Global Voices » China

The Future of Sino-US Relations: Ask Andrew Nathan

Andy Yee — Sat, 19 May 2012 17:28:33 +0000

Xiaomi (twitter: xiaomi2020) is organizing an interview with Andrew Nathan, an internationally renowned expert on US-China relations from Columbia University. Submit a question or vote on a question that's already been asked here. Xiaomi is one of the organizers of Yizhe, a group which translates western journalism on China.

China, Singapore: Reaction on Ferrari Crash

Oiwan Lam — Thu, 17 May 2012 06:57:00 +0000

Recently a rich Mainland Chinese man killed three persons (including himself) in a Ferrari car crash in Singapore because of drunk driving. The incident has resulted in anti mainland Chinese sentiment in Singapore, Peter Barefoot from ChinaSMACK translated netizens' reaction from China.

China: Motor-Powered Breakfast Crepes

Juliana Rincón Parra — Wed, 16 May 2012 05:28:50 +0000

The Presurfer shares a video where we can see how the Beijing Jianbing is made. This large breakfast crepe is made possible thanks to a very steady hand and a motorized wheel that allows a really large and thin crepe to be evenly cooked.

China: Propaganda Against U.S. Ambassador Backfires

Oiwan Lam — Tue, 15 May 2012 14:56:07 +0000

Since the escape of blind civic rights activist Chen Guangcheng into the U.S embassy, the U.S Ambassador Gary Locke has become the major target for media attack in Bejing. However, so far each piece of political propaganda has resulted in a backfire.

A number of state-controlled newspapers are involved in the propaganda campaign but Beijing Daily is the most high sounding one. On May 4, 2012 it published an editorial, “Reading the Measly Performance of U.S. Politicians through the Chen Guangcheng Affair” and openly criticized Gary Locke for playing “little tricks” (via China Media Project):

. . . It must be said that for some time, the American Embassy in China and the new U.S ambassador to China, Gary Locke, have used various means that are incommensurate with their roles and responsibilities — their “little tricks” have continued unabated. This causes people to ask, is it the role of this ambassador to do his utmost to advance the U.S.-China relationship, bridge gaps and eliminate misunderstandings, or is it to hatch schemes and bound out into Chinese society to make trouble, manufacturing new and greater fissures between China and the United States.

Many netizens were outraged by such propaganda and attacked the newspapers for losing their consciences. By 8 p.m on May 4, the term “Beijing Daily” (北京日報） had become unsearchable [zh]. The political spoof below, a imitation of political prosecution during the Cultural Revolution, reflects the popular sentiment towards the Chinese propaganda machine's attack on Gary Locke (via China Media Project). The photo's caption read: “The only way out for Ambassador Locke is to be whole-hearted corrupt!”:

Gary Locke's little trick. Via China Media Project

The latest round of attack by Beijing Daily came through its official Sina Weibo account on May 14 demanding that Gary Locke disclose his personal assets. China Media Project has translated some of the immediate responses from Sina Weibo:

@Liu Yadong [zh]: No matter whether its praise or criticism your dishing out, it must be based on a deep understanding of the other side. Seen from a many sides, Beijing Daily‘s demand that Gary Locke disclose his personal finances is a basic error. It shows a basic lack of understanding of American society: how can that country’s top politicians possibly keep their personal assets secret! To openly make such a childish demand perhaps also reveals the closed-up nature of this newspaper, its lack of international perspective. This is a lesson!

@Zhao Chu [zh]: Beijing Daily is a joke. For them to make a joke like this just shows they’re a bunch of stupid pigs at the top.

In early morning the next day, the newspapers removed its comment and re-post the same comment by adding a re-post in front of the message [deleted]. It continued to attract a lot of criticism. The China Media Project has captured and translated some from the comment thread:

@半拉北京人: His assets were disclosed back in 2010. Why doesn’t he teach Chinese official how to disclose [their assets]?

@辣笔小飞: Beijing Daily, are you really dumb, or just playing dumb? You think that just by having this title “Beijing” to back you up you can lead public opinion astray?

@无梦的八戒: Of course Gary Locke’s personal assets have been disclosed. And what about the assets of those imperial officials [of ours]?

@天恩0120: Oh, editors and comrades of Beijing Daily, how are you? How tough things are for you. It’s just that the residence of the Ambassador and the cars he rides in are about the image of America. No matter how we try to refine the idea of whether or not Gary Locke is corrupt, there’s the looming issue of our leaders living in Zhongnanhai. And how much more resplendent are those official residences? Why don’t you have a look.

@老男人的小日子: “What about that post asking Locke to disclose his assets? How was that deleted? How humiliating for the Party!

In less than an hour or so, the post was removed again. However, it couldn't stop netizens from laughing about its self-humiliating move:

wh_w：严重怀疑北京日报脑残或被收买了.洛有无目的另说，麻烦別拿家丑和人家的优势对比。有些方面祖国是相当落后的

@wh_w [zh]: I seriously suspect that Bejing Daily is run by mentally retarded or it has been bribed. I don't want to comment on Locke's intention. But please don't expose the dirt/corruption in our own country by comparing with others. Our country is still backward in many aspects.

buckforland：北京日报挺幽默的，一巴掌打过去竟打回自己的脸上了。

@buckforland [zh]: Beijing Daily is quite hilarious. It just punched its own face.

lpcysy：纽约时报：我们美国多民主，可以公开要求骆家辉公布财产北京日报：我们中国也民主，可以公开要求骆家辉公布财产

@lpcysy [zh]: New York Times: We Americans have democracy and can demand that Gary Locke publicize his personal assets. Beijing daily: We Chinese also have democracy and can demand that Gary Locke publicize his personal assets.

haistone1：感谢北京日报的良苦用心，引起了全社会对官员财产公开的高度关注。

@haistone1 [zh]: We should thank Beijing Daily for humiliating itself to raise the public's concern on the need to be more transparent regarding Chinese government officials' personal assets.

China: Mother's Day

Oiwan Lam — Mon, 14 May 2012 12:48:59 +0000

David Wertime from Tea Leaf Nation blogs about Weibo users' expression of love towards their mothers in May 13 mother's day.

China: Domestic Violence

Oiwan Lam — Mon, 14 May 2012 06:45:12 +0000

Shards of China blogs about the problem of domestic violence in China. Even though the government has acknowledged the problem, little has been done to protect abused wives.

China: Foreigner beaten by Beijingers for sexually assaulting a woman in public

Oiwan Lam — Mon, 14 May 2012 06:36:27 +0000

A video, showing a drunken foreigner beaten up by a number of passersby for sexually assaulting a woman in public, has been circulated widely on line. Ministry of Tofu translated some of the online comments.

China: In Bo Xilai Saga, Did Social Media Challenge Government?

Violeta Camarasa — Fri, 11 May 2012 12:53:47 +0000

This post is part of our special coverage International Relations & Security.

Bo Xilai portrayed as Greek mythology character Icarus, who tried to fly too close to the sun with a set of wings made from wax. Source: Beijing Cream.

Political struggle, murder, corruption, espionage and diplomatic conflict - the downfall of Bo Xilai from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) elite ranks has turned out to be a multi-faceted story. The Bo Xilai affair is also a good example of the disruptive role that social media plays in today’s China. Despite censorship, discussions on social networks caused international media to prick up their ears.

With the CCP's once-in-a-decade leadership succession [pdf] scheduled for October 2012, Bo Xilai’s case has jumped to the front page of international and local media. It has been widely argued that social media has made it unfeasible for the government to keep the story behind the scenes. However, it is also true that the government has stirred social media to its own advantage. Did the Chinese government really want to hide Bo Xilai’s story? Did social media really challenge the government control on information? The opacity of China’s politics makes it impossible to answer these questions, but they are worth a thought.

Let’s re-cap on how Chinese social media played a major role by apparently forcing disclosure and challenging government control on information.

February 2012

1. First rumors spread

Wang Lijun, Vice-Mayor of Chonqing, disappears from his post. Despite censorship, speculation regarding his whereabouts spreads on China’s micro-blogs. The rumors state that Wang has requested political asylum at the US consulate after falling out of favor with the local high-profile party secretary Bo Xilai, who aspires to a top political post. Wang may have denounced Bo's implication in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood.

2. A “vacation-style therapy”

An official statement on the Twitter-like Sina Weibo says Wang has been temporarily removed from his post for a “vacation-style therapy”. The phrase becomes an ironic meme on the Chinese Internet.

3. Where are the censors?

The Chinese government confirms that Wang did enter the US consulate in a post on Sina Weibo that netizens hurry to re-tweet. The censorship machine not only allows but boosts online discussions, making netizens suspicious. Blogger C. Custer, from ChinaGeeks writes:

At the moment, Wang is back on the Sina Weibo trending topics list twice. […] Searches for “Wang Lijun” (typed correctly) remain uncensored. It’s quite clear that Sina is not trying to suppress this story at all, which begs the question: is someone at Sina trying to damage Bo Xilai?

March 2012

4. First rumors confirmed

Official news agency Xinhua makes a double announcement: Wang has been removed from his position and Bo Xilai has been replaced as Chonqing Party Chief by Zhang Dejiang. Another report confirms that Wang did request political asylum at the US consulate.

5. Second wave of rumors flows in

In the midst of hectic public discussion on Bo’s political purge, online rumors spread about a coup d’état in Beijing and a confrontation between President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao on one side, and Bo’s supporter Zhou Yongkang on the other.

6. Talks of coup finally wake the Great Firewall up

Micro-blogging sites Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo block word search facilities. Days after the blocking, the government cracks down on social media. Six people are arrested and 16 websites closed for “disseminating online rumors” that “severely disturb the public order, undermine social stability and deserve punishment”, Xinhua reported. The same report states Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo have been “criticized and punished accordingly”. The two sites halt the posting of comments for three days.

April 2012

7. Rumors become the truth

On April 10, Xinhua makes two separate announcements: Bo’s dismissal from his position at the CCP Central Committee for “serious discipline violations”, and his wife's alleged role in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood over “economic interests”.

Netizens can't get over their surprise. The rumors that have been flooding the net for months suddenly make it to the covers of all official newspapers. Jing Gao, from

Ministry of Tofu writes:

Weibo user Zhang Xingsheng wrote, “We had already followed the instruction from the higher-up that we’d never believe or spread a rumor. But today, the rumor became the truth! I am puzzled! To believe or not to believe? This is a question!

China’s 550 million micro-blog users have witnessed a twisted public information stratagem. Online rumors becoming official truth overnight, endorsed by the same official media that censored and demonized them in the name of social harmony.

8. Political struggle and corruption

The government insists that Bo’s fall is a fight against corruption that has nothing to do with political struggle. As details on Bo’s family fortune emerge, public discussion gets heated over the enrichment of party officials. With corruption debate taking over the press, the government manages to sideline sensitive discussion on political infighting.

Again, Jing Gao reflects:

But one thing is certain. Before the advent of social media, the government never owed the people an explanation. […] Today, with tens of millions of Chinese actively use Sina Weibo, a low murmur of political gossip may have already been amplified and heard by thousands before the internet police step in.

Social media play a major role boosting public discussion in China by breaking systematic cover ups. However, it seems clear enough that the Chinese government has shown a remarkable expertise in playing with censorship, leaking or blocking information at its convenience to lead public opinion. Who wins? Do China’s social media outlets really challenge the government’s control of information?

This post and its translations to Spanish, Arabic and French were commissioned by International Security Network (ISN) as part of a partnership to seek out citizen voices on international relations and security issues worldwide.Visit the ISN blog and see more related stories.

China, Philippines: Scarborough Shoal Sovereignty Tension Rises

Oiwan Lam — Thu, 10 May 2012 10:37:11 +0000

Tension between China and the Philippines over the disputed waters of the Scarborough Shoal or Huangyan Island has been elevated, with the state-controlled Chinese media reporting that China can no longer tolerate the presence of Philippines naval ships in the South China Sea.

The China Daily commentary on May 8, 2012, highlighted [zh] in its headline that China “could not tolerate the intolerable” regarding the Scarborough Shoal dispute and it revealed that the Chinese government's diplomatic strategy would be a demonstration of sovereignty in the South China Sea.

Nationalist performance

Nationalist Chinese media outlet Global Times's editorial on May 9, stated that [zh] “it would be a miracle if the confrontation would not end up in military conflicts”.

Local newspapers also reported that Chinese naval ships have expelled [zh] Philippine fishermen from the Shoal. The nationalist commentaries come in reaction to a Philippine military expert's claim [zh] that China would not resort to military means to solve either the Scarborough Shoal dispute or domestically, Chinese online nationalism.

The latest sovereignty performance came with the erection of a Chinese flag on the main reef of the Scarborough Shoal by a Dongfan Star television reporter:

Chinese social media is flooded with nationalist sentiment when the word “黃岩島” (Huangyan Island) is searched for, and the mainstream media have added oil to the flame. Below is a selection of some typical Weibo comments on the issue:

周指辉：估计我国要实际控制黄岩岛——这是一个好机会，希望能顺手把菲占的其他岛也给一并拿了！

@周指辉 [zh]: It seems that our country is to take control of the Huangyan Islands. This is a golden opportunity, I hope we can take control of other islands as well.

醉想丽华：[1/2]中国疆域领土确实很大，但没有一寸是多余的，关于领土问题没有谈判，只有战争，如果不准备动武就不要拿起武器，一旦遭人欺负，就应当瞬间回击；对于黄岩岛问题别每天总是在说是中国固有的领土，固有、固有听着就烦了，都已被人家欺负到这份上了，还无动于衷，不给一点颜色瞧瞧还真的以为好欺负，

@醉想丽华 [zh]: Chinese territory is really huge, but every inch of it is holy. There is no negotiation over territorial matters, only war can solve the problem. We have to hold our weapon and get prepared. Once we are being bullied, we have to fight back. Everyday, the media keep saying that Huangyan is an integral part of China, this is so frustrating… we are being bullied and we still keep talking. We need to show some colors so that they won't test our strength.

黑匣子陈廖宇：黄岩岛问题特别满足各种国人从各方面的意淫。所以还是不要解决的好。

@黑匣子陈廖宇 [zh]: The Huangyan issue is a symbolic act for different countries to feed their fantasy [political and nationalistic]. So better not to solve the problem.

佳琦-半正太V：对于最近的南海诸问题，中国一直都忍让，但这次黄岩岛和菲律宾闹的有点大。我想，是不是想拿来它试试刀，镇一下越南和小日本呢，

@佳琦-半正太V [zh]: China has been very restrained in dealing with the South China Sea problem. But the Huangyan Island issue has been stirred up by the Philippines. I think we can test our knife and see if we can also give some warning to Vietnam and Japan.

A media worker's reflection

Media worker in Guangzhou, Su Shaoxin [zh], is critical of the media flaming of the popular nationalistic sentiment:

如同我严厉批评我所任职的媒体机构一样，作为媒体及公众人物在此刻为民族主义情绪张目，确能两头讨好：政治上正确，也能获市场掌声。但这种功利思维或不自觉做法背后可能产生的灾难性后果，您应比我更有切肤之痛。这大概是我会使用“知识能力不足”的原因——因为这如果不是天真的话，就是别有用心。

As media workers and public figures, we can win applause from the market and enjoy being politically correct by adding oil to the nationalist sentiment at this moment. However, such utilitarianism would bring disaster to the country and you [probably refers to a more experienced media worker] have much [more] painful experience than me. I would say there is a lack of knowledge and ability in dealing with the [Huangyan] issue — because if it is not out of naivety, there is some hidden agenda [behind the reports and commentaries].

China: Political Space of the Weibo Blogging Platform

Oiwan Lam — Thu, 10 May 2012 08:04:32 +0000

Chicago University Sociology Professor Zhao Dingxin recently delivered a speech entitled “Weibo, Political Space and China Development” at East China Normal University. Zhao's reservations on the technological setting and nature of Weibo, a well known Chinese micro-blogging platform, has triggered debate and reflections amongst Chinese bloggers.

Reflections on Weibo

Zhao's speech has been partial transcribed and published in local newspaper Dongfang Daily (via NetEase) [zh]. Below is a selected translation of the transcript:

微博是一个彻底民主的同时又是可被操纵性很强的通讯手段。说它是最彻底的民主是因为微博只需写寥寥几句话，只要知道怎么用微博，谁都能写，写得好坏也无所谓。说它可操纵性强，是因为微博中的声音不具有“一人一票”的性质。…只要一个人掌握着大量的金钱或者某种技术，那个人就能通过雇佣水军把自己的声音做大，于是就形成了虚假舆论。这里面可操纵的余地太大。

Weibo is an absolutely democratic but highly manipulative mode of communication. It is democratic in the sense that the user only need to write a few sentences. Once a person knows how to login, s/he can start writing regardless of the quality. It is manipulative in the sense that each voice does not register the character of an equal vote… If a person controls a lot of money or certain technology, s/he can hire an online army to magnify their voice and create fake public opinion. The space for manipulation is huge.

前台行为和后台行为的区隔是我们社会文明处事的一个很重要的原则。但是在微博的公共空间中前台行为和后台行为的界限不再清晰。微博中的言论是面向社会的，它们本来应该是前台行为。但是微博中许多人并不在自己熟悉的圈子内混，不少人的真实面目我们完全不清楚。这些人因此能在微博中动辄破口大骂，而不怕受到惩罚。从这个意义上来说，微博公共空间的出现把人类的许多后台行为前台化了，这就是微博语言暴力趋向背后的结构性原因。

The distinction between front-stage and back-stage behavior marks the principle of our social manner. However, in Weibo, the line between front-stage and back-stage has been blurred. The speech in Weibo is directed to society and thus should be considered as front-stage behavior. However, many Weibo users are not hanging around with their own social circle and the users don't know each other's real self. Hence, they can swear and get away with peer pressure. In this sense, the public sphere of Weibo has turned the back-stage into the front-stage. This is the structural explanation for the verbal violence and abusive language [evident] in Weibo.

 从一定意义上说，在微博公共空间中，人们的表现会接近于勒庞所描述的“乌合之众”，他们一方面表现得特别不服从权威，另一方面又在操纵下特别容易对权威产生崇拜甚至盲从。微博中的狂热之士很像“文革”中的红卫兵：一方面喊着打倒一切、怀疑一切；另一方面喊着谁敢反对某个权威我们就打倒谁。

In some sense, people are acting like Gustave Le Bon's description of “the crowd” in Weibo's public sphere. They are against authority on the one hand, but on the other hand worship authority. Some Weibo fanatics are acting like the Red Guards in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: tearing down everything and putting everything in doubt, while at the same time attacking whosoever opposes the leader's [here means Mao Tzedong] authority.

Zhao pointed out that most of the debates in Weibo are ideological and he used famous Chinese writer Han Han's ghostwriter scandal as an example to explain his point:

我本以为这一场争论的核心是真假问题，而不是价值观问题，是比较容易说清楚的。但我马上发觉支持作家的人士大致可分为相互重叠的三类人士。第一是原教旨自由主义者。这些人士认定作家是盟友，并认为打假是政治阴谋，是价值观和意识形态层面上的问题，不是一个简单的真假问题。第二就是作家的“粉丝”。不读大学就可以当作家、收入不菲还可以打扮得很酷的生活令年轻人羡慕。维护作家对他们来说，犹如维护宗教信仰一般是他们的责任。第三，就是一些缺乏常识的人，对于这些人来说，什么奇迹都可以发生，常识简直就是对他们认知的亵渎。

At first, I thought the core issue of this debate is a matter of true or false rather than value judgement. Then I found out that those who support the writer could be divided into three types of characters. First are liberalist fundamentalists. They consider the writer as their alliance and see the scandal as a political conspiracy. It is an ideological matter rather than an issue of true and false. The second type are the writer's fans. A writer without a university degree, a cool lifestyle different from typical rich people; many young people adore the writer and feel responsible to defend him. Such behavior is religious in nature. The third type of people are those who lack common sense. They believe in miracles and detest common knowledge.

Zhao believes that such irrational populist sentiment is rooted in the disintegration of the value system in mainland Chinese society as a result of the cultural revolution, the lack of direction in humanities subjects in the education, people's skepticism of the mainstream media and the culture of a mass consumption society.

Reactions online

Some Chinese netizens disagreed with Zhao's observations. For example, blogger Zuo Zhijian pointed out [zh]:

微博有商业水军潜伏，这固然是一个事实。但赵教授忽视了另外一个事实，即微博是一个开放的平台，意味着这是一个自由的言论市场。…即便是水军，在微博上也要比BBS上更容易识别。相信普通网民识别水军的能力，不会弱于公知，因为他们早就熟悉各类网络工具，在水军的风浪中久经考验了。
如果纵向比较，把微博与电视、广播做比较，应该很清楚“操控受众”的难度已经难太多了。

It is true that there is a ‘commercial army' [promoting things] on Weibo. But Zhao has omitted the fact that Weibo is an open platform and a free speech market… It is more easy to distinguish the ‘army' on Weibo than on BBS [Bulletin Board System]. Ordinary netizens' ability to distinguish the ‘online army' is not be weaker than that of public intellectuals. In fact, they have long experience in fighting against the ‘army' across different online platforms.
When compared with TV and radio broadcast, on Weibo it is a lot more difficult to manipulate the audience.

Zuo agreed that it is difficult to develop consensus via Weibo but he stressed that's the reason why public intellectuals should engage more with the open platform:

认识到微博的局限性，政治家与知识分子就更应主动应对并利用微博的长处。
作为政治家，应该更快更及时地提供公共信息，消除民众的疑惑。
作为知识分子，则应该意识到，微博传播价值远高过辩论价值，所以是一个很好的启蒙平台。在中国这样言论空间稀缺的环境下，更几乎是唯一的平台。
当下在中国，启蒙也远比辩论来的重要。知识分子也知道，民众有危险的民粹倾向，这恰恰意味着知识分子还需要做太多事情。
这个时代知识分子面临的环境，与历史上其他时期最大的不同就在于，有了互联网这样的开放平台。了解并善用互联网工具，是这一代知识分子的必修课。

Knowing the restriction of Weibo, politicians and public intellectuals should be more engaged and help to make use of the advance setting of the platform.
For politicians, they should provide accurate public information to clear people out from speculation.
For intellectuals, they should be making use of Weibo's distributive power rather than entangling in the debate of its nature. It is a platform for people's enlightenment. In particular in China where we lack free speech space, Weibo has become the only platform.
In China, the enlightenment project is more important than debate. Now that intellectuals are aware of the populist tendency, which means you have to work hard.
The environment Chinese intellectuals are facing now is very different from our precedents, we have the Internet, an open platform. The fundamental course for intellectuals is to understand and actively making use of the tool.

Blogger Shan Gu's view echoed with [zh] Zuo Zhijian's criticism and looked deeper into the nature of Weibo as an open platform:

固然，微博空间是个大杂烩，其中高雅与低俗并存，美丽与丑陋同行，真相与谣言齐飞。但同时，与传统媒体相比，微博具有更高效的记忆功能：要证明传统媒体在两年前曾经说谎，你或许需要亲自跑一趟档案馆；而要证明一名微博大V两年前曾经说过谎，则只需要点击一下鼠标。因此，微博空间虽然谣言横飞，但其自身便具备了自洁功能，任何试图用谎言、谣言或其他各种极端思想来“操纵网民”作法最终都只会落人笑柄。

The Weibo space is highly diversified. High and low culture, beauty and ugliness, truth and rumor co-exist. However, when compared with the conventional media, Weibo has very good memory function. If we have to prove that a conventional media told a lie two years ago, we have to dig into its archive. If we have to prove a Weibo opinion leader for telling a lie two years ago, we just need to hit our keyboard. Although there are a lot of rumors in Weibo, the rumors would be cleared in time. Lies, rumors and other manipulative acts would become a joke eventually.

勒宠的“乌合之众”非常强调集体行为的“在场感”，只有亲身置于集体行为的特定场域之中，个体的非理性情绪才会在交互影响中被不断加强、放大并最终主宰个人的行动；而网络上的非理性情绪则缺乏这种“在场感”，其非理性情绪没有被放大、被加强的途径，所以其非理性情绪至多也不过是凝聚为几句“气壮山河”的国骂罢了，即便真的有极少数人会付诸行动，其行动也往往是基于功利计算后的个人行为——要理解上述两者之差异，只要想一下在现场看球、和十几个在电视前看球与一个人在家里看球有何不同便可以明了。

Le Bon description of “the crowd” stresses the effect of collective presence. Only when a person is in a collective presence, would his/her irrational emotion be magnified and take control of the individual's behavior. On the Internet, irrational emotion do not have such kind of collective presence and could not be further magnified. It expresses in the form of four-letter [curse] words. Even if a minority of them take action, such action would be based upon a very utilitarian calculation. To understand the difference, we can compare the emotional effect of watching a football match at the pitch with a huge crowd and watching it on a TV screen with a dozen friends.

微博公共空间的隐忧不在于其可能被心怀不轨的“阴谋家”操纵，而在于其可能被国家机器控制——只有国家的控制才不受成本与收益的市场规律制约，并且能凭借其垄断性的资源而使其影响力超越时空范围的限制，获得主宰性的地位。因此，如果网民真的可能存在被操纵的危险，则其危险的根源绝不源于微博自身，而源自微博之外的强制性力量。

The underlying threat of the Weibo public sphere does not lie in the hand of some “conspirators” but in the state machine. Only state control will not be restricted by cost and effectiveness. Its monopolized power allows its influence to extend beyond temporal and spatial restriction and achieve domination. If netizens are to be manipulated, the threat does not stem from the Weibo platform, but the coercive force from outside the platform.

赵鼎新教授的观点则体现了一种智识上的高傲，在他眼中，“网民”是非理性、易忽悠且缺乏常识的，韩寒粉丝的认知能力更甚至是“亵渎常识”的（视他为奇迹、像维护宗教信仰一样维护他）……但他可能忘了，常识的普及永远不可能建立在“先知式”的智者对公众高高在上的“教化”基础之上，而只可能通过信息的自由与开放而实现。

Professor Zhao Dingxin's viewpoint reflects his [feeling of] intellectual superiority. In his eyes, “netizens” are irrational, easily manipulated and in lack of common sense. Han Han's fans' intellect has blasphemed common knowledge (they defend him as if he were a miracle or a religion)… But he has forgotten that the popularization of common knowledge cannot be founded by the “cultivation” of “prophecy” of a guru upon the public. It can only be actualized in an open society with free information flow.

The thumbnail photo showing Professor Zhao Dingxin is accredited to Dongfang Daily via NetEase.

China: Al Jazeera's Beijing Correspondent Expelled

Oiwan Lam — Wed, 09 May 2012 10:56:54 +0000

Al Jazeera English's Beijing correspondent Melissa Chan's press credential were revoked by the Chinese government on May 8, 2012, resulting in the shutting down of Al Jazeera's English Bureau in Beijing.

The incident marks a setback for press freedom in China with the previous expulsion of an accredited foreign correspondent dating back over a decade to 1998.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei offered little explanation for the expulsion, but online speculation points to Al Jazeera's 2011 documentary “Slavery: An 21st Century Evil”, highly critical of China's labour reeducation system, or the so-called the “state sponsored slavery”, and which features undercover filming from inside China labour reeducation prisons. However, Melissa Chan was not involved in the making of the film.

Melissa Chan reporting on illegal land acquisition in Zhejiang province. Via FMN

Isaac Stone Fish, who worked with Chan on the board of the Foreign Correspondent's Club of China, believes that the China government targeted Chan due to her Chinese heritage:

But Chan also fits into the troubling pattern of the foreigners Beijing has targeted over the last decade: those the Chinese government views of having less protection because of their ethnicity and nationality; often with Chinese backgrounds. It appears that someone in the Chinese government wanted to give a warning to journalists without causing an international incident; Chan, a Chinese-American working for a Qatari-based television station, seemed to be an appropriate target. The thinking seems to be that a foreign government will more loudly protest the mistreatment of a citizen who is both born and raised in its own country and working for a domestic company.

Victor Yang also points out that when Chan reported [zh] on Chinese black jails, guards at the scene called her a “traitor”. Blogger Charlie Custer from ChinaGeeks is very frustrated:

The expulsion of @melissakchan is cowardly, childish and pathetic….just what we've come to expect from the Chinese government.

Foreign journalists based in China have expressed serious concerns regarding the Chinese government's attitude. Kathleen McLaughlin wrote on Twitter:

Sad as I am to see @melissakchan go, I hope this exposes China's larger efforts to censor foreign media via visa manipulation.

Mark MacKinnon has has pointed out that the fate of foreign journalists is intertwined with local journalists:

This false freedom given to reporters working in China is much more important than Melissa’s case or the careers of any of the foreign correspondents based in China. What’s at stake is not only the outside world’s (already poor) understanding of this rising but paranoid superpower, but also the future of journalism inside China. Chinese journalists have told me that they watch the foreign correspondents with envy, wishing they could report about their own country as freely as we do. Our fight to do our job is intertwined with their fight to do theirs.

There are relatively few discussions within the Chinese blogosphere. Lao Rong gives an update of the situation in Sina Weibo [zh] and was able to spark some discussion:

@毛聊：“半岛”怎说也是第三世界媒体，不依附西方媒体，这样都容不下，何以服第三世界。

@毛聊：Al Jazeera is a third-world media and is independent from western media. If China cannot allow them to operate here, how can we lead the third world?

@看看看看1：因为敢于报道事实而失业的记者，恐怕只有中国吧。被中国驱逐的记者，应该得到重用才是

@看看看看1：In the whole world, only China will make journalists lose their job because they insist on reporting the truth. Those reporters who are expelled by China deserve good career opportunities.

@nurundini：在对中国政府的报道中，半岛应该是几个大的新闻媒介中较客观的，某些西方媒体甚至批评半岛亲共。当然，美联社就不会出现现在这种情况。

@nurundini：Al Jazeera is more objective when reporting about Chinese government policy than most major media outlets. Some western media even criticize them for being pro-communist. Of course, that wouldn't happen with Associated Press.

赵佑诚：谷歌也不想离开，还不是离开了，呵呵

赵佑诚：Google didn't want to leave China, but in the end it left.

South Korea Seized Infant Flesh Capsules Made in China

Lee Yoo Eun — Tue, 08 May 2012 13:47:47 +0000

South Korean authorities had confiscated tons of dried flesh of dead infants that was being capsuled and smuggled out of China. Whilst almost every blog and media responded to this horrendous news with pure disgust and accusation against Chinese high abortion rate, one PR and communications agency defined this case 'a sad story of misinformation and miscommunication'.

India, Pakistan Missile Launches: Game Changers or Mere Posturing?

Aparna Ray — Tue, 08 May 2012 13:01:30 +0000

This post is part of our special coverage International Relations & Security.

On April 19, 2012, India successfully test-fired its Agni V inter-continental ballistic missile (IBCM). With a range of over 5,000 kilometres, the Agni V places India’s missile capabilities increasingly in line with the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China. The following week, neighboring Pakistan successfully test-launched its nuclear capable ballistic missile, the Shaheen 1-A.

These back-to-back missile tests received widespread coverage and comment on mainstream and social media outlets. In particular, netizens have been engaging in lively online discussions regarding the escalating arms race in South Asia and its impact on the overall security of the region.

While many netizens across India and Pakistan, fuelled with nationalistic fervor, engaged in hyperbole regarding the respective missile launches, there has been some strong criticism in the Pakistani blogosphere regarding the United States’ response to India's missile launch. Labeling it as “double standards”, Yasmeen Ali, a university professor based in Lahore, wrote on Pakpotpourri2's blog:

The Agni V missile being launched off the coast of Odhisa, India, on 19th April, 2022. Image courtesy Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)

The need here is to support a country within the region to act, or seem to act as a deterrent to China. Obvious choice: India.What USA had completely overlooked in this game of regional hegemony is when you let the genie out of the bottle, it will refuse to go back in the bottle. It can one day, turn upon the master, once his heart’s desire of being let out is fulfilled.

However, a section of netizens felt that these missile tests were not going to escalate security tensions among India, China and Pakistan. On his blog Chaturanga, Jaideep Prabhu pointed out that India's policy was to acquire a ‘minimum credible deterrent' and not to escalate an arms race, as was being loosely discussed in a section of the media.

He commented:

The launch of the China-specific Agni V has generated much talk about an arms race between China and India, and consequently, India and Pakistan. The Chinese media (and hence the government) has taken exception to this, reacting sharply to the test and labeling it as India’s missile delusion…But unless India has abandoned its old policy of MUD (Mutually Unacceptable Damage), analysts and Beijing have jumped the gun.

On the blog Rolan San Juan, Rajesh Basrur, a Senior Fellow and the Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), argued that the Agni-V launch was “inconsequential” in that it would not change India's “deterrence game vis-à-vis China.

In his post on The Christian Science Monitor, Scott Baldauf referred to the chain of events as ‘ritual aggression' between India and Pakistan, a posturing more out of habit than actual security concerns, especially given that the two countries were currently trying to develop closer ties.

He wrote:

These tests follow an extraordinary set of meetings between the president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Delhi earlier this month, in which the two nations pledged to increase trade ties and to fight against extremism. While these missile tests might have seemed to be a setback in earlier times, they have now become a kind of theater of virility, separate from any political discourse.

There were hardly any major security concerns expressed in the social media of neighbors such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

Visit the ISN blog and see more related stories.

China: Rural Left-behind Children

Oiwan Lam — Mon, 07 May 2012 09:57:11 +0000

Acopy.net introduces a Chinese documentary, the Road, directed by independent documentary worker Jiang Nengjie on “left-behind children” in rural China.

China: Middle-class Discontent

Oiwan Lam — Mon, 07 May 2012 05:56:27 +0000

China Bubble Watch looks into the economic and political role of middle class in China. The blogger is not optimistic about the influence of middle class on policy decision in China because of the polarized power structure.