the documentary do not have online presence on the public internet, but sometimes publish photos of their work within Facebook.

Russia: The RuNet's Enduring Tomatoes & Tusovki

Andrey Tselikov — Fri, 18 May 2012 19:05:23 +0000

To a casual observer, the Russian protest movement seems current and contemporary. Undeniably, it is. The throngs of people. The charismatic young leaders and elder statesmen. The use of social media networks in their multitude to communicate, organize, and argue. The positioning of the protests within a global movement: from Occupy to Tahrir and the Arab Spring.

Amidst all the excitement, it is easy to forget that the core of the protests — the professional revolutionaries, the leaders, young and old, the activists and the reporters, the analysts and the bloggers, the Russian political tusovka and its online extension — has now existed for almost a decade. Few bloggers last this long. Certainly, the entire Internet infrastructure has changed several times over during the period. Nevertheless, the tusovka endures, perhaps due to the peculiarity of the Russian blogosphere and its longtime sequestration at LiveJournal.

That is not to say that the scene has ossified. On the contrary, relationships have changed, as have account names. Some figures lost prevalence; some have switched sides and opinions. But on the whole, the RuNet of the early oughts is a microcosm of modernity. Pick any recent protest organizer. Oleg Kashin has blogged on LiveJournal since 2002, the same as Sergei Parkhomenko. Ilya Yashin began in 2004 (and has been a promising young politician since). Alexey Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov’s wife, Anastasia, started blogging in 2006, a year after Ilya Ponomarev and Garry Kasparov.

Or pick a critic: former Natsbol and current DemVybor functionary Stas Yakovlev started writing in 2004, while the unabashedly pro-Kremlin Maksim Kononenko (formerly known as Mr. Parker) and Konstantin Rykov have been prominent bloggers for over a decade (though both have since abandoned LiveJournal).

Then, as now, they not only blogged on the same platform; they also argued and engaged each other in polemics. A snapshot taken seven years ago of these movers and shakers would today present many familiar faces and opinions (although notoriously flip-floppy Kashin has done his best to keep things interesting).

Screenshot of Andrei Morozov's LiveJournal, 18 May 2012.

Bearing this in mind, it is perhaps fitting that the man who last Sunday threw tomatoes at Ilya Yashin and journalist/writer Yulia Latynina was a man who did precisely the same thing seven years ago. Andrei Morozov (also known as “Murz,” who blogs at kenigtiger), wearing the same jacket he had on seven years earlier, approached a crowd of OccupyAbai protestors during the “Control Stroll” rally. He threw two tomatoes at the speakers (both missed), after which he was detained by the crowd, who mistook him for a Nashist. Oleg Kashin reported the small incident, lamenting a forgetful new crop of protestors.

Indeed, during the summer of 2005, Morozov gained RuNet notoriety for what he called the “Red Blitzkrieg.” It was the heady summer after the success of the Orange Revolution — the summer of Russian youth politics, and the summer of tomatoes. “Red Blitzkrieg” was what Morozov named the tiny Stalinist-nationalist group he had founded around the time, but the phrase referred more visibly to his strategy of throwing tomatoes at political and ideological opponents.

“Tomato terrorism,” as Morozov jokingly called it, claimed several victims that summer. The first was Yashin, then a leader of Young Yabloko and a memeber of Oborona (a youth organization modeled on Pora and Otpor). On June 20, 2005, Oleg Kashin wrote in his blog, “Today, at Kitai-Gorod, unknown parties threw tomatoes at the Oborona picket line (the tomatoes were good and fresh).” Yashin later posted the name of the assailant, identifying him a member of Dugin’s Eurasia group.

Morozov, who spent a day under arrest for the incident, responded in his blog (vandalized and deleted in 2009; an archive exists on the alternative lj.rossia.org service), claiming full responsibility and denying membership in any political group:

And in general, dear “orangists,” get used to the fact that someone can throw a tomato at you without it being some kind of political commission, but simply from the bottom of their heart, out of aesthetic considerations.

Perhaps because of the gleeful response of Russian netizens to his actions, several days later he tomatoed (”otpomidoril”) the editor of the occasionally sensationalist newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, which had published an article about World War II with which Morozov disagreed (the author controversially wrote that the USSR should have surrendered to Germany, and was “ice-creamed” by another activist on the same day). Soon after came a failed attempt (Morozov missed) of tomatoing Yulia Latynina, whose revisionism of WWII orthodoxy also angered the Red Blitzkrieg.

Ilia Yashin, a member of the Solidarity coalition, 23 November 2008, photo by Lena Lebedeva-Hooft, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

In the meantime, Morozov showed up at another Oborona action, and this time gifted Yashin the tomatoes, rather than throwing them. He followed a similar strategy at a book signing by Maksim Kononenko (whose book of Putin anecdotes was published by Parkhomenko). In August came the tomatoing of the Polish embassy (a response to a scandal involving children of Russian diplomats in Poland, for which Morozov and an accomplice spent three nights in jail), and in September the tomatoing of Echo Moskvy's offices (on general principle).

Other noteworthy incidents included an October small-sword duel (described here by Morozov’s second) between Morozov and a defender of Latynina's honor (which thankfully led to no bloodshed), as well as a failed (and ill-conceived) attempt to throw mice at an opposition rally.

In 2007, Morozov did something even crazier than usual. He had always claimed that his “tomato terrorism” was equal opportunity; that rather than singling out the liberal opposition in his actions, they just happened to be in the way. And so, one cold spring night, Morozov armed himself with a sawed-off shotgun, fired it at the Moscow office of United Russia, and blogged about it. As he had also managed to hit the FSB office located in the same building, this escapade did not end well. He was sentenced to three years in prison for the shotgun, and, under Article 280 of the Criminal Code, for extremist rhetoric in his blog (becoming one of the first Russian bloggers to serve time for extremist speech).

By the time he was released in 2009, after serving eighteen months of his sentence, “Red Blitzkrieg” had fallen apart. Morozov himself states that he has quit public politics, calling it an ineffective waste, and that personal, not political, circumstances were behind his arrest. While it appears that he still has some connections to the nationalist underground, claiming membership in the so-called “Black Blitzkrieg,” he has dismissed his ‘tomato period' as childish, which makes the May 13, 2012, incident all the more surprising.

Morozov described the impetus for his return to form in a May 12 post. “Fate itself,” he argued, brought together in one place his old opponents, Yashin and Latynina. He could “no longer stand” the concentration of “abomination” in the center of the city. ‘Action had to be taken.'

After he went to prison in 2007, Morozov fell off the RuNet radar, though he has been writing regularly since his 2009 release. Most of the protestors present at his latest action had no idea who he was. The ones who did recognize him reacted with disbelief and nostalgia. “F…, the man who threw tomatoes at Yashin was the notorious Murz? Now that's f-ing something!” tweeted Kashin. “The very same?” sentimentally asked Rykov.

There is definitely something romantic about Morozov's little acts of defiance. Of course, there are always questions. Is he a Kremlin project or his own man? Does he believe in what he says or is he just very good at “trolling”? These same questions were asked seven years ago, to no avail. Kashin later succinctly summed up the sentiment: “Today is the same day it was yesterday.“

Russia: NHL Stars Return to 2012 World Hockey Championship

Donna Welles — Thu, 17 May 2012 01:31:46 +0000

Undefeated after seven games, and boasting an All-Star lineup of Evgeni Malkin, Pavel Datsyuk, Alexander Semin, and Alexander Ovechkin, the Russian national team will face Norway in the quarterfinal round of the 2012 World Ice Hockey Championship, tomorrow on May 17.

The 2012 World Ice Hockey Championship is being held in Stockholm and Helsinki. Both cities hosted tournaments during the preliminary round, where eight teams competed for the four slots advancing to the single-elimination quarterfinals. Helsinki's group consisted of: Belarus, Canada, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the U.S., while Stockholm's had: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Russia, and Sweden.

Russia started the tournament on Saturday, May 5, with a 5-2 victory over Latvia, before going on to beat Norway 4-2 on Sunday, Germany 2-0 on Tuesday, and Denmark 3-1 on Thursday.

Russia's Emotional 7-3 Victory Over Sweden

Dmitry Mikhaylov announced in his bilinguial blog how the Russian team came from behind to beat the host country on Friday, May 11.

STOCKHOLM – In a highly anticipated match-up, Russia and Sweden met tonight at the Globe Arena in an emotional battle of undefeated teams at the 2012 IIHF Ice Hockey World Championship. Down 3-1, Russia scored six unanswered goals to win 7-3.

In response to this highly emotional victory, both the mainstream and citizen media outlets of the Russian Internet devoted dramatically increased coverage to the tournament.

Bloggers Respond to Russia's 2-0 Victory Over the Czech Republic

Planet's Sporting World discussed [ru] how, although Russia scored after only 24 seconds of play, the Czech Republic dominated much of the game, but could not capitalize. NHL Pittsburgh Penguins player Evgeni Malkin scored for Russia in the third period, before he and two of his teammates — Pavel Datsyuk and Milan Mikhalek — were charged with minor penalties.

As is often the case when mainstream outlets build attention on an event, many Russian bloggers quoted their reportage, as a way of spreading popular analyses. Ruslan's News reposted [ru] a quote from Evgeni Malkin, taken from a Vesti article:

Тяжело всё выполнить. Но, конечно, здорово сыграли. И в обороне пять минут выстояли в третьем периоде. Это, наверное, дало всплеск эмоций, и после этого мы забили быстрый гол.

It's difficult to accomplish everything. But, of course, we played great. And our defense held out for five minutes in the third period. This, probably, generated a lot of emotion, and afterwards we scored a quick goal.

News Spreads of the Return of Alexander Ovechkin & Alexander Semin

Similarly, news of the return of Alexander Ovechkin and Alexander Semin from the NHL, following the Washington Capitals' 2-1 loss to the New York Rangers, spread rapidly in both mainstream and citizen media outlets. (Evgeni Malkin's Pittsburgh Penguins and Pavel Datsyuk's Detriot Red Wings were eliminated even earlier, in the previous round of the Stanley Cup Playoffs.)

Alexander Semin scores the first goal in the World Ice Hockey Championship final, 18 May 2008, photo by Alexey Chernyadyev, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

Most bloggers framed the story as a homecoming for Ovechkin and Semin, while some Twitter users indicated their familiarity with mainstream journalism, such as Sport.rbc and Lenta.ru.

Lisbeth Armel:

Прочитала, что овечкин любит хип-хоп и r'n'b. представила. 5 минут сидела с фейспалмом.

I read that Ovechkin likes Hip Hop and R&B. I sat down and thought about it. For five minutes I just facepalmed.

Sanya Belovka:

Овечкина и Семина Ждем с нетерпением….В россии….2-1 Вашингтон домои)!!!А Овечкин В ШВЕЦИЮ!!!!

We're anxiously waiting for Ovechkin and Semin….[to be] in Russia [again]…..[He lost] 2-1 to Washington, and now he's homeward-bound.) !!! But [it turns out] Ovechkin is headed for Sweden!!!!

Ilgiz Taipov:

Приезд Овечкина и Семина по разному комментируют, кто то вспоминает его прошлогоднюю игру за сборную, и пишут типа зачем он нужен и т.п.. Надо уметь использовать потенциал этого игрока, а мы то знаем что он может играть, что потенциал у него огромный. Семин тоже хороший игрок, то что с Вашингтонгом Кэпиталз случилось это чисто тренерский просчет.

People are saying different things about the arrival of Ovechkin and Semin. Some recall how [Ovechkin] played [poorly] for last year's national team, and wonder why we need him, etcetera. We have to be able to use this player's potential, and we know that he can play — that he has enormous potential. Semin is also a good player, and what happened with the Washington Capitals was purely an issue with the coach.

Ukraine: Yulia Tymoshenko's Plight and Euro 2012

Veronica Khokhlova — Thu, 17 May 2012 01:12:02 +0000

There must be some corners on the web (e.g., here and here) where football fans are still having apolitical discussions of the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship, scheduled to take place in Poland and Ukraine from June 8 to July 1. For the past few weeks, however, the upcoming sporting event has featured prominently in arguments and discussions among those who seem more interested in the Ukrainian and European politics than sports.

Earlier this month, several European politicians, including the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, announced their plans to boycott Euro 2012 in protest against the imprisonment of ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko. However, there is no consensus among the EU officials yet on whether “to call a political boycott of the Ukraine half of the Euro 2012 football championships.”

Tymoshenko's arrest came on August 5, 2011, a little over a month after the beginning of her first trial on June 24. She was kept at Kyiv's Lukyanivska Prison (GV texts about this facility are here and here) until December 30, when she was transferred to the Kachanivska Penal Colony in Kharkiv to serve a seven-year sentence for exceeding her powers as Prime Minister. Reports of Tymoshenko's health problems and her 20-day hunger strike have dominated the recent coverage of her case. On April 19, another trial of Tymoshenko began in Kharkiv, but she refused to attend it. The hearing of this second case, in which Tymoshenko is charged with evading taxes in the 1990s, has been postponed until late May.

While the preparation for the tournament in Ukraine was marred by a number of other controversies (e.g., the cruel treatment of stray animals; accusations of hotel price gouging; and, of all things, the threat posed by the “beautiful Ukrainian women”), this latest international scandal seems to have done the most harm to Ukraine's image so far.

On May 3, the Economist asked readers in an online poll if they supported the calls to boycott the games held in Ukraine:

The apparently brutal treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko, an imprisoned Ukrainian opposition leader, has led to calls for European leaders to stay away from Ukrainian matches in the upcoming Euro 2012 football tournament, which the country is hosting jointly with Poland.

The Economist agrees with these calls. Do you?

Of the 1,834 votes cast so far, 68 percent are in favor of the boycott and 32 percent are against it.

Odessablogger - who believes that “the football is the wrong stick to hit Ukraine with given the need for EU personalities to interact directly with the Ukrainian people” - recounted some of the examples of sports and politics “colliding” in the past, and quoted from the April 28 Der Spiegel interview [en] with boxer and politician Vitali Klitschko, who opposes the boycott of Euro 2012:

“[…] This tournament is the biggest sporting event in the history of Ukraine. It has to happen. It is even an excellent opportunity to draw the world’s attention to the maladministration in our country. […]”

Odessablogger also noted Yulia Tymoshenko's stance on the boycott:

[…] In case you are wondering, the current position taken by Ms Tymoshenko herself over the matter, is that there should not be a boycott because of her, and that the Ukrainian people should see the EU leaders in Ukraine as it will encourage them to look to the EU rather than think they have been written off. […]

Marek Siwiec, a Polish politician and Member of the European Parliament, explained on his BlogActiv.eu blog why he did not support the boycott:

[…] In Poland we need to understand (and I repeated it many times) that the football championship for Ukrainians is a national question – a source of pride, regardless of political views. Ukrainians deserve to have this tournament in their country in an atmosphere of festivity, in spite of all. […]

[…] Besides, as a whole political class, just as we act together in defence of Yulia Tymoshenko, in this case we should separate sport from politics. If there was somebody in Poland who would like to take this opportunity to rob something from Ukrainians, I warn – the political costs in the mutual relations will be long lasting and serious. […]

Jonathan Hibberd of Chicken in Kiev wrote about Germany's stance on Euro 2012 in Ukraine:

Merkel boycotts Ukraine? Business as usual.

Germany has been boycotting Ukraine's interests for some time. […]

[…] Germany should in fact, albeit indirectly, accept some responsibility for what has happened here since 2010. As one leading commentator said a couple of years back, it would have meant an awful lot if Chancellor Merkel had come to Kiev and made a speech in support of Ukraine's European ambitions. Don't forget how narrowly Tymoshenko lost the Presidential election. German endorsement of a European and Euro-Atlantic choice for Ukraine might well have been enough to swing the election for her, but instead it was held against a background of resignation, that Europe didn't want Ukraine and rapprochement with Russia was paramount. Merkel was not there for her then. […]

At OpenDemocracy.net, Valery Kalnysh, deputy editor of the Kommersant Ukraina newspaper, shared this possible explanation for the German leader's position:

[…] But why, on the other hand, is Germany so active in taking up the cudgels against Ukraine? During the course of a conversation, a German journalist commented ‘It’s quite easy for Merkel to attack Ukraine and demand respect for human rights. Unlike Russia, you have no oil or gas and you’re not as strong and influential as China. It’s convenient to criticise Ukraine and it does great things for [her] popularity rating.’ […]

LEvko of Foreign Notes explained “why Ukraine's Euro 2012 [would] not be as big a success as hoped”:

[…] In previous tournaments, in my experience, many fans have made an extended holiday of their visits to countries hosting such events; days between matches being spent on the beach, sightseeing, etc. etc. In countries such as Austria/Switzerland or Portugal, where tourism is highly developed, this was an attractive proposition..but, no disrespect intended…Kharkiv? Dontesk?

Europe is currently in the deepest economic crisis since WW2. There is little cash around..not enough to pay the Ukraine's rip-off hotel prices.

Then there's the Olympic games in London later in the year - an attractive draw for sports fans.

[…] But the tsunami of bad press in Europe's mass media over the Tymoshenko affair will be the final turn-off. Fans will rather stay at home, or, at best, fly in and out for matches, just like they do for European club matches.. […]

Olga Mrinska of Regional Accents reflected [uk] on the Euro 2012 boycott scandal in the context of the general social and political situation in Ukraine:

[…] The repressive race aimed at the opposition leaders has reached its apogee in the past year, and domestic politics has become the center of attention of world leaders. […] Today's Ukraine is, above all, associated with the jailed opposition, lack of freedom of speech, kleptomaniac and lying officials. Our president must have naively (???) believed that [it's possible to endlessly mislead these “spineless” European leaders and feed them with “mañana” [empty promises] at any mention of the democratic reforms - the leaders who live in ordinary houses in the city center (Germany), ride bicycles (the Netherlands), fly regular commercial flights (Finland) and have incomparably fewer guards that he does (choose any EU country).] And when these Europeans have finally stood up […], [the Ukrainian leaders began talking] of the Cold War era and bias. In my opinion, this is a lousy excuse…

The problem isn't with the Europeans, but with the Ukrainians - the voters who have brought to power people without the intellect, without a strategic vision and without the belief in the better future for the country and its people. The problem is with the so-called elite that, just like those hotel owners, lives only in the present, without giving any thought to the future.

Despite the avalanche of negative information about Ukraine in the world media, justified in most cases, we still have a chance to [show Ukraine in a positive light] to those football fans who would attend the Euro. Out people are the last frontier and the last hope. The end result and the final assessment of the event depends on their open-mindedness, decency and hospitality. […]

Finally, a few words about the aspect of Euro 2012 that has gone largely unnoticed - [the view that the Ukrainians themselves have of the event]. Five years ago, we were promised an ocean of private investments, a new and shining infrastructure that would serve host cities for decades, an influx of tourists and billions for the economy. Instead, residents of Kyiv and other cities have experienced mainly negative consequences - destruction of parks, totally dug-up cities, closed streets, altered public transportation routes, […], growing prices, etc. […]

Russia: State TV Justifies May 6 Police Violence, Cites Spanish Bill Criminalizing Online Protest Organization as Example

Veronica Khokhlova — Wed, 16 May 2012 21:42:31 +0000

In the final segment of the report [ru] on the May 6 protest in Moscow, which ended in clashes with riot police, the Russian state-owned Channel 1 mentioned, among other things, a Spanish draft law [en] criminalizing online organization of public protests, as an example of the “much tougher” treatment of protesters by the “colleagues” of the Russian law enforcement officials “in the countries with the so-called established democracy.”

Global Voices Seeks Contributing Editor for RuNet Echo Project

Ivan Sigal — Wed, 16 May 2012 21:06:43 +0000

Global Voices is seeking a part-time Contributing Editor to support our coverage of Russian citizen media, as part of our RuNet Echo project.

The project provides comprehensive and deep reporting on and analyses of the Russian-language online community. The purpose of the initiative is to deepen our coverage and analysis of Russian-language blogospheres, online speech and social networks.

Produce original analysis, research, and reporting based on our coverage of the Russian-language Internet.
Selectively follow up stories with in-depth research into compelling topics.
Monitor target civil society initiatives, websites, and movements.

The primary focus of our coverage and analysis is Russian-language online writing from and about the Russian Federation. Secondary content may also include Russian-language content from the former Soviet Union, as it relates to the Russian Federation.

The Contributing Editor will assist in producing and editing content for the project, including regular output of stories, translation, and networking. The editor will produce and/or edit several in-depth stories per week, as well as shorter posts linking and pointing to important topics, events, and writing as it occurs. The work will involve extensive translation, analysis, and further original research and reporting when appropriate, in order to elucidate and identify trends, ideas, and social and political currents within RuNet. Analysis will also examine how content in the Russian language space relates to other online communities, languages, and cultures, and offline Russian conversation, journalism, and social and political movements.

The Project Editor will also:

Help manage an ongoing Special Coverage section to consolidate and organize content from the RuNet project.
Work closely with Global Voices' existing Russian-focused editorial editors and authors.
Cultivate relationships with Russian bloggers and writers, toward the same end.
Present at conferences and events pertaining to the Russian online world, as needed

Successful applicants will have the following qualifications:

Fluency in English and Russian. Articles will be published in English, with minimal editing. Writing samples will be required as part of the application.
Familiarity with the Russian blogosphere, Russian social networks, and Russian political, social, economic, and cultural trends.
Ability to report on, analyze, and explain the Russian online world, in English and Russian.
Have the ability to work independently, in an unstructured work environment, and to work with a virtual community.
Be computer literate, comfortable working with programmers and technical language. Programming/HTML knowledge not required but strong familiarity with the use of online social media tools (blogging platforms, aggregators, use of RSS feeds, and tagging) is important.

Interested candidates please send CV and Letter of Interest explaining why you'd be a good candidate for the job to: adminjob AT globalvoicesonline DOT org

Interpreting RuNet is funded by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.

Macedonia: Blogging in Estonian about Skopje Marathon/Half-Marathon

Filip Stojanovski — Tue, 15 May 2012 22:35:30 +0000

Sandra Jürs blogged in Estonian about her participation in the Skopje Marathon/Half-Marathon [mk, en] on May 6, 2012.

Russia: Duma Deputy Wants Criminal Liability for Extremist Tweets

Kevin Rothrock — Tue, 15 May 2012 12:42:31 +0000

Yesterday, on May 14, Aleksandr Khinshtein [en], a Duma deputy and member of United Russia ('the party of power'), wrote a letter to Yuri Chaika [en], the Prosecutor General of Russia. In that letter, Khinshtein noted the “recent sharp rise in the number of calls for acts of violence against state officials and police officers” appearing in online social networks. Twitter and Facebook, he argued, “have effectively transformed into an instrument to coordinate the actions of extremists, becoming a channel for the dissemination of detailed instructions to their supporters.” The letter begins [ru]:

Прошу Вас принять меры к владельцам и пользователи аккаунтов в различных социальных интернет-сетях (русскоязычные сегменты Twitter и Facebook), активно содействовавшим в организации массовых беспорядков 6 мая 2012 года в г. Москве.

I ask you to take measures against the owners and users of accounts on various online social networks ([such as] the Russian language segments of Twitter and Facebook), who actively administered the organization of mass unrest on May 6, 2012, in Moscow.

Khinshtein added that bloggers are also using these services to advocate violence against “the legally elected President” and Russia's “constitutional order.” (Twitter user Lucius Aevus, for instance, wrote [ru] on April 24, “Buy weapons, stockpile food, join up, and kill Putin.”) Khinshtein called specifically for (1) the prevention of the further spread of such illegal, extremist online appeals, (2) the criminal prosecution of individuals who use social networks to disseminate extremism, and (3) any other measures legally necessary.

Screenshot of Khinshtein's official Duma webpage, 15 May 2012.

Hours after news of this petition caused a stir in the media, Khinshtein responded by publishing the full text of his letter to Chaika, claiming [ru] that his initiative is not a plea for political censorship. Khinshtein did not, however, publish the supplementary materials he attached to the letter, where he cataloged dozens of examples of bloggers advocating illegal activity. The list, to which online newspaper Gazeta.ru has access and has graciously summarized [ru], focuses on nationalist and liberal democratic oppositionists — some anonymous and others well-known.

First on the list is self-described “ultra-right” anonymous blogger odinzavseh (”one for all”), whom Khinshtein links to soccer hooligans, like the ones infamous for inciting a small ethnic riot in Moscow in December 2010. On Twitter, odinzavseh has called on protesters to beat up Putin-supporters and public figures Sergei Minaev and Konstantin Rykov. He also allegedly encouraged oppositionists to attack government buildings with Molotov cocktails on the night of May 8. Both these tweets were later deleted, though evidence of the former can still be found [ru] on Yandex. In what seems particularly outrageous to many bloggers, Khinshtein has claimed, as well, that retweeting (reposting another user's message) also carries criminal liability. Odinzavseh, for instance, retweeted user LailaMooore's call [ru] on protesters to slash the tires of police vans and bring weapons to protests.

Not one to exclude Russia's homegrown social networks, Khinshtein also cited “The Moscow Front,” a nationalist group based [ru] on VKontakte that advocated attacks on government buildings near Chistye Prudy on May 7. As soon as these allegations went public, the group published its thanks to Khinshtein for the “free publicity.” Several members immediately posted anti-Semitic comments, complaining, for example [ru], “You know, Khinshtein's Jewish snout pisses me off.”

Also gracing the list is Mikhail Svetov, Twitter user msvetov, a Russian student living in Japan, who has been an active virtual participant in the opposition protests. During the May 6 “Million Man March” at Bolonatia Square, Svetov tweeted:

Не выбрасывайте омоновские шлемы в реку, надевайте их на себя. Это броня, она вас защитит от полицейских дубинок.

Don't throw the police helmets into the river: wear them yourselves. They're armor, and will protect you from their nightsticks.

and:

Отнимайте у ОМОНа щиты, каски, дубинки, это уравнивает ваши шансы. Не нападайте на них, но отнимайте амуницию.

Take away the police's shields, helmets, nightsticks — this evens your chances. Don't attack them, but take away their ammunition.

Khinshtein also accused oppositionists Vitaly Shushkevich and Artem Chapaev of online extremism. On May 7, Chapaev tweeted:

Думаю, частью стратегии должна стать дальнейшая радикализация масс, чтобы перейти к тактике ощутимой городской герильи.

I think that further radicalization of the masses should become a part [of the opposition], in order to transition to urban guerilla tactics.

That same day, Shushkevich used his Twitter account to encourage [ru] protesters to bring coins to Chistye Prudy and throw them at police and “Nashists” (members of the pro-Kremlin youth). He also reposted several unsavory messages from Twitter users gruppa_voina, ponny1, papumaria, and moskless, including calls to spread the fear that “Moscow is out of control.”

The always irreverent artist collective Gruppa Voina [en] responded in typical fashion, quipping [ru] that its followers would soon be confronted by Khinshtein himself:

Друзья, вы все шутки шутите - но не забывайте - за КАЖДЫЙ РЕТВИТ с вас спросит @khinshtein в комнате допросов ближайшей к вашему дому тюрьмы

Friends, you're all having a laugh, but don't forget that for EVERY RETWEET Khinshtein will question you in the interrogation room of the prison nearest to your home.

Petr Verzilov, husband of Pussy Riot's imprisoned Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and a Voina member, sarcastically welcomed [ru] Khinshtein's efforts, saying that criminalizing retweets could become the “next step in the development of civil society and legal consciousness in our country.”

Aleksei Navalny is also on Khinshtein's list — included for a May 3 tweet [ru] that joked about burning down the Mayor's office. Navalny quoted the text of a Sergei Udaltsov tweet, altering the final line into a mock appeal for arson:

Чиновники из мэрии вышли на связь, обещают в течение часа согласовать марш. Если обманут – сожжем мэрию.

Officials from the Mayor's office have been in contact. They promise to approve the [May 6] march within an hour. If they're lying, we'll burn down city hall.

In reality, Udaltsov had written [ru]: “If they're lying, we'll make an announcement through the orgkomitet.”

Some RuNet voices have insisted that Khinshtein is asking the Prosecutor General to do something fundamentally beyond its legal authority, and is only causing a stir to grab a moment's publicity. In a series of identical tweets addressed to prominent RuNet bloggers, Yuri Suetin posted the scan [ru] of a letter from May 2011, where the FSB informs a certain Dmitri Goriugin that Russian law enforcement agencies are incapable of deleting or banning posts from Twitter. (Goriugin had apparently complained about personal insults directed at him, published online by pro-Kremlin blogger fritzmorgen — an account that ironically Twitter has since suspended.) Other users, however, were quick to point out that Khinshtein is citing anti-extremism laws that carry far more extensive police powers than Criminal Code 130 (to which Goriugin appealed).

Russian politician, Yuri Chaika, 8 December 2009, photo by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, CC BY-SA 3.0; Wikimedia Commons.

Khinshtein's appeal to Chaika coincides with a draft project [ru] introduced to the Duma yesterday by United Russia deputies. The project denounces protesters who attacked police at Bolotnaia Square on May 6, and advocates criminal prosecution of those “responsible.”

The state's response to Khinshtein's letter will be an interesting test of the lengths to which the Kremlin is prepared to pressure oppositionists in their use of online social media. Services like Twitter and Facebook are widely credited with energizing the protest movement — indeed, the feasibility of recent mass demonstrations seems to have required these instruments. Likewise, heightened public scrutiny on the extremist content of oppositionists' blog posts and tweets will test the maturity and accountability of a space that until now has hosted language often violent and legally dubious according to Russian legislation.

Russia: Website Appears Publishing Civil Servants' Incomes

Siân Sinnott — Tue, 15 May 2012 04:22:41 +0000

The project “Public Profit” [ru] was established so that anyone interested could access information about the salaries of civil servants and state deputies. The information is compiled using public records and disclosed in accordance with Russian law.

In addition to general information about incomes, other interesting statistics can be found on the site, such as reports on individual government departments, as well as data about which civil servants own the biggest apartments.

Several of the facts revealed are nothing short of amazing.

Screen shot of Public Profit's website, 15 May 2012.

For example, Alexander V. Gilderman [ru], Deputy of the Administrative Department of Regional Sustainment, owns a house with land covering 4,433 square meters (1.1 acres).

However, the champion of real estate holdings is Igor I. Shuvalov [ru], whose total income exceeds 14,652,000 rubles (approximately 505,240 U.S. dollars), which only makes up less than 4% of his total family income.

The gap between spouses' earnings is a separate reason to reconsider the traditional family paradigm; Igor Suvalov's wife earns almost 25 times more than him, and Mrs. Sukhenko earns 60 times more than her husband, although their income is more modest by far.

The champion of all Russia's civil servants is Yuri Trutnev, who has earned a record-breaking 114 million rubles (3.7 million U.S. dollars) and change (and, in his case, there is more than a little change). Unfortunately, his income fell in 2010, but let's hope things will be okay. For now, his wife and four children (judging by their income declarations) can get away with not working for now.

Apart from that, we can only be happy for these people!

See the original article here [ru].

Ukraine, France: The Future of Franco-Ukrainian Relationship

Veronica Khokhlova — Sun, 13 May 2012 00:01:41 +0000

Odessablogger comments on the statements made by Ukrainian political scientists regarding the future of the Franco-Ukrainian relationship following the election of François Hollande as the President of France.

Lithuania: Alleged Child Abuse Case

Veronica Khokhlova — Sat, 12 May 2012 23:36:13 +0000

At OpenDemocracy.net, Violeta Davoliūtė draws attention to “some of the more sober realities of life in today’s Lithuania,” highlighting a highly publicised case of alleged child abuse that is “being played out against a background of mob rule, support from politicians and complicity on the part of the police.”