Kyrgyzstan's weakened executive, unruly legislature and compromised judiciary are not renowned for enforcing their own rules and regulations. Indeed, state officials' disregard for due process is a feature of life in the country that can charm or frustrate foreign visitors to the country in equal measure. For citizens of the country, it is simply the daily minefield  they must negotiate in order to get from home to work and back again.

Commissar Karimdjanov, as he has been referred to in the past, has made a habit of exposing these routine violations of law and protocol both on his blog and on the main news portal at Kloop.kg, where he works as a journalist. A recent example saw him “police” a female police officer who appeared to be drinking while in uniform at lunch time:

Karimdjanov: Look, she is drinking beer. Shall we go?

Colleague: Sure

Karimdjanov [to policewoman]: I hope you are not against us making a video. Why are you drinking beer in uniform? It is interesting for us, why is a police official drinking beer?

Policewoman: I have a praznik [celebratory day]

Karimdjanov: But you are on duty…

Policewoman: I understand that it is banned on duty but for one thing it is non-alcoholic…

Karimdjanov: It is not non-alcoholic, we asked the waitress….

Policewoman: It is non-alcoholic you can ask again, and secondly tomorrow is a praznik and [today is] my birthday. May I?

In the Facebook plugin beneath the posted video, Almaz Rakhimdinov noted [ru]:

Not for nothing Ilya Karimdjanov has the title of agent provocateur!

While Cholponbai Borubaeva said [ru]:

Interested to know what will happen to her - a warning or a sacking?

Rinat Shamstudinov argued:

The guys from Kloop [Karimdjanov and colleague, Zarema Sultanbekova] did good. But you should have taken a copy of the receipt because staff [of the police] may do anything possible to turn that Siberian Crown [alcoholic beer] into a Baltika ‘0′ [non-alcoholic].

This isn't the first time Karimdjanov's activities have earned him attention. Another recent video exposed on his blog posed the question [ru] ”Tiyini - Money No-one Needs?”

On that occasion Karimdjanov went around Bishkek with co-author Begimai Bolotbekova trying to spend tiyini, the much-loathed Kyrgyz equivalent of cents, pence and other smaller-than-small currency denominations. Refused by shopkeepers, stallholders and parking inspectors, he successfully exposed another law that doesn't work - that all denominations belonging to the national currency be accepted in cash transactions.*

Ilya's day-to-day blogging sees him defend the constitution [ru] (particularly article 33, allowing access to free information), expose corrupt university lecturers [ru] and make appeals [ru] for greater press responsibility. In this sense, he is like an onlime ombudsman, performing the functions the government, either through indifference or incompetence, doesn't.

But why does he bother? In response to a criticism by one commenter of his handling of the police-beer scandal, Karimdjanov replied [ru]:

I also thought to dismiss it at first. Just get up and leave, but my conscience would not allow me to. I know that nothing has fundamentally changed and it is unlikely to even be punished, but I have every right to approach such employees and to show them that they themselves are doing wrong.
All of us like to chew the fat and say that it is because of low salaries and all that. But fundamentally you don't even desire to do something useful. This is my country, the place my children will live ! And I will do everything possible so that before they arrive, I will make at least a few people, through examples like these, change the way they think about things and do what is correct! To sit back and criticize - is the easiest thing to do. But I respect your opinion, because my task was to convey information to you. I did this as a journalist, and how you perceive it - is up to you

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Vladimir Farofonov is accused under article 299, section one, which applies a charge of causing “national, racial, religious or interregional enmity” via “means of mass information”. Under conditions of judicial impartiality, the case's outcome would probably hinge on the difficulty of proving Farafanov's articles correspond to the charge at all, given that Kyrgyz law makes no provisions for the Internet as “means of mass information”.

Nevertheless, given that local courtrooms are often slaves to overriding political moods, it is far from certain that proceedings will devote themselves to this technicality alone.

Further complicating a case described by CPJ as “politically motivated”, Farafonov himself, appearing at the opening of his trial on March 28 [ru] said that over 11 of the 16 articles that had been brought as evidence against him at the trial were not written by him, something state prosecutors, not generally known for their mastery of the web, will have difficulty in disproving.

Moreover, the idea that the offending articles were written by more than one person has even been put forward by opponents of the very works attributed to Vladimir Farafonov.

Jyrgalbek Turdukozhoyev, an influential former editor of Bishkek-based online news agency, Kabar.kg, launched  a written invective against “the Farafonovs” in the Kyrgyz-language press last year, then gave an interview to “Kyrgyz Ruhu” newspaper, later translated and published online, in which he explained the decision to pluralize his target:

“In my article, I was far from “assigning” the list of articles published under the signature V. Farafonov, to one author, because for me it was clear that behind [the articles] is a whole group of authors, weaving and carrying nonsense,” he said.

To summarize this strange situation, then: An ethnic Russian journalist, born in Kyrgyzstan, faces the possibility of imprisonment (up to five years according to article 299 section one of the Kyrgyz crininal code) for inciting racial enmity in articles published online. The journalist himself denies he is racist (he cites a part-Kyrgyz wife in his defence), denies that he is the author of most of the articles (and many of his accusers appear to agree with him), while his legal team denies that the Internet falls under the umbrella of “mass media”.

N.B If this appears to have a touch of farce about it, it still pales in comparison to the decision of a provincial court in the South of the country to sentence two Jehovas Witnesses to imprisonment as Islamic radicals in May last year…

The right to incite?

But what exactly has Farafonov (or people pretending to be him) done to offend the Kyrgyz state prosecutor that brought the charges against him? An article on Eurasianet.org attempted to frame the accusations against the journalist in the context of some of the openly insulting rhetoric contained in the pieces attached to his name:

“[The journalist's] writing will hardly help his case. In September 2010, Farafonov wrote on byeli parus…that only 20 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz are “modern humans,” while 80 percent are “stupidly stuck in the Asian middle ages.”

In an August 2011 article about the murder of a Kazakh tourist in Kyrgyzstan’s Issyk-Kul region, published by Centrasia.ru, Farafonov calls the Kyrgyz press covering the story “prisoners of political darkness,” trapped in “absolute stagnation” akin to an era of “early feudalism.” Labelling the murder an example of “elementary Kyrgyz hospitality,” the author’s scathing references to “primitive” rural Kyrgyz were condemned by Kyrgyz-language newspapers….”

Inflammatory? Certainly. Capable of causing inter-ethnic discord? Intangible. But much Russian-language media coverage of the Farafanov case has focussed on the perceived one-sidedness in the application of article 299. A quick scan of gezitter.org [ru], which translates Kyrgyz-language print media into Russian, reveals no shortage of chauvinistic articles [ru] that might be better suited to the specifics of the racial enmity charge, since they originally appeared in printed newspapers.

However, while organizations such as the International Crisis Group observed the Kyrgyz-language press' role in fuelling tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the run up to and aftermath of ethnic violence in 2010, no ethnic Kyrgyz editors or journalists have been brought before the courts since that time.

Commenting on Kloop.kg's facebook plugin, Bektour Iskender said:

I don't know whose side I am on in Farafanov's case. But the fact that Kyrgyz language newspapers aren't investigated for nationalism at all - this is certainly a fact IMO.

Take Sha noted that the case had important implications for press and internet freedoms in a country that generally enjoys a better track record in both than its neighbours:

Kyrgyzstan differs from CSI [former Soviet] countries in that you can write what you like and [the state] won't come and grab you, whether it is online, in forums…

But on Twitter, it was clear that Farafanov's writing had caused offence.

@tano-banzai: Farafanov is a ****

Menwhile, @Samatdolotbakov articulated:

People, have you read the articles of #Farafanov “on the Kyrgyz”? Little **** has irritated me. The following tweets will be citations from his articles…

@Ryskulbekov agreed, tending toward the theory that the articles were written by a collective, rather than an individual:

@Ryskulbekov: @samatdolotbakov Samat, I consider, that these Farafonovs are the most genuinely destructive forces in our society

Once referred to as Central Asia's 'island of democracy', Kyrgyzstan has a reputation for political openness and media freedoms superior to the countries that it borders. The Tajik government's recent move to block Facebook, for instance, is an example of a decision that is almost unthinkable in Kyrgyzstan, where MPs actively use social media. Indeed, even aggressive ”trolling” across the country's online space is “pluralist”, according to an excellent IWPR report about comment “wars” between Central Asian netizens and state-sanctioned anonymous posters.

But there are signs that this may change. Recently, the government enacted a long-ago-passed parliamentary ruling  blocking the independent Central Asian news website, Ferghana.ru, which lawmakers felt stoked inter-ethnic tensions in its coverage of the June 2010 violence. The country's former President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, had banned the same site during his own time in office, but that block  lasted just a month, as he was overthrown in a bloody coup in April 2010.

Regardless of what Vladimir Farafanov has or hasn't written, his conviction would set a worrying precedent for state incursions into online territory. If he is found guilty, then the Internet - and everything written on it - could be considered “fair game” for zealous state prosecutors and a compromised judiciary.

Kyrgyzstani bloggers await a verdict with mixed feelings.

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Nevertheless, having come into sharp relief in the aftermath of those tragic events, “ultra patriotic” voices seemed finally to be taking a well-deserved rest in the country, as a government of more moderate political sentiments coalesced around new President Almas Atambaev. Enter language warrior Urulkan Amanbaeva and inter-ethnic peace-pooper Kamchybek Tashiev.

Adapted from the blog thekulas.blogspot.com

When looking at how important a given issue is to Kyrgyz netizens, citizen media portal Kloop.kg’s Facebook plugin is usually a fairly reliable indicator. In still-young 2012, the most discussed articles have been Kyrgyz MPs and their cars, MP Urulkan Amanbaeva’s belief that ethnic Kyrgyz government officials should speak in Kyrgyz, and, most recently, MP Kamchybek Tashiev’s statement that Kyrgyzstan’s Prime Minister should be a “pure blooded Kyrgyz”.

The details of the Amanbaeva case, which involved the deputy from the Respublika faction squawking at an official from the treasury for answering a question posed in Kyrgyz in Russian can be read here. But it is the statement of Tashiev, a polarizing politician from the south of the country, which has attracted the most attention from netizens.

“Oh Tashiev, so very Tashiev”

It was Tashiev’s party, Ata-Jurt, that edged victory in Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary elections in October 2010. Judged by international observers as the country’s most free and fair in 20 years of independence, the result reflected a growing nationalist fervour – especially in the country’s ethnically divided south. But since then, “Kamchike” as he is affectionately known by the country’s red top media, has comprehensively failed to get along with any of the other parties in parliament, and even had a fight with one MP while the legislature was in session.

If Tashiev has an ultimate nemesis, it is Omurbek Bobanov, leader of the Respublika faction and current Prime Minister, who he has accused of a range of misdemeanours in the past. On February 8, in an interview with the Kyrgyz tabloid De Facto, he said the following:

 Society is full of people who are opposed to Babanov leading the government. Everyone knows who Babanov is. I should say openly, and let people not be offended, that the head of government should be a pure-blooded Kyrgyz, who will actually be rooting for the interests of the country. We have been ruled by Tatars, Jews, Russians and others. With the coming to power of Babanov we are now ruled by Kurds. The man who guides the nation should be a full-blooded Kyrgyz. So they say in Russia, and in Kazakhstan. And why should we be ashamed to talk about it?

Russians? Ok, that was the Soviet Union. Tartars - some loose orientalist reference to the age of Ghengis Khan, perhaps. Jews – when was that?

In referring to the people of Zion, Tashiev may have been speaking of Maxim Bakiyev, the son of Tashiev’s former boss, Ex-President Kurmanbek. Maxim’s mother was Russian and his father at various points was accused of being a non-Kyrgyz Dungan (how else could his unpatriotic, corrupt activities be explained?), while Maxim, seemingly by virtue of having Israeli business partners, was labelled “a Jew”. Thus, ethnicity is clearly a complex thing.

Chalkan.kg columnist, Aida Kasymailova, blogged in a piece titled “Tashiev - the true Kyrgyz”:

Yesterday, all Kyrgyz, on hearing the news [of Tashiev’s announcement] via radio and television, glanced at themselves in the mirror and asked themselves whether or not they were “pure-blooded”. They remembered their ancestors up to the seventh generation, enquired with their current and former wives. Some found a reason for pride, but many, doubt.

The allegation that Babanov is a “Kurd” stems from the fact that his mother is Kurdish, according to a comment  re-tweeted [ru] by Kyrgyzstan’s second-most followed twitterer, Edil Baisalov:

If Tashiev is having a go at Babanov's mother, then he should apologize

Bektour Iskender, president of Kloop, let out a despairing cyber-sigh on his citizen media portal's Facebook plugin [ru]:

Oh Tashiev, so very Tashiev

Another user, Bahadir Nazirkhanov, said Tashiev's focus on “pure-bloodedness” put the status of ‘national' literary hero Chingiz Aitmatov [ru] in doubt:

 To follow Tashiev's logic, should we also put C. Aitmatov in the category of unpure?

Indeed, such a thorough and discerning search for purity could reduce the Kyrgyz nation down to Tashiev and a few of his friends, although even Tashiev's own children might miss the cut.

Nazambai Ishkahametov said:

What fascism? Tashiev's wife is Kazakh. To follow his logic, his children are not pure-blooded

But among the liberal complainants, there were a few ready to rally behind Tashiev's message. Kyalbek Kyrgyz said:

Correct Tashiev! Kyrgyzstan is for the Kyrgyz, and not for any old half-hearted b******s. In order that pro-American ass-analysis isn't written here, continue your patriotic duty. If you don't like the Kyrgyz, go somewhere you do like!

Mind your language  

Tashiev's announcement certainly raised the stakes in terms of the nationalist debate. Prior to now, most of the country's discourses on patriotism have had language, rather than genetics, at their core. The need to develop the state-endorsed Kyrgyz, perhaps at the expense of the country's other official mode of communication, Russian, has been a key concern, not only of the country's politicians but of popular culture figures, too.

In an engaging article on Eurasianet.org, Nate Schenkkan profiles Tata Ulan, a Kyrgyz bard/rapper with revivalist cultural leanings, whose performances have made him a national talking-point:

The music video is all one take. Standing behind a podium bearing the state seal of Kyrgyzstan, wearing a felt kalpak hat and armor like the national epic hero Manas, a masked figure hectors the audience over a bounding beat:

In 20 years what has the state given its children? / Sold out wisdom, turned to business, wisdom’s on the street now! / What do my Kyrgyz need? You're a Muslim, you need religion! / What do my Kyrgyz need? Pure Kyrgyz language is what you need!

Ulan went on to tell Schenkkan in an interview that, like many urban Kyrgyz, he had to go back to the books to ‘learn' his native tongue:

“In order to learn my language, I started to read Manas,” he said. “I had never spoken Kyrgyz, at least not well. And I couldn't write the language at all. But then I read Manas, and immediately I started to write”.

[Ulan] is now a fierce advocate of the language. “If you grew up in the city and don't speak Kyrgyz, you're a myrk,” he says in ‘Ne Kerek,' inverting the insult native Bishkek residents use for non-Russian speakers who move to the city. It is statements like this that prompt accusations of nationalism.

An archived Spektator blog has more on the bizarre term “myrk” here.

N.B For readers of Russian, a satirical blog on Akipress.kg that re-imagines public discourses as fairy tales, makes for an interesting introduction to politics in the country. Last week the theme was inevitably ‘pure-bloodedness', discussed in a post “What is on your mother's side?”, with “Kamchi” and “Omurke” as the main characters. In the blog, the author infers that “Kamchi”, who has the Kyrgyz national dish besh barmak in his blood, has long suspected “Omurke” of being ” far too pretty” to be a true member of the “besh barmak nation”.

We will allow Global Voices readers to make up their own mind on that score. Tashiev is on the right, the “impure-blooded” Bobanov on the left:

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Kramer appeared to boil over during a speech by his IMF counterpart, Koba Gvenetadze, during which he rose from his chair, lobbed a drinking glass in the direction of Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Jomart Otorbayev, and stormed out of the meeting.

David Trilling, Eurasianet's Central Asia editor, was one of the first to blog the news:

The incident occurred during a donor meeting at government headquarters, known as the White House, in Bishkek. According to one eyewitness, Kramer had just spoken for a few minutes, praising recent government initiatives and encouraging Bishkek to ensure officials are chosen for their merits. He defended the World Bank’s sometimes slow motions in the country, noting that development is “a marathon rather than a sprint,” according to EurasiaNet's source. During the next set of remarks, by the International Monetary Fund’s country director, Kramer suddenly stood up, yelled, “This is all crap!” and threw the glass, which shattered on the floor in front of Otorbayev.

Although the Kyrgyz government and the World Bank offered slightly different versions of the condition that caused Alexander Kramer to “totally freak out“, as one online news agency put it, both agreed that it was something to do with blood.

According [ru] to citizen media portal Kloop.kg:

The World Bank argues that the office head performed the act solely because of his sharply deteriorating health. The glass, they say, was thrown by accident, and now Kramer is in hospital.

“The act of A. Kramer was caused solely by the state of his health: there was a sudden onset of circulatory disorders of the brain, which led to the extraordinary and unusual behavior of A. Kramer,” said the World Bank in a press release.

The government press service similarly reported that the behavior of Kramer was the result of a “heart attack”.

Tellingly, Kloop's reportage continued:

The World Bank has apologized for the behavior of the head of its office and said that the incident had nothing to do with the person speaking at the time – the head of the International Monetary Fund in Kyrgyzstan, Koba Gvenetadze.

It is no secret that officials from the fund and the bank often regard each other with suspicion and occasionally even hostility. In fact, the dysfunctional relationship between the global economic order's bad and good cops was the subject of a fascinating chapter in ex-World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stieglitz's 2002 whistleblowing best-seller “Globalization and its Discontents”. But if the IMF's abrasive, take no prisoners approach to fiscal policy in the developing world was the source of Kramer's red mist, why did the tumbler land closest to Deputy PM Otorbayev?

Twitter user @Ahmadon had [ru] another theory:

Hahaha, Alexander Kramer – hero, man, baike [elder brother in Kyrgyz], you see, he couldn’t be f***ed to listen to the empty chatter of our state officials

A second Twitter user, @azzzik, compared [ru] Kramer to ex-presidential candidate turned nutty clairvoyant Arstanbek Abdylaev, the subject of this recent Global Voices Post. However, post-tumblergate, Abdylaev's premonitions of ruptures in the international political order seem suddenly prescient, and a third user of the service suggested Sabri bey, a Turkish man who thinks he can fly, was a more worthy parallel.

A few days on from the scandle, the focus of Bishkek Twiterazzi is on Kramer's future:

@ajoroev: Is it true that Alexander Kramer is already the ex-head of the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan and moreover, [already] overseas?

While the former has yet to be confirmed, various agencies have since reported that he is now recuperating in London.

Whatever happens to Alexander Kramer in the long run, it is clear that one projectile-throwing monkey won't stop the show. Yesterday, the World Bank announced that it would be providing nearly $20 million in infrastructural funding for Kyrgyzstan's two main cities, Bishkek and Osh, in 2012. Whether that package will include compensation for a certain smashed glass will doubtless be the subject of a future round table.

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Now, with the help of a new sidekick, a kalpak-sporting, silver-tongued ethnic Korean called Alexander Pak, he is even dabbling in political philosophy. The world, the pair told an expectant press conference on January 27, 2012, is run by figures who are standing behind the figures we think run the world. If that sounds a bit Zeitgeisty, then Abdylaev has added an original twist: Russia’s under-fire prime minister, Vladimir Putin, is a “complex bio-robot.”

Not much of this will make sense until you tune into Abdylaev’s first press conference where his utterance “Зима не будет”, or “there will be no winter” made him an overnight online sensation. Along with that pearl of wisdom, his helper, Mirlan Asakeev, suggested that life had “begun with the Kyrgyz”, and would begin again with the Kyrgyz, at the end of the year 2012. Adam and Eve, he argued, to the astonishment of the assembled hack-pack, were “63.5% Kyrgyz.”

This time round, Asakeev was limited to a bit-part performance, his coveted position as Abdylaev’s number two apparently usurped by Pak. Pak, whose mastery of Russian exceeds that of both his colleagues, proceeded to explain that the original phrase “there will be no winter”, had been taken too literally, and that actually it had a “big energetic and informational bloc” capable of creating a “moment of total quantum leap” for humanity.

A New World Order

Besides the assertion that Kyrgyzstan would be the “informational centre of the 21^st century”, Abdylaev revealed that he had forewarned the Kazakh and Russian governments of the political perils rippling accross the globe:

“Four months ago we wrote to the Kazakh ambassador – we said, you are going to [suffer] terrorist attacks – mass upheavals – they laughed at us. We wrote to the leader of the Russian Federation – Putin. We said that there would be war in Arabia, and they laughed at us, but there was [war]. Now my words are being proven, not by a historian, or an academic, or paper, but time,” Abdylaev said.

Where could the press conference possibly go from there? Well, despite apparently being ridiculed by the Russian leadership, journalists heard, Moscow still has a place in Abdylaev’s New World Order – chiefly as the brawn behind Kyrgyzstan’s brain. Since Europe will soon be starved, disease-ridden and submerged under water, he reasoned, Russia would have no choice but to turn East.

“Why are we writing to Russia? Russia and Kyrgyzstan will conserve humanity. That’s why I call Putin “a complex bio-robot”… We will give a program to the Russian leader, Putin, and he will do it, because he has the power,” Abdylaev said.

And for the dull reporter lost on the difference between an ordinary bio-robot and a complex bio-robot, Abdylaev elucidated:

With a bio robot, you give him a program and he does it, correct? But Putin is a complex bio robot – he himself does it.

Perhaps this difficult, semi-mechanic nature is the source of Putin’s reputed marital troubles….

As the press conference wound down, Alexander Pak summed the group's message up as follows:

This phrase [there will be no winter]… is also a code. Anyone who has heard the phrase “there will be no winter” has already received the code and they are using it, even if they are not fully conscious of this. That code contained here among the Kyrgyz should arrive in every person, and through it every person should come to a condition of over-standing; they will become more than human and they will be aware of their true capabilities and their real meanings as human beings… This is why Arstanbek [Abdylaev] called Putin a bio-robot. Barack Obama is also a bio-robot. Other bio-robots stand behind these people and behind these people are other people and today these people are all bio-robots. This code [there will be no winter] allows these bio-robots to become human and write constitutions for the future era, the era we have called the golden era.

So, what is this strange “People's Academy?” Aside from obtuse letters to world leaders, do they have any publications or academic accreditation? Increasingly they are beginning to sound like a cult, a fact that could get Abdylaev into trouble in a country where the state is often hostile towards obscure religious movements.

Inter-internet conflict?

On YouTube, Abdylaev’s second coming earned a mixed reception, both from local Kyrgyz Internet users and from the broader RuNet:

“In my brain after watching that clip I had a total quantum leap,” said [ru] underaszZz

But whether stoned or sober, the “energetic code” of Abdylaev's “Peoples Academy” is drawing a few genuine followers:

“They are trying for us. We just need to become different, change our souls, become purer! It is great that they want to bring this to the people. There is no point picking holes in their grammar. Come, let us be people, brothers and sisters. It will be easier for us to live this way,” said [ru] psipolza

And truly, who would lack the humanity to disagree with such sentiments? Perhaps only the evil bio-robots among us:

N.B According to Bishkek-based citizen media portal Kloop, Abdylaev's second press conference has already surpassed his first in terms of online popularity. Once again, the catalyst for a spike in viewing figures was a prime-time slot on Russian satirist Stas Davydov's internet show “ThisisHorosho“.

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The environmental NGO CEE Bankwatch Network has been reporting on mining projects both in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, projects which have been encouraged by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Bankwatch's concerns, voiced in ‘Rushing into gold can leave people behind, EBRD‘, are around resource depletion, particularly water, and changes in commodity prices:

Whether the promised revenues will help Mongolia to develop badly needed welfare services and build an economy that can sustain the depletion of its resources or sudden changes in commodity prices is an open question however. The dominance of the mining sector has already raised fears of a “dutch disease” or “resource curse”.

Open pit mining in Mongolia. Image by Flickr user pjriccio2006 (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).

This short video was made by CEE Bankwatch Network in eastern Europe, Urgewald from Germany, the Bank Information Center in the United States and Oyu Tolgoi Watch from Mongolia, who traveled to Mongolia to study the environmental and social impact the Ukhaa Khudag coal mine in Mongolia's south Gobi desert is already having:

If the previous video showed how things are starting to go with mining in Mongolia, in Kyrgyzstan they already have a long history of negative effects mining has had on the environment, health and local communities.

The next video goes into the glaciar region of Kyrgyzstan and visits the areas surrounding the Kumtor open air gold mine, which has been operating for over 15 years. Cyanide poisoning and water contamination is what the communities have; none of the promised development and benefits have reached them.

Both the Mongolian and the Kyrgyzstan mining videos and background were written about in ‘Earth's riches, people's troubles. Mining in Central Asia‘:

The cases in question – the Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi mines in Mongolia and the Kumtor gold mine in Kyrgyzstan – are both important contributors to their country's national income and both receive (or in case of Oyu Tolgoi may soon receive) support from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development(EBRD). Both, however, pose risks to the local communities that can't be compensated in monetary terms.

These countries are not the only ones facing development with the negative impacts mining brings. In nearby Tibet, villagers managed to halt a mining project being established in one of their sacred mountains.

The topic is controversial; how high a price can a community pay for development of their country? Vladlena Martsynkevych, Bankwatch's Central Asia Officer writes:

The extractive industry can very well contribute to a country’s economic development and bring desired employment and revenues. At the same time mining is a highly disruptive activity with considerable negative impacts on the environment and the livelihoods of local communities. In countries with underdeveloped democratic structures, lack of institutional capacity or simply corruption, the damages can quickly overweigh. Benefits can then bypass the local level and end up enriching the involved companies and – not least - the technological progress and wealth in developed nations.

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The proposal came from within the ranks of the socialist Ata-Meken party, as part of a continuing discourse on how to shrink an alarmingly bloated and deficit ridden state budget. The reactions of MPs from other factions were then comprehensively canvassed in an excellent article by Kloop.kg's Begimai Bolotbekova.

Ata-Meken's Akunaly Dosaly outlined [ru] the “shuttle scheme” thus:

In each faction, there could be one or two custom vehicles while the majority of MPs could take a shuttle bus. They could arrive in the morning then be brought back in the evening.

This would seem a reasonable initiative, given that MPs of different factions can hardly be expected to ride the same bus. But even with that proviso, some lawmakers weren't happy with the idea.

Jyldyzkan Joldosheva of the Ata-Jurt party said [ru]:

I have a house in Bishkek – I refused a [state-funded] apartment. But the car, I cannot refuse because it is not a luxury, but a necessity

Incidentally, if the allegations of one news portal [ru] are to be believed, Zholdosheva is rather fond of state-funded “necessities”.

Although a couple of MPs supported the parliamentary shuttle plan in principle, others thought it unfeasible. Tatiyana Levina of the Ar-Namys party said she wasn't against travelling by shared transport per se, but feared that it might give off the wrong impression to the electorate:

If you give up company cars, you need to give up everything – payments, subsidies… Well, how would that look? Everyone lives in different parts of the city. I think our voters would find it more annoying [if we got a bus to work], because our pensioners cannot ride buses for free – they must pay a fee

So the knowledge that MPs get a free bus pass would be more of an irritation to the electorate than watching the same representatives cruise into work in a government-allocated Toyota Camri? Hmmm…

Nice wheels, baike

It is worth mentioning that not all of Kyrgyzstan's legislators drive a Camri to work. Some of them eschew the gift for their own flashier set of wheels, while others alternate between privately owned and publically owned automobiles.

Following the interest in Bolotbekova's article, Kloop.kg invited their posse of young journalists (all aged under 24) and readers of the portal to take snaps of deputies on their way to work. The results were displayed as follows (example):

Azamat Arapbaev, MP of the faction Ata-Jurt, goes to work in a ”Lexus LX570″,  2008 model, with the registration number 0028 KG.

According to [current information], this brand of car changes hands for USD 87,000.

To afford this car - without eating anything and living on the street - would take:
- An MP on an official salary: 4.5 to 6.5 years
- The average working resident of Bishkek: from 22 to 33.5 years

The article, featuring fifteen such profiles, generated a stream of comments from netizens, who via Kloop's Facebook plugin either chose to defend specific MPs as “honest” or move in for the kill with complaints about graft and inequality.

Tynchtyk Maldybaev posted ironically:

But why do you [speak] badly of our deputies, they are the demigods, the Kyrgyz  representatives of God on earth, they only think of the people

Another reader, Isken, quoted the English historian Lord Acton:

For we know that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely

But while some readers strained to calculate how long it would take them to own a Lexus, others suggested that the piece had attempted to bias the people against the ruling elite. In response to these accusations, Kloop Editor Anna Leilik replied:

We had no goals to show MPs in a positive or negative light. You probably noticed we did not have the same number of deputies from different factions - the cars were randomly selected. We wanted to compare data from different sources with the photos. With regard to the [costs of the cars] and the salaries, they are publically available online, and the same thing we did - calculate - anybody could have done.

From private armies to public transport

Views on the moral character of MPs not withstanding, the very fact that the Kyrgyz parliament is debating such changes marks a massive shift from April of last year, when former house speaker Akhmatbek Keldibekov proposed legislation that would allow lawmakers and their personal bodyguards to carry weapons in and around the parliament.

Back then, a Kloop poll showed a vast majority of portal users as being opposed to the legislation, while several who supported it did so only for the bloodiest of reasons. One user, Nurbek, commented:

I am FOR this law. Let them shoot at each other in the Jogorku Kenesh

Clearly, less than 12 months down the line, the legislature is a changed place. It has a new ruling coalition, a new speaker, and its members are pondering the need to swap the ”parliamentary fleet” for a communal shuttle. Somewhere in all this there is a reality TV show waiting to happen.

N.B.: Coincidentally, Akhmatbek Keldibekov left the speaker's office amidst a scandal surrounding the distribution of the special ‘KG' registration plates. Ranging from the presidential plate (KG 001) to less prestigious registrations in the KG hundreds, these items are something of a status symbol in Kyrgyzstan and usually get you past traffic cops without any bother. What plates the proposed “faction buses” will carry is as yet unknown.

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The repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks to Georgia from Azerbaijan, Russia and Central Asia is not just a priority for the Georgian government, but also an obligation it has had to fulfill to the Council of Europe since becoming a member in 1999. Over 100,000 people were deported by Stalin in 1944, from the Meskheti region of Georgia, among them Hemshin (Muslim Armenians), Kurds, and Karapapakhs. By far the largest group relocated, however, were the Meskhetian Turks.

At least 400,000 Meskhetian Turks now live outside of Georgia, although it has been unclear how many would return in a process that should have officially ended last year, but which might be extended. This has been one of the reasons why the process of resettlement has taken so long, especially as ethnic Armenians now make up the majority population in what is now the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. As a result, in order not to strain inter-ethnic relations, the Georgian government is settling Meskhetian Turks throughout the country.

East of Center recently touched upon the sensitivities surrounding the issue:

Thanks to Stalin’s paranoia, millions of Muslims and members of various non-Slavic ethnic groups in the Soviet Union were forcibly relocated to Central Asia during the ’30s and ’40s. It’s hard to think of any of these communities that has been victimized more often and so thoroughly ignored by the wider world as the Meskhetian Turks. […]

Clearly, however, Georgia is not capable of resettling that large a population anywhere on its territory, much less the underdeveloped Samtskhe-Javakheti region where the Meskhetians originally lived. And then there is the Armenian question, and a large dose of anti-Muslim feeling. […]

Salim Khamdiv of Abastumani village. Khamdiv was 14 when the deportation happened © Temo Bardzimashvili

However, in a two-year application period ending in July 2010, the Georgian government received only 5,841 eligible applications according to the European Center for Minority Issues (ECMI). This amounted to just 9,350 individuals. Ahıska Türkleri – Ahıskalılar explains what the Meskhetian Turks hope for:

We want to return our lands from which we were expelled unjustly. As of today, we have been settling down in 2000 different settlements at 9 different countries including USA. We have difficulty in getting citizenship, settlement permission and work permission in the countries where we live. Our culture and language is on the edge of vanishing. We want to return our country as Georgian citizens and to live in our lands from now on.

Osman Mekhriev (left) and Islam Niazov, elders of the Abastumani Meskhetian community, take a break from the holiday prayers during the end of Ramazan celebrations © Temo Bardzimashvili

Last year, Zaka Guluyev's Blog detailed the situation of some of those that have returned, mainly from Azerbaijan, to Samtskhe-Javakheti:

Muslim Arifov and his family has come back to Akhiltskhe three years ago from Saatly, settlement of Azerbaijan. Arifov says that now he feels happy coming back and live in his motherland Georgia. “My parents were unfairly deported from this region. Now I’m happy that I managed to come back and live in my home Georgia with my family.”

Two months ago Muslim’s relative Mehemmed Rehimov also decided to come back with his family from Azerbaijan and to live in his motherland Akhlstkhe. Mehemmed Rehimov says that Georgia seems better place to live in. “It’s very good sense to live in my motherland Georgia. two months already past after my coming to Georgia. I’m happy here with my family and I’m feeling myself very well”.

[…]

Ismayil Moidze, the chairman of the [Vatan Georgian Axhiska Turks] society says that, their organization was expecting more people to apply for returning. But he explains that many families refused to apply because […] many documents are required for applying [for] repatriat status in Georgia. […] That’s why many families decided to stay where they live”.

Rana Rajabova, a 24-year-old bride in the Azerbaijani village of Shirinbeili. Rana's grandparents, natives of the Arali village in Georgia's Adigeni region, were deported to Uzbekistan. Before the deportation they were told by the soldiers that they would return in 7 days, so no belongings should be taken. Her grandmother hid her gold jewelry at home with the hope of returning after a week. Rana's family has applied for the repatriation and says that they do not want to be "refugees." © Temo Bardzimashvili

Georgian Youth | Multiculturality | New Challenges looks at how the new arrivals are reintegrating:

In Samstkhe-Javakheti, the regional association “Toleranti” provides families of repatriated Meskhetians with legal counseling, medical assistance and language support. In the frame of its 3-year project “Provision of humanitarian assistance to repatriate Meskhs and prevention of “self-repatriation”, the association noticeably organizes classes for young repatriated Meskhetians twice a week. Youth who attend the classes hope to improve their chances of success at school, where they receive tuition in Georgian, and to support their integration in the community.

Considering how motivated they are to learn Georgian, and as quickly as possible, this integration is usually 100% successful.

[…]

As many others however, one thing prevents them from totally feeling home in Georgia: they are waiting for an answer to their application for the Georgian citizenship, which they sent two years ago. Without citizenship, they are not fully-fledged citizens in Georgia, and therefore struggle to have access to basic services like medical assistance. They have no choice, though: just like the others, they have to wait […] – this means a life of uncertainty in the long-term…

Portraits of Abdullah Gamidov, his wife Khalida, and her father Zia Chumidze lie on the checkerboard in the Gamidov's house in Kant, Kyrgystan. Zia Chumidze was fighting at the frontline when the deportation happened and never made it home. © Temo Bardzimashvili

Where's Keith comments on the work of Georgian journalist and photographer Temo Bardzimashvili who has been documenting the return of the Mskhetian Turks to Georgia as well as their lives in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Some of Bardzimashvili's work, “The Unpromised Land – the Meskhetians’ Long Journey Home,” was exhibited in Tbilisi, sponsored by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), and accompanies this post with kind permission.

Delizia Flaccavento also posts photographs of a Meskhetian refugee community in Buffalo, New York, as does Meskhetian Turk Refugees in Atlanta, Georgia (the US State). Meanwhile ECMI says there is a “serious need […] to enhance public awareness on the right of deported persons to return and on the repatriation process […], in particular through the media and the educational system.”

This post is part of our special coverage on Refugees.

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The recent effort to install a Prime Minister to head the government is a case in point. The majority of the candidates who put themselves forward for the appointment were under forty-five, something which in itself represents a sea change in domestic political circles.

Following firm backing in the coalition vote, Omurbek Babanov, aged 41 , took the post on December 23. But the leader of the Respublika faction, to a great extent, was the establishment choice. An ally of recently elected President Almas Atambayev, he can be reasonably relied on to do the head of state’s bidding while Atambayev himself enjoys the more glamorous lifestyle of grand interstate summits and security staff reshuffles.

A more independent, reform-minded PM might have been Ravshan Jeenbekov, also 41. But with only 5 coalition votes, his candidacy flopped.  Moreover, he failed to win the support of many members of his own party, Ata-Meken, who under the leadership of veteran politicker Omurbek Tekebayev, pragmatically decided to endorse the Atambayev-inspired status quo. After the announcement of the coalition’s vote on December 19, Jeenbekov’s Facebook wall was flooded with condolences.

“Mr MP Jeenbekov, after your party didn’t support you during voting for the post of Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, do you intend to continue working with the traitors?” asked [ru] Aziz Abakirov

“Aziz, hello. Each person chooses their own path. I work according to my convictions and I travel my own path. Many members of my party made their choice. It is their right, although not completely, I think, given [their obligation to] their ideological and political position. I will have to work among them, yes, because I am an MP of this party. I am obligated,” replied [ru] Jeenbekov.

“But answer, how can you love a woman after she has cheated on you?” pressed [ru] Abakirov.

“Aziz, love for a woman and politics differ strongly from one another ),” Jeenbekov [ru] answered.

Even during less exciting moments in Kyrgyzstan’s political calendar Jeenbekov’s wall overflows with discussions. While the MP responds unfailingly to praise (he is human, after all) and ducks the odd difficult question (he is a politician, after all), perhaps the most important element of his profile is that it offers his nearly 4,500 followers a single space where they can discuss topical issues and meet edninomyshliniki (like minded people) with whom they share common values. The fact that an elected representative frequently participates in these exchanges brings the whole process a step closer to Rousseauian visions of direct democracy.

“Pity that many MPs do not realize that the consciousness of the young is growing, and that this is no longer the same people who just nod at what their “bosses” say. Or maybe they understand it and are therefore hiding from us, because our thoughts and ideas knock them down. Inevitably there will come an intellectual ‘revolution’. Now, many young leaders realize that they can participate in the government, as is their complete right to do so!” Uluk Kydyrbaev concluded during the December 19 wall discussion, to a score of ‘likes’ from other users.

Indeed, by showing the ambition to nominate himself for the PM spot Jeenbekov didn’t nod at his party bosses, he defied them. And, with growing online followings that undermine more traditional forms of political loyalty in Kyrgyzstan (regional, patronage-based, deference to seniority etc), the day when he and other social-media-friendly deputies seek to challenge the aksakals on their own terms may not be too far away. As Jeenbekov predicted in a reply to one of his contacts, Ilyas:

“Ilyas, I think, that at the next elections the [Ata-Meken] party will be reformatted. I am sure that [at the next elections] a strong party, with a liberal-democratic position will appear.”

Watch this space.

Social Media in Kyrgyz politics: No Magic Wand, Yet 

Cynics will make the argument that social media such as Facebook and Twitter are limited in their ability to transform either the agency or the fundamental structure of Kyrgyz political society and currently, the numbers support their case.

While internet penetration in the country, at just under 40%, compares favourably to most Central Asian states, social media statisticians estimate that only 1.17% of the country has a facebook account, the vast majority of whom are based in the capital, Bishkek.  Also, a 2009 report cited by Neweurasianet suggested that less than 10% of Kyrgyz internet users are over 40, meaning that many of the most powerful and influential in this post-Soviet society still get their kicks offline.

Nevertheless, as overall usage continues to grow, a Twitter or Facebook account is increasingly being seen by local bigwigs as a valuable source of political capital.  A September Global Voices post by Elena Skochilo highlighted a Facebook-based witch hunt which demanded Kyrgyz netizens ‘unfollow' or ‘defriend' politicians on Twitter and Facebook, who do not use their accounts personally, or, who set them up opportunistically, prior to elections. As human rights activist Dmitry Kabak posted [ru] on the group's wall:

“I know 100% that Dastan Bekeshev, Shirin Aitmatova, Ravshan Jeenbekov write themselves. I do not know who writes in the accounts of Nariman Tuleev and Tursunbai Bakir uulu. [Their] Twitter and Facebook [activity] intensified on the eve of the presidential race. Marat Imankulov… is not writing himself- the date of birth and positions don't tally, and there are only links to news stories “about himself.” Please add information about “suspicious activity” on political accounts and then un-follow.”

But whether Kyrgyz power-brokers see social media as an opportunity to communicate with constituents or simply another way of boosting their public profiles, their dalliances with online activity are sufficient evidence that Facebook and Twitter are gradually altering the political landscape of this year-old parliamentary republic. The latter in particular has become ‘The News Before it Happens', with online agencies such as Kloop relaying live Twitter-feeds from deputies musing on laws and coalition-formations as they spar and haggle in the legislature.

Moreover, in a small country where institutions are feeble and personal connections all-conquering, the scattergun effect of a succinct 'tweet' may prove the equal of multiple phone calls in times when a lethargic body politic needs to be shaken into action. That, at any rate, is the conclusion drawn in a brilliant article on the Foreign Policy blog by Natasha Yefimova-Trilling, titled Twitter Vs. the KGB.

The beginning of the piece finds US photographer Nic Tanner in a spot of bother. While covering the aftermath of the November presidential elections in the southern city of Osh, he is accosted by plain-clothes-wearing men who claim to be representatives of the local equivalent of the KGB. After frantically phoning his journalist colleague, Natasha's husband David, an SOS tweet went out from @DTrilling, followers of whom include “young former and current Kyrgyz officials”. Within minutes, a tense situation was diffused and Tanner was free to go, baffled by a complete reversal in the officers' behaviour towards him. But as Yefimova-Trilling explains:

This is not a story of Twitter's ability to galvanize grassroots protests and marshal ordinary citizens to defend just causes. Kyrgyzstan is a place where high-tech social networks meet old-fashioned patronage networks.  All those who got in touch were people we knew personally, and people with some clout…Our use of social media didn't tap a network of underground civil-society activists — it simply sped up the well-oiled machinery of string-pulling.

And sadly, Twitter is no magic wand if you are an ethnic Uzbek human rights activist. Arrested following ethnic conflict in southern Kyrgystan, a regional court convicted Azimzhan Askarov to a life sentence on a series of charges that international and domestic human rights organizations feared were ‘trumped up' against a background of seething nationalism. Despite being one of the most tweeted about subjects in the Kyrgyz Twittersphere - #Askarov -  the Kyrgyz Supreme Court upheld the regional court's decision on December 21.

Social media then can go far in Kyrgyz politics, but probably only so far, insofar as public life in the country continues to be dominated by familiar faces, a compromised judiciary and what RFER/L's Daisy Sindelar refers to as “cynical season(s) of gray-haired power-jockeying”.

N.B  One infrastructural obstacle to the powers of internet-based social technologies in Kyrgyzstan is the nation's currently patchy supply of electricity. Following a cold snap that saw an uptake in energy consumption in the northern half of the country, the Soviet era energy grid is wheezing, leading to sustained shortages for citizens. In a parody of this bold nostradamian statement, Sadybakas Abylov has produced [ru] a lively and very readable blog post titled “There will be no electricity”.

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Abdylayev, who collected less than 1% of the vote in the recent presidential elections, was offering sniggering journalists a “vision from the cosmos” of a “new era beginning from the Kyrgyz, starting in 2012” when the phrase popped out of his mouth. Within days, online videos of the press conference had gone viral, and Kyrgyz users of Gmail and Facebook had promptly updated their statuses to “Зима не будет “, or “there will be no winter”.

Arstanbek Abdylayev

If the appearance was a bid to gain greater visibility for Abdylaev and his “For the People” party, it was a stunning success, with news of his Nostradamus-like premonitions rippling accross the Russian-speaking swathes of the internet. According to Meerim Nazarova [ru] at the independent news outlet Kloop.kg:

A clip [of a press conference] originating in Kyrgyzstan has accrued further fame via the [satirical] Russian Internet show “This is harasho”. The show’s host Stanislav Davydov commented on the video sent to him in a comic manner. Davydov’s show has already been viewed by over a million users.

Davydov, a kind of Russian Russell Brand, was vicious in his takeoff [ru, en], referring to Abdylaev as a new “Kyrgyz Hitler” due to his aide Mirlan Asakeev’s questionable claim that “life started with the Kyrgyz”. Davydov then twice repeated the clip of the “For the People” chief predicting apocalyptic floods in the West and the end of seasonal change as the world knows it ,  before concluding that Abdylayev is a “liar, because, as we all know, winter is close”.

YouTube user Toxic959 has uploaded a surprisingly catchy hip-hop 'remix' of Abdylayev and Asekeev's performance here.

In Bishkek, it is snowing, by the way.

Bad PR

On the Kyrgyz video portal blive.kg, the comments section swelled. In response to Asakeev's estimation that the inhabitants of the Garden of Eden were “63.5%” Kyrgyz, greenrum, a blive user, asked:

“Where did they find Adam’s DNA?”

“Kill these two idiots [Abdylayev and Asakeev]. They are a discrace to the nation,” raged [ru] another user, Scanner.

“Maybe if he had won the election, we wouldn’t have had a winter,” mused [ru] a third, unbliver.

But alongside the wise cracks and the death threats, there was a growing sense of exhaustion at the lengths public figures were prepared to go to gain access to the media spotlight.

“I just want to say how awful living here has become,” said [ru] Blacky. “I would rather drown in Europe than [stay] and get connected to [the Kyrgyz cosmic force] AYAN!!! Good luck to Adam’s children!!!”

And it isn't as if the surreal December 6 press conference is the first time that the erratic behavior of Kyrgyzstan's elite  has caught the world's attention.

In April of this year, Jamestown foundation blogger and analyst Erica Marat wrote:

Tired of continuous showdowns that threaten to disintegrate the ruling coalition, Kyrgyz MPs decided to sacrifice seven sheep in front of the parliament building. According to local traditions, offering the blood of a slaughtered sheep expels devils that a human being is not able to oust just by virtue of his or her own effort.

The act was futile, as borne out by the fact that Kyrgyzstan’s ruling coalition is once again the subject of uncertainty, but it did ensure a slew of comic headlines at the nation’s expense, such as the New York Times’ “Kyrgyzstan: A Sacrifice to Save Democracy”.

“The best traditions in the world”

Another of Abdylayev and Asakeev’s boasts was that “Kyrgyzstan has the best traditions in the world.” While most foreigners in these parts attest to the hospitality of the countryside Kyrgyz, who are always on hand to thrust a bowl of kymyz in the direction of stray travellers, it is an altogether different national tradition that is currently the focus of the world media.

According to a November 14 post by Voice of Russia [ru]:

A month campaign to fight bride kidnapping has been announced in Kyrgyzstan, where, according to the ombudsman of the republic, the number of kidnapped girls is now estimated at 15,000-16,000… the Kyrgyz authorities will organize meetings with locals to explain them that marriage by abduction is illegal, and also discuss the situation with the police. Bride kidnapping is a crime, no matter what reasons people use to justify it.

But a recent article by the young journalists at Kloop shows they face an uphill struggle in making their message heard. In a distressingly ironic report, Azat Ruziev, Diana Rahmonova and Bektour Iskender detail how a student from the provincial town of Karakol, Kymbat Barkan kyzy, was stolen by unknown men while en route to a regional campaign against the practice of bride kidnapping.

For those unfamiliar with what the crime entails, a December 9 video by Vice News offers an accessible if somewhat dumbed-down window into the phenomenon, while the second issue of the Bishkek-based English-language magazine the Spektator covers a disturbing kidnap for marriage with documentary-maker and journalist Anthony Butts.

The women's rights organization Equality Now helped spark the campaign into life.

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Almasbek Atambayev being sworn in. Image is official publication.

On December 1, 2011, in a ceremony replete with medieval references, Almasbek Atambayev was sworn in as Kyrgyzstan's fourth president, with cannons sounding a peaceful transition between two heads of state for the first time in over 20 years of independence.

That his predecessor and political ally, Rosa Otunbayeva, left office to the noise of ceremonial artillery rather than automatic rifle-fire is in itself a marker of political progress in the country. But as Atambayev kissed the Kyrgyz flag and spoke warmly of Manas, the horse-riding, sword-wielding hero of Kyrgyz folklore, question marks over the country's future loomed large.

Will Atambayev be a knight or a dragon? That was the puzzle posed by MP Tursunbai Bakir uulu, in an obtuse, open letter addressed the new president:

You were talking a lot about knights who defeated dragons, but later they all became dragons. The knights couldn’t resist the gold in the dragons’ dungeons. I sincerely don’t want You to become a new dragon in the history of Kyrgyzstan.

A former ombudsman, Bakir uulu is an eccentric, pious personality famous for swearing his own oath as a lawmaker on the Koran, rather than the Kyrgyz constitution. Moreover, in Kyrgyzstan's fraught political landscape, he is one of a number of prominent southern politicians unhappy with Atambayev's recent electoral victory, a victory tarnished by accusations that the former prime minister used administrative resources both in the build up to, and during, the vote on October 30.

With the ever-present threat offered by Kyrgyzstan's regional divide, Atambayev, a northerner, would do well to befriend Bakir uulu, as well as significant others who have yet to offer any formal recognition of his victory.

Urging unity

Perhaps in lieu of this, the veteran politician urged unity in the face of ethnic schisms and factionalism during an upbeat inaugral speech. But with the gap between good words and good deeds a commanding feature of Kyrgyz politics, EurasiaNet blogger Nate Schenkkan wondered whether or not he could “make good on this half extended olive branch.”

Crucially, some things may prove beyond Atambayev's direct control. This blog has already noted the animal spirits involved in Kyrgyz coalition-building, and that torturous process is set to start over, with the three-party government collapsing [ru] the day after the new president took his oath.

According to Kyrgyzstan's constitution, a document many analysts argue is destined to be short-lived, three attempts to form a coalition may be made before parliament is dissolved and fresh parliamentary elections are announced. With two of those having  ended in failure, the pressure to create a viable alliance is now on, with the Ata-Meken socialist party playing powder-keg politics by issuing a vote of no-confidence in the house speaker, southerner Akhmatbek Keldibekov.

Whether Atambayev will be able to use his limited powers to influence the situation in the fractured legislature remains unclear. What is more certain is that regional support for Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary democracy is limited, as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of high-ranking Kazakh and Russian officials at Atambayev's inauguration.

Bishkek's relationship with Russia, in particular, is the subject of hot debate in domestic society. Currently the country is committed to entry into the Customs Union, a Moscow-led organization that promises to impose formidable tariff barriers on non-members, including China, currently Kyrgyzstan's biggest source of imports.

When the author of this Global Voices post interviewed Osmonakun Ibraimov, Secretary of State under Kyrgyzstan's first president Askar Akayev,  for an article on Eurasianet, Ibraimov was unflinching in his assessment of what he called the potentially ”economically suicidal” decision to enter the union, which currently comprises Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

“If Atambayev decides to enter the Customs Union, and the cost of cheap Chinese goods at [major wholesale markets] Dordoi and Kara-Suu rises, there will be a third revolution,” he said ominously.

But Bishkek is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't. As observed in an engaging piece on Eurasia Review by Robert Hernandez, any move to ignore Russia's rogueish charms could have disastrous consequences for a country the size of Kyrgyzstan:

In the first world we usually do not equate gasoline tariffs with revolution…but those in Kyrgyzstan know too well the effects of trade when it is used as a political weapon. While it may sound farfetched, it is widely accepted that the punitive Russian gasoline export tariff, implemented in the spring of 2010, was the main instigator which lead to the ouster of Kyrgyzstan’s then president Kurmanbek Bakiev.

Free Trade or Survival?: A Hobson's choice indeed.

Still, if a tumultuous, powerful parliament, a fragile economy, and an inability to attract foreign investment may eventually combine to drive  poor Atambayev to the drink [ru], then he should at least enjoy the here and now of being the top dog. That, at any rate, is the message of Bishkek's English-language tourist magazine the Spektator, who produced a moving poetic tribute to Almasbek in celebration of his inauguration:

Almas, Almas, in power at last!
The vote was rigged, the dye was cast,
The shyrdak came out royal blue,
Your rivals said it wasn’t true,
But who are they, and who are you?

Not for them the robes of state,
And while Tashiev’s brothers eight,
Will whine about you in his ear,
You’ll serve your own kin well (I fear),
But maybe that’s a smear.

And Madumarov is mad you know,
We’re glad you saved us from his throes,
To ballot-stuff – not such a crime,
Compared to murder and rapine,
It’s rather fine – the throne is thine!

But lo, behold the troubled realm!
And now it has you at its helm,
I wish you strength to smite your foes,
They’re not so patient – you should know,
They rally, roar and overthrow

Then perilous, this neighbourhood!
That Karimov is not so good,
And Russia’s touch – too much like glue,
While China wants to swallow you,
Or so says all the news….

Yet these are pains for other days,
When bells will toll and troubles weigh,
When second wives will make demands,
And younger sons will tie your hands,
For now you are the man – the man!

Written by Chris Rickleton · comments (4)
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